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2012 DIGILAW 292 (CHH)

Khomanlal v. State of Chhattisgarh

2012-11-02

R.N.CHANDRAKAR, T.P.SHARMA

body2012
JUDGMENT T. P. SHARMA, J. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 10-7-2003 passed in S.T. No. 151/2002 whereby and whereunder the Sessions Judge, Rajnandgaon after holding the appellant guilty for causing homicidal death amounting to murder of Kumari Chitrekha Yadav, convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo R.I. for life imprisonment. 2. Conviction is impugned on the ground that without an iota of evidence the trial Court has convicted and sentenced the appellant as aforementioned, and thereby committed illegality. 3. As per case of the prosecution, on fateful day i.e. 23-7-2002 at about 5.00 p.m. in Village Manikpur, Police Station Dongergaon, District Rajnandgaon the appellant chopped head of Kumari Chitrekha Yadav, aged about 16 years, by dangerous weapon knife and rushed towards the police station with chopped head after leaving rest part of the body near the place of incident. The incident has been witnessed by Kusum Bai (PW-2) and child witness Rajeshwari Sahu (PW-3). Merg was recorded vide Ex.P-1. FIR was lodged by Ramdayal Sahu (PW-1) vide Ex.P-4. The Investigating Officer left for the scene of occurrence and after summoning witnesses vide Ex.P-2, inquest over; dead body of the deceased i.e. trunk of the dead body, was prepared vide Ex.P-3. At the time of inquest, chopped head was not present on the spot. Blood stained clothing, ladies undergarments, handkerchief one soap and other articles were seized from the spot vide Ex.P-5. Blood stained soil and plain soil was seized from the spot vide Ex.P-7. The appellant reached Police Station Dongergaon at about 11.40 p.m. on 23-7-2002 along with chopped head of Chitrekha and a panchnama (Ex.P-11) in that regard was prepared. The appellant was taken into custody, he made disclosure statement of one sharp edged weapon. Vide Ex.P-12 and the same was recovered at the instance of the appellant vide Ex.P-13. Blood stained clothing of the appellant was seized vide Ex.P-8. Nails of the appellant were cut and blood present over it were removed and seized vide Ex.P-9. The blood stained bicycle was seized from the appellant vide Ex.P-10. Dead body of Chitrekha was sent for autopsy to the Community Health Centre, Dongergaon vide Ex.P-14 where Dr. Praveen Goswami (PW-7) conducted autopsy vide Ex.P-15 and found following injuries : l head chopped from trunk. The blood stained bicycle was seized from the appellant vide Ex.P-10. Dead body of Chitrekha was sent for autopsy to the Community Health Centre, Dongergaon vide Ex.P-14 where Dr. Praveen Goswami (PW-7) conducted autopsy vide Ex.P-15 and found following injuries : l head chopped from trunk. l scratch over left cheek of 6 x 3 x 1 cm. l lacerated wound on head near mandible of 4 x 2 x 1 cm. l lacerated wound over chin of 3 x 2 cm. l lacerated wound over right forehead of 6 x 3 x 2 cm. l lacerated wound over left side parietal bone of the head of 5 x 3 x 2 cm. & one another wound on the forearm of 8 x 4 x 2 cm. l lacerated wound over occipital region of 10 x 7 x 3 cm. l Abrasion over left wrist of 4 x 2 cm. l Abrasion over small finger of left hand of 2 x 1 cm. l lacerated wound over left index finger of 2 x 1 cm. l lacerated wound over left middle finger of 4 x 3 cm. l lacerated wound over right index finger of 3 x 2 cm. l lacerated wound over middle finger of right hand of 2 x 1 cm. l lacerated would of 8 x 2 cm. over back. As per opinion of the doctor, cause of death was chopping of head from the neck region. The appellant was also examined by Dr. Praveen Goswami (PW 7) vide Ex. P-17 and he found one abrasion over his left hand showing the word Chitrekha. Weapon seized from the appellant was examined by the doctor vide Ex. P-19 and he opined that chopping of neck and other injuries may be caused by the alleged weapon. Chopped head of the deceased was examined vide Ex. P-20. Belongings of the deceased were seized vide Ex. P-21. Spot map was prepared vide Ex.P-23. Seized articles were sent for examination to the Forensic Science Laboratory vide Ex.P-24. Statements of witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. 4. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Rajnandgaon, who, in turn, committed the case to the Court of Sessions for trial. In order to prove guilt of the appellant, the prosecution had examined as many as 17 witnesses. Statements of witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. 4. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Rajnandgaon, who, in turn, committed the case to the Court of Sessions for trial. In order to prove guilt of the appellant, the prosecution had examined as many as 17 witnesses. Statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. in which he denied the circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution case and pleaded innocence & false implication. He has taken a specific defence that deceased Chitrekha was his beloved, he do not know who has killed and chopped Chitrekha but when he saw dead body and chopped head of Chitrekha, he took it to the police station. 5. The trial Court, after providing opportunity of hearing to the parties convicted and sentenced the present appellant as mentioned in Paragraph 1 of this judgment. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the judgment impugned and record of the trial Court. 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that present is the case of full of suspicion and illegal & unwanted action of the Investigating Officer to falsely implicate the appellant on the ground that the appellant was having love affairs with the deceased Chitrekha was killed and chopped by some person and on seeing dead body of Chitrekha, he took chopped head to the police station in the evening time where he was detained by the police and, thereafter, the police concocted the case. As per evidence of Ramdayal (PW-1), who lodged Merg (Ex.P1) & FIR (Ex.P-4), has specifically deposed that he informed the Police Station Dongergaon about the incident over telephone and, thereafter, the police came on the spot and there he lodged report but reasons best known to the Investigating Officer, he has neither produced the report lodged pursuant to the information received over telephone nor the report recorded on the spot. Evidence of Ramdayal (PW-1) revealed that Merg (Ex.P-1) & alleged FIR (Ex.P-4) recorded at 7.00 p.m. & 7.40 p.m. respectively are the 3rd & 4th first information reports, therefore, the same are not admissible under the law. The prosecution was required to only prove first FIR lodged by telephone and other alleged information can be treated as statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. and used only for contradiction & omission but not for corroboration. The prosecution was required to only prove first FIR lodged by telephone and other alleged information can be treated as statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. and used only for contradiction & omission but not for corroboration. In absence of any first information report, conviction of the appellant is not sustainable in law. He, further, submits that as per evidence of Ramdayal (PW-1), the appellant rushed towards the police station with chopped head but reasons best known to the police, the Investigating Officer, who came on the spot for inquest, has prepared panchnama of production of chopped head Ex.P-11 at 11.40 p.m. after lapse of about four hours. There is contradiction between Ex.P-19 & Ex.P-20 relating to shape & size of the alleged weapon. Weapon has not been produced before the Court below at the time of evidence to enable the defence to establish whether it was sufficient for causing such fatal injury i.e. chopping of head from trunk of the girl aged about 16 years. Evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution is full of contradictions & omissions. He further submits that trial Court be examined child witness Rajeshwari (PW-3), aged about 13 years, but did not administer oath to her on the ground that though she is minor but she looked competent to give evidence, therefore, her evidence is recorded without administering oath to her. The aforesaid satisfaction of the Court below is not permissible under the law and, therefore, alleged evidence of child witness Rajeshwari (PW-3) cannot be considered as evidence against the appellant. Ultimately, he submits that conviction of the appellant is not based on law and the appellant is entitled for acquittal. 8. On the other hand, learned State Counsel opposed the appeal and submitted that though Ramdayal (PW-1) has not witnessed the incident but he is Sarpanch of the village concerned and he himself has lodged Merg (Ex.P-1) & FIR (Ex.P-4), but has slightly deviated from his evidence and tried to show that earlier he has intimated the police over telephone and, thereafter, he narrated the incident to the police on the spot. Even otherwise evidence of Ramdayal (PW-1) is that he has simply intimated the police by telephone about the incident but detailed FIR and Merg has been lodged by him vide Ex.P-1 & Ex.P-4. Even otherwise evidence of Ramdayal (PW-1) is that he has simply intimated the police by telephone about the incident but detailed FIR and Merg has been lodged by him vide Ex.P-1 & Ex.P-4. If the factum of the information over telephone is considered then that would be a cryptic intimation of commission of offence, therefore, detailed descriptive first information report lodged after said cryptic information is sustainable under the law and in suitable cases second FIR can be lodged. Even otherwise, evidence of Kusum (PW-2) and Rajeshwari (PW-3) inspire confidence and the same cannot be brushed aside only on the ground of some infirmities, irregularities or even illegality in the investigation. 9. In order to appreciate the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties, we have examined the evidence adduced on behalf of the parties. 10. In the present case, homicidal death inter alia brutal and merciless homicidal death of the deceased by chopping her head from trunk has not been substantially disputed on behalf of the appellant. The appellant himself has taken a defence that somebody has chopped the head of deceased Chitrekha whom he was loving. Even otherwise, from the evidence of Dr. Praveen Goswami (PW-7) and autopsy report (Ex.P-15), it is established that death of deceased was homicidal in nature. 11. As regards to complexity of the appellant in the crime in question is concerned, conviction is substantially based on the evidence of Kusum Bai (PW-2) & Rajeshwari Bai (PW-3). Rajeshwari Bai (PW-3) is 13 years old girl and as per noting of the trial Court she appears to give evidence and her evidence has been recorded after administering her oath which reads as under : (vernacular matter omitted........Ed.) 12. Much argument has been advanced on behalf of the appellant relating to above remark made by the trial Court. As per Section 118 of the Evidence Act, 1872 all the persons shall be competent to testify unless the Court considers that witnesses are prevented from understanding the question put to them or from giving rational answers to those questions, by tender years, extreme or old age, disease, whether of body or mind, or any other cause of the same kind. 13. 13. While dealing with the question of competency of a child witness, even a girl of 5 years, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 614 has held that competency of a child witness depends upon her understanding the duty to speak truth and to answers the question rationally and the same is required to be determined by the Court before whom the child witness appears as witness in witness-box and if the Court is satisfied with the witness that the witness, may be of 5 years, is able to understand the questions put to him or her and answers the questions rationally and also able to understand the duty of speaking truth. Similar view has been taken in the matter of Dhanraj v. State of Mahrashtra, AIR 2002 SC 3302 : 2002 Cri LJ 4325. 14. In the case of a child witness, the Court is required to satisfy itself that whether the child witness understands the duty of speaking truth and is able to answer the questions rationally. In the present case, child witness is Rajeshwari (PW-3), who was 13 years old at the time of incident. Although questions to satisfy itself have not been asked to this witness by the trial Court, but only on the ground that questions have not been put to this witness, her evidence cannot be discarded and her evidence requires scrutiny in the light of requirement of Section 118 of the Evidence Act, 1872. This witness has specifically and clearly deposed that the appellant came with knife, he caught hold Chitrekha by one hand and started chopping her neck by knife. Due to fear she shouted save-save and thereafter ran towards his maternal uncle Ramdayal Sahu. Thereafter, when she again came on the spot with her uncle Ramdayal Sahu (PW-1), the appellant ran towards the house of Chhabilal Dewangan with chopped head of Chitrekha. She has further deposed that before incident when they were coming towards Bazar Chowk, Kusum (PW-2) was going ahead. The defence had cross-examined this witness at length. In her detailed cross-examination she has specifically deposed that she has seen the incident, she has not been tutored by Ramdayal (PW-1) or any other person. She has denied the suggestion that the appellant has not assaulted Chitrekha. The defence had cross-examined this witness at length. In her detailed cross-examination she has specifically deposed that she has seen the incident, she has not been tutored by Ramdayal (PW-1) or any other person. She has denied the suggestion that the appellant has not assaulted Chitrekha. Her evidence revealed that she was in a position to answer the questions put to her and she had answered the questions rationally. The aforesaid facts are sufficient to presume that Rajeshwari (PW-3) was able to answer the questions rationally and she has deposed what she has seen. Therefore, her evidence cannot be discarded only on the ground that some questions have not been put to her before recording her evidence or same has not been recorded by the Court below. 15. Specific defence has been taken by the defence that Ex.P-1 & Ex.P-4 i.e. Merg and FIR, is the 3rd & 4th information and if the defence of the appellant is considered then the same may be 4th & 5th information. Even otherwise it is not disputed that the appellant himself reached to Police Station with the chopped head and informed the police about the incident. It was unnatural and uncommon for the police, therefore, even by watching the appellant with chopped head, the police would have taken the cognizance of offence. Ramdayal Sahu (PW-1) has deposed in Para 1 of his evidence that firstly he telephoned the police and then the police reached on the spot where he narrated the incident to the police. 16. A. S. Tripathi (PW-11) has deposed that on the information given by Ramdayal Sahu in the Police Station, he lodged Merg (Ex.P-1) and, thereafter, FIR (Ex.P-4). He reached on the spot immediately and kept the dead body at safe place. On second day he prepared inquest over the dead body in presence of the witnesses. Blood stained clothing of the appellant were seized, his nails were cut and seized, chopped head of the girl produced by the appellant has been seized vide Ex.P-11. In Para 16 of his cross-examination he has admitted that on 23-7-2002 some telephone call has been received by the Head Constable Habibullah Khan, at that time he was not in the Police Station. In Para 16 of his cross-examination he has admitted that on 23-7-2002 some telephone call has been received by the Head Constable Habibullah Khan, at that time he was not in the Police Station. In Para 17 he has further deposed that the appellant did not come to the police station with chopped head of Chitrekha at about 6.00 p.m. rather he came at about 9.00 p.m. He has denied the suggestion in Para 18 that the appellant himself had lodged report that some person had killed his beloved Chiterekha but he has manipulated the facts. In Para 19 he has specifically admitted that when the appellant came to the police station with chopped head, situation of the police station became abnormal and when situation became normal, he started recording seizure, panchnama etc. He has specifically denied the suggestion that he has recorded Merg Ex.P-1 in the village (Para 28 of the cross-examination). Evidence of this witness, especially Para 16, revealed that Police Station Dongergaon has received some telephonic information from Village Manikpur relating to incident, which has been received by the Head Constable Habibullah Khan, but he has not recorded any roznamchasanha or report. FIR relating to the incident has been recorded vide Ex.P-1 as Merg. 17. As per Section 154 of Cr.P.C. Station In-charge of a police station is required to register every information relating to commission of a cognizable office termed as FIR. Definitely there can be no second report but in case of cryptic information there may be a detailed first information report and in case of rival versions in respect of the same episode, two first information reports are permissible. 18. While dealing with validity of second FIR, the Supreme Court in T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala and others, 2001 6 SCC 181 : 2001 Cri LJ 3329 has held that there can be no second FIR and consequently there can be no fresh investigation in respect of the same cognizable offence or same occurrence giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. Paras 17 & 18 of the said judgment read thus; 17. Sub-section (1) of Section 154 CrPC contains four mandates to an officer in-charge of a police station. Paras 17 & 18 of the said judgment read thus; 17. Sub-section (1) of Section 154 CrPC contains four mandates to an officer in-charge of a police station. The first enjoins that every information relating to commission of a cognizable offence if given orally shall be reduced to writing and the second directs that it be read over to the informant; the third requires that every such information whether given in writing or reduced to writing shall be signed by the informant and the fourth is that the substance of such information shall be entered in the station house diary. It will be apt to note here a further directive contained in sub-section (1) of Section 157 CrPC which provides that immediately on receipt of the information the officer in charge of the police station shall send a report of every cognizable offence to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence and then proceed to investigate or depute his subordinate officer to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case. Sub-section (2) entitles the informant to receive a copy of the information, as recorded under sub-section (1), free of cost. Sub-section (3) says that in the event of an officer in charge of a police station refusing to record the information as postulated under sub-section (1), a person aggrieved thereby may send the substance of such information in writing and by post to the Superintendent of Police concerned who is given an option either to investigate the case himself or direct the investigation to be made by a police officer subordinate to him, in the manner provided by CrPC, if he is satisfied that the information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. The police officer to whom investigation is entrusted by the Superintendent of Police has all the powers of an officer in charge of the police station in relation to that offence. 18. An information given under sub-section (1) of Section 154 CrPC is commonly known as First Information Report (FIR) though this term is not used in the Code. It is a very important document. And as its nick name suggests it is the earliest and the first information of a cognizable offence recorded by an officer in charge of a police station. It is a very important document. And as its nick name suggests it is the earliest and the first information of a cognizable offence recorded by an officer in charge of a police station. It sets the criminal law in motion and marks the commencement of the investigation which ends up with the formation of opinion under Section 169 or 170 CrPC, as the case may be, and forwarding of a police report under Section 173 CrPC. It is quite possible and it happens not infrequently that more information’s than one are given to a police officer in charge of a police station in respect of the same incident involving one or more than one cognizable offences. In such a case he need not enter every one of them in the station house diary and this is implied in Section 154 CrPC. Apart from a vague information by a phone call or a cryptic telegram, the information first entered in the station house diary, kept for this purpose, by a police officer in charge of a police station is the First Information Report FIR postulated by Section 154 CrPC. All other information’s made orally or in writing after the commencement of the investigation into the cognizable offence disclosed from the facts mentioned in the first information report and entered in the station house diary by the police officer or such other cognizable offences as may come to his notice during the investigation, will be statements falling under Section 162 CrPC. No such information/statement can properly be treated as an FIR and entered in the station house diary again, as it would in effect be a second FIR and the same cannot be in conformity with the scheme of CrPC. Take a case where an FIR mentions cognizable offence under Section 307 or 326 IPC and the investigating agency learns during the investigation or receives fresh information that the victim died, no fresh FIR under Section 302 IPC need be registered which will be irregular; in such a case alteration of the provision of law in the first FIR is the proper course to adopt. Let us consider a different situation in which H having killed W, his wife, informs the police that he is killed by an unknown person or knowing that W is killed by his mother or sister. Let us consider a different situation in which H having killed W, his wife, informs the police that he is killed by an unknown person or knowing that W is killed by his mother or sister. H owns up the responsibility and during investigation the truth is detected; it does not require filing of fresh FIR against H the real offender who can be arraigned in the report under Section 173(2) or 173(8) CrPC, as the case may be. It is of course permissible for the investigating officer to send up a report to the Magistrate concerned even earlier that investigation is being directed against the person suspected to be the accused. 19. While dealing with same question, the Supreme Court in the matter of Kari Choudhary v. Most. Sita Devi and others, AIR 2002 SC 441 : 2002 Cri LJ 923 has held that there cannot be two FIRs against the same accused in respect of the same case. But when there are rival versions in respect of the same episode, they would normally take the shape of two different FIRs and investigation can be carried on under both of them by the same investigating agency. Para 11 of the said judgment reads thus : 11. Learned counsel adopted an alternative contention that once the proceeding initiated under FIR No. 135 ended in a final report the police had no authority to register a second FIR and number it as FIR 208. Of course the legal position is that there cannot be two FIR’s against the same accused in respect of the same case. But when there are rival versions in respect of the same episode, they would normally take the shape of two different FIR’s and investigation can be carried on under both of them by the same investigating agency. Even that apart, the report submitted by the Court styling it is as FIR No. 208 of 1998 need be considered as an information submitted to the Court regarding the new discovery made by the police during investigation that persons not named in FIR No. 135 are the real culprits. To quash the said proceeding merely on the ground that final report had been laid in FIR No. 135 is, to say the least, too technical. To quash the said proceeding merely on the ground that final report had been laid in FIR No. 135 is, to say the least, too technical. The ultimate object of every investigation is to find out whether the offences alleged have been committed and, if so who have committed it. 20. While dealing with same question, the Supreme Court in the matter of Ramesh Baburao Devaskar and others v. State of Maharashtra, 2008 (2) SCJ 883 : 2008 Cri LJ 372 has held that in case of cryptic message not disclosing the identity and other requirements to satisfy the requirement of Section 154 of the Cr.P.C., the information regarding commission of offence may be recorded. When, however, the First Information Report is lodged by a person who claims himself to be aware of not only the commission of the offence, the name of the deceased and at least one of the accused who had committed the same, could have been recorded on the basis thereof. Para 11 of the said judgment reads as follows : œ11. Lodging of a First Information Report is necessary for setting the criminal law in motion. It can be lodged by anybody. It, however, should not be too sketchy so as to make initiation of investigation on the basis thereof impossible. Only information in regard to commission of an offence may not for all intent and purport to satisfy the requirement of the First Information Report. When, however, the First Information Report is lodged by a person who claims himself to be aware of not only the commission of the offence, the name of the deceased and at least one of the accused who had committed the same, could have been recorded on the basis thereof. It may, however, be another thing to say that any information in regard to the commission of an offence is given by way of a telephone or by a person who does not disclose his identity and such message is so cryptic that it may not satisfy the requirement of Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (See Om Prakash alias Raja v. State of Uttaranchal, (2003) 1 SCC 648 : 2003 Cri LJ 483. 21. (See Om Prakash alias Raja v. State of Uttaranchal, (2003) 1 SCC 648 : 2003 Cri LJ 483. 21. While dealing with same question relating to recording of subsequent FIR, the Supreme Court in the matter of Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab & Ors., 2009 AIR SCW 60 : AIR 2009 SC 984 : 2009 Cri LJ 958 has held that the second FIR would be maintainable when new discovery is made on factual foundations. Para 59 of the said judgment reads thus, 59. The second FIR, in our opinion, would be maintainable not only because there were different versions but when new discovery is made on actual foundations. Discoveries may be made by the police authorities at a subsequent stage. Discovery about a larger conspiracy can also surface in another proceeding, as for example, in a case of this nature. If the police authorities did not make a fair investigation and left out conspiracy aspect of the matter from the purview of its investigation, in our opinion, as and when the same surfaced, it was open to the State and/or the High Court to direct investigation in respect of an offence which is distinct and separate from the one for which the FIR had already been lodged. 22. Thus, as per dicta of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid authorities, normally there cannot be two FIRs against the same accused in respect of the same case, but when there are rival versions in respect of the same episode they would normally take the shape of two FIRs and investigation can be carried on under both of them by the same investigating agency. 23. In the instant case, Ramdayal (PW1) has deposed that he has telephoned in Police Station Dongergaon. Shri A. S. Tripathi (PW-11), A.S.I., Police Station Dongergaon has specifically admitted in Para 16 of his cross-examination that on 23-7-2002 somebody has telephoned from Village Manikpur to Head Constable Habibullah Khan but he has not recorded roznamcha sanha in respect of the information recieved by him over telephone. Shri A. S. Tripathi (PW-11), A.S.I., Police Station Dongergaon has specifically admitted in Para 16 of his cross-examination that on 23-7-2002 somebody has telephoned from Village Manikpur to Head Constable Habibullah Khan but he has not recorded roznamcha sanha in respect of the information recieved by him over telephone. The aforesaid fact revealed that although oral information has been received by Head Constable Habibullah Khan but no written information has been recorded by the police and for the first time, Merg (Ex.P-1) has been recorded on 23-7-2002 at 7.30 p.m. and thereafter FIR (Ex.P-4) has been recorded on the same day at about 7.40 p.m., therefore, Ex.P-1 can be considered as first information. Even otherwise if it is considered that Ramdayal Sahu (PW-1) has telephonically informed Habibullah Khan who has not recorded the same in writing then in the light of dictum of the Supreme Court that descriptive second FIR giving details is permissible under the law. 24. Conviction of the appellant is substantially based on the evidence of Kusum Bai (PW-2) and child witness Rajeshwari (PW-3). Rajeshwari (PW-3) was competent witness and she has answered the questions rationally. She has clearly deposed that when the appellant started cutting neck of Chitrekha by knife, she raised alarm save-save and rushed towards Ramdayal Sahu (PW-1). She again came on the spot with Ramdayal Sahu and saw that appellant was running towards the house of Chhabilal Dewangan with chopped head of the deceased. The defence had cross-examined this witness at length and in her detailed cross-examination, she has admitted some contradictions and omissions but clearly deposed that the appellant was the person who chopped the head of the deceased from neck and ran away with the chopped head. Her evidence finds corroboration from Kusum Bai (PW-2), who was going ahead of Rajeshwari and after hearing her voice she turned and saw that the appellant was chopping the head of the deceased. Ramdayal Sahu (PW-1) had also deposed that on hearing the voice of Rajeshwari Bai (PW-3) when he came on the spot, he saw that the appellant holding chopped head of Chitrekha was running towards the house of Kusum and Chhabilal. 25. The above evidence is sufficient to establish the fact that the appellant has caused chopped injury of neck and separated the head from the neck of deceased and thereby committed homicidal death of Chitrekha. 25. The above evidence is sufficient to establish the fact that the appellant has caused chopped injury of neck and separated the head from the neck of deceased and thereby committed homicidal death of Chitrekha. Evidence of Rajeshwari (PW-3) duly corroborated by Ramdayal Sahu (PW-1) & Kusum Bai (PW-2) inspires confidence and trustworthy. In these circumstances, the trial Court has rightly relied upon the evidence of the aforesaid witnesses. 26. As regards question of motive is concerned, chopping of head by knife and causing other injuries are itself sufficient to prove grave intention of the appellant of causing murder of deceased Chitrekha. The appellant himself has admitted that he went to the police station with chopped head and although he has taken a defence that some other person has chopped the head of the deceased but the same is falsified by evidence of Ramdayal (PW-1), Kusum (PW-2) & Rajeshwari (PW-3). 27. On close scrutiny of evidence, we do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment requiring interference in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Consequently, the appeal fails and dismissed. Appeal dismissed.