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2012 DIGILAW 282 (MP)

Pankaj Mehrotra v. Shilpi Mehrotra

2012-03-12

R.C.MISHRA

body2012
Judgment Arguments heard. 2. This common order shall govern disposal of both the petitions filed by the petitioners for getting the criminal proceedings, pending as Complaint Case No. 1923/2009, before Shri Sanjay Singh, JMFC, Jabalpur, quashed, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code'). In that case, cognizance of offences punishable under Sections 498-A read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 3 read with Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 has been taken upon a complaint filed by Shilpi Mehrotra, impleaded as respondent No. 1 in both the cases. 3. Marriage of the complainant/respondent No. 1 was solemnised with Pankaj, who is the son of Kedarnath and Mohani and brother of Ruchi, on 9-2-2007 at Kota (Rajasthan). 4. The complaint inter alia contained the following allegations :- (i) Soon after the marriage, the petitioners started subjecting the complainant to cruelty and harassment for not bringing sufficient dowry and on 1-3-2007, upon her return to parental home at Jabalpur, she apprised her parents of the mal-treatment at the hands of the petitioners for non-fulfillment of their expectation for dowry worth Rs. 25-30 lacs. (ii) On 30-4-2007, parents of the complainant took her to the matrimonial home at Kota where Pankaj, Kedarnath and Mohani impressed upon them to purchase a flat for them in Mumbai or any other Metropolitan City. Still, she was made to stay there under the hope for improvement in behavioral pattern of her husband and in-laws. (iii) Ultimately, on 30-5-2007, Pankaj and Kedarnath left the complainant at her parental home in Jabalpur, saying that she will be taken back only upon satisfaction of the demand for a flat. Thereafter, Mohani and Ruchi also reiterated telephonically the same pre-condition for her re-entry to the matrimonial home. 5. The complaint was forwarded, under Section 156 (3) of the Code, to police for investigation and upon the corresponding report; the complaint was rejected for want of territorial jurisdiction. However, by way of order dated 5-2-2009, learned Magistrate proceeded to reconsider the question of jurisdiction in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in Sujata Mukherjee Vs. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee. (1997) 5 SCC 30 , [that had already been distinguished on facts in a subsequent judgment rendered in Y. Abraham Ajith Vs. However, by way of order dated 5-2-2009, learned Magistrate proceeded to reconsider the question of jurisdiction in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in Sujata Mukherjee Vs. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee. (1997) 5 SCC 30 , [that had already been distinguished on facts in a subsequent judgment rendered in Y. Abraham Ajith Vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai, (2004) 8 SCC 100 ], completely ignoring the bar of review as contained in Section 362 of the Code and directed issuance of process against the petitioners in respect of the aforesaid offences. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has strenuously contended that the Court at Jabalpur had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences as none of the alleged acts of cruelty and harassment was committed within its territory. According to him, the complainant had resided at her matrimonial home at Kota initially, for a period of 19 days and thereafter, for 29 days. 7. In response, learned Counsel for respondent No. 1, while placing reliance on Sujata Mukherjee's case (supra), has submitted that the complaint was entertainable at Jabalpur in view of the allegations suggesting that on 30-5-2007, while leaving the complainant at Jabalpur, Pankaj and Kedarnath had again put a condition for fulfillment of demand for a flat as a pre-condition for taking her back to the matrimonial home. However, in that case, the distinguishing feature was that though the dowry demands were made earlier, husband of the complainant went to the place where she was residing and had also assaulted her. Moreover, as explained by the Apex Court in Y. Abraham Ajith's case (supra) and reiterated in Ramesh Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2005 SC 1989 and Manish Ratan Vs. State of M.P., (2007) 1 SCC 262 , the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC is not a continuing offence. As further observed in Manish Ratan's case (supra), the term "ordinarily" has to be considered having regard to the provisions under Section 178 (c) of the Code. 8. In Ramesh's case (supra), it was alleged that relatives of the complainant had met her in-laws at a hotel in Chennai and there was again a demand for dowry and threat to torture her in case she was sent back to Mumbai without the money and articles demanded. 8. In Ramesh's case (supra), it was alleged that relatives of the complainant had met her in-laws at a hotel in Chennai and there was again a demand for dowry and threat to torture her in case she was sent back to Mumbai without the money and articles demanded. On these facts, the Supreme Court proceeded to hold that Court at Trichy, where wife was residing with her parents had no jurisdiction and complaint was transferred to Magistrate at Chennai, where only a part of cause of action has arisen primarily for the reason that matrimonial petitions were pending for decision at that place. 9. It is relevant to note here that, in the instant case, the decree for restitution of conjugal rights has been passed by the Family Court at Kota only. 10. Venue of the trial is primarily to be determined by the allegations, as contained in the complaint. On one hand, the major part of the cause of action against all the petitioners had accrued at Kota, where most of the alleged acts of cruelty were committed and on the other, no part of cause of action against women petitioners had arisen at Jabalpur (See : Bhura Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2008 SC 2666 ). 11. In this view of the matter, the offence under Section 498-A of the IPC must be tried by a Court at Kota and not by the Court at Jabalpur. A contrary view taken by the Magistrate, therefore, deserves interference particularly in view of the fact that the objection as to lack of territorial jurisdiction was taken at the outset. 12. In the result, both the petitions are allowed and the corresponding order dated 5-2-2009 (above) is hereby set aside. The Trial Magistrate is directed to return the complaint filed against the petitioners for presentation before a Court of competent jurisdiction at Kota. Copy of this order be retained in the connected M.Cri.C.