Judgment : 1. This Review Application is filed to review the decree and Judgment dated 14.8.2007 and made in A.S. No.555 of 2003 on the file of this Court. 2. The Review Applicants are the Appellants in the Appeal in A.S. No.555 of 2003 on the file of this Court and the Defendants in the Suit in O.S. No.520 of 1995, on the file of the learned Principal Subordinate Judge Vilupuram. 3. The Respondent had filed the Suit in O.S. No.520 of 1995 against the Review Applicants (herein after they may-be referred to as the ‘Appellants’ and the Respondents be referred to as it is) seeking the relief of partition of 2/3rd share in the suit properties. That Suit was decreed. Being aggrieved by the Decree and Judgment dated 7.10.2002, the Defendants had preferred the Appeal in A.S. No.555 of 2003 before this Court. 4. After hearing both sides and on appreciation of the evidence both oral and documentary and on perusal of the Judgment of the Trial Court, this Court had proceeded to pass a Judgment on 14.8.2007, dismissing the Appeal after confirming the Decree and Judgment of the Trial Court. 5. The Appellants, who are the Defendants in the Suit have not preferred any Appeal challenging the Judgment of dismissal and hence the Judgment and Decree in A.S. No.555 of 2003 has become final. 6. Instead of filing an Appeal, they have knocked at the door of this Court once again under the guise of review after invoking the Proviso to Section 114 read with Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 7. Before we go into the merits of this Review Application, it is to be borne in mind that “It is beyond any doubt or dispute that the review Court does not sit in Appeal over is own order. A re-hearing of the matter is impermissible in law. It constitutes an exception to the general Rule that once a judgment is signed or pronounced. It should not be altered. It is also trite that exercise of inherent jurisdiction is not invoked for reviewing any order.” This principle is laid down by the Apex Court in Inderchand Jain (D) through L.Rs. v. Motilal (D) through L.Rs. 2009(5) CTC 365 (SC) 8. It should not be altered. It is also trite that exercise of inherent jurisdiction is not invoked for reviewing any order.” This principle is laid down by the Apex Court in Inderchand Jain (D) through L.Rs. v. Motilal (D) through L.Rs. 2009(5) CTC 365 (SC) 8. Not with standing the question of maintainability of this Review Application this Court wishes to place it on record that the Proviso to Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not prescribe any limitation on the power of the Court and such limitations have been more fully explained in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 9. The proposition that Proviso to Section 114 and Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure do not prescribe any limitation on the power of this Court to review an Order or Judgment, whatever may be the case does not mean that the power of review can be exercised invariably even in respect of undeserved matters. 10. Virtually Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers the Court to review it’s Order, if the conditions precedent laid down therein are satisfied. The substantive provision of law does not prescribe any limitation on the power of the Court except those which are expressly provided in Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure in terms where of it is empowered to make such order as it thinks fit. This dictum is held in Board of Control for Cricket, India v. Netaji Cricket Club and others, AIR 2005 SC 502 , (605). 11. It may also be quite relevant to extract the Proviso to Section 114 of the code of Civil Procedure. 114. Review. Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved— (a) by a decree or order from which no Appeal is allowed by this Court, but from which no Appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no Appeal is allowed by this Court, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order, and the Court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit. 12. 12. It is significant to note here that under Section 114 of the code of Civil Procedure any person considering himself being aggrieved by a decree or Order, is having competency to make an Application for a review of Judgment to the Court, which passed the decree. 13. Firstly, the scope and Application of Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure is any person who has been considering himself as aggrieved by a decree or Order from which he is entitled to Appeal, but he has not actually preferred any Appeal. 14. Secondly, any person considering himself as aggrieved by a decree or Order, from which no Appeal is allowed by this Court. 15. Thirdly, if any person considering himself as aggrieved by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small causes may apply for review of the Judgment to the Court, which passed the decree or made the Order. 16. In Inderchand Jain (D) through L.Rs. v. Motilal (D) through L.Rs. 2009 (5) CTC 365 (SC) : the Apex Court has held that “Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for a substantive power of review by a Civil court and consequently by the Appellate Courts. The words ‘subject as aforesaid’ occurring in Section 114 of the Code means subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed as appearing in Section 113 thereof and for the said purpose, the procedural conditions contained in Order 47 of the Code must be taken into consideration”. 17. The words ‘subject as aforesaid’ occurring in Section 114 of the Code means subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed as appearing in Section 113 thereof and for the said purpose, the procedural conditions contained in Order 47 of the Code must be taken into consideration”. 17. The grounds on which review can be sought are enumerated in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as under: R.1 Application for review of Judgment: (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved— (a) by a decree or order from which an Appeal is allowed, but from which no Appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no Appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Cases, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time, when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the fact of the record of for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. The Review Applications herein do come under the category of Clause (a) to Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure as well as Clause (a) in sub-rule (1) to Rule 1 of Order 47 of the Code. 18. In Inderchand Jain (D) through L.Rs. v. Motilal (D) through L.Rs. 2009 (5) CTC 365 (SC) : while speaking on behalf of the Division Bench. His Lordship Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.B. Sinha has held that “an Application for review would lie when the Order suffers from an error apparent on the fact of the record and permitting the same to continue would lead to failure of justice. In order to fortify this reasoning. His Lordship has quoted the decision in Rajendra Kumar v. Rambai, AIR 2003 SC 2095 . In this case, the Apex Court has held that “the limitations on exercise of the power of review are well settled. In order to fortify this reasoning. His Lordship has quoted the decision in Rajendra Kumar v. Rambai, AIR 2003 SC 2095 . In this case, the Apex Court has held that “the limitations on exercise of the power of review are well settled. The first and foremost requirement of entertaining a Review Petition is that the order, review of which is sought, suffers from any error apparent on the face of the order and permitting the order to stand will lead to failure of justice. In the absence of any such error, finally attached to the judgment order cannot be disturbed.” 19. After referring the above cited decision. His Lordship has also observed that “the power of review can also be exercised by the Court in the event discovery of new and important matter or evidence takes place which despite exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the Applicant or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. An Application for review would also lie if the order has been passed on account of some mistake. Furthermore, an Application for review shall also for any sufficient reason.” 20. In the light of the guidelines, envisaged in the above quoted decision, it is crystallized that the Review Application would lie on the following three grounds: (i) When the Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record and permitting the same to continue would lead to failure of justice; (ii) The power of review can also be exercised by the Court in the event discovery of new and important matter or evidence takes place, which despite exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the Applicant or could not be produced by him at the time when the Order was made; and (iii) An Application for review would also lie if the order has been passed on account of some mistake. 21. The Review Applicants are under the obligation to convince the Court as to whether the Review Application comes under the ambit of at least anyone of the grounds as aforesaid. 22. Mr. Vedantham Srinivasan, learned Counsel appearing for the Review Applicants, while advancing his arguments, has adverted to that the Second Respondent Mr. 21. The Review Applicants are under the obligation to convince the Court as to whether the Review Application comes under the ambit of at least anyone of the grounds as aforesaid. 22. Mr. Vedantham Srinivasan, learned Counsel appearing for the Review Applicants, while advancing his arguments, has adverted to that the Second Respondent Mr. P. Govindarajulu, who is the Second Defendant in the suit has been described in the cause title of the Suit as an aged and mentally ill person being represented by his son and next friend one Mr. Sampathkumar alias Abubakkar. 23. In this connection, he has emphasized that the First Plaintiff or the person, who represent the Second Defendant viz., Mr. Sampathkumar ought to have applied before the competent Court of law to appoint a guardian so as to enable him to make representation in the judicial proceedings and other activities as contemplated under Section 50, 51, 52, 53, 54 & 61 of the Mental Health Act. Since it has not been done on the part of the Plaintiffs and since Mr. Sampathkumar was not permitted to represent on behalf of a mentally ill person, the Suit itself in respect of the Second Plaintiff has become vitiated and liable to be dismissed. 24. He has also submitted that unfortunately both the Trial Court as well as this Court being the First Appellate Court had lost sight upon this point. 25. He has also maintained that though the Defendants 1 to 4 had raised this issue in paragraph No.17 of their Written Statement and in paragraph No.18 of the Written Statement filed by the Sixth Defendant both the Trial Court as well as this Court being the First Appellate Court had lost sight upon this ground. 26. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon the decisions Simhachala Mahanti v. Bhagirathi Mahanti, AIR 1976 AP 83 ; and R. Lingaraj and others v. Parvathi, 1975 Mad. 285. 27. In this connection, it may be appropriate to refer the Written Statement of the Defendants and the testimonies of PW1 and DW1. In paragraph No.17 of the Written Statement filed by the First Defendant and adopted by the Defendants 2 to 4, it has been stated as follows: “17. 285. 27. In this connection, it may be appropriate to refer the Written Statement of the Defendants and the testimonies of PW1 and DW1. In paragraph No.17 of the Written Statement filed by the First Defendant and adopted by the Defendants 2 to 4, it has been stated as follows: “17. the 1st Defendant submits that the representation for the 2nd Plaintiff by his son Sampath Kumar (a) Abubakkar is against the mental Health Act, 1987 Section 53, since the Sections 50 to 53 had not been followed. This itself alone sufficient to dismiss the Suit with exemplary costs.” In paragraph No.18 of the Written Statement filed by the Sixth Defendant and adopted by the other Defendants, it has been stated as follows: “18. The Defendants submit that the representation for the 2nd Plaintiff by his son Sampathkumar alias Abubucker is against the Mental Health Act, 1987 Section 3, since the Sections 50 to 53 had not been followed. This itself and alone is sufficient to dismiss the Suit with exemplary costs.” 28. On coming to the evidence in chief of PW1, he has disclosed that the Second Plaintiff is their elder brother and aged about 70 years and he was not in a fit state of mind to understand what we are saying. He has also disclosed that the guardian and next friend Mr. Sampathkumar is none other than his son. 29. It is apparent that though the Defendants have raised this issue saying that the Second Plaintiff was a mentally ill person and this Suit without following the procedures envisaged under Sections 3 & 50 to 53 of the Mental Health Act, 1987, is liable to be dismissed, on the ground of maintainability, the Trial Court has not framed any issue on this point. Even the contention of the Defendants, with regard to the Second Plaintiff’s mental illness, has not been incorporated in the Judgment while drafting the pleadings. 30. It is very important to note here that the Review Applications, who are the Defendants in the Suit, were defeated and preferred an Appeal in A.S. No.555 of 2003. After a hot contest, they have lost the Appeal also. 30. It is very important to note here that the Review Applications, who are the Defendants in the Suit, were defeated and preferred an Appeal in A.S. No.555 of 2003. After a hot contest, they have lost the Appeal also. In this regard, this Court would like to place it on record that though as nearly as eighteen grounds have been formulated by the Review Applicants in the Memorandum of Appeal, they have not chosen to raise the issue of mental instability of the Second Plaintiff as one of the grounds in their Appeal. They have miserably failed to do so. 31. It is also very relevant to note that the First Defendant, when he was deposing as DW1, has fairly disclosed that his elder brother Mr. Govindarajulu, who is the Second Defendant in the Suit, was aged about 70 years and he was not having the capacity of understanding. 32. Even though PW1 has disclosed that his elder brother was mentally ill person, in his cross-examination a question was put to him on behalf of the Review Applicants saying that no documentary evidence was produced to show that the Second Plaintiff was a mentally ill person. 33. On careful analyzation of this question, this Court finds that this question implies indirectly that in so far as the Review Applicants/Defendants are concerned, the Second Plaintiff was in a good state of mind and he was not a mentally ill person. 34. In order to justify the impression of this Court, the First Defendant, who was examined as DW1 has deposed in his chief-examination saying that the Second Defendant Mr. Govindarajulu was in a good condition and he was not a mentally retarded person and that he was in sound state of mind and the Suit filed on his behalf is not sustainable. This stand taken by DW1 is entirely contrary to their own plea saying that the Suit in respect of the Second Plaintiff is not maintainable, as no guardian was appointed by the competent Court of law an envisaged under Sections 3 & 50 to 53 of the Mental Health Act, 1987. 35. Therefore, this Court finds that the decision cited supra, during the course of arguments advanced on behalf of the Applicants, are not made applicable to the present case on hand. 36. 35. Therefore, this Court finds that the decision cited supra, during the course of arguments advanced on behalf of the Applicants, are not made applicable to the present case on hand. 36. It is also manifested that though the Defendants had raised this issue, about the mental instability of the Second Plaintiff in their Written Statement, it was not seriously urged before the learned Trial Judge or even before this Court. When the Review Applicants themselves go against their own plea, they cannot blame upon the Trial Court as well as upon this Court. 37. In Shiv Baran Singh and others v. Board of Revenue, U.P. and others, AIR 1993 All 247 : 1993 All LJ 1096 : 1993 All CJ 8, it is held that mere absence of formal order appointing guardian does not vitiate the decree more so if the minor lunatic was represented in the Suit by natural guardian and no prejudice was caused to the opposite party. 38. Order 32, Rule 15 contemplates that Rules 1 to 14 (except Rule 2-A) to apply to persons of unsound mind. Rule 15 to Order 32, contemplates that Rules 1 to 14 (except Rule 2-A) shall, so far as may be, apply to persons, adjudged, before or during the pendency of the Suit, to be of unsound mind and shall also apply to persons who, though not so adjudged, are found by the Court on enquiry to be incapable, by reason of any mental infirmity, of protecting their interest when suing or being sued. 39. The arguments, in other aspects viz., the findings of the Trial Court in its Judgment that the Defendants were not in clear state of mind of their stand, is not discernible, because, the Trial Court, with regard to the ambiguous nature of stand taken by the Defendants relating to the property, in respect of which a partition was claimed, happened to make such comments and this will not in any way prejudice the Review Applicants and this may not also be a reason to review the Judgment of this Court. 40. This Court has carefully perused the Judgment of the Trial Court as well as the Judgment of this Court. After giving its due consideration, this Court finds that the Judgment and Decree of this Court dated 14.8.2007 and made in A.S. No.555 of 2003 does not suffer with any apparent error. 40. This Court has carefully perused the Judgment of the Trial Court as well as the Judgment of this Court. After giving its due consideration, this Court finds that the Judgment and Decree of this Court dated 14.8.2007 and made in A.S. No.555 of 2003 does not suffer with any apparent error. It is not the case of the Review Applicants that they have discovered a new and important matter or evidence, which despite the exercise of their due diligence, was not within their knowledge or could not be produced before this Court at the time when the Judgment was pronounced. 41. The Review Applicants have not brought out a case that the Judgment, in respect of which a review is fought for, has been passed on account of some mistakes. 42. As observed herein before, if at all the Applicants are aggrieved by the Judgment of this Court, they could have very well preferred an Appeal, instead they have come forward with this Review Application, which has not been justified by them. 43. It is beyond any doubt or dispute that the review Court does not sit in Appeal over its own order and therefore the re-hearing of the matter is impermissible in law. 44. With these observations, this Review Application is dismissed with the cost of the Respondents. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.