Judgment :- 1. Suit is filed for delivery of vacant possession and for costs. 2. The following are the brief allegations contained in the plaint - 2 [A] The plaintiff is the owner of the suit schedule mentioned property by virtue of the registered sale dated 30.04.2007. Prior to 1946, the property mentioned in the schedule alongwith other properties were in joint occupation of the heirs of Ponnusamy Sah by a partition deed dated 07.02.1946 registered as document No.382/1946. The parties to the deed are Abibu N./S.Kiddrai. Abibu Rajaram Sah, Abibu K.Narayana Sah, Abibu G.Askaapathy, Abibu G.Vasu, Abibu P.Krishna Sah, Abibu P.Lakshmi Narayana Sah, Lakshmi Bai, Heera Bai and Minor Seenu partitioned the joint family property and have taken their respective separate shares. Abibu P.Krishna Sah and Abibu P.Lakshmi Narayan Sah were allotted with bungalows and coconut garden bearing door No.34/35, Mundakanniamman Koil Street, Mylapore, Madras measuring about two cawnies and 215 sq.ft. Comprised in R.S.No.1873 and C.C.No.1487 of Mylapore, Madras. 2[B] It is further stated that A.P.Krishna Sah and A.P.Lakshminarayana Sah were in absolute possession of the said properties till the year 1966 when a major fire broke in the locality. Due to the fire accident, the superstructure in the suit schedule properties were collapsed leaving a vacant site. The said Krishna Sah and Lakshminarayan Sah permitted the local residence that has loss their huts to have temporary huts and sheds in the suit scheduled property but the predecessors of the defendants have occupied a portion of the properties and raised temporary huts, that A.K.Narayana Sah son of A.P.Krishna Sah succeeded with the properties as A.P.Lakshminaraya Sah died without any heirs. Since he was residing in Sowcarpet he had no day to day control over the properties which paved the defendants and other to raise superstructure in the properties without any permission or authorisation, that in the year 199, A.K.Narayana Sah have executed a deed of General Power of Attorney dated 29.10.1999 in favour of M.K.Devaraj and the said Devaraj being a power holder of A.K.Narayana Sah has taken steps to vacate the defendants and others who were illegal occupants of the properties. 2[C] Whenever M.K.Devaraj or his principal tried to evict them, the defendants and others with their man power evaded eviction and managed to continue in possession, that M.K.Devaraj as the power of attorney holder of A.K.Narayana Sah have executed a sale deed dated 30.4.2007 in favour of the plaintiff and the same has been registered as document No.1107/2007, that right from the day of purchase, the plaintiff is making all effects steps and measures to vacate the defendants which ended in vein and hence he issued legal notices to the defendants on 08.12.2008 for which the 1st defendant had given a reply on 28.12.2008 through his counsel stating that he has purchased the property and occupied by him from a unnamed person mentioned as rightful owner by a sale deed dated 21.8.1996, that he also caused notices through his counsel to the 2nd and 3rd defendants on 10.02.009 and 27.01.2009 respectively which were not served on them and the same were returned, that the defendants 1 to 3 were tresspassed and they are continuing their possession over the properties illegally without any permission or authorisation from the plaintiff and hence the suit came to be filed. 3. 3. The following are the averments contained in the written statement filed by the defendants :- 3[A] The defendants are not aware of the partition deed dated 07.02.1946, that Smt.Gangammal was a lessee of land under one a.K.Krishna Sah and brother from 1955 to 1967 but it cannot be claimed as the lease of the suit property unless it is proved, that the allegation that a major fire broke out in the year 1966 in the locality is false, that the superstructure in the suit schedule properties were collapsed leaving a vacant site is also denied, that the defendants did not aware of the death of A.P.Lakshminarayan Sah without issue and afterwards A.K.Narayana Sah took steps to vacate the occupants in the properties, that all the defendants are in absolute possession and enjoyment of their property without any interference, that these defendants were not demanded by anybody at any point of time to vacate the suit property, that the said A.K.Narayana Sah executed a power deed in favour of M.K.Devaraj and he tried to evict the defendants are false, that the 1st defendant admits the receipt of the legal notice and it was answered by him on 28.12.2008 since the 1st defendant was in possession and enjoyment of the property by a sale deed in his favour and he has perfected his title by adverse possession, that even assuming that they are lessees for the land they are entitled to purchase land under Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act provided that the plaintiff proves that these defendants are in possession of the land belongs to him, that the suit is not maintainable and hence the same is liable to be dismissed. 4. After analysing the pleadings, evidence and exhibits, the learned Fast Track Court Judge No.3, Chennai dismissed the suit with costs observing that the plaintiff has not proved that he is the legal purchaser for valuable consideration of the property from proper person and also the defendants have prescribed title by adverse possession. Aggrieved against the judgment, the plaintiff has preferred this appeal. Points for consideration :- (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the suit property as owner ? (2) Whether the defendants have prescribed title by adverse possession ? (3)Whether the defendants are continuing in the suit property as tenants? (4) To what relief are the plaintiff entitled to ? Aggrieved against the judgment, the plaintiff has preferred this appeal. Points for consideration :- (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the suit property as owner ? (2) Whether the defendants have prescribed title by adverse possession ? (3)Whether the defendants are continuing in the suit property as tenants? (4) To what relief are the plaintiff entitled to ? Point Nos.1 to 3 : 5. The suit property is situate in Door No.70 & 71 in Mundagakanniamman Koil Street, Mylapore, Chennai with an extent of 810 sq.ft. This property and some other properties originally belonged to one Ponnusamy Sah by virtue of a registered partnership deed dated 07.02.1946. His legal heirs divided the properties and got their respective shares among whom Abibu P. Krishna Sah and Abibu P.Lakshmi Narayana Sah were allotted with bungalows and coconut garden in Door No.34 & 35 Mundakanniamman Koil Street, Mylapore, Chennai measuring about two cawnies and 2156 sq.ft. The copy of partnership deed is Ex.A1. 6. It is alleged that there was an inferno in the locality in the year 1966 by means of which the super structures in the suit property were destroyed. The vacant site was left out. Both Krishna Sah and Lakshmi Narayan sah permitted local residents to put up temporary huts and sheds in the schedule property. In that occasion, the defendants occupied a portion of the properties and raised temporary huts. 7. A.P.Lakshminarayana Sah died without leaving any heirs and hence Krishna Sah was enjoying the properties. The said A.P.Narayana Sah executed a registered General Power of Attorney on 29.10.1999 in favour of one M.K.Devaraj under Ex.A2 on 29.10.1999. On the strength as power holder, the said M.K.Dearaj took initiatives to vacate the defendants and others who remained as trespassers, but in vain. He executed a sale deed with respect to the suit property in favour of his son, the plaintiff under original of Ex.A3 on 30.04.2007. Plaintiff sent Ex.A4 notice to the first defendant who received the same and sent Ex.A5 reply on 28.12.2008 wherein he has inter alia stated that he has got a registered sale on 21.08.1996 from one Muthusamy with respect to super structures to an extent of 120 sq.ft. He assails the documents referred to by the plaintiff in his notice. 8. Plaintiff sent Ex.A4 notice to the first defendant who received the same and sent Ex.A5 reply on 28.12.2008 wherein he has inter alia stated that he has got a registered sale on 21.08.1996 from one Muthusamy with respect to super structures to an extent of 120 sq.ft. He assails the documents referred to by the plaintiff in his notice. 8. The plaintiff under Ex.A6 notice called upon the 3rd defendant to vacate the premises and he also sent Ex.A7 to the second defendant to vacate the premises. Both of them refused to receive the notice and the returned covers have been marked as Exs.A8 and A9. There is no connection between the first defendant on one hand and the second and third defendant on the other. The second and third defendants are daughter-in-law and daughter respectively of one Gangammal who was holding possession previously. The second defendant filed a suit in O.S.No.3137 of 2009 on the file of the XI Asst. Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai against the above said Devaraj and Narayan Sah for permanent injunction. Ex.A10 is copy of the written statement filed by defendants in the said suit. The suit was afterwards not pressed by the plaintiff Pownammal and the same was dismissed as not pressed. Ex.A11 is copies of judgment and decree in O.S.No.3137 of 2009 dated 22.10.2010. 9. Ex.B1 is the sale deed dated 21.08.1996 in favour of the 1st defendant by Muthusamy with respect to superstructure in the shop with an extent of 120 sq.ft. which is a portion of present suit property. It is in door No.71. It is admitted that the first defendant purchased as per Ex.B1 only superstructures in the above said site. 10. Ex.B2 is property tax demand card and letter from EB for name transfer in favour of first defendant. Ex.B4 series are the receipts for payment of rent issued by Krishna Sah & Brothers to Gangammal in the years 1955, 1958, 1960, 1963 and 1964. Ex.B5 series are the licences issued by Corporation of Madras to Gangammal to run a restaurant. 11. The second and third defendants pressed into service Ex.B6 unregistered deed of declaration (uruthi pathiram) executed by Gangammal by means of which she allotted the shops to her son Mani, husband of second defendant and daughter, the third defendant to enjoy after her lifetime. 11. The second and third defendants pressed into service Ex.B6 unregistered deed of declaration (uruthi pathiram) executed by Gangammal by means of which she allotted the shops to her son Mani, husband of second defendant and daughter, the third defendant to enjoy after her lifetime. Ex.B7 series are the property tax receipts for the year 1977 – 78 and 1984 – 1988. Ex.P8 series are water tax receipts paid in the years 1986 and 1988. In 1973 by means of Ex.P9 receipt, the electricity consumption charge was paid. 12. The defendants have consciously admitted by conduct that they have not purchased the site upon which the superstructure are put up. In this context, the pleading of defendants in their statement is pertinent. It is stated in the written statement that even assuming that the defendants are lessees for the land, they are entitled to purchase the land under Section 9 of the City Tenants Act provided the plaintiff proves that these defendants are in possession of the land belonging to him. They have also taken a plea of adverse possession by alleging that they are in absolute possession and enjoyment of the property without any interference from any quarters for more than statutory period. It is also in their pleading that even though the sale deed Ex.B1 is only for the superstructure, they are in continuous possession and enjoyment for more than statutory period through his predecessors and that they have perfected title by adverse possession, so also the second and third defendants. 13. The plaintiff, as PW1 would say about Exs.A2 and A3. His father, as vendor is brought to box as PW2. Their evidence would show in what way the plaintiff derived title to the property. Originally, the suit property and other extensive properties belonged to Ponnusamy Sah and after his demise, his heirs 1 to 9 inherited who entered into partition with respect to the family properties under original of Ex.A.1 on 07.02.1946 by means of which Lakshmana Sah and Krishna Sah got two bungalows and coconut garden in Mundagakanniamman Koil Street, Mylapore, Chennai and also another property in Mylapore. It is the case of the plaintiff that a fire accident took place by means of which the properties were left as vacant sites. One portion among those properties is the suit property. 14. It is the case of the plaintiff that a fire accident took place by means of which the properties were left as vacant sites. One portion among those properties is the suit property. 14. By means of Ex.A2, PW2 was entrusted with management of the suit property and he has been authorised to alienate the property also. Afterwards, he sold the property under original of Ex.A.3 on 30.04.2007 to the plaintiff. PW2 is son of Krishna Sah. He has clearly mentioned in Ex.A3 that after the death of Krishna Sah, he, PW2 alone got the property as legal heir and he sold the same to the plaintiff for Rs.10,20,000/-. Ex.A2 was executed by Narayana Sah in favour of PW2. The said Narayana Sah is stated to be the son of Krishna Sah. Hence, Narayana Sah and PW2 are brothers. However, it is specifically recited in Ex.A3 that the suit property fell to the share of Krishna Sah and PW2 got it by succession. Hence, there could be no cloud on the plaintiff's title to the property. It has been established that he is the true owner of the suit property. 15. Even though all the three defendants have filed a common written statement, DW1 says that he has nothing to do with the second and third defendants. He admits that the sale deed, Ex.B1 executed by Muthusamy in his favour on 21.08.1996 is with respect to the superstructures, he has categorically admitted that in Ex.B1 it is stated that the property belongs to Krishna Sah and others. In Ex.B1, in more than one place, it is recited that the property belongs to Krishna Sah vakaira. 16. The first defendant also produced receipts for payment of rent paid to Krishna Sah under Ex.B4 series which are pertaining to the years 1955, 1958, 1960, 1963 and 1964. Hence, it is the admitted case of first defendant that he got right to the superstructures alone and the title to the site upon which the superstructures are present remained with Krishna Sah and others. However, he would plead that he prescribed title by adverse possession since he has been in long and uninterrupted, unobjectionable and continuous possession in the property, claiming the right over the superstructures, he also lays claim over the vacant site and he has stated that by adverse possession, he has been the owner of the property. 17. However, he would plead that he prescribed title by adverse possession since he has been in long and uninterrupted, unobjectionable and continuous possession in the property, claiming the right over the superstructures, he also lays claim over the vacant site and he has stated that by adverse possession, he has been the owner of the property. 17. In so far as the second and third defendants are concerned, the property held by them was originally occupied by Gangammal. It is also the admitted case of second and third defendants that Gangammal is not the owner of the property. Gangammal executed Ex.B6 a deed of declaration, which is unregistered, on 13.03.1977 allotting two portions of the superstructures in the shops, one to her son and another to her daughter, the third defendant. Both second and third defendants also lay claim upon the land as contended by the first defendant. Ex.B5 series are the receipts for the licences paid by Gangammal. They are of the years 1965, 1974, 1975 and 1976. By no stretch of imagination, it could be stated that any right in the site, the immovable property was transferred to the son and daughter of Gangammal for the reasons that she was not the owner of the property and Ex.B6 is hit by Section 17 of the Registration Act for want of registration. If the court is liable to find out that Gangammal had asserted right of ownership over the property, then we can consider that whether she acquired right by adverse possession but in this case, it is admitted that Gangammal is not the owner of the property. In Ex.B1, Muthusamy conveyed rights over the superstructures and also the lease hold right, which is admitted by DW1 in his cross examination. He further states that neither Krishna Sah nor his agent gave permission to build the shop. He clearly says in cross examination that he is lessee for the property he possesses and both second and third defendants are lessees as far as the other portion which is in their occupation. From the above said evidence, it is admitted by first defendant that they are lessees. In order to claim adverse possession, one has to assert that the property has been in his possession with knowledge to true owner over the statutory period. From the above said evidence, it is admitted by first defendant that they are lessees. In order to claim adverse possession, one has to assert that the property has been in his possession with knowledge to true owner over the statutory period. In this context, it is incumbent upon the party pleading adverse possession to indicate the period from which his possession became adverse to the true owner. 18. As for second and third defendants, DW2, the second defendant candidly admits that she had given rent to Krishna Sah, that there is no arrears and that up to today, she has paid the rent. This part of evidence would vividly show that second and third defendants also are not asserting right over the suit property as it is their own. As far as they are concerned, there is no date nor period from which their possession became adverse to the true owner. When she was re-examined by her advocate on another day on petition, she says that she did not pay rent to Narayana Sah but in her cross examination, she clearly states that she has paid to Krishna Sah and that upto date, there is no arrears of rent. In view of the above said oral evidence on record, it is discernible that the defendants have been in possession of the property as tenants. 19. The defendants are tenants in the vacant site. In the written statement, they have also stated that in case if the plaintiff proves that he is the owner of the property, then they are prepared to purchase the property under Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act. But they have not taken any steps under the provisions of the Act. As far as such claim is concerned, it has become time barred. 20. Much was said about the adverse possession reportedly acquired by the defendants. The learned counsel for the appellants Mr.K.P.Gopala Krishnan would rely upon a number of citations to show that the defendants have failed to establish the plea of adverse possession as required by law. In 2003 (1) SCC 488 [Abdul Rahman v. Prasony Bai] the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the plea of adverse possession cannot be raised by tenant against the owner of the land. In AIR 2009 (NOC) 488 (A.P.) [M.Maremma & Ors. In 2003 (1) SCC 488 [Abdul Rahman v. Prasony Bai] the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the plea of adverse possession cannot be raised by tenant against the owner of the land. In AIR 2009 (NOC) 488 (A.P.) [M.Maremma & Ors. v. D.Krishnavenamma & Ors.] , the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that when the parties who plead as tenants, their possession is only permissive. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in 2006 (7) SCC 570 [T.Anjanappa v. Somalingappa] has formulated the principles for interfering adverse possession. The important passages in paragraphs 12, 14, 15 and 18 are as follows - 12. The concept of adverse possession contemplates a hostile possession i.e. a possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of the true owner. Possession to be adverse must be possession by a person who does not acknowledge the other's rights but denies them. The principle of law is firmly established that a person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to denial of his title to the property claimed. For deciding whether the alleged acts of a person constituted adverse possession, the animus of the person doing those acts is the most crucial factor. Adverse possession is commenced in wrong and is aimed against right. A person is said to hold the property adversely to the real owner when that person in denial of the owner's right excluded him from the enjoyment of his property. 13. Possession to be adverse must be possession by a person who does not acknowledge the other's rights but denies them: “24. It is a matter of fundamental principle of law that where possession can be referred to a lawful title, it will not be considered to be adverse. It is on the basis of this principle that it has been laid down that since the possession of one co-owner can be referred to his status as co-owner, it cannot be considered adverse to other co-owners.” (See Vidya Devi v. Prem Prakash1, SCC p. 504, para 24.) 14. Adverse possession is that form of possession or occupancy of land which is inconsistent with the title of the rightful owner and tends to extinguish that person's title. Adverse possession is that form of possession or occupancy of land which is inconsistent with the title of the rightful owner and tends to extinguish that person's title. Possession is not held to be adverse if it can be referred to a lawful title. The person setting up adverse possession may have been holding under the rightful owner's title e.g. trustees, guardians, bailiffs or agents. Such persons cannot set up adverse possession: “14. … Adverse possession means a [hostile possession] which is expressly or impliedly in denial of title of the true owner. Under Article 65 [of the Limitation Act,] burden is on the defendants to prove affirmatively. A person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unequivocal evidence i.e. possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to a denial of his title to the property claimed. In deciding whether the acts, alleged by a person, constitute adverse possession, regard must be had to the animus of the person doing those acts which must be ascertained from the facts and circumstances of each case. The person who bases his title on adverse possession, therefore, must show by clear and unequivocal evidence i.e. possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to a denial of his title to the property claimed. … 15. Where possession can be referred to a lawful title, it will not be considered to be adverse. The reason being that a person whose possession can be referred to a lawful title will not be permitted to show that his possession was hostile to another's title. One who holds possession on behalf of another, does not by mere denial of that other's title make his possession adverse so as to give himself the benefit of the statute of limitation. Therefore, a person who enters into possession having a lawful title, cannot divest another of that title by pretending that he had no title at all. (See Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil v. Balwant2, SCC p. 554, paras 14-15.) 15. An occupation of reality is inconsistent with the right of the true owner. Therefore, a person who enters into possession having a lawful title, cannot divest another of that title by pretending that he had no title at all. (See Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil v. Balwant2, SCC p. 554, paras 14-15.) 15. An occupation of reality is inconsistent with the right of the true owner. Where a person possesses property in a manner in which he is not entitled to possess it, and without anything to show that he possesses it otherwise than an owner (that is, with the intention of excluding all persons from it, including the rightful owner), he is in adverse possession of it. Thus, if A is in possession of a field of B's, he is in adverse possession of it unless there is something to show that his possession is consistent with a recognition of B's title. (See Ward v. Carttar3.) Adverse possession is of two kinds, according as it was adverse from the beginning, or has become so subsequently. Thus, if a mere trespasser takes possession of A's property, and retains it against him, his possession is adverse ab initio. But if A grants a lease of land to B, or B obtains possession of the land as A's bailiff, or guardian, or trustee, his possession can only become adverse by some change in his position. Adverse possession not only entitles the adverse possessor, like every other possessor, to be protected in his possession against all who cannot show a better title, but also, if the adverse possessor remains in possession for a certain period of time produces the effect either of barring the right of the true owner, and thus converting the possessor into the owner, or of depriving the true owner of his right of action to recover his property and this although the true owner is ignorant of the adverse possessor being in occupation. (See Rains v. Buxton4.) 16. Adverse possession is that form of possession or occupancy of land which is inconsistent with the title of any person to whom the land rightfully belongs and tends to extinguish that person's title, which provides that no person shall make an entry or distress, or bring an action to recover any land or rent, but within twelve years next after the time when the right first accrued, and does away with the doctrine of adverse possession, except in the cases provided for by Section 15. Possession is not held to be adverse if it can be referred to a lawful title. 17. According to Pollock, “In common speech a man is said to be in possession of anything of which he has the apparent control or from the use of which he has the apparent powers of excluding others”. 18. It is the basic principle of law of adverse possession that (a) it is the temporary and abnormal separation of the property from the title of it when a man holds property innocently against all the world but wrongfully against the true owner; (b) it is possession inconsistent with the title of the true owner. 21. In 2006 (5) CTC 378 [Anjanappa, T. v. Somalingappa], their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that animus of person doing those acts is most crucial factor in determining adverse possession and that principle of law is that person, who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and unambiguous evidence that his possession was hostile to real owner which should amount to denial of his title to property claimed. A Division Bench of this Court in 2006 (2) L.W. 742 [A.Vedanayagam & Others v. Annakili & 5 others] has dealt with the principles governing adverse possession, as follows: 25. Now the law is well settled, that the person, who claims adverse possession, alone has to establish the same and on his failure, whatever may be the period of his occupation, the owner of the property is entitled to recover the property, which cannot be prevented. Now the law is well settled, that the person, who claims adverse possession, alone has to establish the same and on his failure, whatever may be the period of his occupation, the owner of the property is entitled to recover the property, which cannot be prevented. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the defendants that since the suit is not filed within 12 years, or within six months from the date of dispossession, the claim of the plaintiffs should be negatived, is legally unsound, deserves rejection, which could be seen from the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vasantiben Prahladji Nayak and others vs. Somnath Muljibhai Nayak and others [ (2004) 3 SCC 376 = 2004-3-L.W.301] wherein the view of the Bombay High Court was affirmed, which reads : "In the case of Hanamgowda Shidgowda Patil v. Irgowda Shivgowda Patil [AIR 1925 Bombay 9 : 26 Bombay L.R. 829], it has been held that in cases of adverse possession, the starting point of limitation does not commence from the date when the right of ownership arises to the plaintiff, but it commences from the date when the defendants' possession became adverse. Therefore, in the present case, the starting point of limitation for adverse possession cannot be taken as 29.11.1965 and one has to take the date when the respondents' possession became adverse. 22. In the following decisions also, the settled principles, as stated above have been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court and other High Courts. (1) 2007 (2) MLJ 657 (SC) [M.Durai v. Madhu & Ors.] (2) AIR 1993 Delhi 19 [Wg. Cdr. (Retd.) R.N.Dawar v. Shri Ganga Saran Dhama] (3) 2003 (1) CTC 290 [K.Krishnan and Anr. v. S.Mari Naicker and Anr.] (4) 2004 (4) MLJ 497 [Pandurangam v. Sakkubai and Ors.] (5) 2007 (2) L.W. 114 [Duraisami @ R.Natarajan v. M.Vellingiri & 6 Ors.] (6) 2007 (2) L.W. 955 [T.Anjanappa and Ors. v. Somalingappa and Ors.] (7) 2008 (1) L.W.69 [ Annakili v. A.Vedanayagam & Ors.] (8) 2009 (1) CTC 366 [M.Subbiah v. T.Subbiah (died) & 13 Ors.] (9) 2011 (1) L.W. 1014 [Dhanabaghyam Ammal (died) & Ors. v. Dhanavel & Ors.] (10) 2011 (2) MWN (Civil) 848 [Syed Mohindeen v. Periannan @ Ramaswamy & Ors.] (11)2011 (2) MWN (Civil) 855 [Chatti Konati Rao & Ors. v. Palle Venkata Subba Rao] 23. v. Dhanavel & Ors.] (10) 2011 (2) MWN (Civil) 848 [Syed Mohindeen v. Periannan @ Ramaswamy & Ors.] (11)2011 (2) MWN (Civil) 855 [Chatti Konati Rao & Ors. v. Palle Venkata Subba Rao] 23. Following the principles laid down in the above said decision, it has to be observed that the defendants have to prove their long uninterrupted, continuous and unobjectionable real possession over the property against the true owner with his knowledge, with intention to hold the property as their own over the statutory period. In the case on hand, the fact remains that the defendants are continuing in the property as tenants, that they have no intention (animus) to hold the property as their own property, that they did not show that with the knowledge to the true owners that they are in continuous possession of the property and that they have miserably failed to establish that they have been in unobjectionable possession for over 12 years. In these circumstances, an inevitable conclusion would be that the defendants have not proved their title by adverse possession. They have not exercisedtheir right as tenants under the City Tenants Protection Act, inspite of an opportunity was being granted and they are not entitled for any relief except to vacate the premises. I answer points No.1 & 3 in the affirmative and 2 in negative. Point No.4 : 24. In the light of the observations recorded by this Court following the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it has been held that the defendants have not prescribed title by adverse possession and they are not entitled for any relief. The plaintiff has established that he is the owner of the suit property. In such view of this matter, the relief for recovery of possession have to be granted to the plaintiff. The appeal deserves to be allowed. The judgment of the trial court suffers from factual and legal infirmities which is liable to be set aside and it is accordingly set aside. This point is answered as above. 25. In the result, the Appeal Suit is allowed with costs throughout. The suit in O.S.No.10151 of 2010 on the file of the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.III, Chennai is decreed as prayed for. Time for delivery : two months.