Judgment : 1. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 25.10.1994 in Special Civil Suit No. 165 of 1982 dismissing the suit of the plaintiff with costs; the present appeal was filed by the original plaintiff. 2. FACTS: Appellant is the original plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as plaintiff). Plaintiff filed a suit for money claim in the sum of Rs.5,62,845.46. Plaintiff averred in the plaint that he is a transporter. There was an emergency work projected by the defendants for transport of coal by road from New Majri Colliery to Paras power station and therefore they made an enquiry with the plaintiff under letter dated 25.4.1979 in which it was stated that the distance between new Majri Colliery to Paras power station was 263 kms. Plaintiff submitted his offer which was accepted as per terms and conditions enumerated in the letter dated 28.4.1979. The transport work was to be completed by the end of June 1979. The rate agreed to be paid was 70 paise per tonne per kilometer. The work being short term emergency, there occurred a mutual mistake amongst the parties in mentioning the distance as 263 kms. when the actual distance was 307 kms. In other words, the distance of 44 kms. was shown less. The plaintiff completed the work in between 30th April 1979 and 9.6.1979 and transported the entire coal. When the plaintiff submitted his first bill on 14.5.1979 he had come to a concrete conclusion that the actual distance was 307 kms. and not 263 kms. And therefore he had submitted the bill accordingly mentioning that he was submitting the bill under protest as there was a major variation in the distance mentioned in the work order and the actual distance. He submitted the second bill with similar protest. Since he required money he accepted the payments under those bills in order that the work was not hampered. Thereafter he submitted the subsequent bills. He then demanded money from the defendants for the difference of 44 kms. of distance by issuing notice, but to no avail. Finally he filed the suit and claimed the principal amount of Rs.4,14,643.46 at the agreed rate for excess 44 kms. and interest thereon at 12% per annum amounting to Rs.1,48,200/-, thus making the total of Rs.5,62,843.46. He then demanded money from the defendants for the difference of 44 kms. of distance by issuing notice, but to no avail. Finally he filed the suit and claimed the principal amount of Rs.4,14,643.46 at the agreed rate for excess 44 kms. and interest thereon at 12% per annum amounting to Rs.1,48,200/-, thus making the total of Rs.5,62,843.46. He also made a prayer vide prayer clause (b) requesting the Court to rectify prayer clause (a)as mentioned in the letter dated 28.4.1979 by exercising power under Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act. 3. The defendants filed their written statement and denied the claim in entirety. They stated that enquiries were made from many others including the plaintiff for making transport of coal to the power station at Paras and finally the work order was issued which was accepted by the plaintiff without any protest. The work order clearly indicated the distance of 263 kms. which the plaintiff accepted. Having accepted the said distance and the rate etc. the plaintiff was estopped from making such a bogus claim. There was no question of verification of shortest distance or the said mention of distance of 263 kms. The plaintiff cannot unilaterally modify the contract, which he sought in the suit and that could not be done in the suit. The plaintiff started making grievance only after the lapse of two years and never before and, therefore, the entire claim was after thought. The plaintiff submitted his bills according to the distance of 263 kms. and accepted the same. He never moved the higher authorities or the chief Engineer. According to him if there was any dispute about the distance, the plaintiff cannot be allowed to turn around and make a claim which is wholly unjustified. The Court cannot change the agreement between the parties. The plaintiff never changed the work order. None compelled the plaintiff to complete the contract, particularly when he submitted his first bill and also accepted the same. He was free to abandon the contract. He did nothing but lodged the claim in question. The defendants thus prayed for dismissal of the suit. 4. The trial Court framed ten issues. Parties adduced evidence. After appreciating the evidence on record, the trial Court held that the claim was not tenable and, therefore, dismissed the suit with costs. 5. He was free to abandon the contract. He did nothing but lodged the claim in question. The defendants thus prayed for dismissal of the suit. 4. The trial Court framed ten issues. Parties adduced evidence. After appreciating the evidence on record, the trial Court held that the claim was not tenable and, therefore, dismissed the suit with costs. 5. SUBMISSIONS: Mr.S.P. Dharmadhikari, learned counsel for the appellant, made the following submissions: (a) The work that was required to be performed by the plaintiff was short emergency work and was required to be commenced from 30.4.1979 and was to be completed by 9.6.1979, i.e. before the rainy season. That is why enquiry was made personally from the plaintiff who was performing his work of transport regularly. The work order was issued mentioning the distance of 263 kms. as the shortest distance. The defendants did not verify the actual distance of the road selected by them but mentioned 263 kms. by approximation. The plaintiff relying on the authorities of defendants and looking to the emergency of transport work, started his work immediately. But he came to know when he submitted his first bill on 14.5.1979 that the actual distance was 307 kms. and not 263 kms. and thus there was a difference of 44 kms. He thus submitted his first bill and the subsequent bills under protest regarding the difference in distance. Merely because he did not stop or abandon the work, the plaintiff cannot be denied what is due to him. The trial Court committed an error in holding that the plaintiff having agreed to the terms of the contract, i.e. the distance of 263 kms., he cannot ask the Court to ignore the terms and conditions even regarding the distance since there was a complete contract between the parties and the Court would not be able to add something which did not form part of the agreement (Ex.24), namely the distance of 307 kms. (b) Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act has wrongly been considered by the trial Court by holding that there was no mutual mistake. The trial Court has held otherwise that Section 26 is not attracted since there was no mutual mistake. The learned Senior Advocate then contended that the shortest distance was actually 307 kms. By now stands admitted because this Court had appointed a Commissioner to measure the actual shortest distance. The trial Court has held otherwise that Section 26 is not attracted since there was no mutual mistake. The learned Senior Advocate then contended that the shortest distance was actually 307 kms. By now stands admitted because this Court had appointed a Commissioner to measure the actual shortest distance. The Commissioner's report (Ex.59) shows that the distance was slightly more than 307 kms. The Commissioner report having not been assailed by the defendants, conclusion has to be drawn that there was a mutual mistake on the part of both the sides in prescribing the distance as 263 kms. There is no reason to reject the said report of Commissioner which was prepared in presence of both the parties and by physically measuring the shortest distance. (c) The trial Court committed further error in holding that the bills were not accepted by the plaintiff under protest. The trial Court completely ignored the bills and major mistake in the distance and hence recorded a perverse finding contrary to the bills Exs.25 to 31. The trial Court committed error that the plaintiff could have refused to make the transport having come to know about the actual distance and that not having been done he was estopped from saying that the distance was 307 kms. The trial Court further committed error in holding that both the parties very well knew that the distance that was to be covered was only 263 kms. for which payment should be made and therefore by conduct the plaintiff was estopped from making any claim. Finally, the counsel argued that Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act is liable to be taken into consideration since admittedly the plaintiff did excess work and not gratuitously and he was required to commence and complete the work. He relied on the decisions in (i) State of W.B. vs. M/s B.K. Mondal & sons – AIR 1962 SC 779 and (ii) V.R. Subramanyam v. Thayappa (deceased) & ors. - AIR 1966 SC 1034 . 6. Per contra, Mr.Moharir, learned counsel for the respondents, vehemently opposed the appeal and made following submissions: (i) The trial court was justified in dismissing the suit with costs and this Court should also dismiss the appeal with costs. - AIR 1966 SC 1034 . 6. Per contra, Mr.Moharir, learned counsel for the respondents, vehemently opposed the appeal and made following submissions: (i) The trial court was justified in dismissing the suit with costs and this Court should also dismiss the appeal with costs. (ii) Perusal of the work order (Ex.24) in clear terms shows that the same was accepted as it was the plaintiff who without any protest or reservation started the work acting on the said work order. After all, it was a contract between the parties made in writing for a particular distance and at a particular road. The Court does not get any authority or power to tinker with the said contract between the parties. (iii) If at all the plaintiff was aggrieved, at the time of accepting the contract he could have challenged the same before the competent forum or could have refused to perform the contract. He did nothing. On the contrary, he accepted the contract, started his work and also completed it without making any protest. This conduct on the part of the plaintiff should be noted with caution and on his conduct also, the suit has been rightly dismissed by the trial Court. (iv) The plaintiff never made any complaint or grievance before the higher authorities of the defendants about the matter which shows that he wanted to accept the contract as it was given to him and complete it. It is only after the work was completed and the time for payment of bills came, the plaintiff started making grievance. The plaintiff thus waived his right, if any, to make claim for alleged excess work. (v) In a suit for recovery of money, the court's power cannot extend beyond the terms of the contract. (vi) The doctrine of estoppel or waiver would come into play against the plaintiff and the trial Court has rightly found that by his own conduct he was estopped from making such claim before the Court. (vii) The plaintiff never stopped his work or abandoned the work. If there was a grievance that he was doing extra work nothing prevented him from abandoning the work. There was no question of mutual mistake, as alleged, and therefore provisions of Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act is not attracted. (vii) The plaintiff never stopped his work or abandoned the work. If there was a grievance that he was doing extra work nothing prevented him from abandoning the work. There was no question of mutual mistake, as alleged, and therefore provisions of Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act is not attracted. The Court has not accepted that the defendants committed any mistake all the more so because the defendants never said that any mistake was committed by them. (viii) Had the plaintiff not accepted the contract or abandoned the work immediately after he came to know about extra distance, the defendants could have got the work done from other transporter and that is another reason why the claim was not liable to be entertained and the trial Court has rightly rejected the claim. The plaintiff cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate or blow hot and cold. Finally, Mr.Moharir prayed for dismissal of suit. 7. Having gone through the impugned judgment and decree, so also the entire evidence- oral as well as documentary, following points arise my determination and my findings are recorded against them. (i) Is it proved beyond any doubt that the shortest distance between New Majri Colliery and Paras power station is 307 kms. and not 263 kms.? Yes. (ii) Is it proved that there was mutual mistake between the parties and the same was liable to rectified? Yes. (iii) Whether the defendants proved that the distance of 263 kms. mentioned in the letter (Ex.24) was the actual distance upon verification? No. (iv) Whether the plea of estoppel and waiver would operate against the plaintiff in order to negate his claim for recovery of money? No. (v) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the claim as stated in para 7 of the plaint and with interest? Yes. 8. As to Point no. (i): In this connection it is note worthy that the trial Court in answer to issue no. 1, which is rather the same point here, has given a categorical finding that the shortest distance between New Majri Colliery and Paras power station is 307 kms. and not 263 kms. This finding has not been assailed by the defendants. That apart, there is undisputed report of the Commissioner on record at Ex.59 showing the same distance, i.e. the correct distance is 307 kms. and not 263 kms. This finding has not been assailed by the defendants. That apart, there is undisputed report of the Commissioner on record at Ex.59 showing the same distance, i.e. the correct distance is 307 kms. This report of the Commissioner was never objected to nor the same has been criticised before me also. The Commissioner was appointed by this Court in C.R.A. No. 344 of 1992. I have, therefore, no difficulty in answering point no. (i) in affirmative. 2. 9. As to point no. (ii): Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act reads thus: “26. When instrument may be rectified.- (1) When, through fraud or a mutual mistake of the parties, a contract or other instrument in writing [not being the articles of association of a company to which the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), applies] does not express their real intention, then - (a) either party or his representative in interest may institute a suit to have the instrument rectified; or (b) the plaintiff may, in any suit in which any right arising under the instrument is in issue, claim in his pleading that the instrument be rectified; or (c) a defendant in any such suit as is referred to in clause (b), may, in addition to any other defence open to him, ask for rectification of the instrument.....” 10. In the instant case, the plaintiff examined himself and categorically deposed that there was a mistake on his part in assuming that the distance was only 263 kms. and that he did because he believed in the defendants who had mentioned the said distance in the work order (Ex.24). He realized his mistake after performing some work and particularly at the time of submitting of his first bill and that is why he submitted the first bill under protest clearly mentioning therein that there was a major variation about the distance. My attention was invited to the cross-examination of plaintiff by Mr.Moharir. I have carefully considered the submissions made by Mr.Moharir on the basis of cross-examination about the plaintiff in not approaching the higher authorities or abandoning the work or refusing to perform the work etc. including the reason regarding distance. Having perused the cross-examination of the plaintiff, I do not think that the evidence of the plaintiff on material particulars has been at all shattered. The fact that the actual distance -if 307 kms. including the reason regarding distance. Having perused the cross-examination of the plaintiff, I do not think that the evidence of the plaintiff on material particulars has been at all shattered. The fact that the actual distance -if 307 kms. is an established fact, then it plays a vital role and there is reason to believe that the mention in the contract of work about the distance of 263 kms. was made purely out of mistake and by approximation or imagination of the concerned officer who put the distance. On the contrary, in the written statement in para 5 the defendants stated thus: “On the contrary, it is submitted that this distance (263 kms.) has been mentioned by much accurate approximation.” When the defendants are not disputing the actual distance, as aforesaid, there is no explanation on record as to why on preponderance of probabilities the Court should not believe that it happened only because of the mistake on the part of the defendants in putting the wrong distance in the work order. Had there been any other reason rather than any mistake the respondents were never prevented from saying so the Court by tendering oral or other evidence of the concerned officer, but that did not happen. The defendants did not examine a single witness. In the wake of this situation, the trial Court was not justified in abruptly holding that there was no mistake on the part of the defendants, though it answered issue no.2 in affirmative. Thus the answers to issue Nos. 1 and 2 given by the trial Court cannot be reconciled in the above factual background narrated by me above. The reasoning given by the trial Court that the plaintiff could have stopped the work had there been actual mistake is clearly perverse and leads one nowhere. On the contrary, for the factual reasons given by me above, there is a strong reason to believe that the defendants also committed a mistake like the plaintiff when the distance of 263 kms. was only mentioned in the work order. I, therefore, hold that there was mutual mistake on the part of the plaintiff and defendants both and the trial Court ought to have exercised its power under Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act to declare accordingly. Hence, I answer point no. (ii) in affirmative. 11. As to Point no. was only mentioned in the work order. I, therefore, hold that there was mutual mistake on the part of the plaintiff and defendants both and the trial Court ought to have exercised its power under Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act to declare accordingly. Hence, I answer point no. (ii) in affirmative. 11. As to Point no. (iii): In view of answer to point no. (i) and in view of the fact that the defendants did not at all enter the witness box nor adduced any evidence either orally or documentary in support of this point, I answer point no. (iii) in negative. 12. As to Point no. (iv): The issue of estoppel or waiver is sought to be used against the plaintiff in order to refute his claim for the work done. What is estoppel and waiver? The connection between estoppel and waiver is very close. Between the two, there is this broad ground in common, viz. the object and operation of both is to ensure bona fides and to safeguard the transactions. The principles of estoppel is based on the maxim alleganscontract non est audiendus, i.e. a party is not to be heard to allege to the contrary. Following the decision of Privy Council in DawsonsBank Ltd. - Nippon Menkwa Kabushihi Kaish (Japan Cotton Trading Co. Ltd.) - AIR 1935 PC 79 (82), the apex court in BashesharNath v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi & Rajasthan & anr. - AIR 1959 SC 149 and in Mademsetty Satyanarayana v. G. Yelloji Rao & ors. – AIR 1965 SC 1405 held that estoppel is not a cause of action, it is a rule of evidence. On the other hand, waiver is contractual, and may constitute a cause of action, it is an agreement to release or not to assert a right. In para 11, in the case of MademsettySatyanarayan – AIR 1965 SC 1405 , supra, the Court stated thus: (11) The result of the aforesaid discussion of the case law may be briefly stated thus: While in England mere delay or laches may be a ground for refusing to give a relief of specific performance, in India mere delay without such conduct on the part of the plaintiff as would cause prejudice to the defendant empower a Court to refuse such a relief. But as in England so also in India, proof of abandonment or wiaver of a right is not a pre-condition necessary to disentitle the plaintiff to the said relief, for if abandonment or waiver is established, no question of discretion on the part of the Court would arise. We have used the expression “waiver” in its legally accepted sense, namely, “waiver is contractual, and may constitute a cause of action: it is an agreements to release or not to assert a right”; see AIR 1935 PC 79 at p.82). It is not possible or desirable to lay down the circumstance under which a Court can exercise its discretion against the plaintiff. But they must be such that the representation by or the conduct or neglect of the plaintiff is directly responsible in inducing the defendant to change his position to his prejudice or such as to bring about a situation when it would be inequitable to give him such a relief.” Keeping in mind the above text of law, in the first place, I find, as argued by Mr.Moharir and as observed by the trial Court that the only reason that the plaintiff did not abandon the contract in between has been pressed into service for inferring that the plaintiff was estopped from making any claim or that he had waived his right, if any, to make claim is illegal. In this behalf, plaintiff has explained in his evidence and it is clear from the pleadings of the parties as well that the plaintiff himself that initially he was not aware about the actual distance before starting the work. The plea of estoppel can be raised only if it is shown that the plaintiff fully and consciously knew about actual state of affairs and even then he started the work, but that is not the case of the defendants that the plaintiff knew very well that the distance was 307 kms. and not 263 kms. There is no evidence on record or any cross-examination of the plaintiff to that effect. The doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied in cases where the plaintiff is innocent. and not 263 kms. There is no evidence on record or any cross-examination of the plaintiff to that effect. The doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied in cases where the plaintiff is innocent. In the instant case, it is found that when the plaintiff realised that the distance was 307 kms., at the time of submission of his first bill (Ex.25) he made a writing on the bill that there was a major difference of distance and, therefore, the bill was submitted under protest. Thus, till the date of filing of first bill (Ex.25), the plaintiff had no knowledge about the actual distance for which he was supposed to perform the work and was misled by the distance of 263 kms., as mentioned in the work order. Similar is the case with the plea of waiver since the plaintiff cannot be said to have waived his right merely because he had not abandoned the work and that his action of not abandoning the work amounts to waiver. No evidence has been brought on record either oral or documentary that the plaintiff ever agreed or decided to waive its claim which he wanted to make. Hence, neither estoppel nor waiver can be pressed into service. It is also necessary to consider Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act. Section 70 reads thus: “70. Obligation of person enjoying benefit of non-gratuitous act.- Where a person lawfully does anything for another person, or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and such other person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing so done or delivered.” 13. In the case of State of W.B. v. M/s B.K. Mondal, supra, the apex court held thus in para 14 thereof: “It is plain that three conditions must be satisfied before this Section can be invoked. The first condition is that a person should lawfully do something for another person or deliver something to him. The second condition is that in doing the said thing or delivering the said thing he must no intend to act gratuitously; and the third is that the other person for whom something is done or to whom something is delivered must enjoy the benefit thereof. The second condition is that in doing the said thing or delivering the said thing he must no intend to act gratuitously; and the third is that the other person for whom something is done or to whom something is delivered must enjoy the benefit thereof. When these conditions are satisfied S.70 imposes upon the latter person the liability to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing so done or delivered. In appreciating the scope and effect of the provisions of this Section it would be useful ti illustrate how this Section would operate. If a person delivers something to another it would be open to the latter person to refuse to accept the thing or to return it; in that case S.70 would not come into operation. Similarly, if a person does something for another it would be open to the latter person not to accept what has been done by the former, in that case again S.70 would not apply. In other words, the person said to be made liable under S.70 always has the option not to accept the thing or to return it. It is only where he voluntarily accepts the thing or enjoys the work done that the liability under S.70 arises. Taking the facts in the case before us, after the respondent constructed the warehouse, for instance, it was open to the appellant to refuse to accept the said warehouse, and to have the benefit of it. It could have called upon the respondent to demolish the said warehouse and take away the materials used by it in constructing it; but, if the appellant accepted the said warehouse and used it and enjoyed its benefit then different considerations come into play and S.70 can be invoked. Section 70 occurs in Chapter V which deals with certain relations resembling those created by contract. In other words, this chapter does not deal with the rights or liabilities accruing from the contract. It deals with the rights and liabilities accruing from relations which resemble those created by contract. Section 70 occurs in Chapter V which deals with certain relations resembling those created by contract. In other words, this chapter does not deal with the rights or liabilities accruing from the contract. It deals with the rights and liabilities accruing from relations which resemble those created by contract. That being so, reverting to the facts of the present case once again, after the respondent constructed the warehouse it would not be open to the respondent to compel the appellant to accept it because what the respondent has done is not in pursuance of the norms of any valid contract and the respondent in making the construction took the risk of the rejection of the work by the appellant. Therefore, in cases falling under S.70 the person doing something for another or delivering something to another cannot sue for the specific performance of the contract nor ask for damages for the breach of the contract for the simple reason that there is no contract between him and the other person for whom he does something or to whom he delivers something. All that Section 70 provides is that if the goods delivered are accepted or the work done is voluntarily enjoyed then the liability to pay compensation for the enjoyment of the said goods or the acceptance of the said work arises. Thus, where a claim for compensation is made by one person against another under S.70, it is not on the basis of any subsisting contract between the parties, it is on the basis of the fact that something was done by the party for another and the said work so done has been voluntarily accepted by the other party. That broadly stated is the effect of the conditions prescribed by S.70.” Applying the ratio of the above case in the instant case, I find that the defendants accepted the work done by the plaintiff in entirety, never issued him a letter or order immediately after the first bill (Ex.25) was submitted under protest nor asked him to abandon the contract if he wanted to record his protest. On the other hand, it appears that the work being of emergency, namely to supply coal to the power station at Paras- at a distance of 307 kms., the defendants wanted to have the work completed and that is why the plaintiff also did not stop the work. On the other hand, it appears that the work being of emergency, namely to supply coal to the power station at Paras- at a distance of 307 kms., the defendants wanted to have the work completed and that is why the plaintiff also did not stop the work. If the defendants wanted not to entertain the grievance of the plaintiff about the distance, it should not have accepted the first bill (Ex.25) under protest. On the contrary, it accepted the bill under protest and also made payment for a distance of 263 kms. Fact remains that the protest made by the plaintiff remained on record. It is not in dispute further that finally the defendants happily accepted the entire work done and never made any statement about the protest made by the plaintiff. 14. In the case of V.R. Subramanyam v. Thayappa, supra, the apex court in para 5 thereof held as under: “Counsel for the appellant submitted that as in the view of the High Court the respondent failed to prove the oral agreement pleaded by him, the suit should have been dismissed, and they should not hae awarded compensation quantum meruit which was not claimed. It was argued that the respondent must succeed or fail on the case pleaded by him, and not on a cause of action not pleaded. In our view, there is no substance in this contention. As we have already observed, in respect of the additional work done by the respondent, both the parties set up conflicting oral agreements. These were not accepted by the High Court. If a party to a contract has rendered service to the other not intending to do so gratuitously and the other person has obtained some benefit, the former is entitled to compensation for the value of the services rendered by him. Evidently, the respondent made additional constructions to the building and they were not done gratuitously. He was, therefore, entitled to receive compensation for the work done which was not covered by the agreement. The respondent claimed under an oral agreement compensation at prevailing market rates for work done by him; even if he failed to prove an express agreement in that behalf, the court may still award him compensation under Section 70 of the Contract Act. The respondent claimed under an oral agreement compensation at prevailing market rates for work done by him; even if he failed to prove an express agreement in that behalf, the court may still award him compensation under Section 70 of the Contract Act. By awarding a decree for compensation under the Statute and not under the oral contract pleaded, there was in the circumstances of this case no substantial departure from the claim made by the respondent.” 15. Thus, in the light of the law laid down by the apex court as above, and in view of the admitted fact that the contract was for commercial purpose of the defendants, I do not think that the suit of the plaintiff could be dismissed on the ground of estoppel or waiver. Hence, I answer pointed no. (iv) in negative. 16. As to point no. (v): About the quantum of amount claimed by the plaintiff for the principal amount, i.e. at the rate of 70 paise per tonne per kilometer and there cannot be any dispute because it is a matter of contract. However, so far as interest is concerned, counsel for the defendants urged this Court to dismiss the claim for interest since there was no agreement between the parties and the claim of interest was made for the first time by the notice (Ex.32) dated 25.4.1982 issued by the advocate for the plaintiff wherein interest was claimed at the rate of 18% per annum in para 11 thereof. This notice was never replied. In the suit, plaintiff claimed interest on the principal amount of Rs.4,14,643.46 at the rate of 12% per annum from 9.6.1979 to 30.4.1982. In view of the fact that there was no agreement between the parties, I am not inclined to grant any interest from 9.6.1979 to 30.4.1982 which he claimed at Rs.1,48,200/-. Thus the principal amount of Rs.4,14,643.46 shall not carry any interest till 30.4.1982, i.e. the date of filing of suit. The Court gets power under Section 34 of Code of Civil Procedure to award interest. As stated earlier, the plaintiff demanded interest under the said notice (Ex.32). Thus the principal amount of Rs.4,14,643.46 shall not carry any interest till 30.4.1982, i.e. the date of filing of suit. The Court gets power under Section 34 of Code of Civil Procedure to award interest. As stated earlier, the plaintiff demanded interest under the said notice (Ex.32). The transaction being of commercial nature, in the sense that the plaintiff was required to transport coal for the commercial purposes of the defendants, namely power generation, there is no doubt in my mind that the plaintiff would be entitled to the rate of interest which is required to be granted for commercial transactions. The rate of interest claimed in prayer clause (a) of the plaint is at 12% per annum. Looking to the language of Section 34 C.P.C., I have checked up relevant information for the relevant years to find out the lending rate of nationalised banks which is slightly above 12% per annum. Since I have held that the transaction in question was for transport of coal by the defendants for power generation and since the plaintiff was the transporter, the plaintiff should be awarded simple interest at 12% per annum for the above reasons in exercise of powers under Section 34 of Code of Civil Procedure with effect from 01.5.1982, namely the day after filing of the suit, till realisation. Hence, I answer point no. (v) in affirmative. In the result, I make the following order. ORDER (i) F.A. No. 203 of 1995 is partly allowed with proportionate costs. (ii) Special Civil Suit No. 165 of 1982 is partly decreed in the sum of Rs.4,14,643.46. This amount of Rs.4,14,643.46 shall carry simple interest at 12% per annum from 01.5.1982 till realisation. (iii) Claim for interest at 12% per annum on the aforesaid amount of Rs.4,14,643.46 from 9.6.1979 till 30.4.1982 is rejected. (iv) Decree is passed for rectifying prayer clause (a), as mentioned in the letter dated 28.4.1979, for substituting the distance of 263 kms. by 307 kms. (v) Decree be drawn up accordingly.