Prakash Krishna, J.— The above appeal under section 96 of CPC 1908 has been filed against final decree dated 23.4.1982 passed by the 1st Additional District Judge, Mainpuri in partition suit no.68 of 1972. The decree under appeal provides that a final decree in terms of the Commissioner's report which shall form part of the decree, be prepared. Heirs of defendant no. 2, are in appeal. The background facts may be noticed in brief; Kunwar Moti Singh Lal Singh was the common ancestor of the parties. He acquired huge movable and immovable properties during his life time. He died on 21.7.1965, leaving behind him his widow Smt. Janki Bai (Defendant no.3), two sons one Kr.Harnam Singh Moti Singh (Defendant no. 1) and another Kr.Ganga Singh Moti Singh (Defendant no.2) and two sons and one daughter of pre-deceased daughter Smt.Prem Kunwar. For sake of convenience, pedigree, which is not in dispute is reproduced below: Rai Bahadur Kr Moti Singh Lal Singh Widow Son Daughter Son Smt.Janki Kr.Harnam Smt.Prem Kunwar Kr.Ganga Singh Bai Singh Moti Singh (Died on Dec ¾ Moti Singh (Deft.No.3) (Deft.No.1) 1943) No.2) Kr.Pushpendra Kr.Mahendra Smt.Indra Kumari Singh Kama Singh Kama alias Nanda Devi (Plaintiff) (Deft.No.5) (Deft.No.4) After death of Kunwar Moti Singh Lal, a dispute arose amongst his sons and heirs of pre-deceased daughter Smt.Prem Kunwar. Kr. Ganga Singh Moti Singh, defendant no. 2, whose heirs are the (appellants herein) filed a petition no. 327 of 1968 (Ganga Singh versus Harnam Singh & others) in the original side of Bombay High Court for probate on the basis of a Will allegedly executed by deceased Kunwar Moti Singh Lal Singh. On contest, it was converted into two testamentary suits one being suit no. 32 of 1968 (Ganga Singh versus Harnam Singh) and the another being suit no. 15 of 1969 (Ganga Singh versus Smt. Prem Singh & others). The suits were consolidated and were ultimately compromised by the parties. Under the said compromise, the respective shares of the parties in the property left by deceased Moti Singh Lal Singh was agreed upon. For the sake of convenience, the relevant portion of the said compromise which is dated 29.4.1970 is reproduced below: "3. The suits were consolidated and were ultimately compromised by the parties. Under the said compromise, the respective shares of the parties in the property left by deceased Moti Singh Lal Singh was agreed upon. For the sake of convenience, the relevant portion of the said compromise which is dated 29.4.1970 is reproduced below: "3. It is agreed that the share in the properties left by the said Moti Sigh shall be as follows: That in a rupee of 16 annas Harnam Singh Moti Singh do have a 6 annas share therein; that Pushpendra Singh Shiv Singh Kama, Mahendra Singh Shivi Singh Kama and Mrs.Nanda Kumar Pratap Singh do between them equally have a four annas share therein: that Ganga Singh Moti Singh do have a two annas share therein; and that each of Ganga Singh Moti Singh four sons namely, Bhupendra Singh, Digvijay Singh, Kishore Singh and Ishwar Singh do have a one annas share therein." Thereafter, the present suit being Suit No.68 of 1972 for partition of the properties left by deceased Moti Singh was instituted by Pushpendra Singh Kama at District Mainpuri. The plaint of the suit contained four schedules of properties namely A, B, C & D consisting of movable and immovable properties of the deceased situate at Mainpuri and Bombay. In the suit for partition, the plaintiff sought four reliefs. But as would be seen later on, the main relief was for partition of the properties mentioned in schedules A, B, C & D attached with the plaint, praying that the plaintiff be given exclusive possession over his right of 1/12th share. The suit was ultimately decided in terms of compromise between the parties. The trial court accordingly passed a preliminary decree in terms of compromise. The compromise decree has attained finality and was not challenged further by any party. The share of the parties having been defined in terms of the compromise decree, the plaintiff on 23.7.1980 Paper No. 174-C filed an application under Order 26 Rule 13 CPC for appointment of Commissioner for partition of properties both movable and immovable, by metes and bounds. The plaintiff-decree holder submitted that Commissioner be directed to inspect the property situate at Kalba Devi Road Bombay as also at Mainpuri, and should prepare quaras in such a manner that compact portion of properties is allotted to the decree holder. The plaintiff-decree holder submitted that Commissioner be directed to inspect the property situate at Kalba Devi Road Bombay as also at Mainpuri, and should prepare quaras in such a manner that compact portion of properties is allotted to the decree holder. Ganga Singh (father and predecessor) of the appellants herein, as has been earlier also, raised all sorts of objections to the said application and attempted to create confusion that it is Bombay Court which is competent to carry out the proceedings relating to final decree as one of the properties in dispute is situate at Bombay. The court considered the objections in detail and rejected them by the order dated 25.10.1980 and appointed Shri Mathtab Chandra Jain, a senior Advocate of Mainpuri, as Commissioner. The Commisisoner after inspection of the property at Bombay submitted his report and in the report he proposed two quras of property situate at Lohar Chawl Street, Kalba Devi, Bombay. Portion marked by pink colour was proposed to the plaintiff./D.H. Objections were invited by the court against the proposed quras. The appellants herein filed the objections raising various pleas such as the property in dispute is lease hold property and its lessor is Bombay Municipal Corporation, is not capable of division/partition. It was also pleaded that under the lease deed, a lessee is not permitted to sub divided or partition the lease hold property without the sanction of Bombay Municipal Corpn. It was also objected on the ground that instead of proposing two quaras, the Commissioner should have proposed the quras separately of all the parties. The court below rejected the objections filed by Shri Ganga Singh Moti Singh, the present appeal is on behalf of his heirs. Before proceeding further, it may be placed on record that the dispute is confined to only one property situate in Plot No.106, Princes Street, Bombay. Somewhere it is also described as at Kalba Devi Road or Lohar Street. Heard Shri Navin Sinha, learned senior counsel for the appellants, Shri P.K.Singh, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents and Shri Ajit Singh, learned counsel for the respondent no. 2/1/1. Shri Navin Sinha, learned senior counsel for the appellants submitted that the shares of the appellants representing branch of Ganga Singh should have been also carved out separately in the partition scheme. Ishwar Singh, S/o Ganga Singh, defendant no. 9 filed an application no. 2/1/1. Shri Navin Sinha, learned senior counsel for the appellants submitted that the shares of the appellants representing branch of Ganga Singh should have been also carved out separately in the partition scheme. Ishwar Singh, S/o Ganga Singh, defendant no. 9 filed an application no. 195-C and Digvijay Singh, S/o Ganga Singh, defendant no.7 filed application no. 196-C, both dated 30.11.1981 for separation and carvation of their separate quras. The court ordered for payment of court fees which was deposited within the time allowed by the court. The carvation of only two quras instead of quras of all the parties is unwarranted and therefore, the matter should be restored to the court below. The second plea raised is with regard to the market value of the property in question. The submission is that the yardstick adopted by the Commissioner in fixing the market value of the property in dispute is incorrect instead, a valuers report should have been obtained from a qualified valuer. Lastly, it was submitted that the property in dispute is leased property of Bombay Municipal Corporation it is not capable of partition. The attention of the court was drawn to certain terms of the lease deed dated 30.4.1914. The sum and substance of the arguments is that the entire proceeding regarding partition from its threshold is void and illegal in view of the terms and conditions as contained in the lease deed prohibiting any sub division etc. In reply Shri P.K.Singh, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents submitted that before this court, the appellants himself has filed certain proposals for partition of the property in dispute which itself is sufficient to show the property in dispute can be partitioned. The appellants are estopped to say that the property in dispute is impartialable. It was further submitted that the method of valuation adopted by the Commissioner is legally justified. He has taken into consideration the monthly rent i.e usufruct of the property into consideration while proposing the quras. There will not be any remarkable difference if any other method of valuation is adopted. The appellants represent branch of Ganga Singh, defendant no. 2 and they can take appropriate steps for carvation of their inter se quras before the court below, qua the qura allotted to Ganga Singh. Shri Ajit Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no. There will not be any remarkable difference if any other method of valuation is adopted. The appellants represent branch of Ganga Singh, defendant no. 2 and they can take appropriate steps for carvation of their inter se quras before the court below, qua the qura allotted to Ganga Singh. Shri Ajit Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no. 2/1/1 submitted that the entire proceedings is null and void as partition decree required registration compulsorily which has not been done and this plea goes to the root of the matter and can be raised at any stage. He expressed his willingness that the matter may be restored back to the trial court for reconsideration. Considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The following three points fall for determination in the present appeal on the basis of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants. 1. Whether the court below committed any error in passing final decree of partition in terms of two quras as suggested by the Commissioner and by not carving out the quras of each co sharer separately. 2. Whether the mode of valuation adopted by the Commissioner in valuing the property in dispute is justified and correct. 3. Whether the property in dispute in view of the terms and conditions of lease deed dated 30.4.1914 could be partitioned. The only course available is to sell the entire property and distribute its proceeds amongst the parties, alternatively. POINT NO.1 Taking the first point first, it may be noted that Moti Singh Lal Singh, whose property is the subject matter of dispute, left behind him his widow Smt.Janki Bai, two sons Kr.Harnam Singh Moti Singh, Ganga Singh Moti Singh and offsprings of pre-deceased daughter Smt.Prem Kunwar. It has come on record that Smt.Janki Devi, the widow expired during these proceedings and she relinquished her interest in the property in dispute. Therefore, she went out of the picture. Now there remained three branches, two branches representing two sons and one representing the branch of pre-deceased daughter. It has come on record that the plaintiff Kr. Pushpendra Singh Kama and Kr.Harnam Singh (one of the sons of Moti Singh) defendant no.1 agreed, indisputably that they should be allotted a joint qura in the property in dispute in the suit property. It has come on record that the plaintiff Kr. Pushpendra Singh Kama and Kr.Harnam Singh (one of the sons of Moti Singh) defendant no.1 agreed, indisputably that they should be allotted a joint qura in the property in dispute in the suit property. Resultantly, the three branches converged into two branches one representing plaintiff Kr.Pushpendra Singh Kama jointly with Harnam Singh Moti Singh (defendant no.1) and the another Kr. Ganga Singh Moti Singh (defendant no. 2) and his sons Bhupendra Singh, son of Ganga Singh, (defendant no. 6) Digvijay Singh, son of Ganga Singh (defendant no. 7), Kishore Singh son of Ganga Singh (defendant no.8) Ishwar Singh son of Ganga Singh (defendant no.9) and Kr. Mahendra Singh, defendant no. 5 and Smt. Indra Kumari, defendant no.4. No principle of law or precedent was placed before me to show that it necessarily requires that there can only be one final decree of partition amongst the co sharers. On the contrary, law is that there may be more than one final decrees of partition, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It was plaintiff Kunwar Pushpendra Singh who insisted for carving out of his share separately, it is he who filed the suit for partition. It is true that in a suit for partition, everybody is plaintiff and defendant but the fact remains that every possible attempt was made by Ganga Singh (defendant no. 2) and his sons who are appellants herein to forestall the partition proceedings. It is matter of record. The court below has committed no error if the share of the plaintiff with the consent of the defendant no. 1 have been jointly carved out to the exclusion of other co sharers. The Code of Civil Procedure recognises the following classes of decrees:- (i) Preliminary decree; (ii) Final decree; (iii) Partly Preliminary and Partly Final decree. A preliminary decree is passed in those cases in which the Court has to first adjudicate upon the rights of the parties and then to stay its hands for the time being; until it is in a position to pass final decree in a suit. The form of a decree in a suit for partition of property of separate possession of a share therein has been given in Order XXII Rule 18 CPC. The form of a decree in a suit for partition of property of separate possession of a share therein has been given in Order XXII Rule 18 CPC. A final decree is contemplated when the Court is in a position to dispose of the lis between the parties finally i.e. in a partition suit by dividing the properties by boundaries between the co-sharers. It is an acknowledged legal position that there can be more than one preliminary decree in the same suit. The Supreme Court in the case of Venkata Reddi and Ors V Pothi Reddi, AIR 1963 SC 992 has explained the scheme of the Court as also the expressions ' Preliminary Decree' and 'Final Decree' in the following words:- "A decision is said to be final when so far as, the Court rendering it is concerned, it is unalterable except by resort to such provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as permit its reversal, modification or amendment. Similarly, a final decision would mean a decision which would operate as res judicate between the parties if it is not sought to be modified or reversed by preferring an appeal or a revision or a review application as is permitted by the Code. A preliminary decree passed, whether it is in a mortgage suit or a partition suit, is not a tentative decree but must, in so far as the matters dealt with by it are concerned, be regarded as conclusive. No doubt, in suits which contemplate the making of two decrees--a preliminary decree and a final decree-the decree which would be executable would be the final decree But the finality of a decree or a decision does not necessarily depend upon its being executable. The legislature in its wisdom has thought that suits of certain types should be decided in stages and though the suit in such cases can be regarded as fully and completely decided only after a final decree is made the decision of the court arrived at the earlier stage also has a finality attached to it. It would be relevant to refer to s. 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that where a party aggrieved by a preliminary decree does not appeal from it, he is' precluded from disputing its. correctness in any appeal which may be preferred from the final decree. It would be relevant to refer to s. 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that where a party aggrieved by a preliminary decree does not appeal from it, he is' precluded from disputing its. correctness in any appeal which may be preferred from the final decree. This provision thus clearly indicates that as to the matters covered by it, a preliminary decree is regarded as embodying the final decision of the court passing that decree." In the aforesaid case it has been laid down that a preliminary decree can be varied, modified or changed by second or third preliminary decree. It has also been laid down that the preliminary decree in a partition suit is not a tentative decree but must be regarded as final and conclusive in so far as the matters dealt with by it. In Phoolchand and another Vs. Gopal Lal, AIR 1967 SC 1472 the Apex Court has held that there may be more than one preliminary decree if circumstances justify particularly in partition suit when after the preliminary decree some party dies and shares of other parties are thereby augmented. It was also observed that it would be convenient to the Court and advantageous to the parties to have disputed rights finally settled and specification of shares in the preliminary decree varied before final decree is passed. A preliminary decree in a partition suit merely determines and declares the rights of the parties in the properties and the extent to which they are entitled. But it is the final decree which ultimately divides the properties by metes and bounds and award separate possession of the properties to the claimants. Reference can be made to Shankar Balwant Lokhande Vs. Chandrakant Shankar Lokhande, AIR 1995 SC 1211 . It has been laid down that final decree must be specify divisions of shares by metes and bounds and must be engrossed on stamp paper. In the case of Shankar Balwant (supra) the Supreme Court has stated; "It is settled law that more than one final decree can be passed." It shall be open to the other co sharers to take appropriate steps for carvation of their separate shares. In the final decree, the total area of the property in dispute is 13551 square yards. The area of portion marked with red colour is 589 square yards while of green colour is 766 square yards. In the final decree, the total area of the property in dispute is 13551 square yards. The area of portion marked with red colour is 589 square yards while of green colour is 766 square yards. The portion marked with red colour, the north portion, sub division shown by letter 'P' has been given to Harnam Singh (defendant no.1) and Kr.Pushpendra Singh, (Plaintiff). It consist of 11 shops 4 godowns 31 rooms, 15 W.Cs., 10 bathrooms and one stair case as detailed in Chart II in report of the Commissioner. The portion which has been marked by green colour and has been allotted to the present appellants and other defendant nos. 2, 4, 5 & 6 to 9 consist of 16 shops and one godown 4 wooden stalls, 51 rooms, 15 W.Cs 10 bathrooms one stair case, one lift, one well with water pump as detailed in Chart -II of the Commissioner's report. It finds mention in the Commissioner's report that the dividing line between the two portions has been selected in such a manner so that it possess in such a way just at the places where generally the walls exist. It also divides the building vertically upwards and as is also clear from the map as also from annexures 2 to 4 to the Commissioner's report. Taking a overall view of the situation, the Commissioner was conscious about the practical difficulties of the parties and he has taken a note of them while proposing the quras. Significantly, the learned counsel for the appellants could not point out that the appellants in any way have got less by the proposed quras to what they were entitled to under the decree. He could not show, the prejudice if any, caused to the appellants except that the quras of all the parties should be carved out separately. The objection of the appellants is technical in nature, where the decision is correct on merits and within the jurisdiction of the court, no error, defect or irregularity, which does not go to the root of the matter will vitiate the order or invalidate the action, as has been held by the Apex Court in Muhammad Husain versus Baba Kisna Nandan AIR 1937 P.C 238, Kiran Singh versus Chaman Paswan AIR1954 SC 340. Strangely enough, he went a step ahead in advancing the argument while criticizing the Commissioner's report that the Commissioner should have carved out the quras of the plaintiff and defendant no.1 also. The said argument was advanced with a view to confuse the issue and is not available to him in view of the fact that the defendant no.1 and the plaintiff consciously agreed that they may be allotted a joint qura. What possible objection could the appellants have to such arrangement, it is difficult to understand. To conclude, there is no merit in the aforesaid submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants. It shall be open to the appellants who have already applied for separation of their quras to pursue their applications, filed earlier, for carvation of their quras which will be done, by the court below. POINT NO.2 The second point relates to valuation of the property in suit. The property in suit appears to be in possession of number of tenants. List of tenants has been given by the Commissioner as annexure-5 to his report. A bare perusal of the said list would show that the said building has four blocks namely A, B, C & D. There are about 27 tenants in different portion described by letters A-1 to A-30 in Block-A. They are paying paltry sum as rent ranging from Rs.27/- to around Rs.442/-. The total monthly rent fetched by Block A is Rs.2467.90. Similarly, in Block-B there are shops, go-downs marked by letter 'B' 1-22, B-58. The said portion has been let out to different tenants. Block B was fetching Rs.6309 per month as rent. Similarly Block-C was fetching as Rs. 1126.86 and Block D as Rs.223.20 p. The total is Rs.10126.96. This is how he calculated the valuation of the building. The learned counsel for the appellant could refer only paragraph 13 of the objection filed to the Commissioner's report in this regard. For the sake of convenience, the said paragraph is reproduced below: "13. That the para II of the report is incorrect and hence denied the assessment of the rent of the portion in possession and occupation of the defendant 1, 2 and 6 to 9 is imaginary and fanatic. For the sake of convenience, the said paragraph is reproduced below: "13. That the para II of the report is incorrect and hence denied the assessment of the rent of the portion in possession and occupation of the defendant 1, 2 and 6 to 9 is imaginary and fanatic. The rent of the similar portion of the rooms within the said building is between Rs.20/- to Rs.40/- approximately per month which is as per the Bombay rent Act and Standard rent. The Commissioner has apparently been carried away by the suggestion of the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 against the existing facts and law and hence the objectors are not agreeable to the rent mentioned in para 11." No material could be placed to substantiate the above objection. At least, no such material referred to the court, at the time of the hearing of the appeal. Further reference was made to paragraph 23 of the objections wherein it has been pleaded that the market value of the property mentioned in the Commissioner's report cannot be accepted as no government valuer's report is attached. The report of the Commissioner reveals that he had taken care to look into the counterfoils of the rent receipts and other related documents. The income and receipt from the property in suit is duly audited by the Auditor. The Auditor has certified its correctness. The Commissioner in the absence of any material to the contrary has rightly proceeded to value the property in suit as per the actual rent receipts. There is no cogent or reliable evidence to doubt the Commissioner's report in this regard. The argument of the appellants that the Commissioner should have obtained a report from valuer does not advance the case of the appellants. The criteria adopted by the Commissioner is perfectly justified. It is useful to reproduce paragraphs 10 & 11 from the Commissioner's report dated 23.4.1982 Paper No. 236-Ka. "Gross rent of tenanted shops Godowns and rooms of the building and rooms of the buildings is about Rs.10127/- per month (Vide Annexure-5 consisting of 4 pages submitted by Kr. Harnam Singh Deft.No. 1 and attached herewith). The Bill Books from which counterfoils are given to the tenants prior to the payment of rent, were also produced in this connection. I checked several of them with the aforesaid list and the entries were found to be correct. Harnam Singh Deft.No. 1 and attached herewith). The Bill Books from which counterfoils are given to the tenants prior to the payment of rent, were also produced in this connection. I checked several of them with the aforesaid list and the entries were found to be correct. The Accounts are properly maintained and audited annually by Chartered Accountant. It may be mentioned here that the aforesaid list and Bill Book No. 106 were also supplied to Kr. Ganga Singh Deft. No. 2 and 1 asked him to submit a similar list of tenants with their respective rent shown against their names but he failed to do so. At first it was contended by Kr.Ganga Singh Deft. No. 2 and Kr.Ishwarsingh Deft.No. 9 that it is being prepared then it was said that it is being typed and next it was asserted that there are some differences is amount and that there are also some disputes with some of the tenants. I asked the Defts. No.2 and 9 that they could give a suitable note to this effect in their list and submit the same to me but ultimately the list/was not handed over to me at all." The paragraphs quoted above show that necessary precaution was taken by the Commissioner by making random query from the tenants and it was found that the list containing entries of tenants along with monthly rent supplied to him, were found to be correct. No material was placed before me to show that the averments as contained in the aforesaid paragraph no.10 is in any manner is incorrect or cannot be relied upon. The appellant could not place any material before the Commissioner or even in court, that property in suit was not properly valued by the Commissioner. The method for calculation of valuation adopted by the Commissioner on the facts, in correct method. Ergo, there is no substance in the above argument of the appellants and the point no. 2 is decided by holding that the Commissioner has committed no illegality if the monthly rent is made basis for the purposes of valuing the property in suit. POINT NO.3 Then it was submitted that the property in suit at Bombay is not divisible by metes and bounds in view of the terms and conditions as contained in the lease deed dated 30.4.1914. POINT NO.3 Then it was submitted that the property in suit at Bombay is not divisible by metes and bounds in view of the terms and conditions as contained in the lease deed dated 30.4.1914. Elaborating the arguments it was submitted that the property in suit is leasehold property. The super structure belongs to Bombay Municipality and the lease holders have no right to carry out any alteration without the previous consent of the Municipal Corporation. After the determination of the lease, all the buildings including all drains and appurtenances together with all fixtures windows doors shutters fastenings water etc. shall be delivered to the Board (Municipal Corporation). It was further submitted as per term No. 13 of the lease deed, assignment of the demised premises or any part thereof without the previous written consent of the Board is not permissible. To buttress the arguments, attention of the court was invited to condition nos. 2, 12 & 13 only. For the sake of convenience, these conditions are reproduced below: "2 -NOT to make on permit to be made any alterations in additions to any building or other erections for the time being the on land hereby demised nor to erector permit to be erected any building whatsoever on any part of the said premises except with the previous consent in writing of the Board or the Engineer of the Board (hereinafter referred to as the Engineer in which expression are included the Engineer of the Board for the time being and the person for the time being acting for such Engineer and such other officer of the Board as the Board may from time to time appoint to discharge the duties of the Engineer for the purpose of the presents) first and obtained. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 12 - IN the expiration or sooner determination of the said term to quietly deliver up to the Board the demised land and all the buildings which shall have been built the cover during the said term and all drains and appurtenances together with all fixtures windows doors shutters fastenings waster effects to as terms partitions fixed presses pipes pumps rails poles locks and keys and all other fixtures which during the last sever years of the said term shall have been fixened to the said buildings and premises or any part thereof in such and good and substantial repair and conditions and so maintained paved cleaned as aforesaid and in all respect in such state and conditions as shall be consistent with the due performance of the several covenants and provisions herein before contained. 13- NOT to assignees the hereby demised premises or any part thereof without the previous written consent of the Board to such assignment and to leave every such assignment within one calender month after the date thereof at the office of the Board in brider that the same may be registered in the books of the Board AND in case the Board shall deem it necessary or advisable to take legal advice as to any such assignment on demand to pay to the Board all costs which the Board may incur and in and about the obtaining of such advice as aforesaid." It could not be disputed by the learned counsel for the appellants that the conditions referred to above are absolute in terms. On a fair and meaningful reading of the conditions, reproduced above, it would show that alteration or addition to any building or other erections, assignment of the demised premises or any part thereof, are permissible with the written consent of the Board. There is nothing on record to show that if permission is applied for making essential alteration in the building, it will not be granted. It is one thing to say that there is absolute bar in transferring the demised premises or its part thereof, with the consent of the lessor and another thing to say that such, transfer or assignment is totally barred. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants does not hold good that there is complete bar regarding alteration, addition or transfer of part of the demised premises. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants does not hold good that there is complete bar regarding alteration, addition or transfer of part of the demised premises. Equally it is important that partition is not a transfer of property. The partition can be effected on papers and now under the partition scheme, the two quaras are well defined. There are hundreds of tenants in the property in suit. They are living separately with their families or doing separate businesses. This is indicative of the fact that the property in dispute consist of number of tenements. In the final partition scheme, the Commissioner has consciously after weighing all the pros and consequences has chalked out partition scheme by metes and bounds in such a manner by providing that two quras should be separated vertically and the common partition wall will pass generally on the existing walls, just at the places where generally walls exist. This disposes of the last submission made by the appellant. Now I take up the submission raised by Shri Ajit Kumar, representing respondent no. 2/1/1. He submitted that the preliminary decree for partition should be set aside, as it is not registered. The said argument was raised just for sake of the argument without giving a serious thought. As noticed herein above, the preliminary decree was passed in terms of the compromise entered into by the parties with their wide open eyes. Even prior to the suit, the parties had entered into compromise in testamentary suits at Bombay. It is too late to challenge the preliminary decree which was also a consented decree in the proceedings relating to partition decree. Section 97 of CPC is complete answer to the said argument. It is acknowledged legal position that a final decree cannot amend or go behind the preliminary decree on a matter determined by preliminary decree as held by Apex Court in Muthangi Ayyana versus Muthangi Jaggarao and others AIR 1977 SC 292 . In CHINTAMAN versus SHANKER and others 1999 (1) SCJ 558, the Apex Court has laid down when a final decree in a partition suit has been passed the plaintiff is entitled to be put in possession of the suit property. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 2/1/1 has given compilation of various case laws on such points which are not even involved in the appeal. They are- 1. The learned counsel for the respondent no. 2/1/1 has given compilation of various case laws on such points which are not even involved in the appeal. They are- 1. Right of Appeal- No vested right, it is conferred by statute A. AIR 1980 All 42 (Pratap Narain Agarwal versus Ram Narain Agarwal and others) B. AIR 1971 SC 374 (Smt.Jatan Kanwar Golcha versus M/s Goleha Properties Private Ltd.) 2. Transferee pendentetlite - no right - no impleadment AIR 2004 SC 173 (Bibi Zubaida Khatoon versus Nabi Hassan Saheb and another) 3. Res-judicata A. 2005(7) SCC 190 (Ishwar Dutt versus Land Acquisition Collector and another) B. AIR 1977 SC 392 (Y.B.Patil and others versus Y.L.Patil) C. 2005(1) SCC 787 (Bhanu Kumar Jain versus Archana Kumar and Another) 4. Earlier suit withdrawn - no new suit A. 1998 ALJ 543 (Budh Prakash Rastogi versus Santosh Pal Dublish) B. AIR1968 SC 111 (M/s Hulas Rai Baij Nath versus K.B.Bass and Co.) C. 1989 ALJ 960 (Kesho Prasad Tripathi and another versus The Vth Addl.District Judge, Allahabad) D. AIR 1996 SC 3488 (Bakhtawar Singh and another versus Sada Kaur and another) E. AIR 1977 SC 1112 ( Mysore State Road Transport Corporation versus Babajan Conductor and another) 5. Order 40 Rule 1 CPC A. AIR 1997 SC 2183 (Brig.Sawai Bhawani Singh versus M/s Indian Hotels Company Ltd. and others B. AIR 2000 SC 3513 (Vijay L.Mehrotra versus State of U.P and others) C. 1984 ALJ 1003 ( Smt.Saroj Rani Jain and another versus Krishna Swarup Singhal and another ) It is difficult to understand the relevancy of the above cases to the controversy on hand. Harnam Singh Moti Singh (respondent no.2) and Kr.Pushpendra Singh Kama(Plaintiff) admittedly applied for allotment of joint quara to them. Heir of Harnam Singh cannot turn around and take a plea inconsistent to the stand of Harnam Singh Moti Singh. Before parting with the case, it may be noted that this appeal is one of the oldest appeals pending in this court and was running in the list for hearing for years. It was being adjourned due to adjournment applications and illness slips of one counsel or the other. Before parting with the case, it may be noted that this appeal is one of the oldest appeals pending in this court and was running in the list for hearing for years. It was being adjourned due to adjournment applications and illness slips of one counsel or the other. Fed up with successive adjournments when the court took a tough attitude and made it clear that it shall not be possible to adjourn the case any further (though it was adjourned earlier as per convenience of the counsel) an adjournment application was filed and it was insisted that some order should be passed thereon. The application was rejected and after hearing for some time, to accommodate the counsel, the hearing of the case was adjourned. The suit was filed in the year 1972 and four decades have passed away. Sadly, the appeal could be heard with great difficulty. Viewed as above, there is no merit in the appeal. The appeal is dismissed with cost payable to the respondent no.1 only. The office shall send down the lower court record forthwith. _____________