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2012 DIGILAW 3 (SIK)

Dil Hassan Ansari v. State of Sikkim

2012-03-15

PERMOD KOHLI

body2012
JUDGMENT KOHLI, J. (1) Invoking inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 the present petition has been filed seeking quashment of FIR No.22(09)04 dated 24.09.2004 registered with the Jorethang Police Station and the criminal proceedings in G.R. Case No. 102/2007 pending against the petitioners in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate (East and North Sikkim) at Gangtok. (2) Facts relevant for the purpose of the present petition are being noticed hereinafter. 2(i) Sikkim Vigilance Police received information that Dil Hassan Ansari, petitioner No.l herein, along with others was operating schemes with the view to cheat local public by attracting large scale deposits with promise of huge monthly returns, amassing huge wealth through such public deposits and after some time when the net amount deposited would reach a saturation level, they would disappear from the scene leaving the public in ihe lurch. One SI, Surendra Kumar Subba wideputed fpr verification of the information. He visited the office of the petitioner No. 1 located on the first floor of the building at Jorethang as a decoy customer and deposited Rs.5,000/- with the cashier for a period of one month. This deposit was thereafter renewed. The said officer submitted his report that petitioner No. 1 has issued a receipt in the name of Bishwa Manav Jana Kalyan Sansthan (India) with a view to cheat public. He also verified the names of various depositors. On the basis of his report FIR No. 22(09)04, referred to above, was registered under Section 420/34 IPC read with Sections 4 and 5 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978 against the petitioners herein. After conducting the investigation a charge sheet dated 07.12.2004 (Annexure-P2) was filed in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate (South and West Sikkim) at Namchi. All the petitioners herein were arrayed as accused. Charges were framed against all the accused persons on 17.03.2007 by the Judicial Magistrate (South). While the trial of the aforementioned case was pending, another FIR was lodged by one subscriber namely Mrs. Neelam Namgyal with the Jorethang Police Station, alleging that the money deposited by her and other depositors with the Bishwa Manav Jana Kalyan Sansthan (India) has. in fact, been deposited in the personal account of the petitioner No. 1. While the trial of the aforementioned case was pending, another FIR was lodged by one subscriber namely Mrs. Neelam Namgyal with the Jorethang Police Station, alleging that the money deposited by her and other depositors with the Bishwa Manav Jana Kalyan Sansthan (India) has. in fact, been deposited in the personal account of the petitioner No. 1. On the basis of this complaint another FIR No.29(11)04 was registered on 26.11.2004 for offences under Sections 420/406 IPC read with Sections 4 and 5 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978 by the Jorethang Police Station. After investigation a second charge sheet under Section 173 IPC was presented against two persons, i.e. petitioners No. 1 and 2. in the second case being G.R. Case No. 81/2006 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, East and North Sikkim. It seems that the trial in the second case progressed earlier than the first case and on conclusion of the trial the accused persons were acquitted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate (East and North Sikkim) at Gangtok vide judgment dated 30.09.2008 for offence under Sections 420/406/ 34 IPC read with Sections 4 and 5 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act. 1978 arising out of FIR No.29(11)04 dated 26.11.2004. 2(ii) On being acquitted in the second case referred to hereinabove, the petitioners (accused persons) in first FIR which case is pending trial before the Chief Judicial Magistrate filed the present petition seeking the reliefs mentioned hereinabove. (3) The sum and substance of the case of the petitioners is that the allegations/charges against the petitioners in G.R. Case No.80 of 2005 (renumbered as 102 of 2007 pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, East and North Sikkim at Gangtok) and G.R. Case No.81 of 2006 wherein they have earned acquittal being common, the accused cannot be tried again for the same offence. It is accordingly pleaded that the second trial pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate (East and North Sikkim) at Gangtok in G.R. Case No.80 of 2005 (renumbered as 98 of 2007 and 102 of 2007) is liable to be quashed in view of provisions of Section 300 Cr.P.C. and Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India. (4) This petition is seriously resisted on behalf of the State. Mr. Karma Thinlay Namgyal, Ld. Addl. (4) This petition is seriously resisted on behalf of the State. Mr. Karma Thinlay Namgyal, Ld. Addl. Public Prosecutor, appearing on behalf of the respondent, while opposing the contention raised by Mr. A. Moulik, Ld. Sr. Advocate, has taken me through the judgment dated 30.09.2008 passed in G.R. Case No.81 of 2006. In paragraph 28 of the judgment, Ld. Chief Judicial Magistrate has referred to the statement of ASI B. R. Rai (PW-9), the I.O. in the case, who stated that he could not seize any documents in connection with the case investigated by him because all documents had been seized in another case registered against accused persons being Jorethang P.S. Case No.22(9)04 dated 24.09.2004. In paragraph 29 of the judgment, Ld. Magistrate has returned her findings that I.O. could not seize the documents in this case in view of the fact that the documents were already seized in earlier Jorethang P.S. Case No.22(9)04 for offence under Sections 420/406 IPC read with Sections 4 and 5 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978. Ld. Magistrate has recorded further findings in paragraphs 30, 31 and 32 of the judgment holding that the registration of the second FIR is not valid. The relevant observations are reproduced hereunder: - "32. In view of the above discussions and the provisions of law the registration of second FIR in this case on the basis of subsequent information received from Neelam Namgyal is not valid and is of no legal consequences." (5) In paragraph 35 of the judgment, Ld. Magistrate also recorded that the investigation of the case in so far the offence under Sections 4 and 5 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978 is concerned, has not been conducted by the competent person as prescribed under Section 7 of the Act. It has been held that Section 7 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978 empowers only an Officer-in-charge of police station to enter, search and seize in the case under the Act whereas in the case before the Ld. Magistrate investigation has been conducted by an officer in the rank of ASI, who was not incharge of police station. On the basis of the aforesaid findings order of the acquittal has been recorded. Magistrate investigation has been conducted by an officer in the rank of ASI, who was not incharge of police station. On the basis of the aforesaid findings order of the acquittal has been recorded. (6) It has been further contended on behalf of the State that in the first FIR dated 24.09.2004, there are as many as 5 accused persons including the petitioners No. 1 and 2, who are accused in second FIR dated 26.11.2004. It is also the case of the respondent-State that the first charge sheet has been presented under Sections 420, 406, 477A, 120B and 34 IPC read with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978, whereas in sepond FIR/case only two accused are charged with offences under Section 420/ 406/34 IPC read with Sections 4 and 5 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978. It is also pointed out that in the first charge sheet there are as many as 89 witnesses out of which 27 already stands examined whereas in the second qharge sheet there were only 9 witnesses. (7) Based on the above factual background it is submitted on behalf of the respondent that the two charge sheets are based upon distinct facts and accused persons in both the charge sheets have been charged for different offences, though some of the offences are common. Mr. Thinlay has further argued that the entire documentary evidence seized by the police has been produced in the first charge sheet which is pending trial and the accused persons have been acquitted in the second charge sheet for want of the relevant evidence which is available in the first case. His contention is that the acquittal earned by the petitioners in the second charge sheet is primarily for non production of evidence and they have not been acquitted of all the offences for which they have been charged in the first FIR. Hence neither the provision of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India nor of Section 300 are attracted in the present case. Hence neither the provision of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India nor of Section 300 are attracted in the present case. (8) I have also noticed that during the pendency of the second charge sheet, the prosecution filed two applications under Section 220 Cr.P.C. dated 11.12.2006 and 15.05.2008 in G.R. Case No.80 of 2005 (renumbered as 98 of 2007 and 102 of 2007) for conducting trial of both the cases together as the evidence collected by the prosecution is available on the record of aforementioned case. Ld. Chief Judicial Magistrate (South and West Sikkim) at Namchi, who was seized of the G.R. Case No.81 of 2006 while transferring the said case to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate (East and North Sikkim) at Gangtok, rejected the prayer for joint trial on the ground that the charges have already been framed and the evidence recorded. (9) Apart from the above, the petitioners in paragraph 8 of the present petition have also mentioned that a revision petition was filed in this against framing of charge. During the course of arguments Mr. Moulik conceded that the said revision petition was dismissed by this Court. The question which needs consideration by this Court is whether the acquittal earned by the petitioners No. 1 and 2 in G.R. Case No.81 of 2006 in the second FIR entitles them or for that matter all the petitioners in FIR No. 22(09)04 dated 24.09.2004 to be discharged/acquitted and the proceedings pending against them are liable to be quashed? (10) Article 20 of the Constitution of India sought to be invoked by the petitioners reads as under: - "20. Protection in respect of conviction for offences. - (1) No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. (2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. (3) No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." (11) Mr. Moulik submits that clause (2) of Article 20 prohibits not only the punishment but even prosecution for the same offence more than once. (2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. (3) No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." (11) Mr. Moulik submits that clause (2) of Article 20 prohibits not only the punishment but even prosecution for the same offence more than once. It is submitted that the petitioners No. 1 and 2 having earned acquittal in one case for the same offence cannot be prosecuted again. Article 20(2) prohibits double jeopardy, i.e. prosecution and punishment more than once to a person charged for the same offence. To invoke the provision of Article 20(2), the petitioners have to establish that they are being prosecuted and punished for the same offence. It is the admitted case of the petitioners that though they were prosecuted in second FIR but they have not been punished at all. They have been acquitted on account of the circumstances noticed hereinabove to which reference shall be made hereinafter at the appropriate stage. Mandate contained in Article 20(2) is attracted only if a person is prosecuted and punished for an offence and is sought to be again prosecuted and punished for the same offence. This is not the position in the present case. To further appreciate the argument of Mr. Moulik regarding the application of Section 300 Cr.P.C., it is deemed necessary to notice Section 300: - "300. Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence. - (1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under sub-section (1) of section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under sub-section (2) thereof. (2) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be afterwards tried, with the consent of the State Government for any distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been made against him at the former trial under sub-section (1) of Section 220. (2) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be afterwards tried, with the consent of the State Government for any distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been made against him at the former trial under sub-section (1) of Section 220. (3) A person convicted of any offence constituted by any act causing consequences which, together with such act, constituted a different offence from that of which he was convicted, may be afterwards tried for such last-mentioned offence, if the consequences had not happened or were not known to the Court to have happened, at the time when he was convicted. (4) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence constituted by any acts may, notwithstanding such acquittal or conviction, be subsequently charged with, and tried for, any other offence constituted by the same acts which he may have committed if the Court by which he was first tried was not competent to try the offence with which he is subsequently charged. (5) A person discharged under section 258 shall not be tried again for the same offence except with the consent of the Court by which he was discharged or of any other Court to which the first mentioned Court is subordinate. (6) Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) or of section 188 of this Code." Indubitably scope of Section 300 Cr.P.C. is much larger than Article 20(2) of the Constitution. In fact common law rule that no one should be put to peril twice for the same offence as contained in famous maxim "nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa" is embodied in these provisions. (12) To attract bar contained in Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India and/or Section 300 Cr.P.C, the accused must establish two important facts - (i) the offence for which he was earlier tried/prosecuted is the same in the second prosecution/ trial lodged against him/her; and (ii) there has been a determination/finding in regard to such an offence in the earlier trial/ prosecution. (13) Similarity of facts and allegations do not, per se, warrant the creation of bar of double jeopardy as contained in Article 20(2) of the Constitution or Section 300 Cr.P.C. (14) It may be useful to briefly notice the judgments relied upon before me. (13) Similarity of facts and allegations do not, per se, warrant the creation of bar of double jeopardy as contained in Article 20(2) of the Constitution or Section 300 Cr.P.C. (14) It may be useful to briefly notice the judgments relied upon before me. In case of the Assistant Collector of Customs, Bombay and another v. L. R. Melwani and another : AIR 1970 SC 962, the issue relates to validity of criminal proceedings lodged against the accused under Section 120-B IPC read with certain provisions of Sea Customs Act before the Magistrate on the basis of a complaint lodged by the Assistant Collector of Customs, Bombay with sanction of the competent authority. Prior to that a departmental enquiry was held by the Customs Authority for smuggling the goods to India and during the course of enquiry the smuggled goods were seized and later confiscated and penalty imposed upon the accused. High Court interfered in the order of the Magistrate passed in criminal proceedings against the accused persons. However, Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court and restored that of the Magistrate holding that there has not been any earlier trial or prosecution or conviction by the authorities while initiating the proceedings under the Sea Customs Act and that the issue- estoppel does not operate in the case. (15) In State of M.P. v. Bhooraji and others : (2001) 7 SCC 679 : (AIR 2001 SC 3372), the only issue before the Court was whether the trial of offences under SC and ST Act along with other offence by the Sessions Judge without the committal order of the Magistrate was valid in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Gangula Ashok v. State of A.P., (2000) 2 SCC 504 : (AIR 2000 SC 740). The High Court set aside the conviction for want of committal proceedings by the Magistrate before the commencement of the trial by the Sessions Judge and directed fresh filing of charge sheet. Hon'ble Supreme Court, however, set aside the order of the High Court and held the proceedings initiated by the Sessions Court without the committal proceedings as valid. It was held that mere irregularity in trial does not cause failure of justice. One fails to understand how this judgment helps the petitioner rather this judgment can be read against the petitioners. Hon'ble Supreme Court, however, set aside the order of the High Court and held the proceedings initiated by the Sessions Court without the committal proceedings as valid. It was held that mere irregularity in trial does not cause failure of justice. One fails to understand how this judgment helps the petitioner rather this judgment can be read against the petitioners. (16) In case of State v. Nalini and others, (1999) 5 SCC 253 : (AIR 1999 SC 2640), two accused A-16 and A-17 were involved in CC-7 of 1992. They were convicted for offences under Sections 3(3), 3(4) and 5 of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (in short, TAD A) and Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act and Section 3(1) of the Arms Act. Subsequently, they were also involved in killing of Rajiv Gandhi and charged under Section 302 read with Sections 102-B and 212 of the IPC along with offences under TADA, Explosive Substances Act and Arms Act. The question before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was whether the second trial of these two accused persons for offences under various sections of TADA, Explosive Substances Act and Arms Act was hit by the bar of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India and Section 300 Cr.P.C. Considering this question Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- "239. As the contours of the prohibition are so widely enlarged it cannot be contended that the second trial can escape therefrom on the mere premise that some more allegations were not made in the first trial. We have absolutely no doubt that the offences which we have indicated above were fully covered by the trial in CC-7 of 1992, and therefore the prosecution is debarred in this case from proceeding against A-16 and A-17 for the aforesaid offerees. Consequently the conviction and sentence passed by the Designated Court as per the impugned judgment for offences under Sections 3(3), 3(4) and 5 of TADA and also Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act as well as Section 3(1) of the Arms Act on A-16 and A-17 are hereby set aside." (17) In the case of Kolla Veera Raghav Rao v. Gorantla Venkateswara Rao and another, (2011) 2 SCC 703 : (AIR 2011 SC 641). the accused was convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and subsequently, he was also tried for offence under Section 420, IPC on the same allegations. Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside the prosecution under Section 420. IPC being barred by Section 300(1) Cr.P.C. (18) Mr. Moulik has also referred to the case of State of West Bengal and others v. Swapan Kumar Guha and 15 others, (1982) 1 SCC 561 : (AIR 1982 SC 949), wherein transaction of accepting money deposits from public, investing them in high-risk investments earning huge unaccounted profits and paying to the depositors interest at a rate much higher than any other rate in a clandestine manner, was held not falling within the definition of "money circulation scheme" and does not constitute an offence under Section 3 read with Section 4 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978. (19) Based upon the dictum of the judgments it is submitted that there is a clear and categorical finding by the trial Court in judgment dated 30.09.2008 in G.R. Case No. 81 of 2006 in favour of the petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 and thus the criminal proceedings in G.R. Case No. 102 of 2007 are barred. It is useful to notice the findings recorded by the Court in G.R. Case No.81 of 2006 in regard to offences under the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978 - "34. In the present case though there is no evidence on record to show that accused persons were engaged in Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes but the payment of interest in excess of stipulated rate is no offence under the said Act. There is no evidence to show that accused persons are involved in any Prize Chit or Money Circulation Schemes in contravention of the provisions of this Act. No evidence has been adduced to prove that accused persons printed or published any tickets, coupon or other documents like money receipts or slips for use in the Prize Chit or Money Circulation Schemes. The signatures appearing in Exbts. No evidence has been adduced to prove that accused persons printed or published any tickets, coupon or other documents like money receipts or slips for use in the Prize Chit or Money Circulation Schemes. The signatures appearing in Exbts. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 22, 25, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48 and 49 alleged to have issued by accused persons are not all exhibited in the court either by prosecution witnesses from it was alleged to have been seized nor by the I.O. of the case. Interesting thing is that the questioned signature was never send to GEQD, Kolkata for expert opinion for the reason best known to the I.O. There is no any other documents produced in this case to prove that accused persons were involved in Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act under the name of Bishwa Manav Jana Kalyan Sansthan (India) or in any scheme for making easy and quick money." Apart from the above findings, it has also been held in paragraph 35 of the judgment that the investigation has not been conducted by the competent person. (20) It is admitted factual position that a large number of documents were seized by the investigating agency during the course of investigation in FIR dated 23.09.2004 and these documents were filed along with the charge sheet under Section 173 Cr.P.C. in G.R. Case No.80 of 2005, presently G.R. Case No. 102 of 2007. This case was instituted on the basis of the investigation conducted by the Sikkim Vigilance Police as many as 89 witnesses have been cited out of which 27 have been examined so far. The first charge sheet is for offences under Sections 420, 406, 477-A and 120-B of the IPC read with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978 whereas the second FIR dated 26.11.2004 is for offences under Sections 420, 406 and 34 of the IPC read with Sections 4 and 5 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978. (n G.R. 17 Case No.80 of 2005 (renumbered as 102 of 2007) there are 5 accused person I whereas in G.R. Case No.81 of 2006, there were only 2 accused persons. (n G.R. 17 Case No.80 of 2005 (renumbered as 102 of 2007) there are 5 accused person I whereas in G.R. Case No.81 of 2006, there were only 2 accused persons. Even though the allegations are similar in nature but definitely there are different set of witnesses except one or two common witnesses. The offences for which the accused have been charged are also distinct in the pending criminal proceedings. Even if the modus operandi of the accused may be similar, however, every act of misrepresentation to each individual constitutes distinct and separate offence. In the pending case, there are additional offences, particularly, Section 477-A IPC which relates to commission of forgery by the accused persons and thus it cannot be said that the petitioners have been acquitted for the same offence. (21) A similar question came to be considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ravinder Singh v. State of Haryana, (1975) 3 SCC 742: (AIR 1975 SC 856). In this case, separate trials were held of the two accused persons charged with murder of one Bimla, wife of Ravinder Singh. One Bhanu Prakash Singh, a co-accused, tried separately, was acquitted by the High Court on the plea that the approver's evidence was not found to be corroborated in material particulars. In subsequent trial against the husband and another, the approver's statement was found corroborated by the evidence. Considering the legal impact of acquittal of co-accused on the separate trial of other accused, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed:- "19. In order to invoke the rule of issue- estoppel not only the parties in the two trials must be the same but also the fact-in-issue proved or not in the earlier trial must be identical with what is sought to be reagitated in the subsequent trial. 20. In the present case the parties are the State and the accused, Ravinder Singh. In the other case relied upon, the parties were the State and the accused Bhanu Parkash Singh. Besides, as even admitted by Counsel, the approver was not held to be unreliable in that case while deciding the case of Bhanu Parkash Singh. There is no inconsistency between the finding that the approver's statement there was not materially corroborated by other evidence against Bhanu Parkash Singh and the contrary finding in the affirmative in the present case against Ravinder Singh. There is no inconsistency between the finding that the approver's statement there was not materially corroborated by other evidence against Bhanu Parkash Singh and the contrary finding in the affirmative in the present case against Ravinder Singh. As has been observed by this Court in Manipur Administration v. Thokcham, Bira Singh, (AIR 1965 SC 87). issue-estoppel does not prevent the trial of an offence as does autre fois acquit but only precludes evidence being led to prove a fact-in-issue as regards which evidence has already been led and a specific finding recorded at an earlier criminal trial before a court of competent jurisdiction. There is, therefore, no substance in the submission of the learned Counsel on the basis of issue-estoppel in this case." (22) In V. K. Agarwal, Assistant Collector of Customs v. Vasantraj Bhanwanji Bhatia and others, (1988) 3 SCC 467 : (AIR 1988 SC 1106), it has been held that where the ingredients of the two offences are same or different, bar of Section 403(1) Cr.RC. (presently Section 300 Cr.RC.) is not attracted. (23) A similar view has been held in Amar Singh v. Balwinder Singh and others, (2003) 2 SCC 518 : (AIR 2003 SC 1164). (24) In the case of Balbir Singh v. State of Delhi, (2007) 6 SCC 226 : (AIR 2007 SC 2397), acquittal of the accused for want of sanction by the competent authority was held not to bar the subsequent trial with the prior sanction of the competent authority. (25) Undoubtedly, the offences for which the petitioners have been charged in G.R. Case No. 80 of 2005, renumbered as 102 of 2007 contain number of allegations (may be similar in nature) and some distinct offences than for which the accused-petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 have been acquitted in G.R. Case No. 81 of 2006. Thus the bar of Section 300, Cr. P.C. read with Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India is not attracted as the petitioners have not been charged for the same offences in both the cases. (26) Apart from above, it is necessary rather imperative that to attract the bar of Section 300, Cr.P.C. there must be a determination on the same offence in earlier proceedings. This principle of law has been settled by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Manipur Administration, Manipur v. Thokchom Bira Singh, AIR 1965 SC 87. (26) Apart from above, it is necessary rather imperative that to attract the bar of Section 300, Cr.P.C. there must be a determination on the same offence in earlier proceedings. This principle of law has been settled by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Manipur Administration, Manipur v. Thokchom Bira Singh, AIR 1965 SC 87. While considering the scope and ambit of Section 403(1), Cr.P.C, (presently 300 Cr.P.C), and Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India in the light of the common law rule "autre fois acquit" and "autre fois convict", Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under "................As we have pointed out earlier, issue-estoppel does not prevent the trial of any offence as does autre fois acquit but only precludes evidence being led to prove a fact in issue as regards which evidence has already been led and a specific finding recorded at an earlier criminal trial before a court of competent jurisdiction............." For arriving at the above conclusion, Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon a judgment of Wright, J. in Queen v. Ollis, (1900) 2 QB 758 at pp 768-69. The relevant extract is reproduced hereunder: - "The real question is whether this relevant evidence of the false pretence on July 5 or 6 ought to have been excluded on the ground that it was part of the evidence given for the prosecution at the former trial, at which the prisoner was charged with having obtained money from Ramsay on that false pretence, and was acquitted of that charge." After noticing these observations, Hon'ble Supreme Court made following comments:- "The learned Judge then went on to point out that if the acquittal at the first trial was based on the negativing of this basic fact the evidence would be inadmissible but if that acquittal was based on other circumstances the evidence would be admissible." That is why he said:- "An objection in the nature of a plea of "autre fois acquit" cannot of course be maintained, because on either indictment the prisoner could not have been convicted of the offences, or any of them, which were alleged in the. other indictment. other indictment. Nor can there be an estoppel of record or quasi or record, unless it appears by record of itself, or as explained by proper evidence, that the same point was determined on the first trial which was in issue oh the second trial." (27) Applying the principles of law enunciated in the Constitution Bench judgment, the only conclusion that can be drawn from the judgment dated 30.09.2008 in G.R. Case No. 81 of 2006 is that there has been no determination of the acquittal on merits on the basis of the evidence, rather the acquittal has been endured in absence of the evidence which could not be produced by the investigating agency, the same having been tendered in G.R. Case No. 80 of 2005 (renumbered as 102 of 2007). It would have been prudent for the Court trying G.R. Case No. 81 of 2006 to have tried both the cases together. That having not happened, it does not provide any ground to the petitioners to seek quashment of the criminal proceedings pending against them in G.R. Case No. 80 of 2005 (now 102 of 2007) on the basis of socalled acquittal in G.R. Case No. 81 of 2006. The essential ingredients of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India and Section 300, Cr.P.C. have not been established for the reasons noticed hereinabove. (28) This Revision thus fails and is hereby dismissed. (29) Since the trial is pending for the last more than 5 (five) years, the trial Court is directed to complete the trial preferably within a period of 6 (six) months and if, for any reasons, it is not found possible to complete the trial within the above time, the trial Court will inform this Court the reasons for not concluding the trial. Needless to say that the prosecution agency will ensure production of witnesses through Investigating Officer or the District Police agency during the trial of the case. Revision dismissed.