Judgment : Since both these appeals arise out of the common set of facts, issues involved and the parties are one and the same, they are being disposed of by this common order. 2. Both these appeals are directed against the judgment dated 27.04.2007 passed in O.S.No.88 of 2003 by the Principal District Judge, West Godavari, Eluru, whereby and whereunder, the suit instituted by the respondents herein has been decreed granting a decree of specific performance of contract with costs. 3. The first defendant before the Court below is the appellant in A.S.No.439 of 2007 and the second defendant before the Court below is the appellant in A.S.No.414 of 2007. The respondents in both the appeals are also the respondents before the Court below. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be hereinafter referred to as they were arrayed before the Court below. Brief facts of the case 4. Acs.13.50 cents of dry land out of Acs.42.20 cents of land in R.S.No.304-1A situated at Chintalapudi Village & Sub-Division, West Godavari District is the suit schedule land, which originally belonged to one Sayani Syamalamba. Sayani Shyam Sunder Rao, Sayani Madhava Rao, Sayani Babu Nagendra Prasad, Sayani Venugopala Rao, Sammita Kasturi Bai, Chilamkurthi Baby Sarojini are the children of aid Sayani Syamalamba. The sons of Sayani Syamalamba have partitioned their property though a registered partition Deed in the year 1990. Sammita Subhash Chandra Bose, the first defendant in the suit, is the son of Sammita Kasturi Bai and thus the grand son of Sayini Syamalamba. Sammita Sri Nataraj, the second defendant in the suit, is the son of Sammita Subhash Chandra Bose and thus the great grand son of Sayani Syamalamba. Sayani Syamalamba became the owner of the suit schedule land by virtue of a registered settlement deed executed by her brother – S.Basava Nancharaiah on 09.11.1955. Sayani Syamalamba, stating that her sons got sufficient properties in their family partition and that her daughter have other properties, executed a Will on 09.11.1990 in Ex.B.1 in favour of her great grand son – Sammita Sri Nataraj, bequeathing the suit schedule land to him and further contended that since said Sammita Sri Nataraj was a minor on the date of execution of Ex.B.1 Will, his father, i.e., the first defendant herein would act as his guardian till said Sammita Sri Nataraj (hereinafter referred to as the second defendant) becomes major. She had also mentioned that the first defendant would protect the properties and develop the same and handover the same to the second defendant and further contended that Ex.B.1 Will will come into force after her death. She had also reserved the right to cancel and modify Ex.B.1 Will. However, on the same day of execution of Ex.B.1 Will, i.e., on 09.11.1990, she executed a GPA in Ex.A.15 and got it registered empowering the first defendant to sell the land and furnish accounts. The first defendant is also empowered to mortgage the said land. Sayani Syamalamba died on 27.03.1999. 5. The plaintiffs specific case is that the first defendant, as the GPA holder of Sayani Syamalamba, offered to sell the suit schedule land for the purpose of discharging his debts and to meet the medical expenses of Sayani Syamalamba and sale consideration was determined as Rs.3,00,000/-. Accordingly, the first defendant had executed an agreement of sale dated 31.03.1995, in favour of the plaintiff having received an amount of Rs.2,00,000/-and agreed to receive the balance sale consideration amount of Rs.1,00,000/-on or before 19.09.1995. He promised to execute a registered sale deed as and when demanded by the plaintiffs after receiving the balance of sale consideration amount. Ex.A.1 is the agreement of sale. Before the stipulated date, the first defendant acknowledged the receipt of balance sale consideration of Rs.1,00,000/-and executed a separate letter of acknowledgement dated 17.09.1995 in favour of the plaintiffs and on the same day, delivered possession of the suit schedule land to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs’ further case is that as the original agreement of sale dated 31.03.1995 was not immediately available with them at the time of payment of remaining sale consideration amount, the first defendant executed a separate letter of acknowledgement in Ex.A.2 on 17.09.1995. Their further case is that since 17.09.1995, they have been in uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule lands as owner thereof. It is also their case that since they had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule land all these years, they never insisted the first defendant to execute a registered sale deed in their favour in pursuance of agreement of sale dated 31.03.1995. It is also their case that since they had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule land all these years, they never insisted the first defendant to execute a registered sale deed in their favour in pursuance of agreement of sale dated 31.03.1995. It is also their case that the first defendant filed O.S.No.26 of 2001 before the Court below against the first plaintiff and against one Gaddamadugu Vikram for declaration of title and injunction contending that Sayani Syamalamba executed a registered Will and by virtue of the same, the second defendant became absolute owner of the suit schedule land as shown in the said suit therein. (The suit schedule land is a part of plaint ‘B’ Schedule property in that suit). It is also alleged in the said suit that the first plaintiff herein and said Gaddamadugu Vikram had obtained the signatures of the first defendant (Sammita Subhash Chandra Bose) on blank papers and that he never executed any agreement of sale in favour of the first plaintiff herein or in favour of Gaddamadugu Vikram. 6. The further case of the plaintiffs is that in the above circumstances, then the plaintiffs got issued a legal notice dated 17.10.2001 in Ex.A.3 requiring the defendants to execute a registered sale deed in their favour in respect of the suit schedule land in pursuance of Ex.A.1 agreement of sale and having received a reply from the defendants with all false and untenable allegations refusing to execute a registered sale deed in their favour, they filed this suit for specific performance seeking a direction to the first defendant to execute a registered sale deed in pursuance of Ex.A.1 agreement of sale. 7. The defendants have filed separate written statements. The first defendant, while denying the material allegations made by the plaintiffs, contended that he had money dealings with the first plaintiff and Gaddamadugu Vikram and in that connection, they obtained his signatures on three blank promissory notes and on some blank stamp papers as collateral security and later advanced some amounts on several dates under Khata (daily account) and obtained his signatures in the said accounts books and that the total amount borrowed by him comes to Rs.1,20,000/-. It is also his case that due to adverse seasonal conditions, he could not pay the amounts and that in the year 2001, when he approached the first plaintiff and Gaddamadugu Vikram for settlement of accounts, they demanded huge amounts and refused to render proper accounts and said Gaddamadugu Vikram threatened to press blank promissory notes into service and apprehending manipulation of the agreement of sale on stamp papers, he filed O.S.No.26 of 2001 before the Court below. It is also his case that out of three blank promissory notes, the first plaintiff and Gaddamadugu Vikram manipulated two promissory notes one in the name of the first plaintiff for Rs.70,000/-and another in the name of Gaddamadugu Vikram for an amount of Rs.1,80,000/-and they filed a suit against him and got attached his personal property and also the property of the second defendant. His specific case is that he never executed any agreement of sale nor received part sale consideration and never delivered possession to the plaintiffs. It is also his case that the suit is barred by limitation. 8. The second defendant has also taken almost the same stand as taken by the first defendant, and further contended that the first defendant was addicted to vices and to satisfy the same, he incurred debts to the plaintiffs and that he was under the influence of the plaintiffs and in the above circumstances, the plaintiffs obtained his signatures on some blank stamp papers. It is also contended that if at all the plaintiffs had paid the entire sale consideration amount, nothing prevented the plaintiffs’ to obtain regular sale deed. It is also his case that the plaintiffs had never been in possession of the suit schedule land at any point of time. His main case is that he became the absolute owner of the suit schedule land by virtue of the Will executed by Sayani Syamalamba and the first defendant has no right to sell the property during his minority without obtaining the permission of the Court below, as required under law. It is also his case that the first defendant has no right to act detrimental to his interest and that he has been in possession of the suit schedule land after attaining majority and prior to that, his mother had been in possession of the suit schedule land. It is also his case that the first defendant has no right to act detrimental to his interest and that he has been in possession of the suit schedule land after attaining majority and prior to that, his mother had been in possession of the suit schedule land. It is also his case that the first defendant had no right to sell the suit schedule land under the alleged GPA and that there is no reference about the GPA in Ex.B.1 Will executed by Sayini Syamalamba. It is also his case that Sayini Syamalamba created Trust in the name of the second defendant appointing the first defendant as trustee to manage and protect the property of the second defendant till he attains majority. It is also his case that by executing Ex.B.1 Will, Sayini Syamalamba has divested herself of all her rights by creating a Trust Deed dated 09.11.1990 though styled as Will. It is also his case that irrespective of the fact that whether the agreement of sale is genuine or not, it does not bind the second defendant since the same is not for his benefit. 9. Basing on the above pleadings, the Court below framed the following issues and additional issues for trial. “1. Whether the first defendant had any money dealings with the first plaintiff and others prior to the suit agreement? 2. Whether the plaintiffs obtained three blank promissory notes and signed stamped papers from the first defendant as alleged? 3. Whether the suit sale agreement is fabricated by the plaintiffs out of the blank signed papers of the first defendant as alleged? 4. Whether the first defendant is the GPA holder of Late Smt. Syamalamba? 5. Whether Late Syamalamba authorized the first defendant to sell the suit properties? 6. Whether the acknowledgement dated 17.09.1995 for receipt of Rs.1,00,000/-by the first defendant is true and genuine? 7. Whether the plaintiffs are in actual possession and enjoyment of the suit property as alleged? 8. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for specific relief sought for? 9. To what relief? Additional issues dated 28.03.2007:- 1. Whether the agreement of sale is not binding on the defendant No.2 as contended by him in his written statement? 2. Whether the defendant No.2 is the absolute owner of the schedule property as per the Will got issued by Sayini Syamalamba in his favour? 3. 9. To what relief? Additional issues dated 28.03.2007:- 1. Whether the agreement of sale is not binding on the defendant No.2 as contended by him in his written statement? 2. Whether the defendant No.2 is the absolute owner of the schedule property as per the Will got issued by Sayini Syamalamba in his favour? 3. Whether defendant No.1 has no right to settle the property during the minority of the defendant No.2 without obtaining permission as per law?” 10. Evidence has been let in. On behalf of the plaintiffs, the first plaintiff himself is examined as P.W.1 and P.Ws.2 to 6 are examined and Exs.A.1 to A.15 are marked. On behalf of the defendants, the first defendant himself is examined as D.W.1, one Ravisetty Annavaram is examined as D.W.2, the second defendant is examined as D.W.3 and the mother of the second defendant is examined as D.W.4 and ExsB.1 to B.6 are marked. 11. On issues 4 and 5, the Court below held that the first defendant – Subhash Chandra Bose had sold Acs.2.37 cents of land in favour of one Nirmaladevi as GPA of Sayini Syamalamba under registered sale deed dated 30.03.1995, i.e., one day prior to executing of Ex.A.1 agreement of sale and that Ex.A.15 shows that the first defendant is authorized to alienate the properties. On issues No.1 and 2, the Court below came to the conclusion that the defendants failed to prove that he had any money dealings with the plaintiffs or that they obtained signatures of the first defendant on blank signed stamp papers and pressed Ex.A.1 agreement of sale into service. On additional issues 1 to 3, the Court below came to the conclusion that the attestors and scribe of Ex.B.1 Will are not examined, as required under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, and, therefore, they failed to prove Ex.B.1 Will. The Court below, however, holding that the GPA was not cancelled during the lifetime of Sayini Syamalamba and that the first defendant cannot say that he had not executed Ex.A.1 and A.2 in favour of the plaintiffs. The Court below further observed that the judgment in O.S.No.26 of 2001 on the file of the Court below binds the defendants. On issue No.7, the Court below came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are in possession of the property. The Court below further observed that the judgment in O.S.No.26 of 2001 on the file of the Court below binds the defendants. On issue No.7, the Court below came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are in possession of the property. On issue No.6, the Court below came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs’ proved that the first defendant executed Ex.A.2 having received the balance same consideration of Rs.1,00,000/-. On issue No.8, the Court below came to the conclusion that since the plaintiffs proved Exs.A.1 and A.2. It is also held that the suit is not barred by limitation, since the suit is filed within three years from the date of denial by the defendant under Ex.A.14 reply notice dated 31.10.2001 under Section 54 of the Indian Limitation Act. The Court below also came to the conclusion that there is no stipulation of time in Ex.A.1 agreement of sale. Accordingly, the suit filed by the plaintiffs has been decreed. Aggrieved by the same, defendants 1 and 2 filed both these appeals respectively. 12. Sri Parabrahma Sastry, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Sri Venkateshwarlu, learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 have advanced elaborate arguments in support of their case which will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant, in support of his contentions, had relied on the judgments in the cases between R.SandhyaraniVs. M.Mylarappa (AIR 2008 (NOC) 114 (KAR), SyedAbdul Khader Vs. Rami Reddy (AIR 1979 Supreme Court 553 (1), B.L.ChoudaVs. B.K.Rai (AIR 1939 Nagpur 274), Ma.ShweMya Vs. Maung Mo Hnaung (AIR 1922 Privy Council 249), ChanumoluRadharani Vs. Thota Vishnu Rao (2005 (6) ALD 458), KoradaAppalanarasamma Vs. Kinthali Varahanarasimhamurty (2003 (6) ALD (NOC) 93), S.MahaboobBasha Vs. B.R.Mohan Rao (died) by LRs (2006 (4) ALD (NOC) 82), SyedBasha (died) and others Vs. P.Doraikannu ( 1999 (1) MLJ 433 ), MadamsettySatyanarayana Vs. G.Yellaji Rao and others ( AIR 1965 SC 1405 (1), Messrs. Sriram Cotton Pressing Factory (P) Ltd., Vs. K.K.Narayanaswami Naidu (AIR 1965 Madras 352 (Vol.52, C.118)(1) and Food Corporation of India Vs. M/s.Babulal Agrawal (AIR 2004 Supreme Court 2926). 14. Learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 had relied upon the judgments in the cases between AmarendraKomalam Vs. Usha Sinha (2005) 11 SCC 251 ), Mst.SuganiVs. Rameshwar Das ( AIR 2006 SC 2172 ), GunwantbhaiMulchand Shah Vs. Anton Elis Farel (2006) 3 SCC 634 ), S.BrahmanandVs. M/s.Babulal Agrawal (AIR 2004 Supreme Court 2926). 14. Learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 had relied upon the judgments in the cases between AmarendraKomalam Vs. Usha Sinha (2005) 11 SCC 251 ), Mst.SuganiVs. Rameshwar Das ( AIR 2006 SC 2172 ), GunwantbhaiMulchand Shah Vs. Anton Elis Farel (2006) 3 SCC 634 ), S.BrahmanandVs. K.R.Muithugopal (D) ( AIR 2006 SC 40 ), AhmmadsahabAbdul Mulla (deceased by L.Rs.) Vs. Bibijan ( AIR 2009 SC 2193 ), S.NazeerAhmed Vs. State Bank of Mysore ( AIR 2007 SC 989 ) and Bihar School Examination Board Vs. Suresh Prasad Sinha ( AIR 2010 SC 93 ). Points for consideration 15. The points that arise for consideration in these appeals are as follows:- “1. Whether Late Syamalamba executed the Will or created a Trust in favour of the second defendant and whether Sayini Syamalamba executed GPA in favour of the first defendant authorizing him to sell the suit schedule land? 2. Whether the other Legal Representatives of Sayini Syamalamba are necessary parties? 3. Whether the plaintiffs have misused the blank stamp papers and the promissory notes signed by the first defendant and whether Exs.A.1 and A.2 are genuine documents or not? 4. Whether alienation made during the minority of the second defendant is valid? 5. Who is in possession of the suit schedule land? 6. Whether specific performance can be ordered after the death of the principal? 7. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 8. Whether the relief of specific performance cannot be granted in view of the delay in approaching the Court? 9. Whether defendants 1 and 2 can be directed to execute the sale deed in the fact and circumstances of the case? 10. To what relief?” Point No.1 16. 7. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 8. Whether the relief of specific performance cannot be granted in view of the delay in approaching the Court? 9. Whether defendants 1 and 2 can be directed to execute the sale deed in the fact and circumstances of the case? 10. To what relief?” Point No.1 16. Sri Parabrahma Sastry, learned counsel appearing for the appellants herein submits that Sayini Syamalamba intended to give the suit schedule land to the second defendant and she appointed the first defendant as guardian of the second defendant and her intention is clear from the recitals of Ex.B.1 Will that the suit schedule land should be preserved, developed and be given to the second defendant on his attaining the majority and that the recitals of Ex.B.1 Will reveal that in fact, a Trust was created for the benefit of the second defendant and, therefore, the first defendant had no right to enter into any agreement of sale, particularly during the minority of the second defendant. 17. On the other hand, Sri Venkateshwarlu, learned counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that no Trust was crated and that no Trust Deed is filed and the recitals of Ex.B.1 Will clearly go to show that Sayini Syamalamba had retained the right to cancel Ex.B.1 Will and to execute another Will and, therefore, it cannot be said that the document executed is in the nature of a Trust Deed. 18. A reading of Ex.B.1 Will makes it clear that it is not a trust, but in fact, a Will, because, Sayini Syamalamba retained the authority to cancel the Will and stated that it will come into force after her death. Thus, all the requirements of Will are there in Ex.B.1 Will. Thus, it appears that there is no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants/defendants that in fact, a Trust was created by Late Sayini Syamalamba. Though the second defendant deposed that a Trust Deed was there, but admittedly, no such Trust Deed has been filed before the Court. 19. Thus, it appears that there is no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants/defendants that in fact, a Trust was created by Late Sayini Syamalamba. Though the second defendant deposed that a Trust Deed was there, but admittedly, no such Trust Deed has been filed before the Court. 19. Sri Parabrahma Sastry further submitted that the first defendant was addicted to vices and that he was not authorized to alienate the suit schedule land and even if any alienation is made by him ignoring the Will, the same is not binding on the second defendant and that the finding of the Court below that the first defendant, being the GPA, can alienate the suit schedule land is unsustainable in the facts and circumstances of the case. It is also his submission that there was no need for Sayini Syamalamba to sell the suit schedule land and it is nobody’s case that she was in need of money. It is also submitted that the plaintiffs had obtained the signatures of the first defendant on blank stamp papers and hence there is no need to send the said documents to the handwriting expert. 20. On the other hand, Sri Venkateshwarlu, learned counsel for respondents1 and 2 herein submitted that the first defendant never disputed that Sayini Syamalamba executed GPA in his favour and admittedly, a part of the land covered by Ex.B.1 Will was sold by the first defendant under Ex.A.10 on 30.03.1995 and this circumstance shows that the first defendant was authorized to alienate the property. It is also argued that though initially, the plaintiffs have disputed the execution of Ex.B.1 Will, but subsequently, they have not disputed that Sayini Syamalamba has executed Ex.B.1 Will in favour of the second defendant. It is further argued that Ex.B.1 Will did not come into force till the death of Sayini Syamalamba and admittedly, the GPA was not cancelled during her lifetime and when GPA was in force as on the date of execution of Ex.A.1 and A.2, the defendants are bound by Exs.A.1 and A.2. It is also his submission that since the plaintiffs have admitted the execution of Ex.B.1 Will, the proof of Will is not required. It is also his submission that since the plaintiffs have admitted the execution of Ex.B.1 Will, the proof of Will is not required. His main submission is that Sayini Syamalamba after executing Ex.B.1 Will, has executed GPA authorizing the first defendant to alienate the property and if at all Sayini Syamalamba wanted to safeguard the property and give the same to the second defendant, there was no necessity for her to execute GPA in favour of the first defendant authorizing him to sell the property. It is also his submission that all the villagers were under the impression that it is the first defendant who was authorized to alienate the property. It is also his submission that the recitals of the GPA did not show that Sayini Syamalamba had executed a Will in favour of the second defendant and, therefore, except the first defendant, nobody had knowledge about the execution of Ex.B.1 Will by Sayini Syamalamba and in the above circumstances, when the first defendant offered to sell the property as the GPA holder contending that he was in need of money to meet the medical expenses of Sayini Syamalamba and to discharge the family debts, the plaintiffs believed his version and entered into an agreement of sale. 21. As seen from the record, though at the initial stage the plaintiffs seems to have disputed the execution of Ex.B.1 Will by Late Sayini Syamalamba, but subsequently, they have admitted the execution of Ex.B.1 Will by Late Sayini Syamalamba. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the plaintiff also conceded that the plaintiffs have not disputed Ex.B.1 Will in the other suit, i.e., O.S.No.26 of 2001. Hence, there is no need to discuss about the Will in detail. It is true that the recitals of Ex.B.1 Will got to show that Sayini Syamalamba intended to bequeath the suit schedule land to the second defendant and her wish appears to be that the first defendant should develop the suit schedule land and handover the same to the second defendant as guardian of the second defendant, but admittedly, Late Sayini Syamalamba executed a GPA in favour of the first defendant authorizing him to manage the suit schedule land and if necessary, to alienate and mortgage the same. It is not the case of the defendants that the first defendant played fraud on Sayini Syamalamba and obtained GPA from her. It is not the case of the defendants that the first defendant played fraud on Sayini Syamalamba and obtained GPA from her. If at all Late Sayini Syamalamba had no intention to authorize the first defendant to alienate the suit schedule land, there was no necessity for her to execute a GPA in favour of the first defendant. Once the execution of GPA is admitted, it is clear that the first defendant is authorized to alienate the suit schedule land and by virtue of the said GPA, he can enter into contract with the third parties. In fact, the third parties could not know the execution of Ex.B.1 Will by Late Sayini Syamalamba unless it is revealed by the first defendant. Moreover, Ex.B.1 Will admittedly would not come into force till the death of Sayini Syamalamba and Sayini Syamalamba had not cancelled the GPA during her lifetime. Therefore, as on the date of execution of Ex.A.1 Agreement of sale, Ex.B.1 Will did not come into force and the GPA executed by Sayini Syamalamba in favour of the first defendant was in force and, therefore, it is clear that the first defendant was authorized to sell the land as per GPA. In support of his contention that a statement made by the testator against his own interest is admissible, learned counsel had relied upon the judgment in the case between B.L.Chouda’s case (3 supra). As discussed above, admittedly, Sayani Syamalamba executed GPA in favour of the first defendant authorizing him to alienate the property and once Sayani Syamalamba had authorized the first defendant, now it cannot be said that she never expected that the first defendant would sell the property. Moreover, the evidence on record reveals that the defendants have alienated a portion of the property bequeathed to the second defendant. Therefore, I hold that the first defendant was authorized to alienate the property as on 31.03.1995 by virtue of the GPA executed in his favour by Sayani Syamalamba. Point No.2 22. Sri Parabrahma Sastry submitted that when a GPA has acted against the principal, i.e., Sayini Syamalamba, the other legal heirs of Sayini Syamalamba become necessary parties and that they are not made as parties to the suit and, therefore, the suit is bad for non-joinder of the necessary parties. 23. Point No.2 22. Sri Parabrahma Sastry submitted that when a GPA has acted against the principal, i.e., Sayini Syamalamba, the other legal heirs of Sayini Syamalamba become necessary parties and that they are not made as parties to the suit and, therefore, the suit is bad for non-joinder of the necessary parties. 23. On the other hand, Sri Venkateshwarlu submitted that there is no need to implead the other legal representatives of Sayini Syamalamba since the case of the defendants is that Sayini Syamalamba executed a Will in favour of the second defendant and once the second defendant is claiming title to the property under the Will executed by Sayini Syamalamba, the defendants are estopped from contending that the other legal representatives of Sayini Syamalamba are necessary parties. It is also his submission that there is no pleading by the defendants that the other Legal Representatives of Sayini Syamalamba are necessary parties and that no such issue was framed by the Court below. 24. Since the specific case of the second defendant – Sri Nataraj is that Late Sayini Syamalamba executed Ex.B.1 Will bequeathing the suit schedule land to him and he is claiming title through the said Will and also had taken a stand that his father, being his guardian, cannot alienate the property without obtaining permission from the court, there is no need to add the Legal Representatives of Late Sayini Syamalamba as parties to the suit. Moreover, during the lifetime of Sayini Syamalamba, she executed a GPA in favour of the first defendant who, in turn, executed an agreement of sale in favour of plaintiffs. In view of the same, since the plaintiffs are claiming their right under the agreement of sale said to have been executed by the first defendant by virtue of GPA executed by Late Sayini Syamalamba, there is no need to add the Legal Representatives of Sayini Syamalamba. It is not the case of anybody that Sayini Syamalamba had not executed the GPA in favour of the first defendant or that the property devolved upon the other slegal heirs of Sayini Syamalamba. In view of the above discussion, it is clear that there is no need to add the Legal Representatives of Sayini Syamalamba as necessary parties to the suit. Point No.3 25. In view of the above discussion, it is clear that there is no need to add the Legal Representatives of Sayini Syamalamba as necessary parties to the suit. Point No.3 25. Sri Parabrahma Sastry argued that the first defendant was having monetary dealings with the first plaintiff and one Gaddamadugu Vikram and taking advantage of the vices of the first defendant, they obtained the signatures on the blank stamp papers and on promissory notes and other papers as collateral security and when he could not pay the due amount, they created Exs.A.1 and A.2 and filed the suit and in the above circumstances, Sri Parabrahma Sastry submits that there is no need to send the documents to the handwriting expert. 26. On the other hand, Sri Venkateshwarlu submitted that there is no conflict of interest between the father (first defendant) and the son (second defendant) and both are sailing together and that the second defendant had categorically admitted that his father, i.e., the first defendant, had no vices and, therefore, the original theory set up by the defendants that the first defendant incurred debts for his vices or that he signed on the blank stamp papers and promissory notes etc., has lost its basis. His main submission is that the plaintiffs have examined the attestors and scribe of Ex.A.1 and A.2 and their evidence proves that the first defendant executed Ex.A.1 agreement of sale and that he had received Rs.2,00,000/-on 31.03.1995 and the remaining balance of sale consideration on 19.09.1995. It is further argued that the first defendant categorically admitted that either the first plaintiff or Gaddamadugu Vikram never obtained his signatures on any blank stamp papers and this admission proves the case of the plaintiffs as far as execution of Ex.A.1 and A.2 is concerned. It is further argued that the first defendant admitted that he has no enmity with the attestors and the scribe of Ex.A.1 and A.2 and, therefore, their evidence become reliable and thus, the plaintiffs proved the execution of Ex.A.1 and A.2 by the first defendant. It is also his submission that the defendants had never taken any steps to send the documents to the handwriting expert. Learned counsel further argued that the evidence on record shows under what circumstances Ex.A.2 was executed and why endorsement was not obtained on Ex.A.1 itself. It is also his submission that the defendants had never taken any steps to send the documents to the handwriting expert. Learned counsel further argued that the evidence on record shows under what circumstances Ex.A.2 was executed and why endorsement was not obtained on Ex.A.1 itself. It is argued that if at all the plaintiffs wanted to take advantage of the signatures of the first defendant on blank stamp papers, they would have got the sale deed itself or an agreement of sale for entire 50 acres of land. It is also his submission that though there were money transactions between the parties, but all those transactions were subsequent to the agreement of sale. With regard to the genuineness of the transactions of Ex.A.1 and A.2, learned counsel submits that once the first defendant has admitted his signatures, the burden lies on the defendants to prove under what circumstances, his signatures were obtained and that the recitals of those documents are incorrect. 27. It is also submitted that separate suits were filed for recovery of amounts against the first defendant basing on the promissory notes executed by the first defendant on 19.08.1998 and on 15.03.1999 and in the said suits, the first defendant herein, though had taken a plea that the promissory notes were forged, but his plea was negatived and those suits have been decreed. 28. We are only concerned with Exs.A.1 and A.2 in the suit. The plaintiffs case is that the first defendant, having taken amount of Rs.2,00,000/-executed the agreement of sale on 31.03.1995. The defendants’ case is that the plaintiffs obtained signatures of the first defendant on blank stamp papers and some other documents while giving loan and those papers are used for fabricating Exs.A.1 and A.2. The first plaintiff is examined as P.W.1. According to him, he has no financial dealings with the first defendant. However, the evidence on record and the suits filed by him against the first defendant for recovery of money proves that there are money dealings between the parties. Moreover, P.W.1 has admitted that one Gaddamadugu Vikram, the first defendant in O.S.No.26 of 2001 filed a suit against the first defendant for recovery of money. According to P.W.1, said Gaddamadugu Vikram is not related to him. P.W.4 also admitted that Gaddamadugu Vikram used to carry on financial business at Chintalapudi. Moreover, P.W.1 has admitted that one Gaddamadugu Vikram, the first defendant in O.S.No.26 of 2001 filed a suit against the first defendant for recovery of money. According to P.W.1, said Gaddamadugu Vikram is not related to him. P.W.4 also admitted that Gaddamadugu Vikram used to carry on financial business at Chintalapudi. Thus, it is clear that there were some financial transactions between the parties. On that ground alone, Exs.A.1 and A.2 cannot be discarded. It is only one of the suspicious circumstances. Therefore, the evidence has to be carefully examined. 29. There are certain admissions made by D.W.1 (the first defendant) and D.W.3, the second defendant which support the case of the plaintiffs and destroy the version of the defendants, of course, on mere admissions of defendants, the plaintiffs case cannot be accepted. The plaintiffs have examined the attestors and the scribe of Exs.A.1 and A.2. Their evidence establishes that the first defendant executed Exs.A.1 and A.2. According to the plaintiffs, the first defendant executed Ex.A.1 agreement of sale on 31.03.1995 having received an amount of Rs.2,00,000/-from the plaintiffs and agreed to receive the remaining Rs.1,00,000/-and the plaintiffs agreed to pay the remaining amount on or before 19.09.1995 but however, they have paid the balance sale consideration of Rs.1,00,000/-on 17.09.1995 itself under Ex.A.2. Admittedly, Ex.A.2 is on a separate paper. The case of the plaintiffs is that on the date of execution of Ex.A.2, Ex.A.1 agreement of sale was not with them and it was with the second plaintiff. Normally, when a part of the sale consideration is paid, the endorsement showing the part payment would be obtained on the agreement of sale itself or on the reverse of the agreement of sale. Admittedly, the entire sale consideration was paid on 17.09.1995, but the plaintiffs have not taken any steps to obtain the registered sale deed from the first defendant. These are the two important circumstances against the plaintiffs. On an analysis of the entire evidence, it is clear that Exs.A.1 and A.2 contain the signatures of the first defendant. In fact, signatures of the first defendant on Exs.A.1 and A.2 are not in serious dispute. Now, the allegation of defendants is that the signatures of the first defendant were taken on blank promissory notes and blank stamp papers. On an analysis of the entire evidence, it is clear that Exs.A.1 and A.2 contain the signatures of the first defendant. In fact, signatures of the first defendant on Exs.A.1 and A.2 are not in serious dispute. Now, the allegation of defendants is that the signatures of the first defendant were taken on blank promissory notes and blank stamp papers. If the signatures of the first defendant are taken on blank stamp papers, then, normally, the scribe had to adjust the writing in Exs.A.1 and A.2. P.W.4 is the scribe of Ex.A.2. When he was examined, no suggestion is given to him that the writing on Ex.A.1 and A.2 has been adjusted above the signature of the first defendant. The plaintiffs have also examined P.W.2, who is the attestor to Ex.A.1 and P.W.3 is the attestor of ExA.2. The important circumstance is that P.W.1 himself admitted that he has no enmity with P.Ws.2 to 4. It appears that there is no necessity for P.Ws.2 to 4 to give false evidence. The important circumstances are that the second defendant (P.W.3) himself admitted that the defendants have been in possession of the property. There is another circumstance. P.W.3 (the second defendant) himself admitted that his father utilized the sale consideration received under Ex.A.1. The most important circumstance appears to be that if at all the plaintiffs fabricated Ex.A.1 and A.2, they would not have fabricated such documents which would be amenable to attack that the transaction is barred by limitation. Admittedly, the agreement of sale in Ex.A.1 is dated 31.03.1995 and Ex.A.2 is dated 17.09.1995. Admittedly, the suit has been filed in the year 2001. Admittedly, Sayani Syamalamba died on 27.03.1999. The plaintiffs could have prepared any document showing the date just prior to the death of Sayani Syamalamba in order to bring the transaction within the period of limitation. This circumstance shows that Exs.A.1 and A.2 cannot be doubted as fabricated. When we scrutinize the evidence of the first defendant, he did not say that the plaintiffs have obtained his signatures on white paper. There is no such specific plea in the written statement. He had taken the plea in the written statement that the plaintiffs have obtained signatures on the blank stamp papers and the blank promissory notes. But admittedly, Ex.A.2 is on the ledger paper. There is no such specific plea in the written statement. He had taken the plea in the written statement that the plaintiffs have obtained signatures on the blank stamp papers and the blank promissory notes. But admittedly, Ex.A.2 is on the ledger paper. When he was in the witness box, he deposed that the plaintiffs have obtained his signatures on the blank cheques and three blank promissory notes and on some blank stamp papers. It is his pleading that the plaintiffs have obtained the signatures of the first defendant on three blank promissory notes. In the caveat, he stated that his signatures were obtained on empty promissory notes, but when he was cross-examined, he deposed that his signatures were not obtained on stamp papers. Thus, admittedly, the first defendant did not sign on the blank stamp papers. But admittedly, Ex.A.1 is on the stamp papers. D.W.1 categorically admitted that he has not lodged any police complaint when his signatures were obtained on blank promissory notes. He has also admitted that he did not give any legal notice to the plaintiffs alleging that his signatures were obtained on blank stamp papers. When he was confronted with the signatures on Ex.A.1, he denied his signatures on Ex.A.1. When he was confronted with the signatures on the Vakalat executed by him, he denied his signatures even on the Vakalat. However, he admitted that he sold part of the suit schedule land under Ex.A.10. The admissions made by the first defendant himself go to show that his signatures were not obtained on blank stamp papers. Moreover, the second defendant (D.W.3) admitted that his father himself utilized the sale consideration amount under Ex.A.1. In fact, he has been cross-examined with reference to Ex.A.10. D.W.3 admitted that he has not filed any suit questioning the alienation made by his father under Ex.A.10 dated 30.03.1995. The next sentence is that at the time of execution of Ex.A.1, he was a minor and that his father himself utilized the sale consideration under Ex.A.1. However, he denied the suggestion that his father sold the land in Ex.A.1 for the medical expenses of Syamalamba. 30. The Presiding Officers must be very careful while dictating the depositions to the Stenographers and they must be very careful even while correcting the depositions. However, he denied the suggestion that his father sold the land in Ex.A.1 for the medical expenses of Syamalamba. 30. The Presiding Officers must be very careful while dictating the depositions to the Stenographers and they must be very careful even while correcting the depositions. In the instant case, under the normal circumstances, D.W.3 would not have stated that his father himself utilized the sale consideration under Ex.A.1, but this admission goes a long way and since as seen from the evidence, D.W.3 himself admitted the same, it has to be treated as correct. In the above circumstances, the evidence of D.Ws.1 and 3 itself shows that D.W.1 executed Ex.A.1 agreement of sale. It has to be seen that the first defendant himself has executed the Registered Sale Deed under Ex.A.10 on 31.03.1995 and alienated a part of the suit schedule land covered by Ex.B.1 Will under Ex.A.10 and this agreement of sale is executed on the very next day. Therefore, in all probabilities, the first defendant himself seems to have executed Ex.A.1 agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiffs. Thus, it is clear that the version of the first defendant is inconsistent. Point No.4 31. Now it has to be seen whether the alienation during the minority of the second defendant is not binding. It has to be seen that if there is only a Will and no GPA, the contention of Sri Parabrahma Sastry is right that the first defendant was not authorized to alienate the property during the minority of the second defendant even if he is acting as guardian of the second defendant. But the fact remains that Sayani Syamalamba was alive as on the date of execution of Exs.A.1 and A.2 and the GPA executed by her in favour of the first defendant was in force. Moreover, admittedly, the Will in Ex.B.1 did not come into force during the lifetime of Sayani Syamalamba. Therefore, the question of the first defendant acting as the guardian of the second defendant during the lifetime of Sayani Syamalamba does not arise. Since the first defendant was acting by virtue of the GPA executed by Sayani Syamalamba, the questions whether the second defendant was a minor or not and whether the first defendant can alienate the property without the permission of the Court or not etc., does not arise. Since the first defendant was acting by virtue of the GPA executed by Sayani Syamalamba, the questions whether the second defendant was a minor or not and whether the first defendant can alienate the property without the permission of the Court or not etc., does not arise. Sri Parabrahma Sastry argued that in spite of Ex.B.1 Will executed in favour of the second defendant, the first defendant alienated the property. As far as the execution of the Will by Sayani Syamalamba is concerned, admittedly there is no recital about the execution of the Will in the GPA and, therefore, when the first defendant offered to sell the property by virtue of the GPA, there is no possibility to the plaintiffs to know about the Will. It is not the case of the defendants that in spite of informing about the Will, the plaintiffs purchased the suit schedule land. It appears that the plaintiffs had no knowledge about the Will executed by Sayani Syamalamba as on the date of execution of Exs.A.1 and A.2. The other circumstance is that admittedly, the first defendant had alienated a part of the plaint ‘B’ Schedule property and such transaction is not challenged by the second defendant. This shows that the first defendant was authorized to alienate the property by virtue of the GPA executed in his favour by Sayani Syamalamba. Point No.5 32. Sri Parabrahma Sastry submitted that the plaintiffs were never in possession of the suit schedule land and the documents filed by the defendants go to show that they are in possession of the suit schedule land. It is also his submission that the plaintiffs have not disputed the authenticity of the Adangal which shows that the possession of the defendants. 33. On the other hand, Sri Venkateshwarlu had taken this Court through the evidence of D.Ws.1 and 2 and submitted that DWs.1 and 2 have given conflicting versions with regard to the name of the lessee and the evidence on record proves that the plaintiffs have been in possession of the suit schedule land. It is further argued that D.W.3 (second defendant) himself admitted that her mother used to tell him that the plaintiffs have encroached the suit schedule land and that she was taking steps to recover the possession of the suit schedule land. It is further argued that D.W.3 (second defendant) himself admitted that her mother used to tell him that the plaintiffs have encroached the suit schedule land and that she was taking steps to recover the possession of the suit schedule land. It is also his submission that the claim of the defendants that they are in possession of the property is destroyed by the evidence of D.W.3 (second defendant) himself. According to P.W.1, the plaintiffs were delivered possession on the date of execution of Ex.A.2 on 17.09.1995. Their case is that plaintiffs 1 and 2 have jointly purchased the suit schedule land under the agreement of sale in Ex.A.1. P.W.2 is the attestor ofEx.A.1 agreement of sale. Another attestor is Gaddamadugu Vikram. P.W.2 is the attestor of Ex.A.2. P.W.4 is the adjacent land owner. According to him, P.W.1 alone has been cultivating the land. P.W.4 is the scribe of the documents. This witness deposed that the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit schedule land. The admissions made by D.W.3 (second defendant) are fatal to the case of the defendants. Though in the chief examination D.W.3 stated that he is in possession of the suits schedule land, but in the cross-examination, D.W.3 (second defendant) himself admitted that his mother used to tell him that the plaintiffs have forcibly entered into the suit schedule land and cultivating the same and that she is trying to evict them by filing a suit. This clearly shows that the defendants are not in possession of the suit schedule land and the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit schedule land. He further admitted that he has not leased out the suit schedule land to any other person. When D.W.1 (first defendant) was examined, he deposed that one Doddi nageshwara Rao is his lessee. He further admitted that he lodged a police compliant in Ex.A.7 and in the said complaint, he had mentioned that one Chandra Venkatramaiah is his lessee. Thus, the admissions made by the defendants themselves go to show that their version is inconsistent and cannot be accepted. Thus, I hold that the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit schedule land. Point No.6 34. Thus, the admissions made by the defendants themselves go to show that their version is inconsistent and cannot be accepted. Thus, I hold that the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit schedule land. Point No.6 34. Sri Parabrahma Sastry submitted that admittedly, Sayini Syamalamba died on 27.03.1999, i.e., before the institution of the suit and the GPA executed by Sayini Syamalamba in favour of the first defendant stands cancelled by virtue of her death and, therefore, no suit can be filed for specific performance after the death of Sayini Syamalamba. Learned counsel had relied upon R.Sandhyarani’s case (1 supra) in support of his contention that after the death of principal after executing power of attorney, the right given to the power of attorney holder comes to an end and the agent has no right to sell or bequeath the property as per the terms of power of attorney. It is a reported case of NOC. No facts of that case are available. Anyhow, it appears that in the said case, it is held that a registered sale deed cannot be executed after the death of the principal. But in the case on hand, already by virtue of GPA, the first defendant executed the agreement of sale and after the death of Sayini Syamalamba, it cannot be said that the agreement of sale stands cancelled. Since during the lifetime of Sayini Syamalamba the first defendant offered to sell the suit schedule land by showing the GPA executed by Sayini Syamalamba in his favour and by making a clear representation that he was authorized to sell the property as the GPA of Sayini Syamalamba and believing the version of the first defendant when the plaintiffs had entered into the agreement of sale with the first defendant, Late Sayini Syamalamba was bound by the agreement executed by her GPA, the first defendant during her lifetime. It is also the case of the plaintiff that before the stipulated date, they have paid the remaining sale consideration amount and the entire sale consideration was paid to the first defendant. The reasons for selling the property, as per the recitals of Ex.A.1, are (1) first defendant had to discharge his debts; and (2) he has to meet the medical expenses of Sayini Syamalamba. The reasons for selling the property, as per the recitals of Ex.A.1, are (1) first defendant had to discharge his debts; and (2) he has to meet the medical expenses of Sayini Syamalamba. As observed in the earlier paragraphs, since Sayini Syamalamba had not canceled the GPA executed in favour of the first defendant during her lifetime, the successors in interest are also bound by the agreement of sale entered into by the first defendant on behalf of Sayini Syamalamba. 35. Learned counsel for the appellant had also relied upon the judgment in SyedAbdul Khader’s case (2 supra). In that case, the question that came up for consideration is whether three principals can jointly execute a GPA and constitute an agent. The facts of that case are entirely different and not applicable to the facts of the case on hand. There cannot be any dispute to say that an agency comes to an end after the death of the principal and after that date, the agent cannot alienate the property or enter into any contract with any other person, but the same would not apply to the case whereunder, the parties have already entered into an agreement and subsequently, paid the entire sale consideration during the lifetime of the principal. In such circumstances, it had to be held that entire sale transaction is over except the execution of registered sale deed and, therefore, the person on whom the property devolved by virtue of the Will has to fulfill the promise of Late Sayini Syamalamba and execute the sale deed. Point No.7 36. Sri Parabrahma Sastry submitted that the suit is bared by limitation. His main submission is that the plaintiffs ought to have filed the suit within three years from the date stipulated in the agreement of sale under Section 54 of the Limitation Act and the limitation does not begin from the date of issuance of legal notice by the plaintiffs. The main submission of Sri Parabrahma Sastry is that the plaintiffs did not demand the defendants to execute the sale deed and it is not their case that the defendants refused to execute the sale deed and, therefore, the question of counting the period from the date of legal notice is not correct. The main submission of Sri Parabrahma Sastry is that the plaintiffs did not demand the defendants to execute the sale deed and it is not their case that the defendants refused to execute the sale deed and, therefore, the question of counting the period from the date of legal notice is not correct. It is also argued that when the entire sale consideration was paid, in all probabilities, nothing prevented the plaintiff to obtain a regular sale deed from the defendants. 37. On the other hand, Sri Venkateshwarlu submitted that It is also argued that there is time limit for payment of remaining sale consideration amount, i.e., the plaintiffs should pay balance of amount on or before 19.09.1995 and if the amount is not paid within the said period, the first defendant would be entitled to recover the losses through Court. His further submission is that the balance of sale consideration was paid before the stipulated date. His main contention is that there is no time stipulation for execution of the regular sale deed and the recitals of Ex.A.1 would go to show that as and when demanded by the plaintiffs, the first defendant should execute a registered sale deed. It is also his submission that the suit is not barred by limitation and that the Court below had categorically found that the suit is covered by Article 54 of the Limitation Act. His further submission is that the time is not the essence of contract particularly when no date is fixed for execution of the registered sale deed and in such circumstances the time starts running from the date of refusal. It is also his submission that the second defendant even did not plead the issue of limitation. His further submission is that no issue as to whether the suit is barred by time was framed by the Court below and except a vague averment that the suit is barred by time, the defendants did not plead as to how the suit is barred by limitation. It is his submission that the main case of the defendants is that Ex.A.1 and A.2 were fabricated documents and, therefore, they have not raised the plea of limitation specifically. 38. In support of the contention of Sri Parabrahma Sastry that the suit is barred by limitation, he had relied upon Ma.Shwe Mya’s case (4 supra). It is his submission that the main case of the defendants is that Ex.A.1 and A.2 were fabricated documents and, therefore, they have not raised the plea of limitation specifically. 38. In support of the contention of Sri Parabrahma Sastry that the suit is barred by limitation, he had relied upon Ma.Shwe Mya’s case (4 supra). In that case, it was observed as follows:- “The Rights of Equity are rights which are given to people who are vigilant and not to those who sleep, and unless there can be established some reason which threw upon the defendant, the entire blame for the delay, a lapse of time, would be fatal to any action for specific performance of the contract.” 39. The principal laid down in that case is that the law helps only those who are vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights. 40. Learned counsel had also relied upon ChanumoluRadharani’s case (5 supra). The facts of that case are that the parties have entered into agreement of sale on 21.10.1992. Out of the total sale consideration of Rs.1,69,500/-, an amount of Rs.50,000/-was paid on the date of the agreement of sale itself and the balance sale consideration was agreed to be paid by 30.01.1993. The plaintiff, by legal notice dated 05.07.1995, sought three months time for performance of contract. Again they issued a notice dated 30.10.1995 and sought further time. The suit was filed on 12.10.1998. On facts, this Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff did not perform her part of contract by paying the remaining amount of Rs.1,19,500/-before 30.01.1993 nor sought extension of time for payment of the money nor she had issued any notice before 30.01.1993 assigning reasons for not performing her part of the contract. This Court also came to the conclusion that the date fixed for performance of contract on the part of the plaintiff, i.e., 30.01.1993 assumes importance and thus, the limitation starts running from that date and mere issuing of subsequent notice has no effect, whatsoever, and, therefore, the suit is barred by limitation. There cannot be any dispute as to the ratio laid down in the above referred case because the said decision deals with the first part of Article 54 of the Limitation Act. 41. Learned counsel for the defendant had also relied on KoradaApalanarasamma’s case (6 supra). There cannot be any dispute as to the ratio laid down in the above referred case because the said decision deals with the first part of Article 54 of the Limitation Act. 41. Learned counsel for the defendant had also relied on KoradaApalanarasamma’s case (6 supra). In that case, the suit agreement of sale is dated 10.04.1979 and the suit was filed on 03.05.1985. In the above circumstances, it was held that the suit is barred by limitation. 42. Learned counsel for the appellant had also relied on S.MahaboobBasha’s case (7 supra). In that case, the agreement of sale was dated 07.10.1968 and the suit was institutedon 23.11.1977. Three months time was stipulated in the agreement of sale for execution and registration of the sale deed. However, this Court held as follows:- “Injunction order in partition suit filed against original executant of sale agreement cannot stand in way of plaintiffs for filing suit for specific performance for enforcement of sale agreement and the plaintiffs cannot seek aid of Section 15(1) of the Act to save limitation.” 43. In the same decision, this Court further observed as follows:- “Even as per the recitals of Ex.A.1, which are self-explanatory, only an advance of Rs.5,000/-had been paid and it is not their case that there is a recital in Ex.A.1 that on demand, at any point of time, sale deed would be executed.” 44. As seen from the recitals of Ex.A.1 in the case on hand, the sale consideration was fixed at Rs.3,00,000/-and out of the said amount, an amount of Rs.2,00,000/-was paid on the date of agreement of sale, i.e., on 31.03.1995 and it is agreed that the remaining Rs.1,00,000/-should be paid before 19.09.1995. It is further recited that after payment of remaining sale consideration on 19.09.1995, the executant (the first defendant) would execute a sale deed as and when demanded by the plaintiff on the name of any person of their choice and at their expense, i.e., the plaintiffs have to meet the expenses for stamps, registration etc., It is also recited that if the amount of Rs.1,00,000/-is not paid as per the stipulation in Ex.A.1, the executant (the first defendant) could recover the entire loss caused to him from the plaintiffs. In the above referred decision, no such recital is there that on payment at any time, the sale would be executed, but in the case on hand, there is such a specific recital in Ex.A.1 agreement of sale that on demand of plaintiff at any time, the sale deed would be executed by the first defendant. 45. Learned counsel for the appellant had also relied on SyedBasha (died)’s case (8 supra). In that case, the plaintiff field a suit for specific performance basing on the sale deed dated 17.10.1974. An amount of Rs.540/-was paid on the date of agreement of sale and it was agreed that the balance would be paid within three months. Possession was also delivered on the date of agreement of sale itself. On 15.12.1975, the balance of Rs.1,200/-was paid by the plaintiff and the first defendant endorsed on the back of the document itself undertaking to execute the sale deed whenever required. There were four items that were agreed to be sold. On 09.01.1976, by mutual agreement, the plaintiff got executed by the first defendant, sale of item No.4 of the property. The remaining properties were in possession of the plaintiff. For the first time, on 07.02.1984, i.e., after about 12 years, the plaintiff demanded the first defendant to execute the sale deed in respect of item Ns.1 to 3. In the meanwhile, the first defendant had executed the sale deed in favour of the second defendant on 13.02.1984. In Ex.A.1 agreement of sale, there was a forfeiture clause to the effect that if and when plaintiff fails to comply his part of contract, he has to forfeit the amount paid by way of advance. In the above circumstances, the Madras High Court observed that though entire sale consideration was paid on 15.12.1975, the plaintiff has not taken any steps to get the sale deed executed nearly for a period of nine years and in the above circumstances, he is not entitled to claim the discretionary relief. The main distinction is that there is a forfeiture clause in the agreement of sale in the case on hand. Moreover, after payment of entire sale consideration amount, the plaintiff, in that case got executed sale deed in respect of item No.4. The main distinction is that there is a forfeiture clause in the agreement of sale in the case on hand. Moreover, after payment of entire sale consideration amount, the plaintiff, in that case got executed sale deed in respect of item No.4. There was nothing on record to show that the plaintiff had never shown any interest with regard to the othe three items for a period of twelve years in that case. 46. Learned counsel has also relied on MademsettySatyanarayanai’s cae (9 supra). In that case, basing on the advertisement issued by defendants 1 and 2, the plaintiff offered the highest bid but when he tendered 1/4th of the sale price as earnest money, the defendants refused to accept the same. Within one week, the plaintiff gave notice to the third defendant calling upon him to obtain from him, 1/4th amount of sale price as earnest money within 24 hours and to pass a receipt and when defendants 1 and 2 did not give any reply, he filed a suit after about eight months. The trial court dismissed the suit. The High Court, on consideration of evidence, came to the conclusion that the delay in filing the suit was due to the illness of the plaintiff’s wife and also on account of demolition of one of his house by Municipal Corporation and decreed the suit. Challenging the same, the defendants approached the Apex Court. In the circumstances, the Apex Court observed as follows:- “Under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, relief of specific performance is discretionary but not arbitrary. Discretion must be exercised in accordance with sound and reasonable judicial principles.” 47. It is also observed that the plea not raised in the pleadings cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in Supreme Court. 48. Reliance is also placed by the learned counsel in Messrs. Sriram Cotton Pressing Factory (P) Ltd.,’s case (10 supra). In that case, the plaintiff entered into agreement of sale on 26.01.1957 to purchase the suit lands for construction of factory and a period of two years was fixed for performance of contract. Since there was delay in obtaining the approval from the Government to get the area declared as industrial area, the time was extended from time to time till 15.07.1958. Initially, permission was granted. Since there was delay in obtaining the approval from the Government to get the area declared as industrial area, the time was extended from time to time till 15.07.1958. Initially, permission was granted. However, the defendant carried on correspondence with the authorities and ultimately got sanction order on 30.09.1958. Then on 22.04.1959, the plaintiff gave notice to the defendant calling upon him to complete the transaction according to the agreement. The Madras High Court held that initially time was extended till 15.07.1958 and thereafter the plaintiff kept quiet for a period of nine months from 15.07.1958 and there were laches on the part of the plaintiff and, therefore, he is not entitled for the relief of specific performance of contract. However, it was observed as follows:- “The question whether time was the essence of the contract is surely a question no flaw and not of act, being a legal inference is to be derived from the facts. In the instant case, having regard to the conduct of the parties in extending the original time fixed for performance, from time to time, time was an essential element, whether time is essential will have to be decided from the nature of the subject matter of the contract and the object of the contract.” 49. In view of the same, it has to be seen whether time is the essence of the contract in the presence case or not. 50. Learned counsel for the appellant had also placed reliance on Food Corporation of India’s case (11 supra). IN that case, the parties have entered into agreement wherein the hirer agreed to hire the plinth area for three years and the plaintiff constructed by investing money. However, the hirer terminated the agreement before three years and when a suit for damages was filed. With regard to the issue of limitation raised before the Apex Court, the Apex Court, observed as follows:- “No issue was framed on question of limitation. That point was not raised even in the High Court nor in this Court too. It is only in the list of dates/synopsis it is vaguely stated that the suit is time-barred.” 51. It is observed that the Court may have to check at the threshold as to whether the suit is within limitation or not. That point was not raised even in the High Court nor in this Court too. It is only in the list of dates/synopsis it is vaguely stated that the suit is time-barred.” 51. It is observed that the Court may have to check at the threshold as to whether the suit is within limitation or not. In that case, no plea was raised by the defendant or any facts or reasons were indicated as to in what manner the suit was barred by limitation. The Apex Court, though observed that it is the duty of the Court to check at the threshold whether the suit is within limitation or not, but however, observed as follows:- “But in all probabilities, it is always desirable that if the defendant would like to raise such an issue, he would better raise it in the pleadings so that the other party may also note the basis and the facts by reason of which the suit is sought to be dismissed as barred by time.” 52. On the other hand, Sri Venkateshwarlu, learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 had relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Mst.Sugani’s case (13 supra). In that case, the suit was filed basing on the agreement executed by one Mahadeo on 13.12.1975. A sum of Rs.5000/-was paid on the date of agreement as earnest money. Then, Mahadeo executed a sale deed for a sum of Rs.6,000/-on the basis of the agreement of sale. On 03.07.1978, a notice was sent demanding the arrears of rents from the plaintiff. Then on 03.01.1979, the plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of agreement on the ground that Mahadeo had delayed registration on one pretext or other and in the meanwhile, executed a sale deed in favour of respondents 1 and 2 (who demanded arrears of rent) and that respondents 1 and 2 had full knowledge of agreement of sale executed by Mahadeo in favour of the plaintiff and that the plaintiff was throughout willing to execute the sale deed. In the written statement, respondents 1 and 2 had taken a stand that Mahadeo had not entered into agreement of sale to sell the suit property on 13.12.1975 and that Mahadeo had entered into agreement of sale of suit property on 18.12.1973 with respondents 1 and 2 and subsequently, Mahadeo executed the sale deed in their favour on 18.04.1977. In the written statement, respondents 1 and 2 had taken a stand that Mahadeo had not entered into agreement of sale to sell the suit property on 13.12.1975 and that Mahadeo had entered into agreement of sale of suit property on 18.12.1973 with respondents 1 and 2 and subsequently, Mahadeo executed the sale deed in their favour on 18.04.1977. When the matter reached the High Court, the High Court allowed the appeal filed by the defendants. When the matter was carried to the Apex Court, the Apex Court came to the conclusion that though the High Court came to hold that the suit was barred by time, it has to be noticed that no such issue was framed in the suit. The Apex Court further observed it as follows:- “In any event, bare perusal of Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short ‘the Limitation Act’) shows that the suit was within time. There was no issue framed regarding readiness and willingness in terms of Section 16(C) of the Act. In any event, in the plaint categorical statements were made and evidence was also specifically led in this regard.” 53. As seen from the facts of the case on hand, it is not the case of the defendants that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to get the sale deed registered. It is also not their case that the plaintiff was not in position to arrange the required money for getting the sale deed registered. 54. Learned counsel had also relied upon the judgment in GunwantbhaiMulchand Shahi’s case (14 supra). In that case, the plaintiffs’ predecessor in interest along with another, entered into an agreement dated 18.12.1964 for purchase of the plaint schedule property under a registered agreement of sale. On 05.10.1968, a subsequent agreement was executed and possession was transferred to the purchase in pursuance of the agreement of sale. He issued a public notice inviting objections. When he received objections, a suit for specific performance was filed on 04.04.1994. It was averred in the plaint that pursuant to the agreement of sale, the plaintiffs predecessor had paid entire sale consideration and he was in possession of the property. As such, there remained nothing to be performed on the part of the plaintiff on the terms of agreement of sale. The issue of limitation was decided as a preliminary issue. It was averred in the plaint that pursuant to the agreement of sale, the plaintiffs predecessor had paid entire sale consideration and he was in possession of the property. As such, there remained nothing to be performed on the part of the plaintiff on the terms of agreement of sale. The issue of limitation was decided as a preliminary issue. The Court below dismissed the suit on the ground of limitation. The same was confirmed by the High Court. When the matter reached the Apex court, the Apex Court observed as follows:- We may straightaway say that the manner in which the question of limitation has been dealt with by the courts below is highly unsatisfactory. It was rightly noticed that the suit was governed by Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Then, the enquiry should have been, first, whether any time was fixed for performance in the agreement for sale, and if it was so fixed, to hold that a suit filed beyond three years of the date was barred by limitation unless any case of extension was pleaded and established. But in a case where no time for performance was fixed, the court had to find the date on which the plaintiff had notice that the performance was refused and on finding that date, to see whether the suit was filed within three years thereof. We have explained the position in the recent decision in R.K. Parvatharaj Gupta Vs. K.C. Jayadeva Reddy (2006) 2 SCC 428 : (2006) 2 Scale 156. In the case on hand, there is no dispute that no date for performance is fixed in the agreement and if so, the suit could be held to be barred by limitation only on a finding that the plaintiffs had notice that the defendants were refusing performance of the agreement. In a case of that nature normally, the question of limitation could be decided only after taking evidence and recording a finding as to the date on which the plaintiff had such notice. We are not unmindful of the fact that a statement appears to have been filed on behalf of the plaintiffs that they do not want to lead any evidence. The defendants, of course, took the stand that they also did not want to lead any evidence. We are not unmindful of the fact that a statement appears to have been filed on behalf of the plaintiffs that they do not want to lead any evidence. The defendants, of course, took the stand that they also did not want to lead any evidence. As we see it, the trial court should have insisted on the parties leading evidence, on this question or the court ought to have postponed the consideration of the issue of limitation along with the other issues arising in the suit, after a trial. 55. Reliance has also been placed by Sri Venkateshwarlu upon the judgment in S.Brahmanand’s case (15 supra). In that case, the Apex Court, while explaining the words used in Section 54 of the Limitation Act, fixed date referring to the letter of the defendant, wherein, he requested for postponing the performance to a future date. The Apex Court came to the conclusion that the time for performance stands extended and, therefore, the case is governed by Second Part of Article 54 of Limitation Act. 56. Reliance has also been placed by Sri Venkateshwarlu on the judgment in AhmmadsahabAbdul Mulla (deceased by L.Rs.)’s case (16 supra). In that case, this Court observed as follows:- When date is fixed it means that there is a definite date fixed for doing a particular act. Even in the second part the stress is on `when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused'. Here again, there is a definite point of time, when the plaintiff notices the refusal. In that sense both the parts refer to definite dates. So, there is no question of finding out an intention from other circumstances. Whether the date was fixed or not the plaintiff had notice that performance is refused and the date thereof are to be established with reference to materials and evidence to be brought on record. The expression `date' used in Article 54 of the Schedule to the Act definitely is suggestive of a specified date in the calendar. 57. Learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 had also relied upon the judgment in Bihar School Examination Board’s case (18 supra), wherein, the Apex Court held as follows:- According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. 57. Learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2 had also relied upon the judgment in Bihar School Examination Board’s case (18 supra), wherein, the Apex Court held as follows:- According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. (See: State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Ors. ( AIR 1968 SC 647 ) and Union of India and Ors. v. Dhanwanti Devi and Ors. ( 1996 (6) SCC 44 ). A case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more. The words used by Judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words in an Act of Parliament. In Quinn v. Leathem (1901) AC 495 (H.L.), Earl of Halsbury LC observed that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which are found there are not intended to be exposition of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are found and a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated.Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated.Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. 58. Let us consider the relevant provisions. 59. Article 54 of the Limitation Act is as follows:- Description of Suits Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run The date fixed for the 54. For specific performance or, if no such performance of a Three years date is fixed when the contract plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. 60. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act is as follows:- (a) …….. (b) …….. (c) Who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms of performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. Explanation :-For the purpose of clause (c):- (i) Where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in Court any money except when so directed by the Court; (ii) The plaintiff must perform or, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract accordingly to its true construction.” 61. Coming to the facts of the case on hand, it has to be seen whether this case is covered by the first part or the second part of Article 54 of the Limitation Act. The plaintiffs have specifically averred that they have entered into an agreement of sale with the first defendant on 31.03.1995 when the first defendant offered to sell the suit schedule property to them. The plaintiffs have specifically averred that they have entered into an agreement of sale with the first defendant on 31.03.1995 when the first defendant offered to sell the suit schedule property to them. Their further case is that the first defendant, as the General Power of Attorney holder of Sayani Syamalamba, executed an agreement of sale and received an amount of Rs.2,00,000/-and as per the recitals of Ex.A.1 – agreement of sale, the plaintiffs agreed to pay the remaining balance of Rs.1,00,000/-on or before 19.09.1995. Their further case is that on 17.09.1995, they have paid the balance of ale consideration before the stipulated date in Ex.A.1 and on the same day, the first defendant delivered the possession of the plaint schedule property to the first defendant. Thus, the plaintiffs have specifically clamed that they have performed their part of contract. Therefore, there is no further need to plead that they had always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of contract. As seen from Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act extracted supra, if a plaintiff has to perform the essential terms of contract which are to be performed by him, he must specifically plead that he has always been ready and willing to perform such essential terms of contract. D.W.3 categorically deposed that his mother used to inform that the plaintiffs have forcibly entered into the suit schedule property and cultivating the same and that she is trying to evict them by filing a suit in the Court. He has also admitted that his father utilized the sale consideration under Ex.A.1. Thus, the contention of the plaintiff that they are in possession of suit schedule land has been admitted by no other than the second defendant himself. 62. Coming to the recitals of Ex.A.1, it is clear that the sale consideration amount was fixed at Rs.3,00,000/-and the plaintiff has agreed to pay the remaining Rs.1,00,000/-on 19.09.1995. It is categorically mentioned in Ex.A.1 that on payment of Rs.1,00,000/-on or before 19.09.1995, the first defendant would execute a registered sale deed as and when demanded by the plaintiffs. The part to be performed by the plaintiffs is only to pay Rs.1,00,000/-on 17.09.1995. It is categorically mentioned in Ex.A.1 that on payment of Rs.1,00,000/-on or before 19.09.1995, the first defendant would execute a registered sale deed as and when demanded by the plaintiffs. The part to be performed by the plaintiffs is only to pay Rs.1,00,000/-on 17.09.1995. As discussed in the above paragraphs, once it is proved that the entire sale consideration has been paid under Ex.A.2, it is clear that the plaintiffs have performed their part of obligation and, therefore, it is the obligation of the first defendant to execute a registered sale deed and admittedly, no specific time is fixed for obtaining the registered sale deed from the first defendant. In view of the same, it is clear that this case is covered by Part – II of Article 54 of the Limitation Act, i.e., the time begins to run when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. As seen from the evidence, the plaintiffs case is that they have been in possession of the property from 17.09.1995 and they never insisted the first defendant for registration of sale deed in their favour and that when the first defendant field a suit in O.S.No.26 of 2001, they got issued a legal notice for the first time on 17.10.2001 under Ex.A.3 demanding the defendants to execute a registered sale deed and when they refused, they filed suit. Their specific case is that cause of action arose when they received the reply notice on 31.10.2001 from the defendants refusing to execute the registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs. According to P.W.1, the plaintiffs had cordial relationship with the defendants and, therefore, they did not obtain any registered sale deed. The reasons shown by the plaintiffs for not obtaining regular sale deed, as seen from their pleadings and the evidence on record, is that since they were already put in possession of the suit schedule property, they never insisted Sayini Syamalamba or the first defendant to execute a registered sale deed. Point No.8 63. Sri Parabrahma Sastry submitted that when the plaintiffs say that Ex.B.1 Will survives, they cannot take advantage of the contract and the second defendant cannot be burdened with the contract as he is not the legatee for the purpose of executing the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs. 64. Point No.8 63. Sri Parabrahma Sastry submitted that when the plaintiffs say that Ex.B.1 Will survives, they cannot take advantage of the contract and the second defendant cannot be burdened with the contract as he is not the legatee for the purpose of executing the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs. 64. On the other hand, Sri Venkateshwarlu, learned counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that the first defendant filed a suit in O.S.No.26 of 2001 before the Court below for declaration of title and injunction against the first plaintiff and one Gaddamadugu Vikram and the plaintiffs have filed a suit for injunction against the defendants herein and that the second defendant herein alone filed an appeal against the judgment in O.S.No.26 of 2001 in A.S.No.369 of 2006 and that the findings in the said suits have become final and operate as res judicata. It is also his submission that even if the GPA comes to end, the parties are bound by the agreement of sale executed during the lifetime of Sayini Syamalamba and since the defendants have been declared owners as per the judgment in O.S.No.26 of 2001, they have to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs. 65. As discussed in the above paragraphs, mere delay is not a ground to reject the claim for specific performance. It has to be seen that the defendants have taken false pleas that the first defendant was addicted to vices which plea is proved to be false as per the admissions made by D.W.3 (the second defendant) himself. The plea of the defendants that they are in possession is also proved to be incorrect as per the admissions made by D.W.3 himself. The conduct of the parties has to be taken into consideration. Therefore, I am of the view that on the ground of mere delay, the claim for specific performance cannot be rejected. But however, it is an admitted fact that the plaintiffs did not take any steps to obtain sale deed from 19.09.1995 till they issued legal notice on 17.10.2001. The relief of specific performance is a discretionary relief. The defendants are not at all responsible for the delay. It is an admitted case that in the meanwhile, Sayini Syamalamba died. But however, it is an admitted fact that the plaintiffs did not take any steps to obtain sale deed from 19.09.1995 till they issued legal notice on 17.10.2001. The relief of specific performance is a discretionary relief. The defendants are not at all responsible for the delay. It is an admitted case that in the meanwhile, Sayini Syamalamba died. Though it is held that the cause of action arose from the date of knowledge of refusal as per part II of Section 54 of the Limitation Act, the fact remains that the plaintiffs have not assigned any convincing reason for not obtaining sale deed from the first defendant during the lifetime of Sayini Syamalamba. It is clear that there are laches on their part. However, the fact remains that the defendants cannot be dispossessed even if specific performance is refused, but their names cannot be mutated in revenue records. No useful purpose will be achieved by refusing specific performance on the ground of delay. Hence, a pragmatic approach is required. In fact, it is not possible to give a complete satisfaction to both the parties, unless the matter is settled in Lok Adalat and there is a win-win situation. It is not possible to satisfy both the parties when there is a contest between the parties. It may not be possible to have a complete satisfaction to the Court also since total justice may not be totally in favour of one party. Unless we come out of web of technicalities, it may not be possible to reach nearer to complete justice. The second defendant had been bequeathed wit the property. Now the same is denied to him. Therefore, a just and reasonable approach which would be equitable has to be adopted. It appears that in the meanwhile, prices of land increased. In the circumstances, it appears to be just and reasonable to direct the plaintiffs to pay an amount of Rs.1,00,000/-with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from 19.09.1995 till 17.10.2001 as compensation to the defendants. Point No.9 66. Sri Parabrahma Sastry submitted that when the plaintiffs say that Ex.B.1 will survives, they cannot take advantage of the contract and the second defendant cannot be burdened with the contract as he is not the legatee for the purpose of executing the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs. 67. Point No.9 66. Sri Parabrahma Sastry submitted that when the plaintiffs say that Ex.B.1 will survives, they cannot take advantage of the contract and the second defendant cannot be burdened with the contract as he is not the legatee for the purpose of executing the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs. 67. On the other hand, Sri Venkateshwarlu, learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the defendants have sold 5 acres of land during the pendency of the appeal. It is also his submission that though they obtained interim stay order, but the interim stay was made absolute subject to the payment of costs, but subsequently, they failed to pay the costs and, therefore, the interim stay granted earlier by this Court stands vacated and in the above circumstances, the second defendant had no right to sell the property. It is also his submission that even if there is sale during the pendency of the appeal, the plaintiffs are not bound by such sale. It is also his submission that the first plaintiff herein had filed O.S.No.285 of 1984 for permanent injunction against the defendants and that they said suit was decreed and the said judgment operates as res judicata. It is also his submission that the contentions of the first defendant that he was not authorized to sell the property, the legatee is not bound to execute the sale deed and that the other legal heirs of Sayini Syamalamba are necessary parties, were not the original pleas taken by the defendants and, therefore, now they cannot agitate those issues. It is also further argued by the learned counsel that when the first defendant executed the agreement of sale and entered into contract, the contractual obligation does not come to an end and the successors of Sayini Syamalamba or the parsons on whom the property devolves are bound by the contract entered into by Sayini Syamalamba. It is also submitted that the second defendant, being the legatee, is bound to execute the sale deed and that the plaintiffs have every right to get the sale deed executed by the defendants. 68. It is also submitted that the second defendant, being the legatee, is bound to execute the sale deed and that the plaintiffs have every right to get the sale deed executed by the defendants. 68. It has to be seen that the defendants herein themselves filed O.S.No.26 of 2001 before the Principal District Judge, West Godavari at Eluru, seeking declaration that the second defendant himself is the absolute owner of the plaint ‘B’ Schedule property and admittedly, the said suit has been decreed and the defendants in the said suit have not filed any appeal challenging the said judgment. In that case, defendants 1 and 2 herein are the plaintiffs 1 and 2 in that suit. They sought declaration of title and injunction. As far as the claim of injunction is concerned, learned Principal District Judge, West Godavari at Eluru dismissed their suit. Aggrieved by the same, the second defendant alone filed an appeal in A.S.No.369 of 2006. By a separate judgment, this Court dismissed the said appeal. Hence, by virtue of the judgment in O.S.No.26 of 2001, the second defendant herein has been declared as the owner of plaint ‘B’ Schedule property. Sri Parabrahma Sastry is right in saying that after the death of Syamalamba, the GPA stands cancelled. Therefore, the first defendant cannot be directed to execute the sale deed. In view of the same, the second defendant alone, who is the legatee and who has been declared as the owner of the plaint ‘B’ schedule property by virtue of the judgment in O.S.No.26 of 2001 by the learned Principal District Judge, West Godavari at Eluru, is bound to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs. In the circumstances, as observed in point No.8, the plaintiffs are also directed to pay Rs.1,00,000/-to the second defendant as indicated above within 90 days from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment by any one of the party to this appeal and on such payment, the second defendant shall execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs failing which, the plaintiff will be entitled to get the sale deed executed through the process of the Court. The impugned judgment stands modified accordingly. It is also made clear that any alienation made during the pendency of proceedings stands null and void. Point No.10 69. The impugned judgment stands modified accordingly. It is also made clear that any alienation made during the pendency of proceedings stands null and void. Point No.10 69. Sri Parabrahma Sastry is right in saying that pendency of the appeal in judgment in O.S.No.26 of 2001 before the Principal District Judge, West Godavari at Eluru, was not considered by the Court below, but that circumstance is not sufficient to set aside the impugned judgment. 70. In view of the above discussion and for the foregoing reasons, both the appeals are devoid of merits and are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, both the appeals are dismissed, subject to the modifications made in the impugned judgment. There shall be no order as to costs.