ORDER Hon'ble Mr. Justice U.B. Saha 1. Heard Mr. Somik Deb, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr. PK Biswas, learned Asst. SG for the respondents. 2. The petitioner, a Constable working under the Central Industrial Security Force (for short, "CISF") by way of filing this writ petition, has approached this Court for the second time and has called in question the order dated 16.09.2011 whereby and whereunder the petitioner was posted to FSTPP, Farakka on the ground that the respondent-authority has violated the prescriptions in the guidelines relating to posting/transfer of CISF personnel dated 20.01.2008 (Annexure-P1 to the writ petition) whereby and whereunder it is prescribed that (i) all annual transfer orders shall normally be issued by 31st March and in any case, not later than 30th April of the year and (ii) Notwithstanding anything contained in this policy, the Director General may, if necessary to do so in administrative operational/public interest, transfer or post any OR to any station or post, at any time and (iii) officers will be permitted extension in his present unit for one year if his ward is studying in 9th or 11th class in the current academic year. He/she will not be given extension in the next years on the ground of 2nd ward/wards studying in 9th or 11th class in the subsequent year. If the personnel visualizes such apposition, he should seek pre-mature transfer to other unit/sector as the case may, so that his ward/wards can as far as possible be located at the place where they can pass their examinations within his prescribed tenure there, etc. The petitioner in his writ petition while praying for quashing the order dated 16.09.2011 also asked for directing the respondents to act in conformity with the policy relating to transfer/posting dated 28.01.2008 (Anneuxre-P1 to the writ petition) along with other prayers. 3. The respondents have filed their counter affidavit resisting the writ petition. In their counter affidavit it is the stand of the respondents that the place where the petitioner has been transferred has every facility for the education of the petitioner's daughter and not only that, the authority also considered the representation filed by the petitioner, as observed by this court and ultimately upheld the order of transfer rejecting the representation of the petitioner on 15.11.2011. It is also stated by the respondents in their counter affidavit that in the earlier writ petition being WP(C) 427 of 2011, learned Single Judge of this Court has found the impugned transfer order to be valid and did not interfere with the same, rather an opportunity was granted to the petitioner for making a representation before the appropriate authority. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to challenge the impugned transfer order again by way of a second writ petition. 4. The further case of the respondents is that the order of transfer has been issued on the ground of administrative reasons in exercise of the power under Section 15 of the CISF Act, 1966 and Rule 72 of the Rules made thereunder wherein it is mentioned that every member of the force shall, for the purpose of this Act be considered to be always on duty and shall, at any time, be liable to be employed at any place within India and the guidelines (Annexure-P1 to the writ petition) issued by the authority is only for the purpose of increasing the period of posting on administrative grounds considering the operational need and public interest and has denied the allegations made by the petitioner in his writ petition. 5. Mr. Deb while supporting the contention made in the writ petition would contend that a member of the force like the petitioner is liable to be transferred normally within 31st March of every year and in any case not later than 30th April of that year and as per clause (3) of the guidelines which contained a non obstante clause stating, inter alia, the prescriptions contained in the said guidelines can be superseded by the Director General when the administrative/operational/public interest so demands but in the instant case, the petitioner was transferred on 16.09.2011 (Annexure- P2 to the writ petition) i.e. in violation of the prescription in the guideline (Annexure-P1 to the writ petition). He further contended that during the pendency of the writ petition the representations filed by the petitioner on 19.11.2011 (Annexure-P7 to the writ petition) and 21.11.2011 (Annexure-P8 to the writ petition) were disposed of regarding the prayer for modification. 6. He further contended that during the pendency of the writ petition the representations filed by the petitioner on 19.11.2011 (Annexure-P7 to the writ petition) and 21.11.2011 (Annexure-P8 to the writ petition) were disposed of regarding the prayer for modification. 6. He again contended that only after receipt of the counter affidavit filed by the respondent-employer, the petitioner came to learn regarding the communication dated 26.09.2011 (Annexure-R4 to the counter affidavit) wherein the respondents have rejected the representation of the petitioner stating inter alia that the petitioner hails from Nagaland and has completed 6 years and 9 months in out of Home Zone as against 11 years and 6 months in Home Zone and due for Home Zone (North East Zone). He further contended that Inspector General of CISF is not the competent authority to issue the transfer order since the transfer order is not an annual transfer order. According to him, it is only the Director General of CISF who has the power to transfer a constable like the petitioner at any time either for administrative interest or for public interest. He also contended that when a policy/guideline is issued by an employer, the said employer is bound to follow its policy/guideline. In support of his aforesaid contention he placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Rajendra Roy V Union of India, (1993) 1 SCC 148 wherein the Apex Court noted, "It is true that the order of transfer often causes a lot of difficulties and dislocation in the family set-up of the concerned employees but on that score the order of transfer is not liable to be struck down. Unless such order is passed mala fide or in violation of the rules of service and guidelines for transfer without any proper justification, the Court and the Tribunal should not interfere with the order of transfer." By way of placing the aforesaid decision he urges, inter alia, that when an authority violates its own guidelines or policy the Court has the power to interfere with the transfer order, even when allegation of mala fide intention is absent. On the same point he also placed reliance on another decision of the Apex Court in NK Singh V Union of India and Others, (1994) 6 SCC 98 , particularly paragraph 23 wherein the Apex Court reiterated its earlier views, inter alia, that "unless the decision is vitiated by mala fides or infraction of any professed norm or principle governing the transfer, which alone can be scrutinized judicially, there are no judicially manageable standards for scrutinizing all transfers and the courts lack the necessary expertise for personnel management of all government departments. This must be left, in public interest, to the departmental heads subject to the limited judicial scrutiny indicated." 7. To show that the employer is bound to follow its own policy and if a transfer order is issued in violation of operative guidelines then the same is required to be quashed, he placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan V. Damodar Prasad Pandey and Others (2004) 12 SCCC 299 wherein the Apex Court considering the decision of Abani Kanta Roy V. State of Orissa 1995 supp (4) SCC 169 held that unless an order of transfer is visited by mala fide or is made in violation of operative guidelines, the courts cannot interfere with it. 8. His next contention is that the Inspector General of CISF has no jurisdiction to issue the impugned transfer order. In support of his aforesaid contention relating to jurisdiction of the issuing authority, he placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Dr. Ramesh Ch. Tyagi V. Union of India and Others (1994) 2 SCC 416 , wherein the Apex Court noted that, "Taking up the transfer order it is undisputed that the competent authority to transfer the appellant was the Secretary of the department whereas the order was passed by the Director General. It was attempted to be defended by claiming that the power of transfer was delegated. But despite grant of time no order delegating the authority could be produced. The learned counsel appearing for Union of India had to concede that no order of delegation was on record. We are not prepared to infer delegation because there were orders on record which indicated that subsequently the Secretary had delegated the powers. But despite grant of time no order delegating the authority could be produced. The learned counsel appearing for Union of India had to concede that no order of delegation was on record. We are not prepared to infer delegation because there were orders on record which indicated that subsequently the Secretary had delegated the powers. It is not delegation earlier or later which material but whether any delegation existed on the date when the transfer order was passed. Further it is necessary to mention that the respondents have taken definite stand in the written statement that the transfer order was approved but did not produce the record in the trial court nor could they substantiate it even in this Court, there is no option but to hold that the order was not passed by the person who alone was competent to do so. The transfer order issued by the Director General, thus, being contrary to rules was non est in the eye of law." 9. To supplement his aforesaid contention he also placed reliance on another decision of the Apex Court in State Bank of India V. Anjan Sanyal and Others (2001) 5 SCC 508 , wherein the Apex Court noted, inter alia, that "an order of transfer of an employee is a part of service conditions and such order of transfer is not required to be interfered with lightly by a court of law in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction unless the court finds that either the order is mala fide or that the service rules prohibit such transfer or that the authorities, who issued the order, had not the competence to pass the order." 10. He finally contended that if guidelines/policy issued by the employer authority later than the Act and Rules which guide the service, then the policy will prevail and the authority is bound to abide by the guidelines/policy. In support of his aforesaid contention he placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Union of India and Another V. Azadi Bachao Andolan and Another (2004) 10 SCC 1 , particularly paragraphs 37, 41 and 42 which are as follows:- 37. In support of his aforesaid contention he placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Union of India and Another V. Azadi Bachao Andolan and Another (2004) 10 SCC 1 , particularly paragraphs 37, 41 and 42 which are as follows:- 37. In K.P. Varghese v. ITO it was pointed out by this Court that not only are the circulars and instructions issued by CBDT in exercise of the power under Section 119, binding on the authorities administering the Tax Department, but they are also clearly in the nature of contemporanea expositio furnishing legitimate aid to the construction of the Act. 41. In K.P. Varghese12 this Court held that the circulars of CBDT issued in exercise of its power under Section 119 are legally binding on the Revenue and that this binding character attaches to the circulars "even if they be found not in accordance with the correct interpretation of sub-section (2) and they depart or deviate from such construction". (SCC p. 188, Para12) 42. Navnit Lal C. Javeri V. K.K. Sen16 and Ellerman Lines Ltd. v. CIT clearly establish the principle that circulars issued by the CBDT under Section 119 of the Act are binding on all officers and employees employed in the execution of the Act, even if they deviate from the provisions of the Act. 11. Mr. Biswas, learned Asst. SG while resisting the submission of Mr. Deb would contend that once this Court has put its seal on the impugned posting order the same cannot be challenged by the petitioner by a subsequent writ petition without obtaining liberty from the Court. In the instant case, on an earlier occasion this court has already put its seal on the impugned order of posting and only allowed the petitioner to file a representation. Thus the petitioner can challenge only the order in the representation and not the order of posting. To support his aforesaid contention he placed reliance on the order dated 15.11.2011 passed by the learned Single Judge while disposing of the writ petition being No. WP(C) 427/2011 filed by the petitioner wherein it is noted that "Needless to say, transfer being the incident of service, in absence of any mala fide exercise of power or violation of any statutory rules, the writ court exercising its power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot interfere with the order of transfer. In the instant case, the only ground urged by the petitioner has been noted above. There is no allegation of any mala fide exercise of power and /or violation of any statutory rules. In view of the above, no relief can be granted to the petitioner, exercising writ jurisdiction. Accordingly, the interim order dated 30.09.2011, passed in CM Appl. No. 406/2011 stands vacated. However, it is open to the petitioner to make representation to the respondents." 12. He further contended that the petitioner has been transferred fully in terms of provisions of Section 15 of the CISF Act and Rule 72 of the CISF Rules and also as per the provisions of the guidelines (Annexure-P1 to the writ petition) wherein it is specifically mentioned that the tenure of posting prescribed in this circular is only by way of guidelines and can be increased/curtailed on administrative/ operational or public interest and in the instant case, the impugned order of posting is the result of order of posting/transfer dated 20th August, 2011 wherein the petitioner was posted along with 17 other constables on administrative ground and the same has not been challenged by the petitioner at any point of time. Rather the challenge is only to the order of communication issued by the Chief Airport Security Officer and the Deputy Commandant of the CISF. 13. He further submits that there is no doubt that when guideline/policy is issued in exercise of the power vested under the provisions of an Act the authority has to act within the provisions of the guideline and fact remains that in the instant case the authority has acted within the provisions of the guidelines. Therefore, it would not be proper for this Court to interfere with a valid order of posting/transfer, particularly, when the petitioner is not a civilian employee, rather a member of the force and has not challenged the original posting order. 14. He further submits that the scope of interference by the Courts in regard to the transfer and posting of the members of armed forces is far more limited and narrow and the transfer of an army official cannot be equated with the order of transfer of a civilian. In support of his aforesaid contention he placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Major General J.K. Bansal Versus Union of India and Others (2005) 7 SCC 227 . 15. In support of his aforesaid contention he placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Major General J.K. Bansal Versus Union of India and Others (2005) 7 SCC 227 . 15. He further submits that the petitioner has not submitted any documentary evidence before the authority with his representation in support of his plea that his only daughter would appear in the Board Examination scheduled in March, 2013 and she is preparing herself for the said examination and at this juncture this transfer would affect the education of his daughter. Unless a document is placed before the authority in support of his plea, it would be very difficult on the part of the authority concerned to consider his prayer for modification of the transfer order and in absence of such a document the authority rightly rejected the prayer of the petitioner. 16. He also placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Shilpi Bose (Mrs.) and Others V. State of Bihar and Others 1991 Supp (2) SCC 659 wherein the Apex Court noted inter alia, "In our opinion the court's should not interfere with a transfer order which is made in public interest and for administrative reasons unless the transfer orders are made in violation of any mandatory statutory rule or on the ground of mala fide. A government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other, he is liable to be transferred from one place to the other. Transfer orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his legal rights. Even if a transfer order is passed in violation of executive instructions or orders, the courts ordinarily should not interfere with the order instead affect party should approach the higher authorities in the department." 17. He also placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Union of India and Others Vs S.L. Abbas (1993) 4 SCC 357 wherein the Apex Court while deciding a transfer case of an employee in the postal department considered the guidelines issued by the government and held that the same guideline however does not confer upon the Government employee a legally enforceable right. 18. This Court has anxiously considered the rival submission of the parties and the arguments advanced as well as the records available before it. The entire argument of Mr. 18. This Court has anxiously considered the rival submission of the parties and the arguments advanced as well as the records available before it. The entire argument of Mr. Deb is mainly based on humanitarian grounds and hardship which is answered by the apex court as well as by this Court in a catena of decisions that hardship cannot be a ground for interference so far a valid transfer order is concerned. His additional contention relating to guidelines is also no longer res integra as the Apex Court has decided inter alia, that a guideline does not create any legally enforceable right. In the guidelines (Annexure-P1 to the writ petition) it is stated that the annual transfer order shall be issued normally by 31st March and in any case not later than 30th April of the year, meaning thereby in an extraordinary situation, if the authority considers that an employee is to be transferred for administrative reason even out of that period, that power is with them. Not only that, even the Director General of CISF has the power either to transfer or to post any officer to any station or post at any time on administrative grounds and/or public interest. 19. Now question of jurisdiction as raised by Mr. Deb, it appears from the service order No. 603/2011, i.e. order of posting of CISF Personnel on administrative grounds dated 19th August, 2011 that the petitioner was transferred/posted to FSTPP Farakka and the same has not been challenged by the petitioner. The petitioner also has not challenged the NES HQRS Service order No. 180/2011 dated 20th August, 2011 whereby and whereunder the competent authority has approved the posting of the transfer of the petitioner along with others. It further appears from the note dated 19.08.2011 as placed by learned Asst. SG that the transfer of the petitioner was approved by the concerned Deputy Inspector General, CISF. Therefore, it can be said that the petitioner is transferred/posted by the appropriate authority as mentioned in sub-clause V of sub-rule 1 of rule 72 of the CISF Rules. 20. The case laws cited by Mr. SG that the transfer of the petitioner was approved by the concerned Deputy Inspector General, CISF. Therefore, it can be said that the petitioner is transferred/posted by the appropriate authority as mentioned in sub-clause V of sub-rule 1 of rule 72 of the CISF Rules. 20. The case laws cited by Mr. Deb so far guidelines are concerned are relating to the civil employees but the decision of the Apex Court in Major General J.K. Bansal (supra) their lordships of the Apex Court specifically stated that the scope of interference of the courts in regard to members of armed forces is far more limited and narrow. In the aforesaid case of Major General J.K. Bansal (Supra) the Apex Court has also considered the decision in Shilpi Bose (Supra) as well as the decision in S.L. Abbas (supra). 21. On proper reading of paragraph 23 of NK Singh (Supra) it can be said that the judicial scrutiny of an order of transfer is very much limited as there is no judicial mechanism or standard for scrutinizing such a transfer order due to lack of expertise which can only be done by the employer who is managing the administration. In the instant case, it is the employer who has posted/transferred the petitioner taking note of administrative requirements. Admittedly the petitioner belongs to a disciplined force and his transfer from one place to other place is not only an incident of service but one of the terms of the contract of service. There are so many members in the Force who may be genuinely aggrieved by their transfer like the petitioner and if all of them approach the court of law challenging their individual transfer orders then the Force will not be in a position to discharge the duties for which it is established. Thus, the case of NK Singh (supra) is also in no way help the petitioner. 22. In view of the above, the decision of Apex Court in Dr. Ramesh Ch. Tyagi (supra) as relied upon by Mr. Thus, the case of NK Singh (supra) is also in no way help the petitioner. 22. In view of the above, the decision of Apex Court in Dr. Ramesh Ch. Tyagi (supra) as relied upon by Mr. Deb has no application at all as in that case though the transfer order was approved by the Secretary of the Department but the same could not be produced either in trial or before the Apex Court but in the instant case the relevant note by which the order of transfer/posting dated 19.08.2011 has been issued is placed before this Court which is marked as "X1" for identification and future reference and the relevant papers submitted by Mr. Biswas is marked as "X" for identification and future reference. 23. This court is also of the opinion that the case of the Anjan Sanyal (supra) has no application as in that case also the Apex Court ultimately upheld the order of transfer setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the Calcutta High court and more so, there is no quarrel with the proposition laid down by the Apex Court in that case that an order of transfer of an employee is a part of the service conditions and such order of transfer is not required to be interfered with lightly by a court of law in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction unless the court finds that either the order is mala fide or that the service rules prohibit such transfer or that the authorities, who issued the order, did not have the competence to pass the order. In the instant case, the authority issued the order had/has the competence, more so, the petitioner is a member of armed force which is normally known for their discipline, his case cannot be equated with a civilian employee. 24. In VK Mathew V. Union of India and Ors. In the instant case, the authority issued the order had/has the competence, more so, the petitioner is a member of armed force which is normally known for their discipline, his case cannot be equated with a civilian employee. 24. In VK Mathew V. Union of India and Ors. 2007 (1) GLT 183 this Court while considering a transfer order issued by the CRPF authority took note of the case of S.L. Abbas (supra) and observed that improper consideration of representation violates the provisions of guidelines, which will create indiscipline in the administration in future and the employees for whom this policy is framed, they will not be in a position to fully believe the employer and their actions, as the reason the employers are not acting on their own policy in the name of possibility doctrine. It is also noted that in S.L. Abbas (supra), the Apex court, though did not interfere with the transfer order but mentioned that while ordering the transfer of Government employee, there is no doubt, the authority must keep in mind the guidelines issued by the government on the subject, but the said guidelines do not confer upon the Government employee a legally enforceable right. If a reasonable man centralized of himself to the aforesaid observation of the Apex Court, then, he will find that their Lordships in the aforesaid case though did not interfere with transfer order impugned in that case but reminded the authority to see the object of the guidelines. 25. In the instant case, authority rejected the representation of the petitioner only on the ground that he has not submitted documentary evidence in support of his plea, inter alia, that his only daughter would appear in the board examinations scheduled in March, 2013 and she is preparing herself for the said examination and at this juncture his transfer would affect the education of his daughter, meaning thereby, had the petitioner submitted the aforesaid documents then the authority would have considered the prayer of the petitioner for modification of his place of posting/transfer. 26. 26. However, as the petitioner did not challenge the service order No. 603/2011, i.e. order of transfer/change of place of posting dated 19th August, 2011 and NES HQRS Service order No. 180/2011 dated 20th August, 2011, this Court is not in a position to allow the prayer of the petitioner particularly when there is no allegation either of mala fide intention or collateral purpose, moreover when he is a member of the Armed force. 27. In view of the above, no relief can be granted to the petitioner exercising the power of judicial review. However, as the petitioner admittedly did not submit any documents in support of his plea relating to final examination of his ward, he is at liberty to take up his grievances again with the appropriate authority, if so advised. 28. This writ petition is accordingly disposed of. No costs.