Judgment :- 1. Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader. 2. The petitioner had joined the Karnataka State Judicial Service as a Munsiff of 18.2.1987. He was promoted by selection to the post of Civil Judge (Senior Division) in the year 1997 and as a District and Sessions Judge on an ad-hoc basis during the year 2003. He had served at various places in the State of Karnataka. When he was working as a District and Sessions Judge at Karwar, where he was posted in March 2009, by an order dated 15.5.2009, the judicial work entrusted to the petitioner was withdrawn. The petitioner made two representations to the second respondent, after he found that his name was recommended for compulsory retirement. However, by a Notification dated 23.6.2009, the petitioner, alongwith fourteen other Judicial Officers, was permitted to retire in public interest under Sub-Rule (4) of Rule 285 of the Karnataka Civil Services Rules (Hereinafter referred to as ‘the KCSRs’ for brevity) and he was relieved from service on the afternoon of 24.6.2009. He was aged 53 then. The petitioner had filed a review petition seeking reconsideration of the order. He had also made a representation dated 29.6.2009 to the Governor of Karnataka. The same not having evoked any response, the petitioner is before this court. 3. It is contended that the Notification, by which the petitioner has been permitted to retire, purportedly in public interest, is clearly illegal and is contravention of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. The KCSRs are framed in exercise of the powers conferred under the Proviso to Article 309. They are subject to other provisions of the Constitution of India. In terms of Article 310, a Civil Servant holds office during the pleasure of the Governor of the State. Article 311 prescribes the conditions which are to be satisfied before the dismissal of a Civil Servant or removal from service, after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The combined reading of Articles 309, 310 and 311 indicates that the Rules made thereunder are subject to doctrine of pleasure, which itself, is subject to the limitations imposed under Article 311. Article 311 prescribes the conditions which are to be satisfied before the dismissal of a Civil Servant or removal from service, after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The combined reading of Articles 309, 310 and 311 indicates that the Rules made thereunder are subject to doctrine of pleasure, which itself, is subject to the limitations imposed under Article 311. Therefore, while invoking Rule 285(4) of the KCSRs, it is obligatory on the part of the competent authority to follow the procedure prescribed under Article 311 of the Constitution of India and therefore, it is contended that the impugned Notification is violative of the principles of natural justice. It is urged that the meaning ordinarily attributed to the word “dismissal” is “to let go” or “to be rid of” of “to dismiss”, in other words, “to take away from the position occupied”. Therefore, the effect of removal or dismissal of one from his office is to discharge him from that office. This would take within its fold premature retirement. By that token of reasoning, it is urged that a reasonable opportunity should have been given to the petitioner to show-cause against the proposed action. It is contended that the petitioner has a legal right to continue in service as a Judicial Officer till he attains the age of 60, the age of superannuation, subject to the conditions prescribed under Rule 95-A of the KCSRs. In other words, the second respondent, as on the relevant date, ought to have assessed and reviewed the petitioner’s record for continuing his service beyond 58 and therefore, review of the petitioner’s service, prior to his attaining the age of superannuation, is a direct deprivation of his right to continue as a Judicial Officer as the age of superannuation of Civil Servants in the State of Karnataka is 60 since the year 2008. Whereas the State has chosen to apply the Rule mechanically in purportedly permitting the petitioner to retire in public interest on a mere recommendation by the second respondent. Compulsory or Premature Retirement is one of the known modes of termination of employment at the discretion of the appointing authority. it is a determination of service prematurely. Whereas the State has chosen to apply the Rule mechanically in purportedly permitting the petitioner to retire in public interest on a mere recommendation by the second respondent. Compulsory or Premature Retirement is one of the known modes of termination of employment at the discretion of the appointing authority. it is a determination of service prematurely. The anomaly is that while invoking Rule 285(4) of the KCSRs, no opportunity is granted to the petitioner; Whereas in respect of imposition of the punishment of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement under Rule 8(vi) of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1957 Rules’ for brevity) an opportunity is given to such persons by conducting a departmental inquiry. A person, who is guilty of misconduct, has a greater protection than an individual against whom no allegation is made. This is a glaring disadvantage. For if a person, such as the petitioner, is prematurely retired without indicating the blame or reason for such treatment, under the guise of invocation of Rule 285(4) of the KCSRs, which is clearly arbitrary and falls foul of the due process of law as envisaged under Article 311 of the Constitution. It is also contended that Rule 285(4) enables the appointing authority to prematurely retire a Government Servant working in a substantive post, if it is necessary in public interest by following the guidelines in applying the Rules. But, insofar as the Judicial Officers are concerned, no such guidelines are framed or followed. Therefore, the action initiated by the second respondent is clearly in contravention of the principles of nature justice. The law as laid down by the apex court is well settled, to the effect that though no express provision is made in following the principles of natural justice, compliance with the same would be implicit, where an affected person suffers civil consequence of an order passed against him, which would be prejudicial to his interest. The present impugned order is certainly prejudicial to the interest of the petitioner and is clearly in violation of the principles of natural justice. The impugned proceedings are also in contravention of Rule 285 of the KCSRs inasmuch as three months’ salary in lieu of three months notice has not been paid along with the order of retirement. The present impugned order is certainly prejudicial to the interest of the petitioner and is clearly in violation of the principles of natural justice. The impugned proceedings are also in contravention of Rule 285 of the KCSRs inasmuch as three months’ salary in lieu of three months notice has not been paid along with the order of retirement. The law is also settled insofar as the interpretation of the scope of Rule 285 of the KCSRs is concerned, wherein the apex court has pronounced that the age of retirement of a Judicial Officer cannot be compared with that of a Government Servant and the Judicial Officer has a statutory right to continue in service till he attains the age of superannuation at 60, subject to satisfying the test of suitability. The review contemplated at the age of 58 is for purposes of extending the age of superannuation from 58 to 60 and not for the purpose of compulsory retirement of a Judicial Officer. The law does not permit a career review before a Judicial Officer attains the age of 58. It is also pointed out that the second respondent in its administrative jurisdiction, has failed to evolve any Rules in exercise of power vested under Article 235 of the Constitution of India, in the absence of which, the decision arrived at is irrational and in violation of the principles of natural justice. The petitioner being picked up for compulsory retirement, would smack of arbitrary action in the absence of any reasons assigned. 4. The learned Counsel would seek to place reliance on the following authorities in support of the contentions:- 1. Krishena Kumar vs. S.P. Saksena and other, AIR 1973 SC 1065 , 2. Baldev Raj Chadha vs. Union of India and others, 1980 STPL (LE) 10196 SC, 3. J.D. Shrivastava vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1984 SC 630 , 4. Brij Mohan Singh Chopra vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1987 SC 948 , 5. N.C. Dalwadi vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1987 (3) SCC 611 , 6. TheRegistrar, High Court of Madras vs. R. Rajiah, AIR 1988 SC 1388 , 7. Ishwar Chand Jain vs. High Court of Punjab and Haryana, AIR 1988 SC 1395 , 8. M.S. Bindra vs. Union of India and others, 1998 (7) SCC 310 , 9. Rajat Baran Roy and Others vs. State of West Bengal, 1999 (4) SCC 235 , 10. TheRegistrar, High Court of Madras vs. R. Rajiah, AIR 1988 SC 1388 , 7. Ishwar Chand Jain vs. High Court of Punjab and Haryana, AIR 1988 SC 1395 , 8. M.S. Bindra vs. Union of India and others, 1998 (7) SCC 310 , 9. Rajat Baran Roy and Others vs. State of West Bengal, 1999 (4) SCC 235 , 10. State of Gujarat vs. Umedbhai M. Patel, AIR 2001 SC 1109 11. State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Vijay Kumar Jain, AIR 2002 SCW 1171 , 12. Dev Dutt vs. Union of India, 2008 AIR SCW 3486, 13. Kesar Enterprises Limited vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2011 AIR SCW 4031, 14. Rajiv Ranjan Singh ‘Lalan’ vs. Union of India, 2006 (6) SCJ 440 , 15. Y. Ganga Raju and others vs. The Railway Board and others, 1983 (1) SLR 686, 16. Madan Mohan Choudhary vs. State of Bihar (1999) 3 SCC 396 , 17. Krishna Kamal Ghosh vs. Union of India, 1980 (1) SLR 531. 18. K. Veera Chary vs. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh, WP 16437 and 18123/2007. 5. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader contends that the complaint of the petitioner to the effect that his premature retirement is punitive in nature, under the guise of public interest of that it is arbitrary and in violation of principles of natural justice, as being incorrect. It is contended that the compulsory retirement of the petitioner is not violative of Article 311 of the Constitution of India, as it contemplates dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of a person employed in a Civil capacity under the Union or the State Government the impugned action is neither an order of dismissal or reduction in rank and hence Article 311 cannot be pressed into service. It is contended that under Rule 285(4) of the KCSRs, the right to continue in service till attaining the age of superannuation is no longer available. A Government servant can be compulsorily retired from service on the authority forming an opinion that continuing him in service may not be in the public interest. This power is apart from the power available under Rule 95A of the KCSRs. It is asserted that the expressions “dismissal” or “removal” cannot be construed as “retirement”. A Government servant can be compulsorily retired from service on the authority forming an opinion that continuing him in service may not be in the public interest. This power is apart from the power available under Rule 95A of the KCSRs. It is asserted that the expressions “dismissal” or “removal” cannot be construed as “retirement”. On the other hand, compulsory retirement carries with it no stigma or implication of misbehaviour or incapacity, whereas this is implicit in an order of dismissal or removal from service. Yet another distinguishing feature of compulsory retirement is that, it carries with it all the service benefits to which the person so retired would be entitled. It is also pointed out that what was provided for under Rule 95-A and Rule 285(4) are in respect of different situations and were meant to be complementary. Rule 95-A addressed the pitfalls of ineligibility that a Government servant may have incurred during his service, maybe on account of indiscipline or incapacity. Compulsory retirement under Rule 285(4) on the other hand is an incidence of service and falls entirely outside the scope of Article 311 of the constitution. It is further contended that the tenor of Rule 285(4) does not envisage the issuance of a notice or the holding of a domestic enquiry before invoking the same, hence the plea of violation of principles of natural justice or the violation of Article 311 of the Constitution is not tenable. It is also contended that the very aspect of continuing a Government servant in service till superannuation depending as it does on various other factors such as desirability and incurring of ineligibility by the Government Servant during service, retiring the petitioner under Rule 285(4) by applying the test of desirability cannot be frowned upon and nor doest it infringe upon any right vested in the petitioners as the right to retire a Government Servant compulsorily, is absolute. It is contended that since the consequences directly spring from an order which is passed on the objective decision of the Competent Authority after due application of mind and also where the civil consequences complained of are not the result of any penalty, the rule of natural justice does not come into play. If an enquiry is made, it is more for enabling the authority passing the order to form an opinion that the retirement of the concerned is necessary in public interest. If an enquiry is made, it is more for enabling the authority passing the order to form an opinion that the retirement of the concerned is necessary in public interest. Such enquiry confers no right on the Government Servant to ask for an opportunity to meet the grounds on which a decision is taken to retire him in public interest. The power conferred on the Government cannot be said to be either unguided or uncontrolled in view of the provisions of Sub-Rule (4) of Rule 285 of the KCSRs and the same is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is further contended by the respondents that what is required of a competent authority under Rule 285 (4) is to form an opinion on an objective assessment, in public interest, of the desirability or otherwise of continuing the Government Servant in service. The absence of any rules or guidelines is not fatal to the decision arrived at in so forming an opinion. Where the Rule is silent as to the mode or test to be adopted in examining the desirability of continuing the petitioners in service, the competent authority is free to adopt or follow whatever procedure they may deem fit. The culmination of such exercise under Rule 285 (4) being only “the retirement” of the official concerned, which is not a punishment, the method or basis of forming an opinion by the Competent Authority becomes irrelevant. In the absence of allegations of mala fides, a Government Servant cannot ask for material, on the basis of which, a conclusion was arrived at, as principles of natural justice come into operation, only when a civil servant is proceeded against in an enquiry which could lead to imposition of punishment. In view of fact that Notification No.DPAR/25/SHC/2009 dated 23.06.2009 is issued in the public interest and the same being in accordance with law, the petitioners are not entitled for quashing of the same, much less, for a direction to reinstate them with continuity of service will all other consequential benefits. It is also contended that the High Court of Karnataka had constituted a Committee for the purpose of screening the performance of judicial officers of the State Judiciary, for their continuation in service beyond 50 years and before such officers attained 58 years, under a Notification dated 28.9.2005. It is also contended that the High Court of Karnataka had constituted a Committee for the purpose of screening the performance of judicial officers of the State Judiciary, for their continuation in service beyond 50 years and before such officers attained 58 years, under a Notification dated 28.9.2005. The said Committee having submitted its report, the same has been accepted by the Full Court of the High Court by its resolution dated 25.4.2009. It is therefore contended that the petition be dismissed as being without any merit. 6. The following authorities are cited in support of the above contentions:- i) Shiv Dayal Gupta vs. State of Rajasthan and another, 2006 SCC (L&S) 1230, ii) Allahabad Bank Officers’ Association and Another vs. Allahabad Bank and Others, (1996) 4 SCC 504 , iii) Pyare Mohan Lal vs. State of Jharkhand and others, (2010) 10 SCC 693 , iv) Gian Singh Mann vs. High Court of Punjab and Haryana and Another, (1980) 4 SCC 266 , v) All India Judges’ Association and others vs. Union of India, 2002 (3) KLJ 26, vi) Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh and others vs. L.V.A. Dixitulu and others, (1979) 2 SCC 34 . 7. By way of reply, the learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that after the matter was heard finally and reserved for final orders, the State has chosen to file additional pleadings-which is highly irregular and unfair. The learned counsel would seek to meet those pleadings treating the same as arguments canvassed. It is contended that the procedure adopted by the High Court, culminating in the impugned notification dated 23.6.2009 is contrary to the directions of the apex court and outside the powers of this court on its administrative side. It is urged that the proceedings said to have been initiated pursuant to the Notification dated 28.9.2005 is contrary to law. The decision of the apex court referred to in the Notification does not empower the High Court to constitute a Committee to review the performance and confidential records of all judicial officers on attaining the age of 50 years and 55 years or on completing 20 years of qualifying service to decide on the suitability to continue the judicial officers in service. The decision of the apex court in the judgment dated 21.3.2002 (All India Judges Association and Others vs. Union of India), had modified the directions granted earlier by restraining the review of performance of the Judicial Officers for their continuance in service beyond 58 years before one attains the age of 58 years, by following the procedure for compulsory retirement under the Service Rules applicable to such officer and to give him the benefit of the extended age of superannuation from 58 to 60, only if he is found fit and eligible to continue in service and if he is not so fit and eligible, he could be compulsorily retired on attaining the age of 58. It is pointed out that in the said judgment of the Apex Court, it is reiterated that, subject to the modifications including the above, all other recommendations of the Shetty Commission are accepted. It is thus contended that Recommendation-21.39 was no longer relevant and could not be pressed into service by the High Court. This view is supported by a Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of K. Veerachari vs. High Court of Andhra Pradesh, (2008) 5 ALD 372 . The learned counsel would thus contend that the Notification dated 28.9.2005 is misconceived and would not be applicable to the petitioners as no review can be undertaken of a judicial officer at 50 or 55 years of age or on completion of 20 years of service. It is further pointed out that the minutes of the meeting dated 15.4.2009 and 17.4.2009 would indicate the agenda item as being “to consider the matter with regard to screening of judicial officers at the age of 50 and 55 and the resolution is to consider the work performance, confidential records etc., of the judicial officers who have attained the age of 50 and 55 as on 31.12.2008”. It is contended that the petitioner was neither 50 nor 55 as on 31.12.2008 and hence, the exercise was not warranted. It is further pointed out that the resolution of a Committee of Judges, which has been adopted by the Full Court at its meeting dated 25.4.2009, does not refer to the individual review of performance of the petitioner for his continuance beyond the age of 58. The individual review of the assessment of the confidential reports, performance etc., is also not reflected therein. The individual review of the assessment of the confidential reports, performance etc., is also not reflected therein. Recommendations thus cannot be substantiated by producing the vigilance report and remarks in the confidential records before this court at the hearing stage. In other words, the impugned order should withstand the legal scrutiny independently and cannot be supplemented in the form of affidavits or written submissions at the stage of final hearing and when the case is reserved for judgment. It is also contended that in terms of Paragraph 21.40 of the Shetty Commission Report, there is a suggestion that all the High Courts should frame Rules specifying the age of superannuation without any condition and no such rule has been framed insofar as the State of Karnataka is concerned. Hence, the review of performance of Judicial Officers can only be undertaken at the age of 58 for their continued utility up to the age of 60. It is further pointed out that the vigilance record and the report insofar as the petitioner is concerned, would indicate that the representations received against the petitioner have been closed by the Chief Justice. In respect of Complaint No.HVC 117/2008, no final decision has been taken and no disciplinary proceedings had been initiated. The petitioner had joined service as a Munsiff on 18.2.1987 and was promoted a Civil Judge (Senior Division) in the year 1997 and he was posted to the Family Court, Chikmagalur in the year 2004. the adverse remarks which are referred to in the confidential records were never communicated from 2004 onwards and therefore, he had no occasion to make an representation in that regard. 8. In the light of the above rival contentions and on a perusal of the record that is placed at the disposal of the court, the points that would arise for consideration are as follows:- i) Whether the Notification dated 28.9.2005 was invalid as being contrary to the law as laid down by the Apex Court? ii) Whether the impugned notification by which the petitioner was compulsorily retired from service in terms of Rule 285(4) of the KCSRs is actually punitive in nature, though couched in innocuous language as being compulsory retirement, on being found unsuitable to be continued in service in public interest? ii) Whether the impugned notification by which the petitioner was compulsorily retired from service in terms of Rule 285(4) of the KCSRs is actually punitive in nature, though couched in innocuous language as being compulsory retirement, on being found unsuitable to be continued in service in public interest? iii) Whether it is no longer permissible for the competent authority to undertake a review of a Judicial Officer’s performance, either at the time, the officer attains the age of 50 or 55 or on completion of the 20 years of service? iv) Whether the exercise was permissible insofar as the petitioner was concerned? 9. In answering these points for consideration, it would be useful to have an overview of the case-law that has been cited at the bar. The petitioner has relied on the judgments enumerated hereinabove. In Krishena Kumar, supra, it was a case of an Assistant Audit Officer of the Railways, who sought to challenge an order retiring him from service. Two points arose for consideration. Firstly, whether the notice and the notification in respect of his retirement had been issued by the competent authority and secondly, as there was no mention of the opinion formed by the competent authority, to the effect that it was in public interest to retire the appellant under a relevant rule, whether the same was therefore invalid. The Apex Court answered both the points against the appellant. Insofar as the second point was concerned, the Apex Court was satisfied of the scrutiny made in respect of the appellant as to his suitability for retention in service beyond the age of 55 and that the physical capacity, work and conduct of the petitioner as revealed from the official records, was considered and accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. In the case of Baldev Raj Chadha, the appellant was an Accounts Officer, who was compulsorily retired in terms of the Fundamental Rules government Central Civil Services. The appellant had questioned the competence of the authority to pass the impugned order of compulsory retirement and the main contention was that there was no foundation to hold that the petitioner was retired as it was necessary in public interest. The appellant had questioned the competence of the authority to pass the impugned order of compulsory retirement and the main contention was that there was no foundation to hold that the petitioner was retired as it was necessary in public interest. Insofar as the first issue is concerned, it was held against the appellant, but on the second and the main contention, the apex court examined the procedure adopted by the competent authority and the material that was available in arriving at a decision against the appellant. The apex court held as follows:- “One wonders how an officer whose continuous service for 14 yeas crossing the efficiency bar and reaching the maximums alary in the scale and with no adverse entries at least for five years immediately before the compulsory retirement, could be cashiered on the score that long years ago, his performance had been poor, although his superiors had allowed him to cross the efficiency bar without qualms. A short cut may often be a wrong cut. The order of compulsory retirement fails because vital material, relevant to the decision, has been ignored and obsolete material, less relevant to the decision, has influenced the decision. Any order which materially suffers from the blemish of overlooking or ignoring willfully or otherwise, vital facts bearing on the decision is bad in law. Likewise, any action which irrationally digs up obsolete circumstances and obsessively reaches a decision based thereon cannot be sustained. Legality depends on regard or the totality of material facts viewed in a holistic perspective. For these reasons, the order challenged is obviously bad and we quash it. It is, however, open to the A.G. to take a fresh decision based on legal material and guided by legal principles. The appellant has, by now, reached the age of superannuation in the normal course. The result is that the consequence of any fresh order may only be financial. It is for the A.G. to consider whether in the circumstances, a fresh evaluation for the purpose of compulsory retirement is called for. We merely allow the appeal, quash the order of compulsory retirement and leave the law to take its course. The appellant will be entitled to costs which we quantify at Rs.2,000/-. Appeal allowed”. In J.D. Srivastava’s case, the appellant was a Judicial Officer of the State of Madhya Pradesh who was compulsorily retired in public interest. We merely allow the appeal, quash the order of compulsory retirement and leave the law to take its course. The appellant will be entitled to costs which we quantify at Rs.2,000/-. Appeal allowed”. In J.D. Srivastava’s case, the appellant was a Judicial Officer of the State of Madhya Pradesh who was compulsorily retired in public interest. The Apex Court held after a review of the case-law that it is well-settled that the power to retire a Government Servant compulsorily in public interest in terms of a service rule is absolute provided the authority concerned forms an opinion bona fide that it is necessary to pass such an order in public interest. It is equally well-settled that if such decision is based on collateral grounds or if the decision is arbitrary, it is liable to be interfered with by courts. And on facts, it was found that, the decision taken insofar as the appellant was concerned, was arbitrary as the High Court had proceeded based on the entries that were made twenty years prior to the date on which the decision to compulsorily retire the appellant was taken and dependence on such stale entries could not be placed for retiring a person compulsorily, particularly when the officer concerned had been promoted subsequent to such entries and when there was nothing in the present conduct casting any doubt on the wisdom of the promotion, there was no justification to dig into the officer’s past and accordingly reversed the order of compulsory retirement. In Brig Mohan Singh Chopra, the appellant was appointed as a Superintendent, Quality Marketing Centre, (Scientific Instrument) of the Government of Punjab. He was promoted to the post of Joint Director till he was prematurely retired by the Government in exercise of power under Rule providing for the same. In Brig Mohan Singh Chopra, the appellant was appointed as a Superintendent, Quality Marketing Centre, (Scientific Instrument) of the Government of Punjab. He was promoted to the post of Joint Director till he was prematurely retired by the Government in exercise of power under Rule providing for the same. The appellant had challenged the same in writ proceedings before the High Court and the High Court having dismissed his petition, he was before the Apex Court and the Apex Court has pointed out the relevant considerations which would go into the formation of an opinion to compulsorily retire a civil servant before he attains the age of superannuation in the following terms: “It is now well settled that while considering the question of premature retirement it may be desirable to make an overall assessment of the Government servant’s record, but while doing that, more value should be attached to the confidential reports pertaining to the years immediately preceding such consideration. It is possible that a new entrant to a service may have committed mistakes and for that reason he may have earned adverse entries and if those entries of early years of service are taken into consideration for prematurely retiring a Government employee then perhaps no employee would be safe even though he may have brilliant record of service in later years. This aspect was emphasised by this Court in a number of cases namely, Baldev Raj Chadha vs. Union of India (1981) 1 SCR 430 : ( AIR 1981 SC 70 ), Brij Bihari Lal Agarwal Vs. High Court of M.P., (1981) 2 SCR 297 : ( AIR 1981 SC 594 ), Amar Kant Choudhary vs. State of Bihar, (1984) 2 SCR 299 : ( AIR 1984 SC 531 ) and J.D. Srivastava vs. State of M.P., (1984) 2 SCR 466 : ( AIR 1984 SC 630 ). This Court has consistently taken the view that old and state entries should not be taken into account while considering the question of premature retirement; instead, the entries of recent past of five to ten years should be considered in forming the requisite opinion to retire a Government employee in public interest. It would be unreasonable and unjust to consider adverse entries of remote past and to ignore the good entries of recent past. It would be unreasonable and unjust to consider adverse entries of remote past and to ignore the good entries of recent past. We are therefore of the opinion that if entries for a period of more than 10 years past are taken into account it would be an act of digging out past to get some material, to make an order against the employee. In view of this we would confine our scrutiny to the appellant’s record of service for the last 10 years prior to the date on which he was prematurely retired. There is no doubt that whenever an adverse entry is awarded to a Government servant it must be communicated to him. The object and purpose underlying the communication is to afford an opportunity to the employee to improve his work and conduct and to make representation to the authority concerned against those entries. If such a representation is made it is imperative that the authority should consider the representation with a view to determine as to whether the contents of the adverse entries are justified or not. Making of a representation is a valuable right to a Government. Employee and if the representation is not considered, it is bound to affect him in his service career, as in Government. Service grant of increment, promotion and ultimately premature retirement all depend on the scrutiny of the service records.” In N.C. Dalwadi, supra, the appellant was an officer of the Bombay Service of Engineers, Class-I in the erstwhile State of Bombay and was promoted to the post of Executive Engineer. Later he was promoted to the post of Superintending Engineer on an officiating basis. He was thereafter placed in-charge of Minor Irrigation Project Circle. In other words, the appellant’s meritorious service was not in doubt. However, it was suddenly decided to compulsorily retire him under the relevant Rules giving him three months’ notice of such intention on his attaining the age of 55, though he would have retired in the usual course on attaining the age of 58. He head put in 29 years of service and there were no adverse entries in his Confidential Reports. Therefore, the appellant challenged the order of compulsory retirement in writ proceedings. The High Court having dismissed the petition, the appellant was before the Apex Court. He head put in 29 years of service and there were no adverse entries in his Confidential Reports. Therefore, the appellant challenged the order of compulsory retirement in writ proceedings. The High Court having dismissed the petition, the appellant was before the Apex Court. The Apex Court while placing reliance on an opinion expressed by the court in the case of Union of India vs. Col. J.N. Sinha, (1970) 2 SCC 458 , wherein it was observed that the power to compulsorily retire available under the rules can be exercised subject to the conditions mentioned in the Rule. One of which, is that the concerned authority must be of the opinion that it is in public interest to do so. The test would be as laid down in the said decision wherein it was held that though the appropriate authority has the absolute right to retire a Government Servant, the right conferred is an absolute one. That power could be exercised if the authority bona fide forms an opinion, but it is open to an aggrieved party to contend that the requisite opinion has not been formed or that the decision is based on collateral grounds or that it is an arbitrary decision. Compulsory retirement involves no civil consequences. The Rule providing for the same is not intended for taking any penal action against the Government Servants. That Rule merely embodies one of the facts of the ‘pleasure doctrine’ embodied in Article 310 of the Constitution. That there was no denying the fact that in all organisations and more so in Government organisations, there is a good deal of dead wood. It is in the public interest to chop off the same. The relevant Rule holds the balance between the rights of individual Government Servants and the interests of the public. While a minimum service is guaranteed to the Government Servant, the Government is given the power to energise its machinery and make it more efficient by compulsorily retiring those, who in its opinion, should not be there in public interest and applying those tests, the Apex Court in Dalwadi’s case, opined that there was no justification for compulsorily retirement of the appellant as the record indicated that he had an unblemished record and there was nothing against him to doubt his integrity, fitness and competence and therefore, has allowed the appeal. In Registrar, High Court of Madras vs. R. Rajiah, AIR 1988 SC 1388 , the case pertained to two appeals directed against a common judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court, wherein the High Court had quashed the orders of compulsory retirement of the two respondents, who were District Munsiffs. Following the ratio of the decision in Baldev Raj Chadha and Brij Bihari Lal Agarwal vs. High Court of M.P., AIR 1981 SC 594 , the Apex Court held that since the respondents had been compulsorily retired on the basis of certain adverse circumstances, which were not considered to be on any significance at the time of their appointment being relied upon for purposes of compulsory retirement, could not be sustained and accordingly, dismissed the appeals. In Ishwar Chand Jain, supra, the appellant before the apex court had been selected for appointment to the Haryana Superior Judicial Service and was appointed as Additional District and Sessions Judge on probation for a period of two years. While he was posted at a particular place, the Bar Association of that Court, passed a resolution against the appellant, as a result of which he was transferred to another place. While he was posted there, an inquiry was conducted by a Judge of the High Court into certain complaints. After the inquiry, the High Court at its meeting resolved that the appellant’s work was not satisfactory during his probationary period and as such his services deserved to be dispensed with. This was forwarded to the State Government. Before the State Government could issue any orders, the appellant filed a writ petition before the Apex Court challenging the High Court’s decision. However, he was permitted to withdraw the petition with liberty to approach the High Court and thereafter he had approached the High Court. The Division Bench dismissed the writ petition while finding that the appellant’s work and conduct was not satisfactory and as he was on probation, his services were rightly terminated. Thereafter, the State Government accepted the High Court’s recommendations and terminated the appellant’s services. The Division Bench dismissed the writ petition while finding that the appellant’s work and conduct was not satisfactory and as he was on probation, his services were rightly terminated. Thereafter, the State Government accepted the High Court’s recommendations and terminated the appellant’s services. Aggrieved by it, the appellant was before the Apex Court, On a close examination of the record, the Apex Court found that there were four complaints, which had given occasion to address the suitability of continuing the appellant in service and took note of the fact that a report of the Vigilance Judge indicated that out of the four complaints, the matter relating to item nos.1 and 2 needed further investigation and inquiry and therefore, he was not in a position to record any definite finding on the allegations made in those complaints and as regards the third complaint, the Vigilance Judge did not find any infirmity in the conduct of the appellant and as regards the fourth complaint, the Vigilance Judge did not express any opinion and the Apex Court has noted that the Vigilance Judge did not show that the appellant’s work and conduct were not satisfactory or that he was not fit to act as a Judicial Officer. Therefore, the Apex Court held that the High Court was not justified in considering those complaints and in concluding that the appellant’s work and conduct was not satisfactory and observed thus:- “Under the Constitution the High Court has control over the subordinate judiciary. While exercising that control it is under a constitutional obligation to guide and protect judicial officers. An honest strict judicial officer is likely to have adversaries in the mofussil courts. If complaints are entertained on trifling matters relating to judicial orders which may have been upheld by the High Court on the judicial side no judicial officer would feel protected and it would be difficult for him to discharge his duties in an honest and independent manner. An independent and honest judiciary is a sine qua non for Rule of law. If judicial officers are under constant threat of complaint and enquiry on trifling matters and if High Court encourages anonymous complaints to hold the field the subordinate judiciary will not be able to administer justice in an independent and honest manner. An independent and honest judiciary is a sine qua non for Rule of law. If judicial officers are under constant threat of complaint and enquiry on trifling matters and if High Court encourages anonymous complaints to hold the field the subordinate judiciary will not be able to administer justice in an independent and honest manner. It is therefore imperative that the High Court should also take steps to protect its honest officers by ignoring ill-conceived or motivated complaints made by the unscrupulous lawyers and litigants.” In M.S. Bindra, supra, the appellant belonged to the Indian Revenue Service. He was compulsorily retired from service at the age of 52. The background was that a Scrutiny Committee which considered the cases of several officials of the Revenue Department found that, in the interest of the department, some officials should be weeded out. The committee delved into the files relating to such persons including the appellant and in the case of the appellant, had focused on three instances which have been noted by the Apex Court and the Screening Committee has opined that on the basis of the specific cases and other materials annexed thereto, the appellant was found to be of unreliable integrity and unfit to be entrusted with any position of responsibility in the Government Service as he had widely and systematically indulged in extortion of monies from the parties and adopted methods which have the effect of bringing down the esteem of the Government in the public eye. The Revenue Committee had upheld the conclusion and thereafter, the Government of India had passed the impugned order. The Apex Court opined that the judicial scrutiny of any order imposing premature compulsory retirement was permissible if the order is either arbitrary or mala fide or if it is based on no evidence and that the principles of natural justice would have no place in the context of compulsory retirement, but that does not mean that if the version of the delinquent officer is necessary to reach the correct conclusion, the same could be obviated on the assumption that other materials alone need be looked into. Therefore, it did not choose to address the mala fides claimed by the appellant, but viewed the case for judicial scrutiny, namely, want of evidence or material to reach the decision of compulsory retirement. Therefore, it did not choose to address the mala fides claimed by the appellant, but viewed the case for judicial scrutiny, namely, want of evidence or material to reach the decision of compulsory retirement. On a close examination of the circumstances of the case, the Apex court held that there was dearth of evidence to conclude that the appellant had doubtful integrity and that such conclusion did not stand the judicial scrutiny even within the limited permissible scope and accordingly, the appeal was allowed. In Madan Mohan Choudhary, supra, the appellant was the Additional District and Sessions Judge, who was compulsorily retired from service. While dealing with the question of uncommunicated adverse entries, it was noted that it was laid down in Union of India vs. M.E. Reddy, (1980) 2 SCC 15 , that uncommunicated adverse remarks can be relied upon while passing an order of compulsory retirement, but in two subsequent decisions, namely. Brij Mohan Singh Chopra, supra and Baidyanath Mahapatra vs. State of Orissa, AIR 1989 SC 2218 , which addressed the same question and it was laid down that uncommunicated adverse entries could not be legally relied upon while making an order of compulsory retirement. It was further laid down that if a representation was pending against the adverse remarks, the adverse entries against which the representation is made, could not be taken into consideration unless the representation itself was considered and disposed of. Both the above views were considered by a three-Judge bench in Bikantha Nath Das vs. The Chief District Medical Officer, (1992) 2 SCC 299 and both the views were overruled and the following principles were laid down. “34. (i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour. (ii) The order has to be passed by the Government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the Government. (iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the Government. (iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or this Court would not examine the matter as an appellate court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) mala fide or (b) that it is based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary-in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material; in short, if it is found to be a perverse order. (iv) The Government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter-of course attaching more importance to record of and performance during the later years. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority. (v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference.” This decision was then followed in several other decisions, namely, 1) Posts and Telegraphs Board vs. C.S.N. Murthy, AIR 1992 SC 1368 , 2) Secretary to the Government, Harijan and Tribal Welfare Department vs. Nityananda Pati, AIR 1993 SC 383 , 3) Union of India vs. V.P. Seth, AIR 1994 SC 1261 , 4) M.S. Bindra vs. Union of India, (1998) 7 SCC 310 , 5) State of Gujarat vs. Suryakant Chunilal Shah, (1999) 1 SCC 530. And applying the law therein, the Apex Court found that insofar as the appellant was concerned, adverse remarks for three years namely, 1991-92, 1992-93 and 1993-94 were not communicated in the usual course, but were communicated at one point of time and at a point of time when the Standing Committee of the High Court had already formed an opinion to compulsorily retire the appellant from service, the representation made against those remarks was not dealt with promptly, but was disposed of after a long period of one year. This infirmity, according to the Apex Court, rendered the order of compulsory retirement as being arbitrary and unsustainable. In Rajat Baran Roy and Others, supra, which was a common decision rendered in respect of three petitioners, who were all District Judges compulsorily retired from service. Their grievance was that as per the Service Rules applicable, their retirement from service can take place only on their attaining the age of 60. Whereas the respondents had prematurely retired them at the age of 58 on the basis of review of the petitioners service records, performance, efficiency, integrity, utility etc. The respondents, on the other hand, relied on a decision of the Apex Court in All India Judges Association vs. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 288 , supra, to contend that it was open to the High Court to make pre-retirement assessment of a member of the higher judicial service on or about the time such member attained the age of 58 and if the High Court is not satisfied with the performance of officer concerned, it can recommend to the Governor of the State to compulsorily retire the officer concerned at the age of 58. The Apex Court noticed the directions issued in the first case of All India Judges’ Association vs. Union of India, (1992) 1 SCC 119 , wherein the Apex Court had directed that the retirement age of Judicial Officers be raised to 60 and appropriate steps be taken by December 31, 1992 and therefore, it became the duty of the States and the Union of India to make suitable provisions in the Rules concerned to enhance the retirement age of judicial officers to 60 by 31.12.1992. instead of complying with the directions of the Apex Court in the 1992 case, the Union of India and some of the States filed a review petitions before the apex court on various grounds and that the apex court while directing that the retirement age of the members of the sub ordinate judiciary should be 60, added a rider to the increase in the retirement age to the effect that the benefit of increase in retirement shall not be available automatically to all Judicial Officers irrespective of their past record of service and evidence of their continued utility and the benefit, according to the Apex Court, was available to those who, in the opinion of the respective High Courts have the potential for the continued useful service. It was not intended as a windfall for the indolent, the infirm and those of doubtful integrity, reputation and utility, which was to be assessed and evaluated by appropriate Committees of the Judges of the respective High Courts. This further direction in the 1993 case was warranted because of the failure of the Governments concerned to perform their obligatory duty and hence, the Apex Court has opined that the directions issued would continue to be in force till such time, the States framed the Rules and any pre-retirement assessment would not be applicable unless the same was specifically provided under the Rules. Therefore, on the interpretation of the scope of the relevant rules pertaining to the petitioners therein, it was held that the impugned orders examined in the light of the relevant Rule, the Apex Court found that there was non-application of mind and want of material particulars which are mandatory for invoking the said Rule and the petition stood allowed. In Umedbhai M. Patel, supra, the respondent was an Executive Engineer who was placed under suspension pending disciplinary proceedings. An inquiry was initiated against him alleging misuse of power in connection with the purchase of goods. While he was continuing under suspension, the State Government passed an order of compulsory retirement invoking the Service Rules. He was due to retire on attaining the age of superannuation more than a year later. In the order of compulsory retirement, it was stated that the case relating to continuance of the respondent in Government service, beyond the age of 50 and 55, was reviewed. He was due to retire on attaining the age of superannuation more than a year later. In the order of compulsory retirement, it was stated that the case relating to continuance of the respondent in Government service, beyond the age of 50 and 55, was reviewed. The respondent challenged the order of compulsory retirement before the High Court and a Division Bench of the High Court set aside the impugned order on the ground that the same was punitive in nature and was passed with an oblique purpose, to punish the respondent, which were neither investigated nor was the respondent given a reasonable opportunity of hearing and that was in challenge before the Apex Court. On a review of the case-law pertaining to compulsory retirement, it was laid down as follows: “11. The law relating to compulsory retirement has now crystallized into definite principles, which could be broadly summarised thus: (i) Whenever the service of a public servant are no longer useful to the general administration, the officer can be compulsorily retired for the same of public interest. (ii) Ordinarily, the order of compulsory retirement is not to be treated as a punishment coming under Article 311 of the Constitution. (iii) For better administration, it is necessary to chop off dead wood, but the order of compulsory retirement can be passed after having due regard to the entire service record of the officer. (iv) Any adverse entries made in the confidential record shall be taken note of and be given due weightage in passing such order. (v) Even uncommunicated entries in the confidential record can also be taken into consideration. (vi) The order of compulsory retirement shall not be passed as a short cut to avoid departmental enquiry when such course is more desirable. (vii) If the officer was given a promotion despite adverse entries made in the confidential record, that is a fact in favour of the officer. (viii) compulsory retirement shall not be imposed as a punitive measure.” The Apex Court then addressed the facts of the case before it and found that there were no adverse entries in the respondent’s confidential records, there was nothing averred that respondent’s service record containing any adverse entries and the respondent had successfully crossed the efficiency bar at the age of 50 as well as 55. He was placed under suspension pending disciplinary proceedings and the State Government had sufficient time to complete the inquiry, but it was not done within a reasonable time where the respondent had less than two years to retire from service and if the impugned order was viewed in the light of those facts, it was the opinion of the Apex Court that the order of compulsory retirement was passed for extraneous reasons since the authorities did not choose to wait for the conclusion of the inquiry and decided to dispense with the services of the respondent, merely on the basis of the allegations, which had not been proved and accordingly upheld the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court setting aside the order of compulsory retirement. In State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Vijay Kumar Jain, supra, the respondent was initially appointed as an Assistant Engineer in ad-hoc capacity. His services were regularised and confirmed. He was promoted as an Executive Engineer on the basis of seniority-cum-merit. A Screening Committee however recommended compulsory retirement of the respondent from service on the basis of four adverse entries in his character roll and an order of compulsory retirement having been passed, a writ petition was filed challenging the same before the High Court. The petitioner also challenged the adverse entries in his service record, by way of writ petitions challenging the order of his compulsory retirement and those petitions having been allowed, the adverse entries were nullified. Therefore, his writ petition challenging the order of compulsory retirement also came to be allowed since the basis for the order of compulsory retirement was nullified. The State Government however, challenged the decisions of the High Court before the Apex Court. After review of the case-law, the Apex Court held that the law as laid down would unmistakably indicate that the entire service record of a Government Servant could be considered by the Government while exercising power under the Rule providing for compulsory retirement with emphasis on the later entries and the Rule empowers the State Government with an absolute right to retire an employee on attaining the age of 50. The integrity of an employee is the foremost consideration in public service. If it is unbecoming to the public interest or obstructs the efficiency in public service, the Government has an absolute right to compulsorily retire such an employee, is unquestionable. The integrity of an employee is the foremost consideration in public service. If it is unbecoming to the public interest or obstructs the efficiency in public service, the Government has an absolute right to compulsorily retire such an employee, is unquestionable. In the case on hand, the withholding of integrity of a Government employee was a serious matter and the Apex Court found that the integrity of the respondent was withheld by an order and the entry in the character roll was well within ten years of passing of the order of compulsory retirement and that single entry was itself sufficient to compulsorily retire the respondent from service and accordingly allowed the appeal. In K. Veera Chary’s case, which is a full-bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, the petitioners were Judicial Officers in the rank of District Judge-Grade-II. They were compulsorily retired from service. The rule under which they were so compulsorily retired empowered the State Government to do so at the age of 50 or 55 or 58 or after completion of 33 years of qualifying service. If such officer was found not fit and eligible to be continued in service, the Rule also empowered the State Government to retire the officer in public interest after giving three months’ notice in writing or three months of pay in lieu of such notice. The petitions having been referred to the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, the following points were framed for consideration:- 1) Whether first proviso to Section 3(1A) of Andhra Pradesh Public Employment (Regulation of Age of Superannuation) Act, 1984, as amended by A.P. Act No.42 of 2006, insofar as the same enables the Government to compulsorily retire a judicial officer on attaining the age of fifty years or fifty five years, if he is found not fit and eligible to be continued in service is ultra vires and violative of Articles 14 and 311(2) of Constitution of India? 2) Whether second proviso to Section 3(1A) of Andhra Pradesh Public Employment (Regulation of Age of Superannuation) Act, 1984, as amended by A.P. Act No.42 of 2006, is ultra vires and violative of Articles 14 and 311(2) of Constitution of India? 3. 2) Whether second proviso to Section 3(1A) of Andhra Pradesh Public Employment (Regulation of Age of Superannuation) Act, 1984, as amended by A.P. Act No.42 of 2006, is ultra vires and violative of Articles 14 and 311(2) of Constitution of India? 3. Whether impugned order of the Government in G.O. Ms.No.87, dated 28.07.2007, whereunder the petitioner in W.P.No.16437 of 2007 was ordered to compulsorily retire from service with effect from 31.07.2007 in terms of second proviso to Section 3(1A), is unconstitutional and invalid? 4) Whether impugned order of the Government in G.O. Ms.No.32, dated 07.04.2007, whereunder the petitioner in W.P.No.18123 of 2007 was ordered to compulsorily retire from service with effect from 30.04.2007 in terms of first proviso to Section 3(1A) of the Act, is unconstitutional and invalid? Xxx And it was held, “Accordingly, on point NO.1, we hold and declare that first proviso of Section 3(1A) of Parent Act as amended A.P. Act No.42 of 2006 insofar as the same enables the Government to compulsorily retire a member of Higher Judicial Service or the State Judicial Service on the afternoon of last day of the month in which he attains the age of fifty years or fifty five years is constitutionally invalid and violates Articles 14 and 311(2) of Constitution of India. The words ‘fifty years or fifty five years’ appearing in the impugned first proviso to Section 391A shall be ignored while enforcing first proviso to Section 3 (1A) of Parent Act. In the absence of any guidelines, even if assessment is made, the same does not save impugned provision if it is otherwise unconstitutional. We may mention that even if as good governance policy the decision maker adheres to fairness and procedural due process, the same cannot meet requirement of constitutionality. We have already, while dealing with point No.1, adverted to the decision in Nawal Singh. The same does not support the submission of learned counsel for respondents that second proviso is intended to remove the pollutants of justice delivery system. As rightly submitted by learned counsel for petitioners the absence of the words “compulsory retirement”, the second proviso would render retirement of a judicial officer under the second proviso punitive and certainly results in adverse consequences. It denies the benefits that are earned by judicial officers. As rightly submitted by learned counsel for petitioners the absence of the words “compulsory retirement”, the second proviso would render retirement of a judicial officer under the second proviso punitive and certainly results in adverse consequences. It denies the benefits that are earned by judicial officers. The rule therein is so rigorous vis-à-vis a judicial officer that one who is allowed to go to next stage under the first proviso can be retired under the second proviso. This is arbitrary and fails to satisfy the test laid down by Supreme Court in Motiram and other binding decisions. Xxx 1) This Court declares that first proviso to Section 3(1A) of Andhra Pradesh Public Employment (Regulation of Age of Superannuation) Act, 1984 as amended by A.P. Act No.42 of 2006 insofar as it enables the Government to compulsorily retire judicial officer on attaining age of ‘fifty years or fifty five yeas’ is ultra vires and violative of Articles 14 and 311(2) of Constitution of India. Accordingly, we hold that the words ‘fifty years or fifty five years’ appearing in the impugned first proviso at two places shall have no effect and shall be ignored while enforcing the applying the first proviso to Section 3 (1A). 2) This Court declares that second proviso to Section 3(1A) of Andhra Pradesh Public Employment (Regulation of Age of Superannuation) Act, 1984 as amended by A.P. Act No.42 of 2006 is ultra vires and violative of Articles 14 and 311(2) of Constitution of India, etc., etc., The other points were also held in favour of the petitioner and the writ petitions were allowed. In the case of Dixitulu, supra, on which the learned Government Pleader has placed reliance, the facts were that Dixitulu was a permanent employee of the former Hyderabad High Court prior to 1st November 1956. He was confirmed in the service of Chief Superintendent on the establishment of that High Court in October 1956. At the time of his confirmation, he was serving on deputation with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the Hyderabad High Court as Junior Law Officer in the Ministry of Law, Government of India. In March 1965, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, which was the successor High Court to the Hyderabad High Court, he was appointed as a temporary Deputy Secretary in the Law Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh. In March 1965, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, which was the successor High Court to the Hyderabad High Court, he was appointed as a temporary Deputy Secretary in the Law Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh. By an order on February 6, 1968, the State Government replaced his services at the disposal of the Chief Justice. On reversion from deputation, he rejoined the establishment of the High Court as Sub-Assistant Registrar on February 8, 1968. On that very day, the High Court received a complaint from one Smt. Promila Reddy, as Assistant Translator in the State Law Department alleging misconduct on the part of the Dixitulu, the respondent relating to the period during which he was working as Deputy Secretary in the State Government. A preliminary inquiry was conducted by the then Registrar, who submitted his preliminary report to the then Chief Justice. On consideration of the report, the first respondent was suspended and a departmental inquiry was ordered. After due inquiry, he was found guilty of misconduct and his suspension from service for three years was recommended. The Chief Justice however differed with the recommendation and proposed to impose the punishment of compulsory retirement and accordingly he was retired from service. That was challenged before the High Court by way of a writ petition. The order of reversion was set aside on the ground that there was stigma attached thereto. The order of compulsory retirement was also set aside, not on merits but on the ground that the recommendation of the inquiring Judge, namely, stoppage of increments was not communicated to him. Thereafter, the respondent was reinstated as a Deputy Secretary and once again replaced his services at the disposal of the Chief Justice. The State Government did not take further departmental action on the complaint of Promila Reddy. The respondent filed yet another writ petition questioning the order of the State Government placing his services at the disposal of the Chief Justice. That was dismissed. An appeal against the same was pending before the Apex Court. However, after the dismissal of the writ petition, the first respondent, on reinstatement, joined the duty as Sub-Assistant Registrar in the High Court. Thereafter, he was promoted by the then Chief Justice as Assistant Registrar and later promoted as Deputy Registrar. That was dismissed. An appeal against the same was pending before the Apex Court. However, after the dismissal of the writ petition, the first respondent, on reinstatement, joined the duty as Sub-Assistant Registrar in the High Court. Thereafter, he was promoted by the then Chief Justice as Assistant Registrar and later promoted as Deputy Registrar. In 1975, the Andhra Pradesh Government Servants Premature Retirement Rules, 1975 came into force. Under the Rules, which amended the Andhra Pradesh Liberalised Pension Rules, 1961 and the Hyderabad Civil Service Rules, employees of the State who had completed 25 years of service or completed 50 years of age, could be prematurely retired after three months’ notice or grant of three months’ pay in lieu of notice. Rule 19 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court Service Rules also contained a similar provision. Thereafter in September 1975, a Committee was constituted by the Chief Justice to review the service records of the servants and officers of the High Court, who had reached the age of 50 years. Dixitulu had attained the age of 50 years on 12th March 1974. The Committee resolved to prematurely retire among others in public interest. The Chief Justice, acting under Article 229 of the Constitution, read with Rule 19 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court Service Rules, etc., passed an order retiring the respondent from service in public interest. A review petition was filed challenging the same. The Chief Justice had rejected the same. Thereupon, the respondent moved the High Court on the judicial side by way of a writ petition. The same was dismissed on the preliminary ground that it was not maintainable because the jurisdiction of the High Court which was exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution, to correct the orders of the Chief Justice on the administrative side with regard to the conditions of service of the officers in the High Court stood vested in the Administrative Tribunal by reason of Clause 6(1) of the Administrative Tribunal order. The respondent then moved the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal set aside the impugned order on the ground that it was arbitrary and amounts to penalty of dismissal or removal from service. Against the said order, an appeal was filed by special leave before the Apex Court. The respondent then moved the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal set aside the impugned order on the ground that it was arbitrary and amounts to penalty of dismissal or removal from service. Against the said order, an appeal was filed by special leave before the Apex Court. In addressing the above, on the legal contentions that were raised particularly with reference to Article 229 and the ambit and scope of the power of the Chief Justice under the said Article, after an elaborate and careful discussion of the same, it was laid down as follows:- “76. The statement of Objects and Reasons does not indicate that there was any intention, whatever, on the part of the legislature to impair or derogate from the scheme of securing independence of the judiciary as enshrined in Articles 229 and 235. Indeed, the amendment to abridgment of this basic scheme was never an issue of debate in Parliament when the Constitution (32nd Amendment) Bill was considered. 77. One test which may profitably be applied to ascertain whether the High Court staff and the subordinate judiciary were intended to be included in clause (3) of Article 371D is : Will the exclusion of the judiciary from the sweep of this clause substantially affect the scope and utility of the article as an instrument for achieving the object which the Legislature had in view? The answer cannot but be in the negative. The High Court staff and members of the Subordinate Judiciary constitute only a fraction of the number of persons in public employment in the State. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that one of the primary purposes of this article, viz., too secure equitable share in public employment to people of certain local areas in the State on the basis of the Mulki Rules requiring 15 years residence in those areas, could be achieved under those rules which, as subsequently clarified by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. V.V. Reddy, continued to be in force as valid law in the territories of the former State of Hyderabad even after the constitution of the State of Andhra Pradesh. 78. Let us now apply another test which in the circumstance of the case will be decisive. 78. Let us now apply another test which in the circumstance of the case will be decisive. In that connection, we have to see what consequences will flow if we give this general, undefined and flexible phrase, “civil services of the State” in Article 371D(3), the wider construction so as to include in it the High Court Staff and the members of the subordinate judiciary. The inevitable result of such an extensive construction will be that the control vested in the Chief Justice over the staff of the High Court, and in the High Court over the Subordinate Judiciary will become shorn of its substance, efficacy and exclusiveness, and after being processed through the conduit of the Administrative Tribunal, will pass on into the hands of the Executive Government, which, under Article 371D(5), is the supreme authority, having full power to confirm, not to confirm, modify or annual the orders of the Tribunal. Such a construction will lead to internecine conflict and contradiction, rob Articles 229 and 235 of their content, make a mockery of the Directive Principle in Article 50 and the fundamental concept of the independency of the judiciary, which the Founding Fathers have with such anxious concern built into the basic scheme of the Constitution. Parliament, we are sure, could never have intended such a strange result. In our quest for the true intention of Parliament, therefore, we must eschew this wide liberal interpretation which will defeat or render otiose the scheme of Chapters IV and V, Part VI participated in Articles 229 and 235, and instead, choose the alternative interpretation according to which members of the High Court staff and the subordinate judiciary will not fall within the purview of the phrase “civil services of the State”. Such a restricted construction will ensure smooth working of the Constitution and harmony amongst its various provisions. 79. It is true that this very phrase in the context of the provision in Article 311 includes the employees of the High Court and members of the judicial services. But it must be remembered that the provisions of Article 311 are of a general nature. They give constitutional recognition to a fundamental principle of natural justice, by making its protection available uniformly to all Government servants. That is why in the context of that Article this phrase has been spaciously construed. But it must be remembered that the provisions of Article 311 are of a general nature. They give constitutional recognition to a fundamental principle of natural justice, by making its protection available uniformly to all Government servants. That is why in the context of that Article this phrase has been spaciously construed. As against this, Article 371D is a special provision which marks a departure from the general scheme of the Constitution. The area of the departure cannot be extended beyond what is unmistakably and specifically delineated by the words employed therein. A phrase used in the context of a general provision may not carry the same meaning when employed in the context of a special provision, particularly when that phrase has nowhere been defined in the enactment. “Words used with reference to one set of circumstances”, said Lord Blackburn in Edinburgh Street Tramways Co. v. Torbain (1877) 3 Assistant Commissioner 58, 68, “may convey an intention quite different from what the self-same set of words used in reference to another set of circumstances would or might have produced”. This holds true even when the same words are used in different contexts in the same enactment. Therefore, in a special provision like Article 371D as its heading itself proclaims-which derogates from the general scheme of the Constitution for a specific purpose, general undefined phrases are not to be interpreted in their widest amplitude but strictly attuned to the context and purpose of the provisions. Conversely, had it been the intention of Parliament to include ‘Officers and servants of the High Court’ and members of the ‘Judicial service of the State’ and of the cadre of ‘District Judges’, in the phrase ‘civil services of the State’ occurring in clause (3) of Article 371D, and thereby depart from the basic scheme of Chapters IV and V, Part VI, the language commonly employed in sub-clauses should have read like this:-- Class or classes of posts in the civil services of the State including posts in the “judicial service of the State”, and of “District Judges” in the State; class or classes of posts of “officers and servants of the High Court”… 80. In our opinion, non-use of the phrases “judicial service of the State” and “District Judges” (which have been specifically defined in Article 236), and “officers and servants of the High Court” which has been designedly adopted in Articles 235 and 229, respectively, to differentiate them in the scheme of the Constitution from the other civil services of the State, gives a clear indication that posts held by the High Court staff or by the Subordinate Judiciary were advisedly excluded from the purview of clause (3) of Article 371D. The scope of the non obstante provision in clause (10) which gives an overriding effect to this article is coterminous with the ambit of the preceding clauses. 81. The ‘officers and servants of the High Court’ and the members of the Judicial Service, including District Judges, being outside the purview of clause (3), the non obstante provision in clause (10) cannot operate to take away the administrative or judicial jurisdiction of the chief Justice or of the High Court, as the case may be, under Articles 229, 235 and 226 of the constitution in regard to these public servants in matters or disputes falling within the scope of the said Articles. Clause (10) will prevail over any provisions of the Constitution, other than those which are outside the ambit of Article 371D, such as Articles 229 and 235. Provisions not otherwise covered by Article 371D, cannot be brought within its sweep because of the non obstante clause (10). It follows as a necessary corollary that nothing in the order of the President constituting the Administrative Tribunal, confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal to entertain, deal with or decide the representation by a member of the staff of the High Court or of the Subordinate Judiciary. 82. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the impugned order dated August 24, 1977 of the Administrative Tribunal, having been passed without jurisdiction, is a nullity. Accordingly, we allow Civil Appeal 2826 of 1977 leaving the parties to pay and bear their own costs.” In Gian Singh Man, supra, the petitioner was a judicial officer. He claimed that he was entitled to promotion to a selection grade post and subsequently, to a post in the Punjab Superior Judicial Service. This claim was based on the footing that a post had been reserved for a member of the Scheduled Caste. He claimed that he was entitled to promotion to a selection grade post and subsequently, to a post in the Punjab Superior Judicial Service. This claim was based on the footing that a post had been reserved for a member of the Scheduled Caste. It was also asserted that he was entitled to the same even without reference to such reservation. It was his claim that his service record was uniformly good, but as the High Court was actuated by mala fides, it refused him promotion. It transpires that the High Court had ordered for withdrawal of judicial work from the petitioner and the petitioner had challenged it by way of a writ petition. He also claimed injunction against his premature retirement from service. The Court entertained the writ petition, but declined to grant interim relief. The Punjab Government accepting the recommendation of the High Court, sanctioned premature retirement of the petitioner on his completing 25 years of qualifying service. The Apex Court rejected his claim for promotion on the ground that the writ petition was filed eleven years after the date from which the promotion was claimed and there was no valid explanation for the delay. The other contention that the order of premature retirement was invalid was examined and incidentally, the expression “public interest” was contended to be vague and therefore, the rule which provided for compulsory retirement in public interest as being ultra vires. The Apex Court held that the expression has a well settled meaning. It refers to a case where the interests of public administration required the retirement of a Government Servant, who with the passage of years has prematurely ceased to possess the standard of efficiency, competence and utility called for by the Government Service to which he belongs. No stigma or implication of misbehaviour is intended and the punishment is not the objective. The Apex Court opined that it was beyond dispute that the decision of the High Court to recommend the premature retirement of the petitioner must be regarded as falling within the scope of expression “Public Interest”. In Allahabad Bank officers Association, supra, it was laid down as follows:- “The power to compulsorily retire a government servant is one of the facets of the doctrine of pleasure incorporated in Article 310 of the Constitution. In Allahabad Bank officers Association, supra, it was laid down as follows:- “The power to compulsorily retire a government servant is one of the facets of the doctrine of pleasure incorporated in Article 310 of the Constitution. The object of compulsory retirement is to weed out the dead wood in order to maintain efficiency and initiative in the service and also to dispense with the services of those whose integrity is doubtful so as to preserve purity in the administration. Generally speaking, Service Rules provide for compulsory retirement of a government servant on his completing certain number of years of service or attaining the prescribed age. His service record is reviewed at that stage and a decision is taken whether he should be compulsorily retired or continued further in service. There is no leveling of a charge or imputation requiring an explanation from the government servant. While misconduct and inefficiency are factors that enter into the account where the order is one of dismissal or removal or of retirement, there is this difference that while in the case of retirement they merely furnish the background and the enquiry, if held-and there is no duty to hold an enquiry-is only for the satisfaction of the authorities who have to take action, in the case of dismissal or removal they form the very basis on which the order is made. A government servant who is compulsorily retired does not lose any part of the benefit that he has earned during service. Thus, compulsory retirement differs both from dismissal and removal as it involves no penal consequences. Therefore, compulsory retirement is not considered prima facie and per se a punishment and does not attract the provisions of Article 311. (Para 5) Shyam Lal v. State of U.P., (1955) 1 SCR 26 : AIR 1954 SC 369 ; State of Bombay v. Saubhagchand M. Doshi, AIR 1957 SC 892 : 1958 SCR 571 ; Union of India v. M.E. Reddy, (1980) 2 SCC 15 ; 1980 SCC (L&S) 179, relied on But if the order of compulsory retirement casts a stigma on the government servant in the sense that it contains a statement casting aspersion on his conduct or character, then the court will treat that order as an order of punishment, attracting provisions of Article 311(2) of the constitution. But mere reference to the rule, even if it mentions grounds for compulsory retirement, cannot be regarded as sufficient for treating the order of compulsory retirement as an order of punishment. In such a case, the order can be said to have been passed in terms of the rule and, therefore, a different intention cannot be inferred. So also, if the statement in the order refers only to the assessment of his work and does not at the same time cast an aspersion on the conduct or character of the government servant, then it will not be proper to hold that the order of compulsory retirement is in reality an order of punishment. Whether the statement in the order is stigmatic or not will have to be judged by adopting the test of how a reasonable person would read or understand it.” 10. In the present case on hand, in addressing the first point framed by this court for consideration, it is relevant to extract the Notification dated 28.9.2005, which reads as follows: “NOTIFICATION The Committee constituted for screening of Judicial Officers to extend their services beyond the age of 58 years upto 60 years, will also review the performance and confidential records of all Judicial Officers in the cadre of District Judges, Civil Judges (Sr.Dn.) and Civil Judges (Jr.Dn.), on their attaining the age of 50 years and 55 years or completing 20 years of qualifying service to decide upon the desirability, utility and suitability to continue them in service or for retiring them from service in the public interest, as provided under sub-rule (4) of Rule 285 of Karnataka Civil Service Rules, as per the recommendation No.21.39 of the First National Judicial Pay Commission accepted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of All India Judges’ Association vs. Union of India and others, by judgment dated 21.3.2002.” It is sufficient if the position that emerges from the decisions of the Supreme Court in the following decisions is taken into consideration, namely, All India Judges Association vs. Union of India, (1992) 1 SCC 119 (Hereinafter referred to as ‘the AIJA-1’ for brevity), All India Judges Association vs. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 288 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the AIJA-2’ for brevity) and All India Judges Association vs. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 247 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the AIJA-3’ for brevity). The age of superannuation of judicial officers in the country was to be 60 years as held in the first of the above decisions, namely, in AIJA-1. In AIJA-2, the Supreme Court affirmed its earlier decision and further directed that the enhancement from 58 to 60 years would be subject to the High Court finding an officer fit to be of continued utility for judicial service even after 58 years of age or else he should be compulsorily retired at 58. In AIJA-3, it was pointed out that pursuant to the directions issued in AIJA-2, the Government of India, by a resolution constituted the First National Judicial Pay Commission under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice K.J. Shetty and one of the terms of reference to the said Commission was to examine and recommend in respect of minimum qualifications, age of recruitment, method of recruitment etc., for judicial officers. A preliminary report was submitted on 11.11.1999. The State Governments and the Union Territories were directed by the Supreme Court by an order dated 14.12.1999 to send the responses to the Union of India so that it could co-relate the responses and indicate its own stand on the recommendations of the Commission. The recommendation of the Shetty Commission in respect of retirement age of judicial officers was from 60 to 62 years apart from several other recommendations that were made in relation to other conditions of service. Insofar as this recommendation was concerned, the Supreme Court, in AIJA-3, held as follows:- “26. The Shetty Commission had recommended that there should be an increase in retirement age from 60 to 62 years. In our opinion, this cannot be done for the simple reason that the age of retirement of a High Court Judge is constitutionally fixed at 62 years. It will not be appropriate, seeing the constitutional framework with regard to the judiciary, to have an identical age of retirement between the members of the Subordinate Judicial Service and a High Court. As of today, the age of retirement of a Supreme Court Judge is 65 years, of a High Court Judge it is 62 years and logically the age of retirement of a judicial officer is 60 years. This difference is appropriate and has to be maintained. As of today, the age of retirement of a Supreme Court Judge is 65 years, of a High Court Judge it is 62 years and logically the age of retirement of a judicial officer is 60 years. This difference is appropriate and has to be maintained. However, as there is a backlog of vacancies which has to be filled and as the Judge strength has to be increased, as directed by us, it would be appropriate for the States in consultation with the High Court to amend the service rules and to provide for re-employment of the retiring judicial officers till the age of 62 years if there are vacancies in the cadre of the District Judge. We direct this to be done as early as possible.” Therefore, from a reading of the above it is clear that the Notification indicating that the judgment aforesaid permitted a review of the performance and confidential records of all the judicial officers in the cadre of District Judges, Civil Judges (Senior Division) and Civil Judges (Junior Division) on their attaining the age of 50 years and 55 years or completing 20 years of qualifying service etc., as provided under Sub-section (4) of Section 285 of the KCSRs is clearly not reflected in the aforesaid judgments. On the other hand, in AIJA-1, with reference to the issue pertaining to the age of retirement, it was held as follows:- “15. One of the issued debated at the hearing related to the age of retirement. The Constitution has fixed the age of retirement of Judges in the High Courts and the Supreme Court at 62 and 65 years respectively. There is no constitutional prescription of the age of retirement of the members of the subordinate judiciary and in India that is controlled by the relevant rules obtaining in the different States and union Territories and it is 58 years at present excepting in the State of Kerala where the age of superannuation is 55 years for all State Government employees including the members of the State Judicial Service. 16. It is the claim of the petitioners that the age of retirement of the officers of the subordinate judiciary should be fixed at 60 years inasmuch as the basic qualification for recruitment to the service requires every officer to have in the minimum a bachelor’s degree in law which is acquirable after becoming a graduate. 16. It is the claim of the petitioners that the age of retirement of the officers of the subordinate judiciary should be fixed at 60 years inasmuch as the basic qualification for recruitment to the service requires every officer to have in the minimum a bachelor’s degree in law which is acquirable after becoming a graduate. Thus, while for normal civil service a graduate is eligible, for recruitment to the judicial service a minimum further period of three years becomes necessary to acquire the basic qualification. In many of the States and the Union Territories, for recruitment to the post in the judicial service a basic period of experience at the Bar is a prerequisite. Thus, while for the civil service age of recruitment varies between 25 and 28 years, for judicial service at the basic level most of the States permit entry up to the age of 32. In some of the States where direct recruitment of judicial officers for an in between stage is permitted, the age of entry is even up to 35 years. Article 233 (2) of the Constitution provides: “A person not already in service of the Union or of the State shall only be eligible to be appointed a District Judge if he has been for not less than seven years an advocate or a pleader and is recommended by the High Court for appointment.” 17. Keeping this constitutional requirement in view in respect of direct recruitment for District Judge, entrance is permitted up to a later age in many States. Thus at the point of entry into service there is a marked distinction between civil service and the judicial service. 18. Notwithstanding these special features the history of the service would show that no distinction has been maintained in regard to the age of retirement between officers of the civil service and the officers of the judicial service and over the years the same rule has been applied to both. 18. Notwithstanding these special features the history of the service would show that no distinction has been maintained in regard to the age of retirement between officers of the civil service and the officers of the judicial service and over the years the same rule has been applied to both. This Court in Moti Ram Deka v. The General Manager, North East Frontier Railway, Maligaon, Pandu, (1964) 5 SCR 683 : ( AIR 1964 SC 600 at p.610) pointed out: “In regard to the age of superannuation, it may be said prima facie that rules of superannuation which are prescribed in respect of public service in all modern States are based on considerations of life expectation, mental capacity of the civil servants having regard to the climatic conditions under which they work, and the nature of the work they do. They are not fixed on any ad hoc basis and do not involve the exercise of any discretion. They apply uniformly to all public servants falling under the category in respect of which they are framed…” Nature of work is thus one of the considerations relevant to fixing the age of retirement. 19. There is a marked distinction between the nature of work which executive officers and judicial officers are called upon to discharge. The work of the judicial officers is usually sedentary while that of the executive officers involves a lot of physical movement. This is particularly so in the lower cadres of both the services. In view of this feature physical fitness is more important for an executive officer than in case of a judicial officer while in case of judicial officers, there is thus necessarily more of a mental activity than physical. Experience is an indispensable factor and subject to the basis physical fitness with growing age experience grows. 20. As already indicated, retirement age for High Court Judges is 62 years. A sizable portion of the manning in the High Court is done by elevating District Judges and those who are elevated continue up to the age of 62 years like directly elevated members of the Bar to the High Court. 21. There are certain services in the States where retirement is fixed at the age of 60 years taking into account the special type of work the officers are called upon to perform. 21. There are certain services in the States where retirement is fixed at the age of 60 years taking into account the special type of work the officers are called upon to perform. For instance, throughout the country teachers of universities are allowed to serve up to 60 years of age. Employees under some of the corporations also go up to the age of 60. Scientific Research officers are also allowed in many cases the benefit of 60 year age of retirement. 22. Mr. Poti for the State of Kerala raised serious objection to raising the age of retirement of judicial officers to a common level of 58 years by contending that this would lead to unrest in the other services of the State and everyone would press for the age of retirement being enhanced to 58. In face, Kerala had once experimented with the enhanced age for all and had reverted back to the age of 55. The main ground raised by Mr. Poti to resist the proposal of enhancement is that in the State of Kerala the level of literacy is high and unemployment is acute. If the age of retirement is enhanced the scope of the unemployed to get employment would be adversely affected. We are not impressed by the submission of Mr. Poti on this score. The total number of judicial officers of every category in the State may not exceed 3,000 or so. This certainly is not such a big number that might create unemployment problem in the event of the age of superannuation being brought to the all India level of 58 or even enhanced to a higher limit. 23. The Law Commission in its 14th Report dealt with this aspect at page 213 of the report and said: “There is yet another reason why the question of the age of retirement of the subordinate judiciary should be treated differently from that in other State Services. As noticed earlier a judicial officer enters service at a comparatively higher age than a recruit to the executive or administrative services. It would, therefore, be proper that the retirement age of a judicial officer should be relatively higher than that of an executive officer, so as to enable him to serve for the full number of years if he retains his fitness and capacity of work till he reaches such higher age. It would, therefore, be proper that the retirement age of a judicial officer should be relatively higher than that of an executive officer, so as to enable him to serve for the full number of years if he retains his fitness and capacity of work till he reaches such higher age. We, therefore, recommend that the retirement age of the subordinate judiciary in all States should be raised to 58 years. Such a measure will tend to raise the tone and morale of the judicial service as a whole. It will also be consistent with our recommendation to raise the age of retirement of High Court Judges to 65 years.” 24. The recommendation that superannuation should be fixed at 58 for judicial officers was made at a time when in public services retirement was prescribed at the age of 55. Considering the enhancement of the longevity of human life and taking all other relevant considerations into account, all the States and all the Union Territories have now enhanced the age of retirement to 58 years excepting, as already pointed out, in the case of the State of Kerala. We are of the view that on the logic which was adopted by the Law Commission and for the reasons which we have indicated the age of retirement of judicial officers should be 60 years. We accordingly direct that appropriate alterations shall be made in the Rules obtaining in the States and Union Territories in respect of judicial service so as to fix the age of retirement at 60 years with effect from December 31, 1992. We have given a long period so that appropriate amendments may be made in the meantime.” In AIJA-2, which arose out of review petitions filed by the Union of India and various States raising general objections as well as objections to the specific directions given by the Supreme Court in AIJA-1, the objection, that was raised insofar as the retirement age up to 60 years, was to the effect that late entry into service is not peculiar to judicial service and that there were a number of services like, medical, engineering, teaching, where entry into Government Service is made at a late stage and hence any deviation on the ground of late entry may have implications for other services also. Therefore, in services where entry is at a late stage, the interests of the Government Servants are protected by long specified number of years to be added to the qualifying service for the purpose of determining the pension. Further that the judiciary alone was not doing sedentary work and there are other services like Central Secretarial Services, which also performs sedentary work and therefore, it may not be a valid consideration for laying down a longer retirement age and if the age of retirement of the members of the judiciary is changed, on ground as above, other services would also clamour for the same. In dealing with the said objection, the Supreme Court in AIJA-2 held as follows: “25. (iii) Superannuation Age: The objection to the direction for enhancement of the superannuation age of all the subordinate judicial officers up to 60 years, is firstly on the ground that the determination of the superannuation age us a matter of policy of the executive and hence the said direction is in violation of the basic structure of the Constitution which envisages separation of powers between the three organs of the state. The further objection is that the distinction made between the members of the judicial service and those of the other services on the ground of the late entry into the service and the sedentary nature of the work of the former is an error on the face of the record. It is contended that members of the other services like the College Teachers, Doctors, Engineers, have also to spend longer period in acquiring qualifications required for appointment to their respective services and almost all officers around the age of superannuation reach the highest level and usually carry on sedentary duties. 26. This argument misses the point that the longer period required for acquiring the necessary academic qualifications is only one of the grounds on which the enhancement of the superannuation age is directed. Even after the acquisition of the relevant academic qualifications, a minimum practice at the Bar is in most of the States, a pre-requisite for recruitment to the post of the Judge even at the lowest level. There is no such waiting period for the candidates of the other services after the acquisition of the academic qualifications. Thus the judicial officer enters the service at a relatively higher age than the member of the other services. There is no such waiting period for the candidates of the other services after the acquisition of the academic qualifications. Thus the judicial officer enters the service at a relatively higher age than the member of the other services. Secondly, as observed by the Law Commission in its Fourteenth Report, the judicial service stands by itself in the matter of the age of retirement by reason of the great importance of a long experience and a mature mind in the judicial office. The recognition of such importance has led most countries to prescribe a much higher age for the retirement of judicial personnel as compared with that of the personnel in other services. In England, the judicial service is governed by special rules both in regard to the emoluments and the age of retirement. While the civil servants retire at the age of 60 years, the Country Court Judges and Metropolitan Magistrates retire at 72. In our country also the tenure and other terms and conditions of service of the Supreme Court and the High Court Judges stand out from those relating to the administrative service. Lastly, we cannot shut our eyes to the reality that on account of the sizeable earnings at the Bar, many times out of proportion to the skill and the labour put in, the competent lawyers are reluctant to accept the judicial posts. There is thus a dearth of proper talent available to man the judicial service. It is, therefore, for the health of the administration of justice that attractive service conditions including a higher retirement age, is prescribed for the members of the judiciary. For the same reason, it is necessary that whatever trained talent is available is utilized for as long a period as is feasible. 27. There is also no similarity in the nature of the sedentary work done by the Judge and the members of the other services. The sedentary work is mainly of two types-mechanical and creative. Each case coming before the Judge has its own peculiarities requiring application of fresh mind and skill. The Judge has constantly to be a creative artist. His work, therefore requires constant thinking and display of talent. The exertions involved in the duties of the Judge cannot be compared with the duties of other services. Each case coming before the Judge has its own peculiarities requiring application of fresh mind and skill. The Judge has constantly to be a creative artist. His work, therefore requires constant thinking and display of talent. The exertions involved in the duties of the Judge cannot be compared with the duties of other services. Thus, looked at from any angle, there is need to increase the superannuation age of the Judges as compared to that of the members of the other services. This is apart from the fact that as has been repeatedly pointed out earlier, it is fallacious to compare the judicial service with other services for any purpose, since the judicial service by its very nature stands on a different footing and should be treated as such. 28. What is further, while directing the enhancement of the superannuation age to 60 years, this Court had taken into consideration the fact that the age of retirement in different States varied from 55 to 60 years. Secondly, the age of retirement for the High Court Judges was in the meanwhile increased from 60 to 62 years. The age of retirement of the Supreme Court Judges is 65 years. If the nature and the magnitude of work done by the judicial officers all over the country is the same and if further the members of the higher judiciary, who have to discharge more onerous workload, do it efficiently even at a still higher age, there is no reason why in view of the shortage of the proper talent, the age of retirement of the members of the subordinate judiciary should not be increased to 60 years. The said retirement age is prevalent in some of the States for some of the judicial posts. The only reason why the age of superannuation of the judicial officer is at present kept at 55 to 58 is the misconceived requirement of the parity of service conditions between those of the judicial officers and the members of the other services. That consideration, as pointed out earlier, being both irrelevant and erroneous must fail.” Having regard to the above view of the Supreme Court, it is apparent that Rule 285(4) of the KCSRs, which reads as follows, would be longer be applicable insofar as a Judicial Officer is concerned. That consideration, as pointed out earlier, being both irrelevant and erroneous must fail.” Having regard to the above view of the Supreme Court, it is apparent that Rule 285(4) of the KCSRs, which reads as follows, would be longer be applicable insofar as a Judicial Officer is concerned. “285(1) xxx 285(2) xxx 285(3) xxx 285(4): Retirement of a Government servant in public interest under the orders of Government- (i) Government may, by order, retire a Government servant who is working in a substantive, quasi-permanent or temporary capacity, after he has attained the age of 50 years or after he has completed 20 years of qualifying service, if the retirement is in their opinion necessary in the public interest: Provided that the Government servant concerned shall either be given a notice of three months before the date of retirement or if he is ordered to retire forthwith, be permitted to draw, every month in lieu of pension for the period of three months, from the date of such retirement, a sum equivalent to the salary which he was drawing immediately before the date of retirement and any increment which accrues to him during the said period shall be paid to him and the same period for which he draws such salary shall be treated as duty. (ii) Salary for this purpose will include special allowance, dearness allowance, house rent allowance, city compensatory allowance, uniform allowance, deputation allowance, foreign service allowance and any other allowance, except conveyance allowance and the fixed travelling allowance. If the service of the Government servant who is on deputation or on foreign service for specified period on specified terms and conditions, are withdrawn to his parent department before orders are passed under this sub-rule, no deputation or foreign service allowance will be paid. (iii) Retirement under this sub-rule is not permissible after, issue of an order under clause (c) of Rule 95 of the Rules. (iv) Orders retiring a Government servant under this sub-rule, any time after his completion of 20 years of qualifying service shall not be issued until after the fact that he has put in a qualifying service of not less than 20 years has been verified in consultation with the Accountant General. (iv) Orders retiring a Government servant under this sub-rule, any time after his completion of 20 years of qualifying service shall not be issued until after the fact that he has put in a qualifying service of not less than 20 years has been verified in consultation with the Accountant General. (v) The quantum of pension and death-cum-retirement gratuity admissible to a Government servant, who is retired under this sub-rule shall be proportionate to the length of his qualifying service and calculated in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XIX of the Rules. (vi) The amount of pension/gratuity to be granted shall be subject to the right of the Government or any Competent Authority to make reduction therein in accordance with the provisions of the rules, if his service is not satisfactory. (vii) The provisions of this sub-rule shall come into force from the date of their publication in the Official Gazette.” The Supreme Court has declared, with reference to AIJA-1 and AIJA-2, and has concluded in Bishwanath Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar, (2001) SCC 305, as follows:- “1. Direction with regard to the enhancement of superannuation age of judicial officers given in All India Judges Associations v Union of India [ (1993) 4 SCC 288 ] does not result in automatic enhancement of the age of superannuation. By force of the judgment a judicial officer does not acquire a right to continue in service up to the extended age of 60 years. It is only a benefit conferred on the judicial officers subject to an evaluation as to their continued utility to the judicial system to be carried out by the respective High Courts before attaining the age of 58 years and formation of an opinion as to their potential for their continued useful service. Else the judicial officers retire at the superannuation age appointed in the service rules governing conditions of services of the judicial officers. 2. The direction given in 1993 case is by way of ad hoc arrangement so as to operate in the interregnum, commencing the date of judgment and until an appropriate amendment is made in the service rules by the State Government. Once the service rules governing superannuation age have been amended, the direction ceases to operate. 3. 2. The direction given in 1993 case is by way of ad hoc arrangement so as to operate in the interregnum, commencing the date of judgment and until an appropriate amendment is made in the service rules by the State Government. Once the service rules governing superannuation age have been amended, the direction ceases to operate. 3. The High Court may, before or after the normal age of superannuation, compulsorily retire a judicial officer subject to formation of an opinion that compulsory retirement in public interest was needed. The decision to compulsorily retire must be in accordance with relevant service rules independent of the exercise for evaluation of judicial officers made pursuant to 1993 case. Recommendation for compulsory retirement shall have to be sent to State Government which would pass and deliver the necessary orders. Benefit of extension in superannuation age he would retire at the age of superannuation appointed by the service rules. No specific order or communication in that regard is called for either by the High Court or by the Governor of the State. Such retirement is not “compulsory retirement” in the sense of its being by way of penalty in disciplinary proceedings or even by way of “compulsory retirement in public interest”. No right of the judicial officer is taken away. Where the High Court may choose to make any communication in this regard, it would be better advised not to use therein the expression “compulsory retirement”. It creates confusion. It would suffice to communicate, if at all, that the officer concerned, having been found not fit for being given the benefit or extended age of superannuation, would stand retired at the normal age or date of superannuation.” The above ad-hoc arrangement insofar as the judicial officers are concerned, as observed above, is intended to be continued till such time that the State Government frames Service Rules governing the age of superannuation of judicial officers or as regards Compulsory Retirement. Rule 285(4) being pressed into service insofar as judicial officer is concerned, treating him like any other Government employee is no longer possible. The question of “desirability, utility and suitability” to continue as a judicial officer in service or to retire them from service in public interest, can only be on the ground of proven misconduct. Rule 285(4) being pressed into service insofar as judicial officer is concerned, treating him like any other Government employee is no longer possible. The question of “desirability, utility and suitability” to continue as a judicial officer in service or to retire them from service in public interest, can only be on the ground of proven misconduct. It is only a judicial officer, prior to his reaching the age of 58, who could be assessed and subjected to evaluation of his continued utility to the judicial system and that the High Court could form an opinion as the officer’s potential for the continued useful service, having regard to the present legal position, as settled by the Supreme Court. In that light of the matter, the notification dated 28.9.2005 is invalid and contrary to the law as laid down by the Apex Court. Hence, on Point no.1, it is to be stated that the Notification is invalid and void as it is contrary to the law as laid down by the Supreme Court. 11. As already pointed out, the petitioner was aged 53 in the year 2009 when he was compulsorily retired from service. As seen from the material made available to the court, there were several allegations of corrupt practices, which were not taken to their logical conclusion inspite of the reports having been obtained on confidential and preliminary inquiries conducted. The order of compulsory retirement, therefore, is apparently passed as a short-cut to avoid the departmental enquiry or inquiries and is clearly imposed as a punitive measure. Therefore, pints-2, 3 and 4 would have to be answered in favour of the petitioner. Consequently, the petition stands allowed. The Notification at Annexure-D, insofar as it relates to the petitioner stands quashed. The respondents shall reinstate the petitioner with continuity of service and all consequential benefits flowing therefrom. No order as to costs.