ORDER 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the Combined Competitive Examination Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board). 2. The petitioner appeared at the written test conducted by the Board in the year 2008 for the three years diploma course in Polytechnic Engineering for the Session 2008-2009. He was successful and was called for counselling on 27.7.2008. A handwriting sample taken at the time of counselling, on comparison with that in the answer sheet along with the photograph, led to doubts about his candidature. The handwriting samples were sent for an expert opinion to the Forensic Science Laboratory, C.I.D., Bihar (hereinafter referred to as “F.S.L.”). Provisional admission was granted to him in the meantime. The report of the F.S.L., by the State Examiner of questioned documents, Police Laboratory, C.I.D. opined that they were not of the same person as follows:- “Disputed signatures in English, enclosed with red lines, stamped and marked “TT” and “TT1” are not in the hand-writing of the person who wrote the specimen of signature in English, similarly enclosed stamped and marked “DD”.” 3. A show cause notice was issued to the petitioner based on the F.S.L. report. The petitioner submitted his reply taking a defence of illness during the examination to explain the difference in the handwriting. His provisional admission has then been cancelled on 18.4.2011 for having obtained admission based on impersonation. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there is in fact no difference in the handwriting. The difference if any has been explained as attributable to illness supported by the Doctors certificate. No such allegation was made during counselling on 27.7.2008. Only a doubt was raised. The handwritings were sent to the F.S.L. on 4.2.2009. The report is belatedly on 29.4.2010. Equity lies in favour of the petitioner as he has only two semesters left to complete the six semester course. The delay caused by the respondents in the matter cannot be allowed to prejudice the candidature and career of the petitioner at this belated stage. 5. Reliance was placed on 1982 BBCJ 302 (Amerndra Kumar Vs. Principal, Bhagalpur College). Reliance was placed on a Bench order dated 20.1.2011 in C.W.J.C. No. 19683 of 2010, rejecting the F.S.L. report by reappraisal of handwriting as not being conclusive proof of forgery and impersonation, setting aside the order cancelling provisional admission. 5. Reliance was placed on 1982 BBCJ 302 (Amerndra Kumar Vs. Principal, Bhagalpur College). Reliance was placed on a Bench order dated 20.1.2011 in C.W.J.C. No. 19683 of 2010, rejecting the F.S.L. report by reappraisal of handwriting as not being conclusive proof of forgery and impersonation, setting aside the order cancelling provisional admission. L.P.A. No. 576 of 2011 preferred by the Board, has been declined stay of operation of the order. Liberty has been granted to the Board to obtain fresh reports from any other F.S.L or handwriting expert in the neighboring State and Hyderabad F.S.L. and produce it before the Court whereafter the prayer for stay may be considered. It is submitted that the petitioners handwriting may also be referred to another expert in similar manner. 6. Counsel for the Board opposing the application submits that endorsement was made on his documents during counselling the identity of the candidate appeared different in photograph from that in the main form. The handwriting was sent to the F.S.L. on 4.2.2009. On 16.2.2009 it was opined that since the F.S.L. report was yet to be received the petitioner be given provisional admission pending receipt of the report and subject to the same. The F.S.L. report has been received on 29.4.2010. The petitioner at the time of provisional admission was fully aware of the condition and voluntarily accepted it conditionally. 7. Learned counsel for the Board next relies upon the Bench decisions in C.W.J.C. Nos. 4093 of 2010, 301 of 2010, 1095 of 2010 dismissing similar challenge to F.S.L. reports and cancellation of admissions. L.P.A. No. 1589 of 2010 arising out of C.W.J.C. No. 1095 of 2010 has been dismissed holding that once there was a doubt and it was a case of impersonation strengthened by the opinion of the handwriting expert, the action of the respondents could not be faulted. 8. Counsel for the Board finally invites the attention of the Court to the handwriting of the petitioner at the two different stages appended at Annexure-A and Annexure-B to the counter affidavit and submits that to the naked eye no prudent person would say that it has been written by the same individual. 9. 8. Counsel for the Board finally invites the attention of the Court to the handwriting of the petitioner at the two different stages appended at Annexure-A and Annexure-B to the counter affidavit and submits that to the naked eye no prudent person would say that it has been written by the same individual. 9. In C.W.J.C. No. 4093 of 2010, it was opined:- “In any event of the matter once a report of the Forensic Department with regard to the difference in the two handwritings is available, it would not be the jurisdiction of this Court to assume power to itself as an expert of expert. Forensics is a science by itself, the expertise for which is available with those trained in it. Nonetheless that does not preclude the petitioner from challenging the forensic report in law. He has done so in his reply to the show cause notice. That takes the matter into the arena of disputed facts where it may require oral and documentary evidence etc which cannot be examined in a writ application. This Court therefore declines any interference in the writ application but with an observation that anything stated in this order shall have no bearing on any other proceeding challenging the forensic report which has then to be decided on its own merit in accordance with law.” 10. In C.W.J.C. No. 301 of 2010 the F.S.L. report was questioned. It was held that provisional admission had been granted on undertaking and subject to the F.S.L. report. The difference in the handwriting had been justified by the expert trained and whose competence was recognized by the State Government. The report of the expert could not be doubted in the writ petition. The petitioner could challenge the handwriting expert?s report in a duly initiated proceeding. 11. In C.W.J.C. No. 1095 of 2010 it was urged that the report of the F.S.L. was not conclusive proof but only opinion of an expert. Unless corroborated by other evidence or material it could not be the foundation to cancel admission. The objection was rejected holding that all necessary precaution by way of an expert report, show cause notice and consideration of the reply had been before taking such serious decision. 12. In C.W.J.C. No. 19683 of 2010, the attention of the Bench was invited to the order of the Court in C.W.J.C. Nos. The objection was rejected holding that all necessary precaution by way of an expert report, show cause notice and consideration of the reply had been before taking such serious decision. 12. In C.W.J.C. No. 19683 of 2010, the attention of the Bench was invited to the order of the Court in C.W.J.C. Nos. 4093 of 2010, 301 of 2010, 1095 of 2010 and also C.W.J.C. No. 1722 of 2008. The order of the Division Bench in L.P.A. No. 1589 of 2010 was also noticed. After examining the two handwritings of the petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 19683 of 2010 it was held:- “The order of the Court, relied upon by the learned counsel for the Board, are in the facts of the individual cases. In those order the report of the Laboratory was accepted as sacrosanct and, therefore, the action of the Board was found to be justified.” 13. In L.P.A. No. 576 of 2011 arising out of the above the Division Bench has declined stay of the order and directed fresh F.S.L. reports. 14. The orders in C.W.J.C. No. 19683 of 2010/ L.P.A. No. 576 of 2011 being subsequent in time could have been followed on that ground alone. That the order in L.P.A. No. 576 of 2011 was interim in nature could be a justification for adopting the earlier view. 15. The Court is however not inclined to either course of action on aspect of judicial discipline and propriety as observed by the Supreme Court in (1960) 3 SCR 578 (Mahadeolal Kanodia v. Administrator-General of W.B) holding as :- “19. Before we part with this appeal, however, it is our duty to refer to one incidental matter. We have noticed with some regret that when the earlier decision of two judges of the same High Court in Deo Rajan's Case was cited before the learned judges who heard the present appeal they took on themselves to say that the previous decision was wrong, instead of following the usual procedure in case of difference of opinion with an earlier decision, of referring the question to a larger Bench. Judicial decorum no less than legal propriety forms the basis of judicial procedure. If one thing is more necessary in law than any other thing, it is the quality of certainty. That quality would totally disappear if judges of co-ordinate jurisdiction in a High Court start overruling one another's decisions. Judicial decorum no less than legal propriety forms the basis of judicial procedure. If one thing is more necessary in law than any other thing, it is the quality of certainty. That quality would totally disappear if judges of co-ordinate jurisdiction in a High Court start overruling one another's decisions. If one Division Bench of a High Court is unable to distinguish a previous decision of another Division Bench, and holding the view that the earlier decision is wrong, itself gives effect to that view the result would be utter confusion. The position would be equally bad where a Judge sitting singly in the High Court is of opinion that the previous decision of another single Judge on a question of law is wrong and gives effect to that view instead of referring the matter to a larger Bench. In such a case lawyers would not know how to advise their clients and all courts subordinate to the High Court would find themselves in an embarrassing position of having to choose between dissentient judgments of their own High Court.” 16. This has been again noticed in (1989) 3 SCC 396 (Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhatija v. Collector, Thane) it was held : - “18. It would be difficult for us to appreciate the judgment of the High Court. One must remember that pursuit of the law, however glamorous it is, has its own limitation on the Bench. In a multi-Judge court, the Judges are bound by precedents and procedure. They could use their discretion only when there is no declared principle to be found, no rule and no authority. The judicial decorum and legal propriety demand that where a learned Single Judge or a Division Bench does not agree with the decision of a Bench of coordinate jurisdiction, the matter shall be referred to a larger Bench. It is a subversion of judicial process not to follow this procedure. 19. The judicial decorum and legal propriety demand that where a learned Single Judge or a Division Bench does not agree with the decision of a Bench of coordinate jurisdiction, the matter shall be referred to a larger Bench. It is a subversion of judicial process not to follow this procedure. 19. Deprecating this kind of tendency of some judges, Das Gupta, J., in Mahadeolal Kanodia v. Administrator General of W.B. said: We have noticed with some regret that when the earlier decision of two Judges of the same High Court in Deorajin case, was cited before the learned Judges who heard the present appeal they took on themselves to say that the previous decision was wrong, instead of following the usual procedure in case of difference of opinion with an earlier decision, of referring the question to a larger Bench. Judicial decorum no less than legal propriety forms the basis of judicial procedure. If one thing is more necessary in law than any other thing, it is the quality of certainty. That quality would totally disappear if Judges of coordinate jurisdiction in a High Court start overruling one another's decision. 20. The attitude of Gajendragadkar, C.J., in Lala Shri Bhagwan v. Ram Chand was not quite different: “It is hardly necessary to emphasise that considerations of judicial propriety and decorum require that if a learned Single Judge hearing a matter is inclined to take the view that the earlier decisions of the High Court, whether of a Division Bench or of a Single Judge, need to be reconsidered, he should not embark upon that enquiry sitting as a Single Judge, but should refer the matter to a Division Bench or, in a proper case, place the relevant papers before the Chief Justice to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine the question. That is the proper and traditional way to deal with such matters and it is founded on healthy principles of judicial decorum and propriety. It is to be regretted that the learned Single Judge departed from this traditional way in the present case and chose to examine the question himself”. 21. Chief Justice Pathak, in a recent decision stressed the need for a clear and consistent enunciation of legal principle in the decisions of a court. It is to be regretted that the learned Single Judge departed from this traditional way in the present case and chose to examine the question himself”. 21. Chief Justice Pathak, in a recent decision stressed the need for a clear and consistent enunciation of legal principle in the decisions of a court. Speaking for the Constitution Bench (Union of India v. Raghubir Singh) learned Chief Justice said: “The doctrine of binding precedent has the merit of promoting a certainty and consistency in judicial decisions, and enables an organic development of the law, besides providing assurance to the individual as to the consequence of transactions forming part of his daily affairs. And, therefore, the need for a clear and consistent enunciation of legal principle in the decisions of a court.” 23. Judge Learned Hand has referred to the tendency of some judges “who win the game by sweeping all the chessmen off the table”. This is indeed to be deprecated. It is needless to state that the judgment of superior courts and Tribunals must be written only after deep travail and positive vein. One should never let a decision so until he is absolutely sure it is right. The law must be made clear, certain and consistent. But certitude is not the test of certainty and consistency does not mean that there should be no word of new content. The principle of law may develop side by side with new content but not with inconsistencies. There could be waxing and waning the principle depending upon the pragmatic needs and moral yearnings. Such development of law particularly, is inevitable in our developing country. In Raghubir Singh case, learned Chief Justice Pathak had this to say: “Legal compulsions cannot be limited by existing legal propositions, because, there will always be, beyond the frontiers of the existing law, new areas inviting judicial scrutiny and judicial choice-making which could well affect the validity of existing legal dogma. The search for solutions responsive to a changed social era involves a search not only among competing propositions of law, or competing versions of a legal proposition, or the modalities of an indeterminacy such as “fairness” or “reasonableness”, but also among propositions from outside the ruling law, corresponding to the empirical knowledge or accepted value of present time and place, relevant to the dispensing of justice within the new parameters.” 17. The principle was again reiterated in (2001) 1 SCC 748 (Government of Andhra Pradesh v. A.P. Jaiswal) explaining : - “24. Consistency is the cornerstone of the administration of justice. It is consistency which creates confidence in the system and this consistency can never be achieved without respect to the rule of finality. It is with a view to achieve consistency in judicial pronouncements, the courts have evolved the rule of precedents, principle of stare decisis etc. These rules and principles are based on public policy and if these are not followed by courts then there will be chaos in the administration of justice, which we see in plenty in this case. This Court in the case of Sub-Inspector Rooplal v. Lt. Governor1 held thus: “At the outset, we must express our serious dissatisfaction in regard to the manner in which a Coordinate Bench of the Tribunal has overruled, in effect, an earlier judgment of another Coordinate Bench of the same Tribunal. This is opposed to all principles of judicial discipline. If at all, the subsequent Bench of the Tribunal was of the opinion that the earlier view taken by the Coordinate Bench of the same Tribunal was incorrect, it ought to have referred the matter to a larger Bench so that the difference of opinion between the two Coordinate Benches on the same point could have been avoided. It is not as if the latter Bench was unaware of the judgment of the earlier Bench but knowingly it proceeded to disagree with the said judgment against all known rules of precedents. Precedents which enunciate rules of law from the foundation of administration of justice under our system. This is a fundamental principle which every presiding officer of a judicial forum ought to know, for consistency in interpretation of law alone can lead to public confidence in our judicial system. This Court has laid down time and again precedent law must be followed by all concerned; deviation from the same should be only on a procedure known to law. A subordinate court is bound by the enunciation of law made by the superior courts. A Coordinate Bench of a court cannot pronounce judgment contrary to declaration of law made by another Bench. It can only refer it to a larger Bench if it disagrees with the earlier pronouncement.” 18. A subordinate court is bound by the enunciation of law made by the superior courts. A Coordinate Bench of a court cannot pronounce judgment contrary to declaration of law made by another Bench. It can only refer it to a larger Bench if it disagrees with the earlier pronouncement.” 18. More recently in (2009) 5 SCC 634 (Century Textiles Industries Limited v. Deepak Jain) it was observed : - 23. Time and again it has been emphasised that judicial propriety and decorum requires that if a Single Judge, hearing a matter, feels that earlier decision of a Single Judge needs reconsideration, he should not embark upon that enquiry, sitting as a Single Judge, but should refer the matter to a larger Bench. Regrettably, in the present case, the learned Single Judge departed from the said healthy principle and chose to re-examine the same question himself.” 19. The power of judicial review under Article 226 is primarily confined to the decision making process rather than to the decision itself. The decision may be interfered even thereafter if it is arbitrary, perverse, grossly illegal or a conclusion that no reasonably prudent person would arrive at. If the decision taken by the administrator was one of the two possible views the writ Court cannot interfere only because it may be of the opinion that the view been taken by it is more proper then that taken by the Administrator. 20. In (2007) 13 SCC (A.P. Cooperative Oil Seeds Growers Federation Limited, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh v. D. Achyuta Rao) it has been held as follows:- “41. It is no doubt true that service rules, however, meticulously framed, there is always a chance of some hardship being caused to a particular section of the employees, but as long as the rules are just, fair and reasonable, even if two views are possible, the mere fact that some hardship, inconvenience or injustice results to some members of the service, is not a ground to strike down the rule. It is not safe to test the constitutionality of a service rule on the touchstone of fortunes of an individual. It is not safe to test the constitutionality of a service rule on the touchstone of fortunes of an individual. If the rule otherwise appears to be fair, just and reasonable and does not suffer from the vice of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution or any constitutional guarantee, the mere fact that some little hardship or injustice is caused to someone, is no ground to strike down the rule altogether.” 21. The provisions of the Indian Evidence Act relevant to the controversy are Sections 45, 47 and 73 which read as follows:- “45. Opinions of experts.—When the Court has to form an opinion upon a point of foreign law, or of science, or art, or as to identity of handwriting [or finger impressions], the opinions upon that point of persons specially skilled in such foreign law, science or art, [or in questions as to identity of handwriting] [or finger impressions] are relevant facts. Such persons are called experts. 47. Opinion as to handwriting, when relevant.—When the Court has to form an opinion as to the person by whom any document was written or signed, the opinion of any person acquainted with the handwriting of the person by whom it is supposed to be written or signed that it was or was not written or signed by that person, is a relevant fact. Explanation.—A person is said to be acquainted with the handwriting of another person when he has seen that person write, or when he has received documents purporting to be written by that person in answer to documents written by himself or under his authority and addressed to that person, or when, in the ordinary course of business, documents purporting to be written by that person have been habitually submitted to him. 73. Comparison of signature, writing or seal with others admitted or proved.—In order to ascertain whether a signature, writing, or seal is that of the person by whom it purports to have been written or made, any signature, writing or seal admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the Court to have been written or made by that person may be compared with the one which is to be proved, although that signature, writing, or seal has not been produced or proved for any other purpose. The Court may direct any person present in Court to write any words or figures for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare the words or figures so written with any words or figures alleged to have been written by such person.” 22. In (1979) 2 SCC 158 (State (Delhi Admn.) v. Pali Ram) it was observed : - “30. The matter can be viewed from another angle, also. Although there is no legal bar to the Judge using his own eyes to compare the disputed writing with the admitted writing, even without the aid of the evidence of any handwriting expert, the Judge should, as a matter of prudence and caution, hesitate to base his finding with regard to the identity of a handwriting which forms the sheet-anchor of the prosecution case against a person accused of an offence, solely on comparison made by himself. It is therefore, not advisable that a Judge should take upon himself the task of comparing the admitted writing with the disputed one to find out whether the two agree with each other; and the prudent course is to obtain the opinion and assistance of an expert.” 23. In (1992) 3 SCC 700 (State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh) it has been held as follows:- “32……………..Although the section specifically empowers the court to compare the disputed writings with the specimen/admitted writings shown to be genuine, prudence demands that the court should be extremely slow in venturing an opinion on the basis of mere comparison, more so, when the quality of evidence in respect of specimen/admitted writings is not of high standard. We have already pointed out the state of evidence as regards the specimen/admitted writings earlier and we think it would be dangerous to stake any opinion on the basis of mere comparison. We have, therefore, refrained from basing our conclusion by comparing the disputed writings with the specimen/admitted writings.” 24. In (2009) 13 SCC 131 (Uttamrao Shivdas Jankar v. Ranjitsinh Vijaysinh Mohite Patil) it was held :- 49…..The opinion of the handwriting expert in that regard would have been sufficient and on the basis of the same it could be possible for the High Court to decide the entire lis between the parties…..” 25. A dispute with regard to handwriting is a disputed question of fact to be proved or disproved by evidence, oral or documentary in support. A dispute with regard to handwriting is a disputed question of fact to be proved or disproved by evidence, oral or documentary in support. The relevance of the opinion of the expert is a matter to be more appropriately considered in light of the other evidence that may or may not be available. The jurisdiction of the writ Court on the issue of disputed facts requiring consideration of evidence has been noticed in (1976) 3 SCC 160 (D.L.F. Housing Construction (P) Ltd. v. Delhi Municipal Corpn.) :- “20. In our opinion, in a case where the basic facts are disputed, and complicated questions of law and fact depending on evidence are involved the writ court is not the proper forum for seeking relief. The right course for the High Court to follow was to dismiss the writ petition on this preliminary ground, without entering upon the merits of the case. In the absence of firm and adequate factual foundation, it was hazardous to embark upon a determination of the points involved. On this short ground while setting aside the findings of the High Court, we would dismiss both the writ petition and the appeal with costs. The appellants may, if so advised, seek their remedy by a regular suit.” 26. In (1977) 3 SCC 457 (Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar) it has been held as follows:- “11……………If those facts are disputed and require assessment of evidence the correctness of which can only be tested satisfactorily by talking detailed evidence, involving examination and cross-examination of witnesses, the case could not be conveniently or satisfactorily decided in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. Such proceedings are summary proceedings reserved for extraordinary cases where the exceptional and what are described as, perhaps not quite accurately, “prerogative” powers of the Court are invoked.” 27. Once there is a F.S.L. report, and procedures for decision making have been followed, there is prime facie material and reason for the impugned order. Shall it be the purview of the writ Court in judicial review to thereafter enter into the thicket of facts. A Forensic Science Laboratory report has a presumption of its correctness attached to it. It is a rebuttable presumption. The mode and method is provided under the Indian Evidence Act. The petitioner has chosen not to challenge the F.S.L. report in his writ application. 28. A Forensic Science Laboratory report has a presumption of its correctness attached to it. It is a rebuttable presumption. The mode and method is provided under the Indian Evidence Act. The petitioner has chosen not to challenge the F.S.L. report in his writ application. 28. The Bench is of the opinion that the matter needs to be referred to a Division Bench for an authoritative pronouncement in view of the two conflicting orders in L.P.A. No. 1589 of 2010 and L.P.A. No. 576 of 2011. The fact that the latter may be an interim order does not dissuade the Court from the reference. 29. The prayer for interim relief may more appropriately be made and considered before the Division Bench as any order to that effect at this stage may amount to tacit acceptance of one or the other view. 30. Let the petitioner file two sets of the writ application within a maximum period of two weeks failing which the writ application shall stand rejected without further reference to a Bench. 31. The records may be placed before the Hon?ble the Chief Jusitice for appropriate consideration and orders.