Anil Kumar, J.— Heard Sri Mohd. Abid Ali, learned counsel for the petitioners, learned State Counsel, Sri Anil Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for the contesting respondents and perused the record. 2. The controversy in the present case relates to Chak No. 146 and Chak No. 202 situated in village Loknathpur Balchand Patti, Pargana Aldemau, Tehsil Kadipur, District Sultanpur ( hereinafter referred to as ' land in dispute'). 3. Undisputed facts of the present case is that Sri Faran son of Kallu recorded tenure holder of the land in dispute died in the year 1976 thereafter one Smt. Sumirta moved an application for mutation of the land in dispute in his favour on the ground that she is wife of late Sri Feran, where as another claim has been put forward by Sri Rajai that he is real brother of Sri Feran. 4. The Consolidation Officer by an order dated 26.2.1982 (Annexure no.1) rejected the claim of Smt. Sumirta challenging the same by filing an appeal,dismissed vide order dated 10.12.1982 ( Annexure no.2), challenged by filing revision also dismissed by order dated 2.5.1983( Annexure no.3). 5. Subsequently,opposite party no.3 ( Smt. Sheo Kumari) challenged the order dated 26.2.1982 alongwith application for condonation of delay before the Settlement Officer Consolidation, Sultanpur by filing an appeal under Section 11(1) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act on 17.3.1997. 6. Thereafter the present petitioners for redressal of their grievances approached this Court by filing Writ Petition No.59 of 2000 ( Kharpattu alias Bhagirathi and others Vs. District Dy. Director of Consolidation, Sultanpur and others ),allowed by order dated 14.5.2003 with the following directions:- "In the result, the writ petition is allowed in part. The impugned orders dated 18.2.2000 and 9.6.1999 passed by the District Deputy Director of Consolidation ( District Magistrate) Sultanpur and the Settlement Officer Consolidation, Sultanpur are quashed. The matter is remanded to the Settlement Officer Consolidation, Sultanpur who shall take a decision on the point of limitation and maintainability of Appeal no. 5245- Shiv Kumari Vs. Kharpattu alias Bhagirathi & others, as directed by him vide his order dated 19.3.1998. The decision shall be taken as expeditiously as possible." 7. In view of the said facts, matter came up for consideration before Settlement Officer Consolidation, Sultanpur in pending appeal, who by means of order dated 2.1.2004 condoned the delay and fixed the matter for hearing on 15.1.2004. 8. The decision shall be taken as expeditiously as possible." 7. In view of the said facts, matter came up for consideration before Settlement Officer Consolidation, Sultanpur in pending appeal, who by means of order dated 2.1.2004 condoned the delay and fixed the matter for hearing on 15.1.2004. 8. The order dated 2.1.2004 passed by Settlement Officer Consolidation, Faizabad has been challenged by present petitioner by filing revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Sultanpur, dismissed by order dated 30.10.2004 9. Accordingly after hearing the learned counsel for the parties and taking into consideration the facts that by means of impugned order dated 2.1.2004 passed by Settlement Officer Consolidation, Sultanpur has condoned the delay in filing appeal thereafter revision against the said order has been dismissed vide order dated 30.10.2004 by opposite party no.1/ Deputy Director of Consolidation, Sultanpur and in respect to the matter of condonation of delay the Apex Court has constantly held that the pragmatic view should be taken. In the case of Collector, Land Acquisition V. Mst. Kati Ji and others, reported in 1987 (13) ALR 306 (SC) held as follows: "The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on "merits". The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose of the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy." And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: 1. Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this; when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would he decided on merit after hearing the parties. 3. "Every" day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. As against this; when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would he decided on merit after hearing the parties. 3. "Every" day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay ? The dectrine must be applied in a rational, common sense and pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side can not claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by restoring to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grapped that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." 10. In N. Balakrishnan V. M. Krishnamurthy reported in (1998) 7 SCC 133 the Apex Court explained the scope of limitation and condonation of delay, observing as under: "The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy." 11. In Smt. Prabha V. Ram Prakash Kalra reported in 1987 (Suppl.) SCC 338 the Supreme Court took the view that the Court should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. 12. In Vedabai @ Vaijayanatabai Baburao Patil V. Shantaram Baburao Patil and others reported in 2001 (44) ALR 577 (SC) the Apex Court made a distinction in delay and inordinate delay observing as under: "In exercising discretion under section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts should adopt a pragmatic approach. 12. In Vedabai @ Vaijayanatabai Baburao Patil V. Shantaram Baburao Patil and others reported in 2001 (44) ALR 577 (SC) the Apex Court made a distinction in delay and inordinate delay observing as under: "In exercising discretion under section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts should adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. Whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the otherwise will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach...." 13. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Smt. Shanti Misra reported in AIR 1976 SC 237 , Hon'ble Court held that discretion given by section 5 should not be defined or crystallized so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The express "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction. 14. In Shakuntala Devi Jain V. Kuntal Kumari reported in AIR 1969 SC 575 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that unless want of bona fides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay can not be refused to be condoned 15. In O.P. Kathpalia V. Lakhmir Singh reported in AIR 1984 SC 1744 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. 16. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Haribhai Lakhmanbhai Seedhav Vs. State of Gujarat and to others, 2009 (27) LCD 1645 has also held that the Court should not reject appeal/revision on the ground of delay and the same should be decided on merit. 17. Thus,, it is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court. 18. In view of the decision of the Apex Court it is abundantly clear that while considering the delay condonation application the court has to see the merit of the case also as the law of limitation is not meant to take away the right of Appeal. The courts are meant for imparting justice and not to scuttle the justice on technicalities. The length of delay is also not very much material if there is a substance on merit. 19. Accordingly, in view of the above said facts, I do not find any merit in the present case as by means of impugned order which is under challenge only the delay has been condoned and the matter is still adjudicated and decided by the authority concerned/ Settlement Officer Consolidation, Sultanpur, so the writ petition is dismissed with the direction that it will be open for the parties to take all the plea in support of their case including the plea of maintainability of appeal before the Settlement Officer Consolidation, Sultanpur, the said authority shall decide the same on merit after giving adequate opportunity oral as well as documentary to the parties expeditiously, preferably with a period of six months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before him. 20. For a period of six months or the decision is taken by Settlement Officer Consolidation, Sulanpur whichever is earlier, parties are directed to maintain status quo as exists today. _____________