JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. This Regular Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30.03.2002, passed by the learned Additional District Judge-II, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P. in Civil Appeal No. 91-N/2000. 2. Material facts necessary for adjudication of this Regular Second Appeal, are that the appellant-plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as "the plaintiff" for the sake of convenience) had filed a suit for declaration to the effect that he is owner in possession of the land, bearing Khata No. 66 (34 min red), Khatau ni No. 149, Khasra Nos. 787, 790, 791, 792, 794, 857, measuring 2-34-04 HM, situated in Bela Indora, Tehsil Indora, District Kangra, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as "the suit land"). According to him, earlier he was cultivating the suit land as a tenant and after coming into force the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, he has become owner in possession of the suit land and the respondents-defendants (hereinafter referred to as "the defendants" for the sake of convenience) have no right, title or interest with the land in any manner. He further pleaded that he is in possession of the land comprised in Khata No. 55 (32 min in red), Khatauni No. 129, Khasra Nos. 1009, 1010, 1011, measuring 0-5-76 HM, situated in Village Bela Indora, Tehsil Indora, District Kangra, H.P. as a co-sharer to the extent of share and the gift deed dated 20.02.1992 executed by deceased Rumela in favour of defendants No. 1 and 2, pertaining to Khata No. 66 (34 min in red), Khatauni No. 149, Khasra Nos. 787, 790, 791, 792, 794, 857, measuring 2-34-01 HM and Khata No. 129, Khatauni No. 129, Khasra Nos. 1009, 1010, 1011, measuring 0-55-76 HM is illegal and void. According to him, the same was out come of mis-representation and fraud played by the defendants. According to him, the age of Rumela at the time of death was 90 years. He died on 29.03.1992. It is also pleaded that defendant No. 3 Shri Gurdas Ram is the brother of plaintiff. He is residing in village Tanda Ramdas in Hoshiarpur District. Rumela Singh has been staying with the plaintiff in Bela Indora. He was taken to village Tanda Ram Dass by defendant No. 3. Rumela was ill and he was not in full senses. It is also pleaded that defendant No. 3 Shri Gurdas Ram is the brother of plaintiff. He is residing in village Tanda Ramdas in Hoshiarpur District. Rumela Singh has been staying with the plaintiff in Bela Indora. He was taken to village Tanda Ram Dass by defendant No. 3. Rumela was ill and he was not in full senses. The plaintiff had been cultivating the land bearing in Khata No. 66 as a tenant under the land owner since 1965 till the enforcement of H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. Rumela has never cultivated the suit land. The remaining land comprised in Khata No. 55 was also cultivated by the plaintiff exclusively. The revenue record remained in the name of deceased Rumela in respect of both the land detailed above and the receipts regarding the rent pertaining to the land under tenancy were issued in the name of plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, he has also moved an application for correction of Khasra Girdawari and revenue record pertaining to that piece of land before the revenue authorities. The defendants No. 1 and 3, in connivance with each other, taking the advantage of the old age of the deceased Rumela, have got executed the gift deed in respect of whole of the suit land in favour of defendants No. 1 and 2. According to the plaintiff, Rumela has never executed any gift deed in favour of the defendants No. 1 and 2. Rumela has died within a month of the execution of the gift deed. He was seriously ill. According to him, the land bearing Khata No. 53 is jointly owned by the plaintiff and defendants No. 3 to 5 and defendants No. 1 and 2 have got no concern with the whole of the suit land. He has constructed a residential house on the suit land. The defendant taking advantage of the ill health of the deceased Rumela, also got executed a sale deed pertaining to the suit land for a consideration of 20,000/- on 20.02.1992. 3. The suit was contested by the defendants. Defendants No. 1 and 2 have filed separate written statement. According to them, the suit land was originally in possession of deceased Rumela, who was Gair Marusi Tenant before the enforcement of H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. He become absolute owner to the extent of share each in Khata No. 55 and 66. Defendants No. 1 and 2 have filed separate written statement. According to them, the suit land was originally in possession of deceased Rumela, who was Gair Marusi Tenant before the enforcement of H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. He become absolute owner to the extent of share each in Khata No. 55 and 66. However, deceased Rumela remained as Gair Marusi Tenant qua share in the land comprised in both Khata under the owners. The deceased Rumela during his life time has executed a gift deed dated 20.02.1992 in their favour. They have also taken objection that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction in the matter. According to them, the issue with regard to validity of the gift deed has already been decided by the Court in Civil Suit No. 244/92, decided on 27.05.1997. According to him, the Rumela though was 90 years old, but he was mentally alert. He has executed gift deed out of free will. It is denied by the defendants that the land comprised in Khata No. 66 was under the cultivation of the plaintiff as Gair Marusi Tenant. They have also denied that Rumela has relinquished his tenancy rights qua the suit land comprised in Khata No. 66 in favour of the plaintiff. 4. Defendants No. 3 to 5 have also filed a separate written statement. They have stated that the defendant No. 3 has got residential house at both villages, i.e., Village Tanda Ramdas as well as Village Bela Indora. According to them, the plaintiff has never rendered services to deceased Rumela. According to them, deceased Rumela was looked after by defendants No. 1 and 2. 5. Replication was filed by the plaintiff. The issues were framed by the learned Sub Judge (II) Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. on 5.2.1997 and an additional issue No. 14-A was framed on 11.10.1999. Learned trial Court dismissed the suit on 19.06.2002. Learned trial Court has come to the conclusion that the findings recorded in Civil Suit No. 244/92 will operate as res judicata in the present case, as far as validity of gift deed is concerned. According to the learned trial Court, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of conferment of proprietary rights of late Rumela. Learned trial Court has come to the conclusion that the findings recorded in Civil Suit No. 244/92 will operate as res judicata in the present case, as far as validity of gift deed is concerned. According to the learned trial Court, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of conferment of proprietary rights of late Rumela. Learned trial Court has also given a finding that the plaintiff has not become owner of the suit land by way of operation of H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. 6. The plaintiff preferred an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge-II. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff has only argued on issue No. 8, i.e., the question of applicability of principles of res judicata on the basis of previous judgment rendered in Civil Suit No. 244/92. Learned District Judge dismissed the appeal on 30.03.2002. Hence, this Regular Second Appeal. 7. This Regular Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law on 20.06.2002: "(1) Whether both the Courts below have erred in dismissing the suit of the appellant-plaintiff by holding that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of the appellant-plaintiff by wrongly relying upon the full Bench judgment of this Court in Chuhniya Devi v. Jindu Ram and others, 1991 (1) S.L.C. 223. 2. In the alternative, after holding that Civil Court has no jurisdiction, the plaint was required to be returned for filing in the appropriate court/forum instead of dismissing the suit? 3. Whether both the Courts below have misread and misinterpreted the oral and documentary evidence on record as well as the relevant provisions of law to dismiss the suit of the appellant-plaintiff, inter-alia, holding that it is barred by principles of res judicata under Section 11 CPC?" 8. Mr. Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Advocate for the appellant, on the basis of substantial questions of law framed, has strenuously argued that the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to go into the gamut with regard to conferment of proprietary rights. In the alternative, he also argued that in case the Civil Court has come to the conclusion that it has no jurisdiction in view of bar under the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, the plaint was required to be returned to the plaintiff. In the alternative, he also argued that in case the Civil Court has come to the conclusion that it has no jurisdiction in view of bar under the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, the plaint was required to be returned to the plaintiff. He then argued that the findings recorded in previous judgment, i.e., Civil Suit No. 244/92, titled as Surinder v. Gurdial, decided on 27.5.1997 would not operate as res judicata. 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the judgments passed by both the Courts below carefully. 10. The only point urged before the 1st Appellate Court was with regard to issue No. 8, i.e., validity of the gift deed, dated 20.02.1992 and the applicability of principles of res judicata on the basis of previous judgment rendered in Civil Suit No. 244/92, decided on 27.05.1997. 11. The questions, which have been permitted to be argued by Mr. Bhupender Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant, were not argued before the 1st Appellate Court. However, in the interest of justice, he is permitted to argue these questions to do full justice to the parties. 12. Since substantial questions of law No. 1 and 2 are interconnected and interlinked, the same are taken up together for determination to avoid the repetition of discussion of evidence. The Court will deal with substantial question of law No. 3 separately. 13. Plaintiff has failed to prove that the proprietary rights were ever conferred upon him. The proprietary rights after coming into force the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act were conferred upon the plaintiffs father Rumela during his life time. The mutation was also attested in favour of Rumela and the revenue entries were also entered in the name of late Rumela. Plaintiff has never challenged the conferment of proprietary rights upon Rumela before the competent authority as per the expressed provisions of H.P. Tenancy and Land reforms Act. Plaintiff has also not led any tangible evidence on record to establish that late Rumela has ever relinquished the proprietary rights in his favour. Plaintiff has never challenged the conferment of proprietary rights upon Rumela before the competent authority as per the expressed provisions of H.P. Tenancy and Land reforms Act. Plaintiff has also not led any tangible evidence on record to establish that late Rumela has ever relinquished the proprietary rights in his favour. Accordingly, the learned trial Court has rightly come to the conclusion that the issue with regard to conferment of proprietary rights on late Rumela could not be gone into by the Civil Court in view of the definitive law laid down by the full Bench of this Court in Chuhniya Devi v. Jindu Ram and others, 1991 (1) S.L.C. 223. 14. Now, as far as the plea of Mr. Bhupender Gupta, learned Senior Advocate for the appellant that the plaint was to be returned once the trial court has come to the conclusion that it has no jurisdiction to go into the matter, suffice to say that it is to be done at the initial stage. 15. This Court in Jankan Devi v. Smt. Leelan Devi, 2000 (2) S.L.J. 1194 has held that it is only in a case where from the perusal of the plaint, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is found to be barred by any law, the Court will take recourse to the provisions of Rule-10 or Rule-11 of Order 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure at the initial stage. The learned Single Judge has held as under: "14. At the time of arguments, it was urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that in case Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, the Courts ought not to have proceeded to dismiss the suit/appeal on merits, but the plaint ought to have been returned to the plaintiff without giving any findings on merit. The contention raised by the learned counsel is without any merit and substance. The provisions which provide for return of plaint are contained in Order 7 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure-relevant portion of which reads as follows:- "10. Return of plaint- (1) (Subject to the provisions of Rule 10-A, the plaint shall) at any stage of the suit be returned to be presented to the Court in which the suit should have been instituted." 16. Return of plaint- (1) (Subject to the provisions of Rule 10-A, the plaint shall) at any stage of the suit be returned to be presented to the Court in which the suit should have been instituted." 16. It will depend on the facts and circumstances of the case whether a Civil Suit should or should not give findings in a civil suit which could not be entertained by it. Primarily it will depend on the cause of action as made out in the plaint. If the plaint is so drafted that it raises a question of titled, though by concealing the facts, the Civil Court will have no option but to try it on merits and only then come to a conclusion whether the claim is established or not. It is only in a case where from the perusal of the plaint, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is found to be barred by any law that the Court will take recourse to the provisions of Rule 10 or Rule 11 of Order 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure at the initial stage. In the instant case, the plaintiff had concealed the fact that the plaintiff was a tenant of a large chunk of land under the defendant. On the application of the defendant, resumption of the suit land was ordered and the ownership of the remaining land of her parcel of tenancy was conferred upon her. Had these facts been disclosed in the plaint and there being no Court competent to decide the question, the plaint could have been rejected at the initial stage. However, in view of the concealment of the above facts which were brought on record by the defendant during the course of trial, the Court was bound to try the suit on merits and thus no illegality has been committed by the trial Court or the first Appellate Court in giving findings on the merits of the suit as laid by the plaintiff." 16. Defendants No. 1 and 2 had filed a Civil Suit for permanent injunction against the present plaintiff. The issue No. 1 was framed with regard to validity of the gift. Learned Sub Judge 1st Class has decided this issue in favour of defendants No. 1 and 2 vide judgment dated 27.05.1997. Plaintiff has preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree dated 27.05.1997 before the learned 1st Appellate Court. The issue No. 1 was framed with regard to validity of the gift. Learned Sub Judge 1st Class has decided this issue in favour of defendants No. 1 and 2 vide judgment dated 27.05.1997. Plaintiff has preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree dated 27.05.1997 before the learned 1st Appellate Court. Learned 1st Appellate Court has dismissed the appeal. Accordingly, the issue regarding the validity of the gift deed, since has already been gone into by the trial Court in Civil Suit No. 244/1992 and the same being upheld by the 1st Appellate Court, the findings recorded therein would operate as res-judicata. Thus, the issue with regard to the validity of gift deed cannot be permitted to be re-opened. 17. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sulochana Amma v. Narayanan Nair, (1994) 2 Supreme Court Cases 14 have held that a decree of court based on equitable relief of injunction operates as res judicata in later suit based on title between the same parties. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have held as under: "5. Section 11 of C.P.C. embodies the rule of conclusiveness as evidence or bars as a plea of an issue tried in an earlier suit founded on a plaint in which the matter is directly and substantially in issue and became final. In a later suit between the same parties or their privies in a competent Court to try such subsequent suit in which the issue has been directly and substantially raised and decided in the judgment and decree in the former suit would operate as res judicata. Section 11 does not create any right or interest in the property, but merely operates as a bar to try the same issue once over. In other words, it aims to prevent multiplicity of the proceedings and accords finality to an issue, which directly and substantially had arisen in the former suit between the same parties or their privies, decided and became final, so that parties are not vexed twice over; vexatious litigation would be put to an end and the valuable time of the Court is saved, it is based on public policy, as well as private justice. They would apply, therefore, to all judicial proceedings whether civil or otherwise. It equally applies to quasi-judicial proceedings of the tribunals other than the civil Courts. 8. They would apply, therefore, to all judicial proceedings whether civil or otherwise. It equally applies to quasi-judicial proceedings of the tribunals other than the civil Courts. 8. Sri Sukumaran further contended that the remedy of injunction is an equitable relief and in equity, the doctrine of res judicata cannot be extended to a decree of a Court of limited pecuniary jurisdiction. We find no force in the contention. It is settled law that in a suit for injunction when title is in issue for the purpose of granting injunction, the issue directly and substantially arises in that suit between the parties. When the same issue is put in issue in a later suit based on title between the same parties or their privies in a subsequent suit the decree in the injunction suit equally operates as res judicata. In this case, when the right and interest of the respondent were questioned in his suit against 'K', the validity of the settlement deed and the terms thereof were gone into. The civil Court found that 'K' acquired life-estate under the settlement deed executed by his wife conferring vested remainder in the respondent and on its basis the respondent was declared entitled to an injunction against 'K' who was prohibited not only from committing acts of waste, but also from alienating the properties in favour of third parties. The later suit of injunction to which the appellant was a party also binds the appellant. Therefore, even the decree founded on equitable relief in which the issue was directly and substantially in issue and decided, and attained finality would operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit based on title where the same issue directly and substantially arises between the parties. The appellant is a person deriving title from 'K' who was a party in the former suit is also hit by the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. 18. Consequently, both the Courts below have correctly appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence led by the parties. 19. Accordingly, in view of the observations and discussions made herein above, there is no merit in this Regular Second Appeal and the same is dismissed, so also the pending application(s), if any. No costs.