A.P. Sahi, J.— This Second Appeal has arisen out of the judgment and decree of the court below in Appeal No.61 of 1988 decided on 31.5.1988 whereby the Suit has been disposed of in terms of the Compromise Paper No.39-A-1 dated 17.2.1988 and the judgment and decree of the trial court dated 18.2.1988 has been reversed holding that the trial court committed a manifest error by not proceeding to treat the application dated 17.2.1988 as a compromise and had erroneously travelled beyond the scope of Order-XXIII to decide the Suit on merits treating the said document only as an admission. 2. The plaintiff is in Second Appeal before this Court. The appeal has remained pending for admission since 1988 and was heard on 13.12.2012 by this Court whereupon learned counsel Sri D.S.M. Tripathi has proceeded to address the Court contending that the lower appellate court has committed a manifest illegality by reversing the judgment and decree of the trial court on erroneous assumptions of law, namely that the document in question was only a piece of admission and could not be treated as a compromise under Order XXIII. He has relied upon the provisions of Order XII Rule 6 coupled with the decision in the case of Jineshwardas (Dead) through L.Rs. Vs. Jagrani, decided by the Apex Court on 26.9.2003 wherein it has been held that a judgment or a decree passed as a result of consensus cannot always be said to be on the basis of a compromise or settlement/ adjustment, and at times may be a judgment on the basis of an admission as in the present case. He, therefore, submits that the said proposition of law raises a substantial question of law and, therefore, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court deserves to be set aside. 3. I have heard Sri D.S.M. Tripathi and I have perused the said document which has been described as a piece of admission by the learned counsel for the appellant. It forms part of the Decree. The entire application dated 17.2.1988 which has undisputedly been signed and verified by the parties runs into 5 paragraphs followed by a prayer to terminate the proceedings of the Suit accordingly. The first paragraph recites that the parties to the Suit have resolved their dispute (Maslahat) on the intervention of some reputed persons of the locality. The entire application dated 17.2.1988 which has undisputedly been signed and verified by the parties runs into 5 paragraphs followed by a prayer to terminate the proceedings of the Suit accordingly. The first paragraph recites that the parties to the Suit have resolved their dispute (Maslahat) on the intervention of some reputed persons of the locality. The second paragraph recites that the plaintiff is recognized as the President of the Society. The third paragraph recites that the proceedings of contempt initiated shall stand terminated. The fourth paragraph recites that parties to the Suit shall bear their own costs and the fifth paragraph categorically recites that this compromise (Samjhauta) will form part of the decree. The prayer clause in reference to the said 5 paragraphs makes a request to the court to terminate the proceedings accordingly. 4. Sri D.S.M. Tripathi has vehemently urged that this document is only an admission under Order XII Rule 6 and that the trial court rightly proceeded to decree the Suit treating it only to be an admission. He submits that the lower appellate court has wrongly assumed it to be a composite document of compromise and, therefore, the judgment of the court below deserves to be set aside. 5. I have carefully perused the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant and the provisions of Order XII Rule 6 as well as Order XXIII Rule 1. In my opinion, the lower appellate court has rightly discussed the entire contents of the application and has recorded a satisfaction that it is a document of compromise, as such, the trial court erroneously proceeded to try the Suit on merits and decreed the same. The entire document and the tenor thereof is to abandon the proceeding in terms of the said document. Once the parties have agreed to terminate the proceedings finally then in such a situation, the order to be passed by the trial court was only in terms of the said document treating it to be a request for terminating the proceedings. 6. The only dispute that is sought to be raised is that it should be treated only as a document of admission in respect to the post of President and nothing beyond the same. 6. The only dispute that is sought to be raised is that it should be treated only as a document of admission in respect to the post of President and nothing beyond the same. I am unable to agree to the aforesaid submissions raised by Sri Tripathi inasmuch as in my opinion, as well the entire tenor of the document, indicates a resolution of the entire dispute before the Court and is not a mere admission of the office of the President. The acceptance of the plaintiff as the President by the defendants is only one of the clauses of the document and it was the said basis which may have impelled the parties to arrive at a compromise to end the entire Suit. This, therefore, was not a mere admission and a request to the Court to decree the Suit. On the contrary the parties have agreed to bear the costs of the Suit and have categorically recited that it is a compromise (Samjhauta). In such circumstances, it is the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 1 that were clearly attracted and not a case of mere admission as suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant. 7. This, therefore, does not raise any substantial question of law for this Court to admit this appeal under Section 100 CPC and, therefore, the same is dismissed summarily. _____________