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2012 DIGILAW 3006 (MAD)

Vaanavil Dyeing Rep by its Partner v. Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment

2012-07-13

K.CHANDRU

body2012
Judgment :- 1. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition seeking to challenge a notice issued by the respondent Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment Corporation Limited (for short TIIC), dated 23.12.2011, wherein and by which the petitioner was informed that they had borrowed amounts from the TIIC and subsequently, they sought for concession under One Time Settlement (OTS). The OTS proposal was also given, which was also communicated to the petitioner by letter dated 23.06.2011. The petitioner was advised to remit 20% of the OTS amount within 30 days from the date of the letter and the balance 80% in five monthly installments with 13.5% simple interest and other charges on or before 22.12.2011. The petitioner failed to settle the balance 80% of OTS amount together with interest. Therefore, the OTS given to him was cancelled automatically and he was requested to settle the outstanding amount which worked out to Rs.4,03,84,919/-. 2. When the matter came up on 25.1.2012, this court directed Mr.H.Adaikala Arokiaraj, learned Standing counsel for the respondents to take notice. Pending notice, this court recorded that the petitioner had offered Rs.9 lakhs by way of demand drafts and Rs.1 lakh in favour of the TIIC as part payment. Therefore, an interim stay of auction notice was granted. 3. It is the case of the petitioner that subsequent to the impugned notice, they have written a letter dated 26.12.2011 seeking for extension of time. But, however in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, it was stated that a Term loan of Rs.90 lakhs was given to the petitioner under RTUF Scheme and Rs.20 lakhs under general scheme, thereby the petitioner had availed Rs.110 lakhs on 19.01.2000 for the purchase and erection of machinery to set up a Dyeing of yarn unit at Karaipudur village, Pachankattupalayam, Veerapandi Post, Tirupur. The factory land and building owned by the Managing Partner were offered as collateral security to secure the loan. The partners as well as collateral owners have executed necessary documents mortgaging the primary and collateral security in favour of the corporation. But, however, the petitioner had defaulted in repaying the loan. They sought for certain concessions to settle the dues under the OTS scheme. Despite OTS being offered, once again the petitioner had defaulted. Even after rescheduling the same, they have not paid the amount. Further the cheques given by the petitioner were also returned as dishonoured. But, however, the petitioner had defaulted in repaying the loan. They sought for certain concessions to settle the dues under the OTS scheme. Despite OTS being offered, once again the petitioner had defaulted. Even after rescheduling the same, they have not paid the amount. Further the cheques given by the petitioner were also returned as dishonoured. The following are the details of cheques which were dishonoured: 4. As all efforts in recovering the amount failed, the corporation took possession of assets on 13.02.2008 and brought the property for sale by public auction. At that time there was an offer of Rs.132 lakhs for land, building and machinery. The petitioner filed a writ petition being W.P.No.16944 of 2008 before this court challenging the auction sale. The writ petition was disposed of on 7.9.2010 directing the respondent TIIC to consider the OTS submitted by the petitioner on merits. The TIIC considered the same and approved the payment of Rs.120 lakhs. The TIIC had issued a foreclosure notice on 5.7.2004 as the petitioner did not repay the dues as per the revised schedule. Subsequent to the disposal of the writ petition, the petitioner's request was placed before the appropriate authorities. The meeting held on 19.11.2010 was deferred as the petitioner sought time to decide upon the OTS amount. The petitioner had offered Rs.86 lakhs as OTS amount. As it was less than the realizable value of assets, the OTS proposal was rejected. The petitioner further requested the Corporation to accept Rs.112 lakhs as OTS amount. But the corporation wanted the petitioner to settle Rs.120 lakhs which was accepted. It was also communicated and the petitioner was advised to pay the balance OTS amount excluding the amount of Rs.6 lakhs paid by him. Further it was stated that if the amounts are not paid, the OTS proposals will be withdrawn. Now the principal amount and interest itself worked out to Rs.4,08,48,885/-. The petitioner's properties were brought for auction sale on 30.6.2008. During February, 2010, a private sale of machinery was conducted and one M/s.Mamilon Threads, Mumbai had offered Rs.20 lakhs. The private sale was permitted and that the sale proceeds of Rs.20 lakhs was also credit to the loan account of the petitioner. 5. It must be noted that the relationship between the petitioner and the corporation was purely contractual. During February, 2010, a private sale of machinery was conducted and one M/s.Mamilon Threads, Mumbai had offered Rs.20 lakhs. The private sale was permitted and that the sale proceeds of Rs.20 lakhs was also credit to the loan account of the petitioner. 5. It must be noted that the relationship between the petitioner and the corporation was purely contractual. Already, the petitioner had one round of litigation before this court wherein a direction was given to the respondents to consider the OTS proposal. It was also considered. In this context, it is necessary to refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court in U.P. Financial Corpn. v. Gem Cap (India) (P) Ltd., reported in (1993) 2 SCC 299 . In paragraphs 3,12 and 10, the Supreme Court had observed as follows : "3. With great respect to the learned judges who allowed the writ petition we feel constrained to say this: a reading of the judgment shows that they have not kept in mind the well-recognised limitations of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The judgment reads as if they were sitting as an appellate authority over the appellant-corporation. Not a single provision of law is said to have been violated. ...... 12. While this is not the occasion to examine the content and contours of the doctrine of fairness, it is enough to reiterate for the purpose of this case that the power of the High Court while reviewing the administrative action is not that of an appellate court. The judgment under appeal precisely does that and for that reason is liable to be and is herewith set aside. 10. It is true that the appellant-corporation is an instrumentality of the State created under the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951. The said Act was made by the Parliament with a view to promote industrialisation of the States by encouraging small and medium industries by giving financial assistance in the shape of loans and advances, repayable within a period not exceeding 20 years from the date of loan. We agree that the corporation is not like an ordinary money-lender or a Bank which lends money. It is a lender with a purpose — the purpose being promoting the small and medium industries. At the same time, it is necessary to keep certain basic facts in view. We agree that the corporation is not like an ordinary money-lender or a Bank which lends money. It is a lender with a purpose — the purpose being promoting the small and medium industries. At the same time, it is necessary to keep certain basic facts in view. The relationship between the corporation and the borrower is that of creditor and debtor. The corporation is not supposed to give loans once and go out of business. It has also to recover them so that it can give fresh loans to others. The corporation no doubt has to act within the four corners of the Act and in furtherance of the object underlying the Act. But this factor cannot be carried to the extent of obligating the corporation to revive and resurrect every sick industry irrespective of the cost involved. Promoting industrialisation at the cost of public funds does not serve the public interest; it merely amounts to transferring public money to private account. The fairness required of the corporation cannot be carried to the extent of disabling it from recovering what is due to it. While not insisting upon the borrower to honour the commitments undertaken by him, the corporation alone cannot be shackled hand and foot in the name of fairness. Fairness is not a one way street, more particularly in matters like the present one. The above narration of facts shows that the respondents have no intention of repaying any part of the debt. They are merely putting forward one or other ploy to keep the corporation at bay. Approaching the courts through successive writ petitions is but a part of this game. Another circumstance. These corporations are not sitting on King Solomon's mines. They too borrow monies from Government or other financial corporations. They too have to pay interest thereon. The fairness required of it must be tempered — nay, determined, in the light of all these circumstances. Indeed, in a matter between the corporation and its debtor, a writ court has no say except in two situations: (1) there is a statutory violation on the part of the corporation or (2) where the corporation acts unfairly i.e., unreasonably. While the former does not present any difficulty, the latter needs a little reiteration of its precise meaning. What does acting unfairly or unreasonably mean? While the former does not present any difficulty, the latter needs a little reiteration of its precise meaning. What does acting unfairly or unreasonably mean? Does it mean that the High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can sit as an appellate authority over the acts and deeds of the corporation and seek to correct them? Surely, it cannot be. That is not the function of the High Court under Article 226. Doctrine of fairness, evolved in administrative law was not supposed to convert the writ courts into appellate authorities over administrative authorities. The constraints — self-imposed undoubtedly — of writ jurisdiction still remain. Ignoring them would lead to confusion and uncertainty. The jurisdiction may become rudderless." 6. Further, the Supreme Court in KarnatakaStateIndustrial Investment & Development Corpn. Ltd. v. Cavalet India Ltd., reported in (2005) 4 SCC 456 , in paragraph 19 held as follows : "19. From the aforesaid, the legal principles that emerge are: (i) The High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution does not sit as an appellate authority over the acts and deeds of the Financial Corporation and seek to correct them. The doctrine of fairness does not convert the writ courts into appellate authorities over administrative authorities. (ii) In a matter between the Corporation and its debtor, a writ court has no say except in two situations: (a) there is a statutory violation on the part of the Corporation, or (b) where the Corporation acts unfairly i.e. unreasonably. (iii) In commercial matters, the courts should not risk their judgments for the judgments of the bodies to which that task is assigned. (iv) Unless the action of the Financial Corporation is mala fide, even a wrong decision taken by it is not open to challenge. It is not for the courts or a third party to substitute its decision, however, more prudent, commercial or businesslike it may be, for the decision of the Financial Corporation. Hence, whatever the wisdom (or the lack of it) of the conduct of the Corporation, the same cannot be assailed for making the Corporation liable. ......... (viii) Fairness cannot be a one-way street. The fairness required of the Financial Corporations cannot be carried to the extent of disabling them from recovering what is due to them. Hence, whatever the wisdom (or the lack of it) of the conduct of the Corporation, the same cannot be assailed for making the Corporation liable. ......... (viii) Fairness cannot be a one-way street. The fairness required of the Financial Corporations cannot be carried to the extent of disabling them from recovering what is due to them. While not insisting upon the borrower to honour the commitments undertaken by him, the Financial Corporation alone cannot be shackled hand and foot in the name of fairness." 7. In fact, a division bench of this court presided by M.Katju, C.J. (as he then was) in Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment Corporation Ltd. Vs. Millenium Business Solutions Pvt. Ltd., reported in 2004 (5) CTC 689 directed that the courts must keep certain considerations in mind before entertaining the request and in paragraph 18, it was observed as follows: "18. Before parting with the case we would like to mention that recovery of tens of thousands of crore rupees of loans of banks and financial institutions has been held up by Court orders under Article 226 proceedings which were really unwarranted. However, much sympathy a Court may have for a party, a writ Court must exercise its jurisdiction on well settled principles, and not on mere sympathy or compassion. No doubt, there may be hardship to a party, but unless violation of law is shown the Court cannot interfere. Holding up recoveries of loans by unwarranted Court orders is causing incalculable harm to our economy, since unless the loan is recovered a fresh loan cannot be granted to needy persons. The Courts must keep these considerations in mind." 8. In the light of the above, the writ petition will stand dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition stands closed.