JUDGMENT : R.M. Chaya, J. Petitioner Corporation (A Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956) has challenged the legality and validity of the judgment and award passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Navsari in Reference (LCN) No.8 of 1994 dated 21.2.2000, whereby the Presiding Officer directed the petitioner to reinstate the respondent with 50% back wages. 2. By an order dated 4.9.2000, this Court (Coram: D.H. Waghela, J.) admitted the matter and granted ad-interim relief in terms of Para 4(B), whereby the impugned judgment and award came to be stayed. Thereafter, this Court (Coram: P.B. Majmudar, J. as he then was) by order dated 14.11.2000 confirmed the said interim relief subject to compliance of the provisions of Section 17(B) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for the sake of brevity). It is not in dispute as pointed out by the learned advocates appearing for the parties that the said provisions of Section 17(B) are complied with till date. 3. Before reverting to the facts as well as the contentions raised by the petitioner in this petition, Mr. S.C. Patel, learned advocate for the respondent workman submits that the respondent, who is present in the Court, as identified by Mr. S.C. Patel, makes a statement that the respondent is not desirous of claiming 50% back wages as awarded by the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court by the impugned judgment and award. In view of this statement, what is required to be considered is only the question of reinstatement. 4. The facts which can be carved out from the record of the petition are that the petitioner was initially working on the post of Civil Mistry and Work Charge Establishment since 24.12.1980. It appears from the record that the said order came to be extended from time to time till 15.4.1981. 5. The respondent workman thereafter applied for the post of Clerk-cum-Typist in the pay scale of Rs. 290-10-320-12-380-15-485-18-575. It appears from the record that pursuant to the said application, the petitioner initiated recruitment process. It appears from the record that the petitioner's Circle Selection Committee held interview on 17.3.1981, wherein the report of 24 candidates who were called for the interview for the post of Junior Clerk-cum-Typist was considered and ultimately, the same culminated into the appointment order dated 23.4.1981. It appears from the record that the petitioner's Circle Selection Committee held interview on 17.3.1981, wherein the report of 24 candidates who were called for the interview for the post of Junior Clerk-cum-Typist was considered and ultimately, the same culminated into the appointment order dated 23.4.1981. It appears that thereafter, the respondent reported to the duties and was appointed at Vapi. 6. It appears from the record that thereafter, the petitioner through Superintending Engineer issued a corrigendum dated 9.6.1981 whereby Clause (2) of the original appointment order dated 23.4.1981 was substituted as provided in the said corrigendum. It appears that thereafter, the written test was taken, wherein the respondent workman failed and therefore, the services of the respondent workman came to be terminated. 7. The respondent workman raised a dispute before the competent authority and as the conciliation failed, the said dispute was referred to the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, Navsari and the same came to be registered as Reference (LCN) No.8 of 1994. The Labour Court, after hearing both the parties and after appreciating the evidence adduced by both the sides, by the impugned judgment and award dated 21.2.2000 partly allowed the reference and directed the petitioner employer to reinstate the respondent workman with 50% back wages. Being aggrieved by the same, the present petition is filed. 8. Mr. S.P. Hasurkar, learned advocate for the petitioner has taken this Court through the factual matrix of the matter and has raised the following contentions:- (i)The respondent workman was terminated in terms of the appointment order as well as the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act would be attracted and the provisions of Section 25F has no application. (ii) It is submitted that in fact as per the said order, the appointment was for a temporary period of six months, however, the respondent workman could not achieve the efficiency bar. (iii) The respondent workman was appointed on probation and therefore, the petitioner was supposed to test the suitability of the respondent. (iv) The corrigendum is not change of service conditions but it was issued only for providing a method of assessing the suitability. Therefore, the respondent workman was required to clear speed test which was the material condition to assess the suitability. (iv) The corrigendum is not change of service conditions but it was issued only for providing a method of assessing the suitability. Therefore, the respondent workman was required to clear speed test which was the material condition to assess the suitability. (v) The corrigendum was issued in rem and not in personam and those selectees who have passed the written test so taken have been retained and as the respondent workman did not pass the said speed test, her services came to be discontinued. (vi) The respondent workman has not completed 240 days in the preceding year and therefore, even the provision of Section 25F is not applicable. In view of the above submissions, it is submitted that the petition deserves to be allowed. 9. Per contra, Mr. S.C. Patel, learned advocate for the respondent workman has supported the impugned judgment and award as far as the reinstatement is concerned. Mr. Patel pointed out that the reasons given by the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court is based on proper appreciation of the evidence on record and submitted that the Labour Court has rightly come to the conclusion that the issuance of corrigendum provided for entirely a new service condition and the same would amount to change of service conditions. It is submitted that in fact when the initial appointment was made, the Selection Committee of the petitioner had taken the test including the typing test and thereafter, has selected the respondent workman along with other similarly situated candidates. Mr. Patel relying upon the appointment order submitted that the same was on regular basis and that the petitioner had no authority under the law to change the service conditions. It is therefore submitted that the petition is devoid of any merits and the same deserves to be dismissed. 10. Before considering the rival submissions made by the learned advocates appearing for the parties, it is appropriate to note the following:- (a) By an appointment order dated 23.4.1981, the respondent workman came to be appointed as typist, wherein Clauses 2 and 3 of the said appointment order reads as under:- "2.The post is sanctioned on the Regular Establishment. 3. You will be on probation for a period of one year in the first instance,. 3. You will be on probation for a period of one year in the first instance,. The Gujarat Electricity Board however, reserves the right of termination of services of an employee during the probationary period at any time without assigning any reasons and without giving any notice." (b) The corrigendum Exh.16 reads as under:- In partial modification of Clause No.2 of this office appointment letter no. TGNS/ESTT/403.B/2525, 2526, 2527, 2528 and 2529 dated 23.4.1981, this is to inform you that the Clause 2 referred to above will be read as under:- "Your appointment is purely on temporary basis for a period not exceeding six months and subject to your getting through successfully the speed test being held after the period of 6 months or earlier whatsoever deemed appropriate to the administration." 11. On reading the corrigendum, it transpires that the petitioner by issuance of corrigendum in fact deleted Clause 2 of the appointment order dated 23.4.1981. If the contentions raised by Mr. Hasurkar are examined in this context, Clause 2 of the appointment order dated 23.4.1981 which inter-alia provided that the post is sanctioned on regular establishment is changed to a temporary post for six months with the conditions mentioned in the corrigendum Exh.16, whereas Clause 3 inter-alia provides that the respondent workman will be on probation for a period of one year in the first instance. Even condition No.4 of the said appointment order dated 23.4.1981 provides that the respondent workman would be eligible for confirmation on satisfactory completion of the probationary period. This Court finds that the corrigendum not only changed service conditions after the respondent workman was appointed and joined the service, but also Clause 2 which is amended/substituted runs counter to Clauses 3 and 4 of the appointment order dated 23.4.1981 as if Clause 2 is read in isolation, the selection would be temporary for six months. If that be the case, it goes without saying that there cannot be any probation for one year and further there cannot be any confirmation on satisfactory completion of the probationary period so provided. 12. The contention raised by the learned advocate for the petitioner that the appointment of the respondent workman would attract the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act fails on this contradiction itself. 12. The contention raised by the learned advocate for the petitioner that the appointment of the respondent workman would attract the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act fails on this contradiction itself. Furthermore, no such contention is raised by the petitioner before the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, except the appointment order and the corrigendum. It appears that no other material has been produced by the petitioner to show that the appointment was for a specified period on a contract. 13. The other limb of argument that the respondent was on probation and that she was supposed to test the suitability of the petitioner employer, though attractive at the first glance, runs counter to the very basis of the termination, inasmuch as, on one hand, the petitioner has relied upon the corrigendum whereby initially the appointment of the respondent workman was on regular basis which was changed to the appointment of temporary period of six months unilaterally as rightly noted by the Labour Court, whereas while arguing on the aspect of probation, the petitioner has raised the contention that if the efficiency bar is not fulfilled and if the services of the respondent workman were found not to be satisfactory, the petitioner employer was within his right to discontinue the services of the respondent workman. Only because the respondent workman acceded to the directions issued by the petitioner to appear in the type test would not make the said post temporary for six months. It is not the case of the petitioner that any further corrigendum was issued or that Clause 2 as provided in the corrigendum Exh.16 was the only Clause to be read and that the initial order dated 23.4.1981 was substituted by such a corrigendum. On the contrary, on reading the appointment order dated 23.4.1981, at the end, there is an endorsement which reads as under:- "She is posted against the created post of Junior Clerk-cum-Typist." 14. On examining the impugned award and the evidence on record, more particularly, Exh.15 dated 4.5.1981, it transpires that the respondent workman had joined the duties at Vapi on the basis of the appointment order dated 23.4.1981. On examining the impugned award and the evidence on record, more particularly, Exh.15 dated 4.5.1981, it transpires that the respondent workman had joined the duties at Vapi on the basis of the appointment order dated 23.4.1981. The reasonings given by as well as the findings arrived at by the Labour Court that the post was a regular post which came to be converted into temporary post afterwards and that the same was illegal, improper is found to be correct. The contentions raised by the learned advocate for the petitioner that the provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act would apply is misconceived. The petitioner has not been able to establish the said fact and has not produced any material to show that the appointment of the respondent workman came to be discontinued by relying upon the terms and conditions of such an employment or under any such contract. Even the contention that the provisions of Section 25F of the Act are not attracted as the respondent workman has not completed 240 days, raised by the learned advocate for the petitioner, is without any basis. Such a ground is not even raised in this petition and the same deserves to be rejected. At this stage, it would be advantageous to refer to the decision in the case of Devinder Singh v. Municipal Council, Sanaur, reported in (2011) 6 SCC Page-584, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed thus:- 9. We have considered the respective submissions and carefully perused the record. Sections 2(oo), 2(s) and 25F of the Act which have bearing on the decision of this appeal read as under: "2. We have considered the respective submissions and carefully perused the record. Sections 2(oo), 2(s) and 25F of the Act which have bearing on the decision of this appeal read as under: "2. Definitions.- * * * (oo) 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include- (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or (b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or (bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or (c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health; * * * (s) 'workman' means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person (i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding ten thousand rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature. 25F. 25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until- (a) the workman has been given one months notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months; and (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette." 10. The definition of the term "retrenchment" is quite comprehensive. It covers every type of termination of the service of a workman by the employer for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action. The cases of voluntary retirement of the workman, retirement on reaching the age of superannuation, termination of service as a result of non-renewal of the contract of employment or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation contained therein or termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill health also do not fall within the ambit of retrenchment. 11. In SBI v. N. Sundara Money (1976) 1 SCC 822 , a three Judge Bench of this Court analysed Section 2(oo) and held: (SCC pp.826-27, para 9) "9.... 'Termination ... for any reason whatsoever are the key words. Whatever the reason, every termination spells retrenchment. So the sole question is, has the employees service been terminated? Verbal apparel apart, the substance is decisive. A termination takes place where a term expires either by the active step of the master or the running out of the stipulated term. To protect the weak against the strong this policy of comprehensive definition has been effectuated. Termination embraces not merely the act of termination by the employer, but the fact of termination howsoever produced. May be, the present may be a hard case, but we can visualise abuses by employers, by suitable verbal devices, circumventing the armour of Section 25-F and Section 2(oo). Termination embraces not merely the act of termination by the employer, but the fact of termination howsoever produced. May be, the present may be a hard case, but we can visualise abuses by employers, by suitable verbal devices, circumventing the armour of Section 25-F and Section 2(oo). Without speculating on possibilities, we may agree that "retrenchment" is no longer terra incognita but area covered by an expansive definition. It means 'to end, conclude, cease'." The ratio of the aforementioned judgment was approved by the Constitution Bench in Punjab Land Development And Reclamation Corporation Ltd. v. Labour Court, (1990) 3 SCC 682 . 12 to 16... ... ... ... 17. Section 25-F couched in negative form. It imposes a restriction on the employers right to retrench a workman and lays down that no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less then one year under an employer shall be retrenched until he has been given one months notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or he has been paid wages for the period of notice and he has also been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation equivalent to fifteen days average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months and notice in the prescribed manner has been served upon the appropriate Government or the authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette. 18.This Court has repeatedly held that the provisions contained in Section 25F(a) and (b) are mandatory and termination of the service of a workman, which amounts to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) without giving one months notice or pay in lieu thereof and retrenchment compensation is null and void/illegal/ inoperative. 18.This Court has repeatedly held that the provisions contained in Section 25F(a) and (b) are mandatory and termination of the service of a workman, which amounts to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) without giving one months notice or pay in lieu thereof and retrenchment compensation is null and void/illegal/ inoperative. State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 SC 610 , Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay, AIR 1964 SC 1617 , SBI v. N. Sundara Money, (supra), Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala, (1980) 3 SCC 340 , Mohan Lal v. Bharat Electronics Ltd., (1981) 3 SCC 225 , L. Robert DSouza v. Southern Railway (supra), Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, (1980) 4 SCC 443 , Gammon India Ltd. v. Niranjan Dass, (1984) 1 SCC 509 , Gurmail Singh v. State of Punjab, (1991) 1 SCC 189 and Pramod Jha v. State of Bihar, (2003) 4 SCC 619 . 19. In Anoop Sharma v. Executive Engineer, Public Health Division, Haryana (supra), the Court considered the effect of violation of Section 25-F, referred to various precedents on the subject and held the termination of service of a workman without complying with the mandatory provisions contained in Section 25-F(a) and (b) should ordinarily result in his reinstatement." 15. In view of the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Devinder Singh (supra), the Labour Court, having examined the reference on the basis of the cogent evidence, has rightly come to the conclusion that the termination of the respondent workman was illegal and in view of the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as aforesaid, even the contentions raised by the petitioner in this petition regarding applicability of Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act and non-applicability of Section 25-F of the Act are misconceived. 16. Considering the findings arrived at by the Labour Court, this Court finds that there is no error apparent on the face of the record which warrants any interference by this Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India. The petition is therefore deserves to be partly allowed. 17. Accordingly, the petition is partly allowed. The judgment and award of reinstatement passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Navsari in Reference (LCN) No.8 of 1994 dated 21.2.2000 is hereby confirmed. The petition is therefore deserves to be partly allowed. 17. Accordingly, the petition is partly allowed. The judgment and award of reinstatement passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Navsari in Reference (LCN) No.8 of 1994 dated 21.2.2000 is hereby confirmed. However, in view of the statement made by Mr. S.C. Patel, learned advocate for the respondent workman, the award of 50% back wages is hereby quashed. The judgment and award stands modified accordingly. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent only with no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.