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2012 DIGILAW 2970 (DEL)

BHARATHI RAMAKRISHNAN v. RAVI KANTA

2012-10-31

HIMA KOHLI

body2012
JUDGMENT HIMA KOHLI, J. 1. The present application for interim orders has been filed by plaintiffs in the accompanying suit for declaration simpliciter against the defendants, praying inter alia that the decree dated 29.05.2009 passed by the learned ACJ/ARC(West), Tis Hazari, Delhi, in a suit for possession instituted by the defendant No.1 against the defendant No. 2, registered as Suit No.524/2008, be declared as null and void. 2. The factual matrix of the case is that defendant No.2 who is the husband of the plaintiff No.1 and the father of plaintiff No.2, was the owner of the suit premises, i.e., MIG Flat No.C-2A/241-A, Pocket 16, Janak Puri, New Delhi. Defendant No.2 had sold the suit premises to the defendant No.1 for a total sale consideration of `10 lacs by executing a Sale Deed in her favour on 25.02.2008. Within two days from the date of execution of the Sale Deed, a Rent Agreement dated 27.02.2008 was executed by the defendant No.1 in favour of the defendant No.2 in respect of the very same premises. Under the aforesaid Rent Agreement, which is a registered document, defendant No.1 had agreed to let out the suit premises to the defendant No.2 on a monthly rent of 14,000/-, for a limited period of three months, commencing w.e.f. 27.02.2008. 3. It is the case of the plaintiffs that there exists a matrimonial dispute between the plaintiff No.1 and the defendant No.2 and after converting the suit premises from leasehold to freehold on 18.02.2002, defendant No.2 had clandestinely proceeded to sell the same to the defendant No.1. It is averred in the plaint that the suit premises had been purchased by the defendant No.2 from moneys received from ancestral property belonging to him at his native place in the State of Kerala, and further, that the plaintiff No.2 had paid a sum of `12,370/- to the defendant No.2 for purposes of conversion of the suit premises from leasehold to freehold. However, without taking the plaintiffs into confidence, defendant No.2 had sold the suit premises to the defendant No.1, which fact came to their knowledge on 12.12.2009 when they were sought to be dispossessed by the defendant No.1. However, without taking the plaintiffs into confidence, defendant No.2 had sold the suit premises to the defendant No.1, which fact came to their knowledge on 12.12.2009 when they were sought to be dispossessed by the defendant No.1. It was at that time that the plaintiffs came to know that defendant No.2 had suffered a judgment and decree dated 29.05.2009 in Suit No.524/2008, a civil suit for possession that was instituted by the defendant No.1 against defendant No.2 in the trial court. The plaintiffs claim that only then did they come to know that the defendant No.1 had filed an Execution Petition No.56/2009 before the trial court, for execution of the aforesaid judgment and decree dated 29.05.2009, wherein warrants of possession dated 20.11.2009 had been issued. 4. It is averred in the plaint that immediately upon gaining knowledge of the aforesaid legal proceedings that had been initiated by the defendant No.1, the plaintiffs had filed an application under the provisions of Order XVI Rule 22 CPC for stay of execution of the warrants of possession. Vide order dated 03.03.2011, the court had turned down the objections that were raised by the plaintiffs to the effect that the suit premises had been purchased from out of ancestral funds, i.e., the agricultural income yielded by the land situated at Kerala and it was held that the same was a self-acquired property and that defendant No.2 (Judgment Debtor in the execution proceedings) had the right to dispose of the same as per his wishes. 5. Aggrieved by the dismissal of their application/objections, the plaintiffs herein had preferred a civil revision petition, registered as CRP No.53/2011. However, on 19.04.2011, counsel for the plaintiffs had sought leave to withdraw the civil revision petition while reserving the right of the plaintiffs to seek recourse to any other remedy that would be available to them in law, including filing a civil suit for declaration. As a result, the aforesaid petition was dismissed as not pressed, while granting a period of two months to the plaintiffs for them to avail of any other remedy that may be available to them in law. It was further directed that during the said period, the decree of possession that had been obtained by the defendant No.1 (respondent No.1 in the civil revision petition) would not be executed against them. 6. It was further directed that during the said period, the decree of possession that had been obtained by the defendant No.1 (respondent No.1 in the civil revision petition) would not be executed against them. 6. After a period of eight months, the plaintiffs had filed the present suit on 15.12.2011. Along with the aforesaid suit, the present application was filed by the plaintiffs seeking a stay of the operation of the execution order dated 05.08.2011 passed in Execution Petition No.56/2009. On 19.12.2011, when the suit was listed for admission, an ex-parte ad interim injunction was granted in favour of the plaintiffs, directing that no coercive action would be taken against them in the aforesaid execution proceedings. The aforesaid order that is continuing to operate till date, is opposed by the defendant No.1 who seeks its vacation. 7. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs had submitted that since the year 1983, the plaintiffs have remained in continuous uninterrupted possession of the suit premises and due to a matrimonial discord between the plaintiff No.1 and the defendant No.2, he has been shying away from his responsibilities and has not been residing therein since the year 1992. It was canvassed that the suit for possession that was instituted by the defendant No.1 against the defendant No.2 was a collusive suit and was intended to illegally dispossess the plaintiffs and that in fact, defendant No.1 is a neighbour living in a property adjacent to the suit premises and she had joined hands with the defendant No.2 to obtain a collusive decree against them. 8. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs had submitted that the entire sale transaction had been undertaken by the defendants in a clandestine fashion, behind the back of the plaintiffs and that the defendant No.2 was well aware of the fact that he was not entitled to sell the suit premises, the same not being his self-acquired property. He urged that it was for this reason alone that the defendant No.2 had executed the sale deed in favour of the defendant No.1 in such a secretive manner and only after selling the suit premises, did he dispatch a letter dated 06.03.2008 from Kerala to the plaintiff No.1 with copies marked to plaintiff No.2 and the defendant No.1, informing them about the factum of sale. 9. 9. It was next submitted by learned counsel for the plaintiffs that a family understanding and a scheme of arrangement had been entered into between the plaintiffs and defendant No.2, where under it was agreed by the parties that the suit premises, that had been purchased from periodic infusion of moneys from the ancestral property of the defendant No.2 and on receipt of financial assistance from other family members, would remain the residential house of the plaintiffs. Heavy reliance was placed by learned counsel for the plaintiffs on a letter dated 28.01.2003 addressed by the defendant No.2 to the plaintiff No.2 to contend that defendant No.2 had himself demanded 1/4th share in the suit premises from the plaintiffs and he had undertaken that he would not disturb their occupation thereof. It was alleged that the defendant No.2 had deserted his family since the year 1992 and he had failed to make any financial arrangements to sustain the plaintiffs and maintain the suit premises and that the conversion money deposited in respect of the suit premises as also all the bills and taxes relating thereto had been paid by the plaintiff No.2 as part of the family arrangement and in lieu thereof, defendant No.2 had assured the plaintiffs that he would not disturb their possession. 10. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs had also relied on the letter dated 28.01.2003 addressed by the defendant No.2 to the plaintiff No.2 to fortify his argument that defendant No.2 had mentioned therein that he had cultivable land in Kerala and the said land was fetching good returns from cultivation. He had submitted that if the aforesaid letter is read in totality, it clearly emerges there from that the suit premises was not a self-acquired property of the defendant No.2, but was purchased from an infusion of ancestral funds and hence, he had no right to dispose it of in the manner that he had done. Thus, it was urged on behalf of the plaintiffs that the judgment and decree dated 29.05.2009 passed in the suit instituted by the defendant No.1 against the defendant No.2, being a consent decree and having been obtained by her in collusion with the defendant No.2, is liable to be set aside and during the pendency of the present proceedings, the execution proceedings are also liable to be stayed. 11. 11. Per contra, learned counsel for the defendant No.1 had strongly opposed the present application and had prayed for vacation of the interim order dated 19.12.2011 on the ground that the present suit has been instituted by the plaintiffs in collusion with the defendant No.2 and the said parties have initiated a second round of litigation only to buy time in the execution proceedings, by giving their matrimonial dispute, a colour of collusion. Learned counsel had submitted that after execution of the Sale Deed by the defendant No.2 in favour of the defendant No.1, she became the absolute owner of the suit premises and subsequently, the landlady thereof by virtue of the registered Rent Agreement dated 27.02.2008. He pointed out that neither of the aforesaid documents have been challenged by the plaintiffs in the present proceedings or in any other proceeding and therefore, they cannot lay any claim to have a right, title or interest in the suit premises. He had further argued that the plaintiffs did not have a locus standi or a cause of action to institute the present suit as they did not have a privity of contract with the defendant No.1. He had also drawn the attention of this Court to the averments made in the plaint to urge that the plaintiffs had themselves admitted the fact that the defendant No.2 had been allotted the suit premises by the DDA in the year 1983 and he had deposited all the installments in respect thereof and after conversion of the suit premises from leasehold to freehold on 18.02.2002, defendant No.2 had become its absolute owner and was well entitled to dispose it off as he deemed fit. 12. Learned counsel for defendant No.1 had also relied upon the very same letter dated 28.01.2003 that was addressed by the defendant No.2 to the plaintiff No.2 and filed by the plaintiffs, to contend that the defendant No.2 had clearly stated therein that he had paid all the installments in respect of the suit premises to the DDA from his income from service and his provident fund and further, that the sum of `10,000/- that had been spent by the plaintiff No.2 for converting the suit premises from leasehold to freehold was only a loan taken by the defendant No.2. 13. 13. Learned counsel for the defendant No.1 had stated that in the execution proceedings filed by his client, the plaintiffs had very conveniently chosen to file only two pages, i.e., the first and the last page of the aforesaid letter dated 28.01.2003 written by the defendant No.2 to the plaintiff No.2, whereas the said letter was actually running into fifteen pages and when the court below was unable to correlate the first and the last page of the said letter, the plaintiffs were compelled to file the complete letter comprising of fifteen pages but the same was unsigned. He submitted that in the present proceedings, the plaintiffs have now filed the very same letter along with the documents filed under index dated 15.12.2011, perusal whereof reveals that the same had been duly signed by the defendant No.2. He thus stated that the plaintiffs have tried to play fast and loose with the Court and tried to conceal the entire contents of the aforesaid document by relying only on those portions that suited them. 14. Learned counsel for the defendant No.1 had further submitted that by a subsequent letter dated 06.03.2008 filed by the plaintiffs along with the list of documents, the defendant No.2 had duly apprised the plaintiff No.1 of the fact that he had already sold the suit premises to the defendant No.1 by executing a registered Sale Deed and had received the full consideration amount, and further, that the said flat had been given on rent to the defendant No.2 for a limited period of three months, for which advance rent had been deposited by him with the defendant No.1. It is thus contended on behalf of the defendant No.1 that the plaintiffs cannot feign complete ignorance about the factum of sale of the suit premises or that the same had been let out by the defendant No.1 to the defendant No.2 for a brief period of three months. 15. It is thus contended on behalf of the defendant No.1 that the plaintiffs cannot feign complete ignorance about the factum of sale of the suit premises or that the same had been let out by the defendant No.1 to the defendant No.2 for a brief period of three months. 15. The attention of this Court was also drawn to the order dated 29.05.2009 that was passed in Suit No.524/2008, a suit that had been instituted by the defendant No.1 against the defendant No.3 to submit that the decree sought to be described by the plaintiffs as a collusive decree, was actually a decree that was passed on an application filed by the defendant No.1 under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, based on the admissions that had been made by the defendant No.2 in his written statement. Learned counsel had also referred to the order dated 03.03.2011 passed by the execution court, where under an application filed by the plaintiffs herein, seeking stay of the execution proceedings was dismissed by a detailed order running into seventeen pages and he pointed out that all the pleas that have been taken by the plaintiffs herein were taken as objections in the aforesaid proceedings, duly considered by the executing court and were dismissed as being devoid of merits. 16. As regards the contention of the counsel for the plaintiffs that the defendant No.2 had abandoned the suit premises since the year 1992, the same was strongly refuted by Mr. S.P. Singh, Advocate for the defendant No.1, who had stated that the correspondence that was exchanged between the DDA and the defendant No.2 right upto the year 2002 for converting the suit premises from leasehold to freehold, had mentioned his address as that of the suit premises and even as per the memo of parties filed by the plaintiffs herein, they admit the address of the defendant No.2 to be that of the suit premises. He further stated that in the replication filed by the plaintiffs to the written statement of the defendant No.1, they have averred that it is not their case that the transaction was a Benami transaction or the premises is of the Joint Hindu family. Instead, they have described the suit premises as an ancestral property and have claimed that the defendant No.2 had no right to sell the same without obtaining a NOC/Relinquishment Deed from the plaintiffs. Instead, they have described the suit premises as an ancestral property and have claimed that the defendant No.2 had no right to sell the same without obtaining a NOC/Relinquishment Deed from the plaintiffs. He referred to the order dated 03.03.2011 passed by the execution court and submitted that the aforesaid stand taken by the plaintiffs was duly examined by the said court and was turned down. Even otherwise, he urged that the aforesaid plea taken by the plaintiffs that the premises in question was ancestral in nature, is devoid of merits for the reason that the plaintiffs and the defendant No.2 hail from the State of Kerala and under the Kerala Joint Family Abolition Act, 1976, ancestral property devolves on female descendants and not on male descendants and therefore, the plaintiffs cannot lay a claim to the suit premises by describing the same as ancestral in the hands of the defendant No.2. 17. Additionally, learned counsel for the defendant No.1 had placed reliance on two judgments of this Court in the cases of Rahul Behl and Ors. vs. Smt. Ichayan Behl and Anr. reported as DRJ 1991 (21) 205 and Pratap vs. Shiv Shankar reported as 164(2009)DLT 479 to canvass that even if the plaintiffs seek shelter under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, then Section 8 of the said Statute excludes sons of son but includes sons of a predeceased son and any ancestral property that devolves on a son, is not in his capacity of being a Karta of a HUF, but in his individual capacity vis-a-vis his sons. He thus submitted that for this reason also, neither of the plaintiffs cannot claim a right to challenge the Sale Deed that was executed by the defendant No.2 in favour of the defendant No.1. 18. Learned counsel for the defendant No.1 also questioned the maintainability of the present suit in view of the provisions of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and Section 3 and 4 of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 and canvassed that having miserably failed to establish a prima facie case or balance of convenience in their favour, the ex-parte ad interim injunction order dated 19.12.2011 operating in favour of the plaintiffs, ought to be vacated forthwith. It is thus stated that not only should the interim application filed by the plaintiffs be dismissed, the suit that has been instituted by them is also liable to be dismissed as not maintainable in view of the provisions of Rule 101 of Order XXI of the CPC. 19. A perusal of the averments made in the plaint reveals that the plaintiffs have also admitted the fact that the suit premises in question, i.e., an MIG flat was allotted by the DDA to the defendant No.2 in the year 1983 and that it was the said defendant who had paid installments thereof to the DDA. However, a twist has sought to be given by the plaintiffs to the source of the installments that had been deposited by the defendant No.2 by alleging that he had made periodic infusion of funds and incomes from the ancestral agricultural land, to which the plaintiffs had a lawful right and therefore, the suit premises had acquired the colour of being an ancestral property in the hands of the defendant No.2. 20. Though none had appeared on behalf of the defendant No.2 when the present application was argued, a perusal of part-I file reveals that a written statement had been filed by the said defendant on 25.05.2012, wherein he has categorically denied the submissions made by the plaintiffs to the effect that they had contributed any amount to purchase the suit premises. Instead, defendant No.2 has asserted that the entire amounts payable for purchase of the suit premises were deposited by him in installments with the DDA, spread over a period of eight years from the year 1983 to the year 1990. It is further averred in the written statement that the sale transaction between him and the defendants No.1 was within the knowledge of the plaintiffs and the temporary arrangement of tenancy under the defendant No.1 was worked out by him after duly taking them into confidence, and further, that the suit premises had been sold by the defendant No.2 for purposes of constructing a house in Kerala and he had even started construction thereof with the sale proceeds received from the suit premises. 21. 21. Defendant No.2 has further averred in his written statement that the suit premises had been converted in his name by the DDA from leasehold to freehold and all the installments in respect of the flat had been duly paid by him, which fact would be borne out by all the challans that were filled up in his own handwriting and were deposited with the DDA. He has categorically denied having purchased the suit premises from out of moneys received from the ancestral property or the proceeds of the ancestral property as alleged by the plaintiffs. He has further averred in para 13 of the written statement that he and the plaintiffs hail from Kerala and under the Kerala Joint Family Abolition Act, 1976, the children get right by birth only in their mother’s property. Hence, the question of any ancestral property devolving on him or his having infused the proceeds thereof in the suit premises has been categorically denied by the defendant No.2. 22. This Court has heard the counsels for the parties and carefully considered their respective submissions in the light of the pleadings as also the documents that have been placed on record. 23. The facts of the case that are relevant for deciding the present application have been duly narrated above. To test the claim of the plaintiffs that they came to know about the sale transaction and the litigation that had been initiated by the defendant No.1 for seeking possession of the suit premises on 12.12.2009, when she had sought to forcibly evict them from the suit premises, it is necessary to examine the stand taken by the defendant No.2 in his written statement. As noted above, in his written statement, defendant No.2 has submitted that the plaintiffs were all along aware of the pendency of the court proceedings between him and the defendant No.1 and of the decision of the Court, but they still chose not to vacate the suit premises. Defendant No.2 has also denied the fact that there was any collusion between him and the defendant No.1 and he has controverted the stand taken by the plaintiffs that the aforesaid sale transaction and the Rent Deed were not to their knowledge. 24. It is also relevant to examine the documents that have been filed by the plaintiffs under the index dated 15.12.2011. 24. It is also relevant to examine the documents that have been filed by the plaintiffs under the index dated 15.12.2011. The said list of documents reveals that initially, the plaintiffs had obtained and filed certified copies of the documents that had been filed by them in Execution Petition No.56/2009, filed by the defendant No.1. At page 50 of the aforesaid documents is the copy of a two page letter dated 28.01.2003 addressed by the defendant No.2 to his son, plaintiff No.2. The said letter, marked as Annexure A-5, is however not paginated. The first page of the said letter mentions that defendant No.2 had received a sum of `78,000/- from the company where he was employed and he had taken more than half of his Provident Fund from the company for making payment for the suit property. On the second page of the said letter, defendant No.2 wrote that if health permitted, he would want to work for some more time and if for any reason, that did not happen, then he would have no other alternative but to make a demand of 1/4th share of the house (i.e., the suit premises). 25. The second relevant document filed by the plaintiffs is the letter dated 06.03.2008 addressed by the defendant No.2 to his wife, plaintiff No.1 informing her that he wanted to settle at his native place in Thiruvilwamala at Kerala and with this intention, he had sold his house to the defendant No.1 by executing a registered Sale Deed and the entire sale consideration had been received by him and further, plaintiff No.1 was informed that he had taken the very same premises on rent for a limited period of three months, for which purpose, he had got a Rent Agreement registered with the defendant No.1/landlady and under the said Rent Agreement, they were required to vacate the house by 27.05.2008. Defendant No.2 had also warned the plaintiff No.1 that failure to vacate the house by the cut-off date would result in suffering the liability of paying double the normal rent and he advised her to come and stay with him at Kerala alongwith their son, plaintiff No.2, for which purpose, he had made arrangements to construct a house in his native place. 26. 26. At page 95 of the very same set of documents filed by the plaintiffs, is a fifteen pages letter dated 28.01.2003 written by the defendant No.2 to his wife, plaintiff No.1. A perusal of the said letter reveals that the first and the last pages thereof are identical to the pages that have been enclosed by the plaintiffs at pages 50-51 of the set of documents as have been mentioned in para 24 hereinabove. The aforesaid letter contains a litany of complaints against his wife, made by defendant No.2 to the plaintiff No.2. On the second page of the said letter, defendant No.2 had written that he had retired from his service in a private limited company and his salary was `4,000/- and that he had left for Bangalore in the year 1993 and had returned after one year, during which period, the MCD had addressed three letters to him demanding a sum of `23,000/- and only upon his return, could he deposit the said amount. At page 3 of the aforesaid letter, defendant No.2 has mentioned having paid a sum of `25,000/- to the Statutory Authority for converting the suit premises from leasehold to freehold. He also admitted having borrowed a sum of `10,000/- from the plaintiff No.2 and assured him that he would return the said loan. At page 9 of the letter, defendant No.2 had written that the suit premises was occupied by him and his family from the year 1982, till the year 2003 and in these twenty one years, it was he alone, who was bearing the electricity bills (apart from a couple of times when the plaintiffs had paid the said bills) and that none of the parties had paid any amounts in respect of the suit premises, including property tax bills, ground rent bills and service charges etc. 27. With regard to the native property of the defendant No.2, at page 11 of the aforesaid letter dated 28.01.2003, he had stated that he still had some cultivable land at his native place but could not find any buyer for the same. He informed plaintiff No.2 that he had not transferred the said land to anybody. 27. With regard to the native property of the defendant No.2, at page 11 of the aforesaid letter dated 28.01.2003, he had stated that he still had some cultivable land at his native place but could not find any buyer for the same. He informed plaintiff No.2 that he had not transferred the said land to anybody. On the last page of the said letter, defendant No.2 had stated that his bank balance was reduced to nil and he had no other investment and if his health permitted, he would want to continue with his service for some more time but if the same did not happen, then he would have no alternative but to demand 1/4th share of the house for the purpose of his livelihood. The contents of the aforesaid letter addressed by the defendant No.2 to the plaintiff No.2 and heavily relied upon by the counsel for the plaintiffs completely demolishes the stand taken by the plaintiffs that the defendant No.2 was not residing in the suit premises ever since the year 1992. 28. The aforesaid position is also borne out from a perusal of the documents that were handed over by the counsel for the defendants in the course of arguments, which are a bundle of correspondence exchanged between the defendant No.2 and the DDA for conversion of the suit premises from leasehold to freehold. In all the aforesaid letters written by the defendant No.2 to the DDA, right upto the year 2001, he had mentioned his address as that of the suit premises. This also negates the stand taken by the plaintiffs that after the year 1992, defendant No.2 was not residing in the suit premises. 29. Moreover, the contention of the counsel for the plaintiffs that the suit premises was ancestral in nature has not been substantiated by the plaintiffs by either furnishing the details of the purported ancestral property, the proceeds whereof were allegedly used by the defendant No.2 to purchase the suit premises, or by substantiating their claim of contributing financially to the suit premises by filing some documents in support of the said submission. A mere extension of a paltry sum of `10,000/- as loan by the plaintiff No.2 to his father for conversion of the suit premises from leasehold to freehold can hardly be treated as an investment made by him for purchase thereof. A mere extension of a paltry sum of `10,000/- as loan by the plaintiff No.2 to his father for conversion of the suit premises from leasehold to freehold can hardly be treated as an investment made by him for purchase thereof. Hence a bald assertion made by the plaintiffs that the suit premises was purchased from monies received from ancestral property or that they had contributed in any way for purchase thereof, cannot take their case any further. 30. The aforesaid stand taken by the plaintiffs was also examined by the execution court while passing the order dated 03.03.2011, wherein it was observed that the argument of the plaintiffs (objectors in the said proceedings) that the property in question was purchased out of agricultural income was untenable as the said property had not been purchased by the defendant No.2 as the Karta of a joint Hindu family, but the same was allotted to him in his individual capacity and thus, it had remained his self-acquired property. Even today, the plaintiffs did not deny the fact that the suit premises was allotted by the DDA to the defendant No.2 and after the same was converted from leasehold to freehold, it had remained his exclusive property. In any case, learned counsel for the plaintiffs did not deny the fact that the plaintiffs and the defendant No.2 hail from Kerala and the society in Kerala being a matriarchal society, ancestral property devolves on female descendents and not on male descendants as the parties are governed by the Kerala Joint Family Abolition Act, 1976. Even otherwise, the plaintiffs have themselves admitted in their replication to the written statement filed by the defendant No.2 that they did not seek the benefit of the exception carved out in the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 or lay a claim on the suit premises on the ground that it had been purchased as an HUF property and they are the coparceners in a Hindu Undivided Family. 31. Furthermore, the attempt on the part of the plaintiffs to describe the judgment and decree dated 29.05.2009 passed by the trial court in the suit instituted by the defendant No.1 against the defendant No.2 as a consent decree, is not just erroneous, but is misconceived. 31. Furthermore, the attempt on the part of the plaintiffs to describe the judgment and decree dated 29.05.2009 passed by the trial court in the suit instituted by the defendant No.1 against the defendant No.2 as a consent decree, is not just erroneous, but is misconceived. A perusal of the aforesaid judgment and decree dated 29.05.2009 reveals that the same was passed under the provisions of Order XII Rule 6 CPC, on the basis of admissions that were made by the defendant No.2 in his written statement. In fact, the statement of defendant No.2 was separately recorded by the trial court much earlier, on 16.10.2008 when he had undertaken to vacate the suit premises by 27.10.2008. However, when he did not vacate the same, the defendant No.1 was compelled to file an application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, for grant of a judgment on admission. In view of the aforesaid position, the learned ACJ/ARC(West), Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, had held that the defendant No.1 was the owner of the suit premises in view of the registered Sale Deed that was executed in her favour by the defendant No.2, who was the original allottee and subsequent to the sale, there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between the said parties, by virtue of the registered Rent Agreement dated 27.02.2008 and when the tenancy period had expired on 26.05.2008 by efflux of time, defendant No.2 was in unauthorized occupation of the suit premises. Consequently, the suit for possession instituted by the defendant No.1 was decreed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC and based on the said judgment and decree dated 29.5.2009, defendant No.1 had filed the execution proceedings against the defendant No.2, wherein the plaintiffs had filed their objections, that came to be dismissed, vide order dated 3.3.2011. 32. The plea of marital discord between the plaintiff No.1 and the defendant No.2 as taken by the plaintiffs, cannot be a ground for holding that there is a prima facie case in their favour or that balance of convenience lies in their favour, nor can the said plea be treated as a ground to treat the Sale Deed executed by the defendant No.2 in favour of the defendant No.1 as a sham transaction or one that was intended to defeat the claims of the plaintiffs only on account of the fact that they are in physical possession of the suit premises. 33. As noted above, the plaintiffs have failed to place on record even a semblance of a document to establish that the suit premises had been allegedly purchased out of the funds received from ancestral property that had been allegedly sold by the defendant No.2. Instead, the contents of letter dated 28.01.2003 addressed by the defendant No.2 to the plaintiff No.2 and heavily relied upon by the plaintiffs completely wipes out the aforesaid stand for the reason that in the said letter, defendant No.2 had categorically stated that he had not transferred the agricultural land at his native place to anybody and that cultivation thereof had become unremunerative. The entire letter has to be read as a whole and not in bits and pieces as sought to be done by the plaintiffs, as that would distort the meaning conveyed therein by the defendant No.2, the author thereof. 34. Similarly, if it is the stand of the plaintiffs that they had made financial contributions towards the purchase of the suit premises, then it was for them to have demonstrated that they had filed some objections with the DDA when the same had been converted into a freehold property, solely in the name of the defendant No.2. 35. The bald denial issued by the plaintiffs that they were blissfully unaware of the factum of execution of the Sale Deed in respect of the suit premises in favour of defendant No.1 or the execution of the Rent Agreement runs contrary to the contents of the letter dated 06.03.2008 addressed by the defendant No.2 to the plaintiff No.1, wherein he had duly informed his wife of having sold the suit premises to the defendant No.1 by virtue of a registered Sale Deed and he had also apprised her of the fact that a Rent Agreement had been executed by him with the defendant No.1 for retaining the house as a tenant for a period of three months and had undertaken to vacate the same by 27.10.2008. For them to now claim that they came to know about the sale transaction only on 12.12.2009, when the defendant No.1 had tried to forcibly enter the suit premises, cannot cut any ice in the light of the aforesaid documents that have been filed by the plaintiffs themselves. 36. For them to now claim that they came to know about the sale transaction only on 12.12.2009, when the defendant No.1 had tried to forcibly enter the suit premises, cannot cut any ice in the light of the aforesaid documents that have been filed by the plaintiffs themselves. 36. Another important event that must be noticed, is the ex parte ad interim injunction order dated 19.12.2011 and the order dated 2.3.2012. A perusal of the order dated 19.12.2011 reveals that in para 8 thereof the Court had recorded the submission of the counsel for the plaintiffs to the effect that the defendant No.2 had in collusion with the defendant No.1, sold the suit premises to the latter so as to deprive the plaintiffs of a shelter over their heads. Further, counsel for the plaintiffs had categorically stated that the original Conveyance Deed of the suit premises, a copy whereof had been filed on record, was in the possession of the plaintiffs and that they had been in settled possession therein ever since the year 1983. Persuaded by the aforesaid submissions that were made by the counsel for the plaintiffs as recorded in paras 8 and 9 of the aforesaid order, an ex parte ad interim injunction was granted in favour of the plaintiffs by directing that no coercive action would be taken against them in the execution petition filed by the defendant No.1. 37. However, on the very next date, i.e., on 02.03.2012, learned counsel for the plaintiffs had proceeded to submit that it had been wrongly recorded in para 8 of the order dated 19.12.2011 that the original Conveyance Deed of the suit premises was in the possession of the plaintiffs, and in fact only a photocopy thereof was in their possession. Although the said submission was recorded in the order dated 02.03.2012, but the Court did not make any specific observation in that regard. 38. In view of the above, this Court is of the opinion that misleading facts were deliberately presented by the plaintiffs on 19.12.2011, which had resulted in passing of the ex-parte interim order in their favour and knowing very well that the said statement could not be substantiated by them, later on an innocuous statement was sought to be made on their behalf that the original conveyance deed of the suit premises was not in their possession. There was no occasion for the predecessor Bench to have on its own recorded in the order dated 19.12.2011, that the original Conveyance Deed was in the possession of the plaintiffs unless and until such a submission had been made on behalf of the plaintiffs. This is more so when only a copy of the Conveyance Deed had been filed by the plaintiffs while instituting the suit, which fact had been admitted by the counsel for the plaintiffs on 02.03.2012. 39. Furthermore, if it was an erroneous recording of the statement of learned counsel for the plaintiffs, then he ought to have approached the Court for making necessary corrections, at the first given opportunity. This is all the more so when the copy of the order dated 19.12.2011 was given to the plaintiffs dasti and therefore knowledge thereof cannot be denied by them till as late as in March, 2012, and nor can there be any justification for remaining silent in this regard till 2.3.2012. The above events fortify the view of this Court that the plaintiffs knew all along that they were on a weak wicket and they still proceeded to take their chance by asserting that the Conveyance Deed of the suit premises was in their possession and after the ex-parte injunction order was passed, sought to attribute their submission to an error in the court proceedings as recorded on 19.12.2011. 40. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is not persuaded to continue the interim order dated 19.12.2011 in favour of the plaintiffs, which is accordingly vacated forthwith and the present application is dismissed with costs of Rs. 10,000/- payable to the defendant No.1 within two weeks.