Judgment :- 1. The petitioners are accused 2 and 3 in C.C.No.4590/2006 on the file of the IX Metropolitan Magistrate, Chennai. Admittedly, there are six accused in the case. The 2nd respondent is the de facto complainant. The 1st respondent filed a final report that all the accused have committed offences under Sections 498-A, 406, 323, 417 and 506 (ii) of IPC read with 34 and 109 of IPC. The first accused is the husband, the 2nd accused is the father-in-law, the 3rd accused is the mother-in-law and the others are the sisters-in-law of the de facto complainant. The allegation is that all these accused demanded dowry from the de facto complainant and harassed her. They have also withheld the properties belonging to the de facto complainant. Seeking to quash the case so far as it relates to these two petitioners, the petitioners have come up before this Court with this petition. 2. It is brought to my notice that a case against the accused 4 and 5 who are the sister-in-law of the de facto complainant have been quashed by this Court in Crl.O.P.No.5346 of 2007 dated 20.01.2011. In this petition, it is submitted that the petitioners also stand in the same footing like the accused 4 and 5. Therefore, the case against the petitioners is also liable to be quashed. 3. In order to substantiate the said contention, the learned Counsel for the petitioners would take me through the order passed by my learned brother Justice G.M. Akbar Ali wherein he has pleased to quash the proceedings against the accused 4 and 5 on the ground that the allegation made against them were very vague. 4. But the learned Counsel for the 2nd respondent would submit that in the said proceedings, the de facto complainant was not a party. However, he would submit that from the materials available on record, there are sufficient materials as against these two petitioners. Therefore, the proceeding is not liable to be quashed, he contended. 5. I have considered the above submissions. 6. A perusal of the statements recorded from the witnesses, more particularly, the statement recorded from the de facto complainant under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. would go to show that there are allegations against these two petitioners about the demand of dowry and consequential harassment on various occasions. 5. I have considered the above submissions. 6. A perusal of the statements recorded from the witnesses, more particularly, the statement recorded from the de facto complainant under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. would go to show that there are allegations against these two petitioners about the demand of dowry and consequential harassment on various occasions. Thus, these allegations require investigation from the competent criminal court by conducting proper trial. 7. Nextly, the learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the IX Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai has got no territorial jurisdiction to try the petitioners. According to him, the occurrence as alleged by the de facto complainant have either taken place in Bahrain or in Kanpur and there was no part of cause of action in Chennai. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel, the proceeding against the petitioners is liable to be quashed. For this proposition, the learned Counsel would rely on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Thota Venkateswarlu vs. State of A.P. Tr. Principal Secretary and another reported in He has also relied on two other judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Y. Abraham Ajith and others v. Inspector of Police, Chennai and another reported in 2004 AIR SCW 4788 and Bhura Ram and Others Vs. State of Rajasthan and another reported in 2008 AIR SCW 4449. 8. But the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent would submit that in the statements of witnesses, there are allegations that a part of occurrence has taken place in Chennai. The learned counsel would take me through the statement of the de facto complainant wherein she has stated that on 13.11.2004, these two accused joined with her father-in-law, demanded dowry and harassed her. Thus, according to the 2nd respondent, a part of the occurrence has taken place in Chennai and the rest have taken place either in Bahrain or in Kanpur. But he would fairly concede to that there would be no sanction accorded from the Central Government in respect of the occurrence taken place in Bahrain. 9. I have considered the above submissions. 10. A perusal of the records would go to show that a part of occurrence has taken place in Chennai and the rest has taken place either in Bahrain or in Kanpur. 9. I have considered the above submissions. 10. A perusal of the records would go to show that a part of occurrence has taken place in Chennai and the rest has taken place either in Bahrain or in Kanpur. In respect of the allegations which have taken place in Bahrain, since there has been no sanction obtained under Section 188 of the Code of Criminal Procedure from the Central Government, the learned Magistrate cannot try that part of the offence. In this regard, I may refer to paragraphs 10 and 11 of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Thota Venkateswarlu case cited supra which reads as follows: “…….Although the decision in Ajay Aggarwal’s case (supra) was rendered in the background of a conspiracy alleged to have been hatched by the accused, the ratio of the decision is confined to what has been observed hereinabove in he interpretation of Section 188 Cr.P.C. The proviso to Section 188, which has been extracted hereinbefore, is a fetter on the powers of the investigating authority to inquire into or try any offence mentioned in the earlier part of the section, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. The fetters, however, are imposed only when the stage of trial is reached, which clearly indicates that no sanction in terms of Section 188 is required till commencement of the trial. It is only after the decision to try the offender in India was felt necessary that the previous sanction of the Central Government would be required before the trial court commence. 11. Accordingly, up the stage of taking cognizance, no previous sanction would be required from the Central Government in terms of the proviso to Section 188 Cr.P.C. However, the trial cannot proceed beyond the cognizance stage without the previous sanction of the Central Government. The Magistrate is, therefore, free to proceed against the accused in respect of offences having been committed in India and to complete the trial and pass judgment therein, without being inhibited by the other alleged offences for which sanction would be required.” 11. In my considered opinion, applying the said principles stated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the IX Metropolitan Magistrate shall not try that part of the offence which has taken place in Bahrain for want of sanction under Section 188 of Cr.P.C. 12. In my considered opinion, applying the said principles stated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the IX Metropolitan Magistrate shall not try that part of the offence which has taken place in Bahrain for want of sanction under Section 188 of Cr.P.C. 12. In respect of the occurrence which has had been taken place in Kanpur, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor would submit that if that is the case, it is for the petitioners to apply for transfer and such transfer could be effected only by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In this regard, I am of the view that it is only a continuation of the offences, part of which has taken place in Chennai. Therefore, this contention cannot be accepted. 13. In view of all the above, the petition deserves only to be dismissed, however, with the above observation. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed. The learned Magistrate will frame charges in respect of the occurrence which had taken place in India alone and he shall not frame charges in respect of the occurrence which had taken place in Bahrain without there being sanction under Section 188 of Cr.P.C.