JUDGMENT : Thisappeal is preferred by the defendant No. 1 who has suffered a decree ofpossession from both the Courts. This Court vide order dated 24-2-1995 while admitting the appealhad formulated the following substantial question of law : - "Whetherthe plea of adverse possession raised by the appellant was rejected onerroneous assumption that there is no denial of title in the earlier suitbetween the parties " 2.Facts giving rise to filing of the appeal, briefly stated, are that the fatherof the plaintiff, namely, Late Hukumchand was theowner of the house and the site comprised in Plot Nos. 21/1, 21/2 and 19/2. Asper the case set forth in the plaint, father of the plaintiff, inducted one Sitaram who is father of the defendants, as tenant sometimein 1949-50 in respect of the house situate on Plot No. 21/2 on a monthly rentof Rs . 10/-. In 1968, the plaintiff filed a suitagainst the father of the defendants, namely, Civil Suit No. 19-A/1968 foreviction on the ground of arrears of rent. A writtenstatement ( Exh . P-30) was filed by the fatherof the defendants. In the aforesaid civil suit in Paragraph 2 (a) of the plaintit was pleaded that for more than 20 years the defendants are the adverselyexercising their possession over the house in question. It was further pleadedthat they have repudiated the title of plaintiff’s father-late Hukumchand and landlord of the house. The Trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 6-8-1970 ( Exh . P-5), inter alia , held that relationship of landlord and tenant betweenthe parties to the suit is not established. It was further held that noticeterminating the tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act wasnot valid. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed. Being aggrieved by theaforesaid judgment and decree, an appeal was preferred by the plaintiff. Duringthe pendency of the appeal, the father of thedefendants expired. However, the present defendants were not brought on record.Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed as abated vide order dated 14-9-1979 ( Exh . P-6). Thereafter, on or about 27-10-1980 the plaintiff filed the instant suitseeking the relief of possession which was based on title. The defendants filedwritten statement in which, inter alia , it waspleaded that defendants have acquired title by adverse possession. 3.The Trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 31-3-1987 decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff. P-6). Thereafter, on or about 27-10-1980 the plaintiff filed the instant suitseeking the relief of possession which was based on title. The defendants filedwritten statement in which, inter alia , it waspleaded that defendants have acquired title by adverse possession. 3.The Trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 31-3-1987 decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff. Theaforesaid decree was affirmed in appeal by the Lower Appellate Court videjudgment and decree dated 30-1-1995 .Being aggrieved by the aforesaid decree, the defendant No. 1 preferred theinstant appeal. The instant appeal was decided vide judgment dated 9-5-2006 by this Court by which the matter was remanded to the Appellate Court tore-decide the appeal by taking into consideration the averments made in Exh . P-30, i.e., the written statement filed by the fatherof defendants, namely, Late Sitaram in previous suit.The aforesaid judgment was challenged by the plaintiff before the SupremeCourt. The Supreme Court vide order dated 11-5-2009 set aside the judgmentpassed by this Court and remanded the matter to this Court to decide the matterafresh on merits. 4.Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that the father of thedefendants, namely, Sitaram in the written statement( Exh . P-30), which was filed in the previous suit had denied the title of the father of the plaintiff aswell as the relationship of landlord and tenant. It was further submitted thatthe plaintiff himself in Paragraph 9 of the plaint had stated that sometime inthe year 1949-50 the father of the plaintiff inducted one Sitaram in possession of the suit house as tenant. Thus, the father of the defendantswas in possession of the suit house since 1949-50. While inviting the attentionof this Court to Paragraph 18 of the plaint it was pointed out by learnedSenior Counsel that plaintiff himself has stated in that father of thedefendants had denied the title of the plaintiffs father. There is no evidenceon record to show that the defendants are the tenants of the plaintiff.However, the Courts below have travelled beyond thepleadings of the parties and have recorded the findings. In support of hissubmissions, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the decisions ofPrivy Council reported in Siddik Mahomed Shah Vs. Mt. Saran and others, 1930 PC 57 (1) and of Supreme Court reported inand Nirod Bar an Banerjee Vs. Dy . Commissioner of Hazaribagh , AIR 1980 SC 1109 . In support of hissubmissions, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the decisions ofPrivy Council reported in Siddik Mahomed Shah Vs. Mt. Saran and others, 1930 PC 57 (1) and of Supreme Court reported inand Nirod Bar an Banerjee Vs. Dy . Commissioner of Hazaribagh , AIR 1980 SC 1109 . 5.On the other hand, learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that previouscivil suit instituted by the father of the plaintiff was dismissed on technicalground. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed the instant suit which is based ontitle. The defendants have failed to show as to how they were inducted in thepremises In question. It was further' submitted that in Paragraph 2 (a) of thewritten statement ( Exh . P-30) filed by the father ofthe defendant in the previous suit, the status of the father of the plaintiffas landlord was denied. It was further argued that there is no pleading withregard to adverse possession in the written statement. The defendants havefailed to disclosed the point of time when theirpossession became adverse to the interest of the plaintiff. Mere longpossession is not sufficient to confer title by adverse possession. It was alsosubmitted that both the Courts below on meticulous appreciation of evidence onrecord have recorded a concurrent finding of fact that defendant did notacquire any title by adverse possession. The aforesaid finding is based onevidence available on record and can neither be said to be perverse nor basedon no evidence. In support of his submissions, learned Counsel has placedreliance on the decisions of Supreme Court reported in Veerayee Animal Vs. Seeni Animal, (2002) 1 SCC 134 , Kulwant Kaur and others Vs. Gurdial Singh Mann (dead) by LRs .and others, (2001) 4 SCC 262 , Sugani ( Mst .) Vs. Rameshwar Das and another, (2006) 11 SCC 587 , Roop Singh (Dead) through LRs . Vs. Ram Singh (Dead)through LRs ., 2000(3) M.P.H.T. 18 (SC) = AIR 2000 SC1485, State Bank of Travancore Vs. Arvindan Kunju Panicker and others, AIR 1971 SC 996 and of this Courtreported in General Mines and Quarries Ltd. Vs. Kartar Singh Prem Singh and others, 1992 MPLJ 563 . 6.I have considered the submissions made by learned Counsel for the parties andperused the record. The jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with thefindings of fact under Section 100 of CPC is limited to the case where thefinding is either perverse or based on no evidence. Kartar Singh Prem Singh and others, 1992 MPLJ 563 . 6.I have considered the submissions made by learned Counsel for the parties andperused the record. The jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with thefindings of fact under Section 100 of CPC is limited to the case where thefinding is either perverse or based on no evidence. This Court cannot interferewith the concurrent finding of fact until or unless the same is perverse orcontrary to material on record. [ See : Sugani ( Mst .) (supra), Gurdev Kaur Vs. Kaki, (2007) 1SCC 546, Prakash Kumar Vs. State of Gujrat , (2004) 5 SCC 140 , Thiagarajan and others Vs. Sri Venugopalaswamy B. Koil and others, (2004) 5 SCC 762 and Narayanan Rajendran and another Vs. Lekshmy Sarojini and others, (2009) 5 SCC 264 ] It is equallywell settled that this Court in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Codeof Civil Procedure cannot re-appreciate evidence. [ See : Thimmaiah and others Vs. Ningarnma and another, (2000) 7 SCC 409 ]. It is equally well settled that where onappreciation of evidence, even if two view are possible,this Court in exercise of powers under Section 100 of the Code of CivilProcedure would not interfere. [ See : Kondiba Dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai Sopan Guzar and others, (1999) 3SCC 722 and Veerayee Animal (supra)]. It has furtherbeen held by the Supreme Court that interference with a question of fact is notpermissible. [ See : Basayya I. Mathad Vs. Rudrayya S. Mathad and others, (2008) 3 SCC 120 ]. In S. Appadurai Nadar and another Vs.A. Chokalinga Nadar andanother, (2007) 12 SCC 774 , it has been held by the Supreme Court that inexercise of power under Section 100 the Courts should be slow in reversing thefinding of fact. The finding of fact even if erroneous wouldnot be disturbed in second appeal unless the finding is shown to beperverse and based on surmises and conjectures. [ See : Kulwant Kaur (supra), Hqfazat Hussain Vs. Abdul Majeed and others, (2001) 7 SCC 189 and Bharath Matha Vs. R. Vijay Rengandathan , (2010) 11 SCC 483 ]. Ina case where the plaintiff takes a plea of acquisition of title by adversepossession, has not only to plead the actual possession but has also to pleadthe period and date from which he claims the possession. Abdul Majeed and others, (2001) 7 SCC 189 and Bharath Matha Vs. R. Vijay Rengandathan , (2010) 11 SCC 483 ]. Ina case where the plaintiff takes a plea of acquisition of title by adversepossession, has not only to plead the actual possession but has also to pleadthe period and date from which he claims the possession. The plaintiff hasfurther to plead and prove that his possession was continuous, exclusive andundisturbed to the knowledge that he is the real owner of the land. He isrequired to demonstrate a hostile title and has to communicate his hostility tothe real owner. [ See : Krishnamurthy S. Setlur (Dead) by LRs . Vs. O.V. Narasimha Setty and others, (2007) 3 SCC 569 ]. 8.A person who bases his title by adverse possession must show by clear andunequivocal evidence, i.e., the possession was hostile to the real dwndr.and amounted to denial to the property claimed. [ See : Annasaheb Bapit Saheh Patil Vs. Halwant @ Balasaheb Babusaheb Patil (dead) by LRs . and heirs, AIR 1995 SC 895 ]. It is equally wellsettled that party pleading adverse possession must state with sufficientclarity as to when he is in adverse possession, nature of this possession andthe plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law, but a mixedquestion of fact and law. [ See : Dr. Mahesh Chand Sharma Vs. Rajkumari Sharmaand others, AIR 1995 SC 869]. The plea that permissive possession becameadverse must be established by cogent and convincing evidence to show hostileanimus and possession adverse to the knowledge of real owner. Mere possessionfor how-so-ever length of time does not result in converting permissivepossession into adverse possession. [ See : Thakur Kishan Singh (Dead) Vs. Annnd Kumar (1994) 6 SCC 591 ]. 9.In the backdrop of aforesaid well settled legal position the facts of the casemay be adverted to. The defendants' witness No. 1 Babulal has stated in his examination-in-chief that he is not aware as to in whichcapacity the plaintiffs father was in possession of the suit premises.Similarly, the defendant No. 1 has stated that his father was in possession ofthe suit premises since 1948. In Paragraph 6 of his cross-examination it hasfurther been admitted that in the year 1948 he was aged about 14 years and wasnot aware about the negotiations which his father had with regard to the suithouse. In Paragraph 6 of his cross-examination it hasfurther been admitted that in the year 1948 he was aged about 14 years and wasnot aware about the negotiations which his father had with regard to the suithouse. The defendants in the written statement have failed to prove the mannerin which they came in possession of suit house and as to when possession ofdefendants became adverse to the interest of the plaintiff. 10.The Trial Court after appreciation of the evidence on record has held that thedefendants have failed to prove that they have acquired the title by adversepossession. The Lower Appellate Court vide, judgment and decree dated 30-1-1995had held that in the earlier civil suit the defendants had denied the fact thathis father was the owner of the suit house for want of knowledge. It hasfurther been held by Lower Appellate Court that from the statements ofdefendant witness No. 1 and defendant witness No. 2, it is not clear as to whenthe possession of the defendants became adverse to the interest of theplaintiff. It has also been held by the Lower AppellateCourt that it is not a case of the defendants that they forcibly tookpossession of the suit house. It was further held that mere long possessiondoes not amount to adverse possession. From oral and documentary evidence onrecord, by no stretch of imagination, findings recorded by the Trial Court aswell as Lower Appellate Court with regard to acquisition of title by adversepossession, can be either said to be perverse or based on no evidence. TheSupreme Court had held that plea of acquisition of title by adverse possessionis a mixed question of law and fact. The aforesaid finding of fact is based onappreciation of evidence on record which is concurrent in nature. The plea ofadverse possession raised by the appellant has not rejected merely on theground that there is no denial of title in the earlier suit. From perusal ofthe judgment and decree of the Trial Court as well as Lower Appellate Court itis apparent that Courts below have not rejected the plea of adverse possessionraised by the appellant merely on the ground that there is no denial of titlein the earlier suit between the parties. Accordingly, the substantial questionof law is answered in the negative and against the appellant. 11.In the result, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.