Judgment :- The petitioner has come up with the above writ petition, challenging a resolution passed by the Bar Council on 22.1.2012, taking up for investigation, a complaint of misconduct lodged by the respondents 2 and 3 against the petitioner. 2. I have heard Mr.S.Diwakar, petitioner appearing in person, Mr.S.Y. Masood, learned counsel for the first respondent and Mrs.Raffia Saleem, the second respondent appearing in person, both on her behalf and on behalf of the third respondent, who is her son. 3. The petitioner is an Advocate enrolled with the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu. He is practising in various Courts in the City and suburban areas. He is the owner and resident of a building bearing No.13/44, Tarachand Nagar, 3rd Street, Virugambakkam. 4. The respondents 2 and 3 are neighbours of the petitioner. They are residing at Door No.11/44 in the same street. On 1.6.2011, the respondents 2 and 3 lodged a complaint with the first respondent-Bar Council under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961. The Bar Council sent a copy of the complaint to the petitioner and the petitioner submitted a reply on 27.7.2011. The notice as well as the reply were placed before the Bar Council in its meeting held on 22.1.2012. After perusing the notice and the reply, the Bar Council passed a resolution bearing No.90/2012, holding that there was a prima facie case of misconduct made out against the petitioner. Consequently, they referred the complaint to the Disciplinary Committee. 5. The Registrar of the Disciplinary Committee thereafter issued a notice in his proceedings D.C.C.No.18/2012, calling upon the petitioner to appear for an enquiry on 24.3.2012. Challenging the resolution passed by the Bar Council on 22.1.2012 and the notice issued by the Disciplinary Committee, the petitioner has come up with the above writ petition. 6. 5. The Registrar of the Disciplinary Committee thereafter issued a notice in his proceedings D.C.C.No.18/2012, calling upon the petitioner to appear for an enquiry on 24.3.2012. Challenging the resolution passed by the Bar Council on 22.1.2012 and the notice issued by the Disciplinary Committee, the petitioner has come up with the above writ petition. 6. The sum and substance of the complaint made by the respondents 2 and 3 against the petitioner, are:- (i) that the petitioner was behaving very badly with the second respondent and her daughter-in-law by using abusive and lewd words; (ii) that the petitioner was making ugly gestures towards the second respondent's daughter-in-law; (iii) thatwhenever he was questioned, the petitioner was behaving badly and indecently; (iv) that to prevent the respondents 2 and 3 from initiating action, the petitioner preferred vexatious complaints to the police and the police obliged him; (v) that at odd hours, the petitioner went to their house and banged the gates and doors, harming the respondents' reputation in the locality; (vi) that without any regard to the second respondent being an orthodox Muslim lady, the petitioner used to bring police to their house and threaten them; (vii) that on 13.12.2010, he went to their house and banged the gates and abused them and made obscene gestures and that therefore, he is guilty of misconduct. 7. From a perusal of the contents of the complaint made by respondents 2 and 3, against the petitioner, it is clear that the complaint is not one of professional misconduct against the petitioner. Therefore, it is the contention of the petitioner that a complaint of this nature, cannot be investigated by the first respondent-Bar Council. According to the petitioner, there are lot of disputes between the petitioner and the respondents 2 and 3 right from the year 2001. The copies of the complaints filed by them against each other demonstrate this. In the light of these complaints, the petitioner contends that a complaint of the nature made by respondents 2 and 3 would not fall within the definition of the expression "misconduct", enabling the first respondent to investigate into the same. 8. Therefore, the question that arises for consideration is as to whether the complaint made by respondents 2 and 3 can actually be investigated by the first respondent or not. 9. 8. Therefore, the question that arises for consideration is as to whether the complaint made by respondents 2 and 3 can actually be investigated by the first respondent or not. 9. Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961, enables the Bar Council to enquire not only into complaints of "professional misconduct", but also into complaints of 'other misconduct'. The case on hand admittedly would not fall within the category of professional misconduct. Therefore, the question is as to whether it would fall under the category of "other misconduct". 10. The word "misconduct", as pointed out by the Supreme Court in several decisions, has not been defined in the Act. In R.D.Saxena vs. Balram Prasad Sharma { 2000 (7) SCC 264 }, the Supreme Court was concerned with the question as to whether an Advocate has a lien on the litigation papers, for his fees. While dealing with the meaning of the expression "misconduct", the Supreme Court pointed out, in paragraph 19, that the word "misconduct" is a relative term and that it had to be considered with reference to the subject matter and the context wherein such term occurs. Literally the word "misconduct" would mean "wrong or improper conduct". Therefore, in paragraph 22 of its decision, the Supreme Court held that a wide canvass has to be taken for understanding the import of the expression "misconduct". Similarly, in D.P.Chadha vs. Triyugi Narain Mishra { 2001 (2) SCC 221 }, the Supreme Court held the word "misconduct" to be an expression with a sufficiently wide meaning. In paragraph 22 of its judgement, the Supreme Court held that misconduct is not necessarily something involving moral turpitude. It is a relative term which has to be construed by reference to the subject matter and in the context in which it is employed. 11. There are not many precedents in which the jurisdiction of the Bar council to enquire into such complaints which fall outside the purview of the professional duties of an Advocate came up for consideration. Even in cases where such a question arose, they were not squarely dealt with. 11. There are not many precedents in which the jurisdiction of the Bar council to enquire into such complaints which fall outside the purview of the professional duties of an Advocate came up for consideration. Even in cases where such a question arose, they were not squarely dealt with. For instance, in Bapurao Pakhiddey vs. Suman Dondey { 1999 (2) SCC 442 }, the Honorary Secretary of a Society formed for the welfare of Handicapped, Scheduled Castes and Backward people, lodged a complaint with the Bar Council of Delhi against an Advocate, alleging that during his tenure as the Treasurer of the same Society, the Advocate received certain monies and he did not account for the same. The Advocate raised an objection that the complaint was not maintainable under Section 35 of the Act, as there was no nexus between his profession as an Advocate and his activities as a Treasurer of the Society. The Bar Council rejected his preliminary objections and held that the same would fall under the category of "other misconduct". Eventually, he was punished by the Bar Council and the penalty was challenged before the Supreme Court. But unfortunately the Supreme Court did not go into the question of maintainability of the complaint. On the other hand, the Supreme Court found on facts that it was only a case of non accounting of the monies received by the Advocate from the Society and that therefore, the Bar Council could not have arrived at the finding of misappropriation in the absence of clinching evidence. In paragraph 4 of the judgment, the Supreme Court pointed out that when the charge was merely one of not accounting for the monies received, the Disciplinary Committee should not have dealt with the matter in the manner in which it did, especially in the absence of proper account books. Consequently, the Supreme Court held on merits that the petitioner was not guilty of the charge. Therefore, the question of maintainability went unanswered. 12. Similarly in D.D.Choudhari vs. H.I.Kalyani { 1997 (10) SCC 393 }, the Advocate concerned was elected as a Councillor of the Jalgaon Municipal Council. As a Councillor, he was also elected as a member of the Senate of the Poona University for 6 years. Therefore, the question of maintainability went unanswered. 12. Similarly in D.D.Choudhari vs. H.I.Kalyani { 1997 (10) SCC 393 }, the Advocate concerned was elected as a Councillor of the Jalgaon Municipal Council. As a Councillor, he was also elected as a member of the Senate of the Poona University for 6 years. Upon his appointment as a Government Pleader and Public Prosecutor, he resigned from the Councillorship of the Municipal Council, but he continued to attend the meetings of the Senate, even thereafter. For attending the meetings of the Senate he received travelling allowance and daily allowance. Contending that it was a misconduct within the meaning of the expression "other misconduct", another Advocate practising in the same Court, sent a letter to the University. When the Registrar of the University sought the comments of the Advocate, he returned the amount received by him by way of TA/DA. However, the Bar Council initiated proceedings. The Disciplinary Committee dismissed the complaint on the ground that neither a professional misconduct or other misconduct was made out. Therefore, the complainant Advocate filed an appeal to the Bar Council of India and the same was allowed, on the ground that the Advocate concerned was guilty of "other misconduct". Challenging the said order, the Advocate, who was proceeded against, filing an appeal before the Supreme Court. Even in this case, the Supreme Court did not go into the question of maintainability of the complaint under the circumstances narrated above. However, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal on the sole ground that the Advocate did not have any dishonest intention in attending the meetings of the Senate and claiming DA/TA and that his act in returning or refunding the total amount already received by him, immediately upon receipt of a letter from the University demonstrated his bona fides. Therefore it is clear that the question of maintainability was not answered directly in any of these judgments. Hence I have to go into the core issue. 13. In Noratanmal Chouraria vs. M.R.Murli { 2004 (5) SCC 689 }, the Advocate against whom the Bar Council refused to initiate proceedings, had a rent control proceedings, to which he himself was a party litigant. In the course of those proceedings, a physical scuffle took place between the Advocate appearing as a party-in-person and the tenant. A complaint was made to the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council. In the course of those proceedings, a physical scuffle took place between the Advocate appearing as a party-in-person and the tenant. A complaint was made to the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council. The Bar Council held that there was no prima facie case for investigation and that the first respondent in that case had appeared not as an Advocate, but as a litigant person in that case. Challenging the decision of the Bar Council, an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court. While dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court pointed out that misconduct "envisages breach of discipline, although it would not be possible to lay down exhaustively as to what would constitute conduct". However, it was held that the expression was wide enough to include wrongful omission or commission whether done or omitted to be done intentionally or unintentionally. After quoting from Black's Law Dictionary and P.Ramanatha Iyer's Law Lexicon, as to what constitute misconduct, the Supreme Court pointed out that misconduct means "improper behaviour, intentional wrong doing or deliberate violation of a rule or a standard of behaviour". It is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action where no discretion is left, except what necessity may demand. It is a violation of definite law. 14. After dealing with the question as to what constitutes misconduct, the Supreme Court pointed out in paragraph 11 that a member of a legal profession is expected to maintain a standard in a dignified and determined manner and that the standard required to be maintained by him must be commensurate with the nobility of the profession. The Court pointed out that a Lawyer is obligated to observe those norms which make him worthy of the confidence of the community in him as an Officer of the Court. 15. Coming to the question of maintainability of complaints against the members of the Bar in relation to their conduct in their normal daily affairs as human beings, otherwise than in a professional capacity, the Supreme Court held in paragraph 12 as follows:- "12. Although the power of the Bar Council is not limited, the thrust of charge must be such which would necessitate initiation of disciplinary proceedings. A professional or other misconduct committed by a member of the profession should ordinarily be judged qua profession. Although the power of the Bar Council is not limited, the thrust of charge must be such which would necessitate initiation of disciplinary proceedings. A professional or other misconduct committed by a member of the profession should ordinarily be judged qua profession. To determine the quantum of punishment which may be imposed on an Advocate, the test of proportionality shall be applied which would also depend upon the nature of the acts complained of. No universal rule thus can be laid down as regards initiation of a proceeding for misconduct of a member of the profession." 16. Therefore, it appears that the line of control or the line of demarcation is very thin. While being a member of the profession (once upon a time noble), an Advocate is also a member of the Society in which he lives. Therefore, his interaction with the other members of the Society may arise out of a variety of relationships contractual or otherwise. He could be a landlord/tenant, borrower/lender/, parent/ward and a neighbour (though not a good samaritan). If his conduct and behaviour with persons with whom he comes into contact in his daily routine, could be the subject matter of an enquiry by the Bar Council, it would be impossible for the members of the profession to practice. Therefore, some rationale approach has to be evolved by the Bar Council while dealing with such complaints relating to "other misconduct" on the part of the members of the Bar. 17. Keeping the above principles in mind, if we look into the contents of the complaint made by respondents 2 and 3, they are no doubt very serious in nature. But it is borne out by the records that for the past 10 years, the petitioners and respondents 2 and 3 have not been having good neighbourly relationship. The nature of the complaint made by respondents 2 and 3, though very serious, is such that the same cannot be enquired into by the Bar Council. The allegations made by respondents 2 and 3, if true, constitute various offences under the Indian Penal Code and other enactments. The Bar Council may not be competent to inquire into the allegations of such nature and hence in such cases, the Bar Council ought to take its hands off, leaving it to the complainants to go before the appropriate Forum. 18. The Bar Council may not be competent to inquire into the allegations of such nature and hence in such cases, the Bar Council ought to take its hands off, leaving it to the complainants to go before the appropriate Forum. 18. In view of the above, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned resolution and the proceedings are set aside. It will be open to respondents 2 and 3 to lodge criminal complaints or even any civil action as they may deem appropriate against the petitioner and any observation contained in this order shall not be taken to be a finding on the merits of the dispute between the parties. There will be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.