Judgment :- W.P.No.12919 of 2012 was filed by the maritime Institute Association represented by its Secretary challenging Order No.2 of 2007 made in supersession of the proceedings of the Director General of Shipping Order No.1 of 2003 and seeks to set aside the same insofar as it relates to Clause 4.23. W.P.No.12920 of 2012 was filed by an institute known as the International Maritime Academy, represented by its Managing Director for the very same relief. 2. Both writ petitions when it came up for admission on 5.6.2012, Mr.S.Haja Mohideen Gisthi, learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel took notice for the respondents. He also filed a counter affidavit, dated 19.6.2012. In the DGS Order No.2 of 2007 made in supersession of DGS Order No.1 of 2003, the requirements and procedures for obtaining approval from the Director General of Shipping was prescribed for the conduct of Pre Sea Courses for training for service in the merchant Navy. Paragraph 4.23 over which the petitioners were aggrieved reads as follows : "4.23.Annual remittance to Government : All approved Institutes and approved workshops themselves conducting maritime training course, shall pay to the DGS one percent of the total fees which will include tuition and all other fees chargeable from a student, for the sanctioned strength of all courses, every financial year from 1st April to 31st March, the minimum of which shall not be less than Rs.10,000. This amount of annual contribution to Government should be remitted to the DGS by 31st May after every financial year by DD payable in the name of Director General of Shipping. A penal interest of 18% shall be levied on the amount due when there is a default by the Institute/workshops. Moreover, if the amount due is not received by 31st July of the year, the approval itself may be suspended till such time the payment is made and the Institute will be responsible for all consequences arising thereof." 3. Heard both sides. The contention raised by the petitioner was that the first respondent Director General of Shipping is a statutory authority functioning under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958. Under Section 78 of the Act, various grades of Certificate of Competency can be issued by the DGS. The power of the first respondent with respect to collection of fees from the maritime training institutes is specified in the Merchant Shipping Rules, 1998 and 2001. Under Section 78 of the Act, various grades of Certificate of Competency can be issued by the DGS. The power of the first respondent with respect to collection of fees from the maritime training institutes is specified in the Merchant Shipping Rules, 1998 and 2001. The first respondent in contravention of the above powers started interfering with the functioning of the maritime institutions and Pre-sea training courses by passing its own orders, circulars and notifications. The first respondent has not been accorded any specific power either under the Act or by the Ministry of Shipping. 4. In the present writ petitions, it was stated by the petitioners that the first respondent has got jurisdiction only with reference to fees that are collected for issuing of CDCs and to conduct necessary inspection for the said purpose as per the Act and the Ministry's guidelines. But, on the contrary, the first respondent claims 1% of the total fees received from the students, i.e., tuition fee, university examination, mark sheet, convocation, boarding and lodging, laundry, uniform, linen, bed, books, furniture, medical expenses, library, laboratories, transportation, educational equipments, swimming training, computer training, internet facility, ship visits, boat rowing practice, Gym, saloon, etc., in terms of clause 4.23 of the order No.2 of 2007, dated 31.10.2007 and the same is illegal. The maritime institutions inspite of paying necessary taxes that are applicable and levied by the Government of India, without having knowledge of the competency of the first respondent's collection of 1% fees, they were paying the same till 2011. Only after an order was passed by this court in two batch of writ petitions, the institutions got knowledge of the first respondent's power insofar as it relates to collection of 1% fee from students. The first respondent not only claimed 1% fees in terms of Clause 4.23, but also threatened maritime institutions stating that if there is any default in paying 1% fees to the first respondent, the approval of the institute itself will be suspended till such time payments are made. For stating so, the first respondent has no authority or jurisdiction. The first respondent not only claimed 1% fees in terms of Clause 4.23, but also threatened maritime institutions stating that if there is any default in paying 1% fees to the first respondent, the approval of the institute itself will be suspended till such time payments are made. For stating so, the first respondent has no authority or jurisdiction. Therefore, one of the members of the petitioners association sent a notice dated 9.4.2012 through their counsel questioning its power to collect 1% fee and asked him to withdraw clause 4.23 in order No.2 of 2007, dated 30.10.2007 relating to the demand of 1% of the total fee collected in respect of the conduct of certificates, diplomas and degree courses in Pre-sea training courses. Though notice was received, there has been no reply. Hence these writ petitions. 5. Reliance was placed upon a judgment of this court in a batch of writ petitions in W.P.No.10912 of 2009 and batch cases, dated 17.11.2009 in Maritime Institutes Association and another Vs. The Secretary, Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and Highways (Department of Shipping), Government of India, No.1, Parliament Street, New Delhi-110 001 and others. In that case, while analyzing the power of the Indian Maritime University, vis-a-vis Director General of Shipping, it was held that in the absence of law, the DGS cannot be said to be the creature of any statute and therefore the contention that DGS is a regulatory body for the entire maritime education cannot be countenanced by this court. It is not clear as to how the said judgment will have any relevance. 6. Similarly, in a batch of writ petitions in W.P.No.15464 of 2010 in Sairam Shipping Science Institute and others Vs. India Maritime University and another, dated 14.10.2011, this court held that since there was competitive claim between the University and the DGS, it was directed that the matter must be resolved by the Ministry and to convene a meeting of all concerned and decide the question of limiting the power of both competitive players in the field of maritime institutions. It is not clear as to how this judgment will have any bearing on the demand of 1% fees sought by the DGS in respect of training courses conducted by them. It was also urged that in the absence of legislative power for levying tax under Article 265, the collection of 1% fee is illegal. 7. It is not clear as to how this judgment will have any bearing on the demand of 1% fees sought by the DGS in respect of training courses conducted by them. It was also urged that in the absence of legislative power for levying tax under Article 265, the collection of 1% fee is illegal. 7. In the counter affidavit filed by the first respondent, it was stated that the DGS is the regulatory authority for merchant navy for the whole of India. He has to regulate, control and certify the competency of various categories of seafaring officers in accordance with Sections 78 and 79 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958. As the sole regulating authority for the conduct of such examinations for the issuance of Certificate of Competency (COC), the Directorate had brought out various guidelines which are exclusive for the maritime sector. Under Section 79 of the Merchant Shipping Act, the Central Government or any person duly authorized by it can alone appoint persons for the purpose of examining the qualifications of the candidates for the said certificate under Section 78 of the said Act. Section 78 provides for the Central Government to make rules in regard to Part VI relating to certificate of competency. Part VII deals with ratings. Right from the beginning, the COCs have always been issued by the first respondent. The institutes for the purpose of training candidates to become eligible for COC were also being run by the Government under the control and supervision of the first respondent. In India, there are only three institutes, i.e., Training Ship Dufferein for Deck Cadets and Directorate of Marine Engineering Training (DMET) both in Kolkatta and Mumbai. Both institutes became Marine Engineering Research Institutes in Kolkatta and Mumbai and that T.S. Dufferein became T.S.Chanakya. Earlier these were only ship based and subsequently they became ship and shore based academies. Prior to becoming of T.S.Chanakya, it was a ship based academy called T.S.Rajendra. One of the DMET institutes also came to be called as Lal Bahadur Shastri Nautical College of Advanced Maritime Studies and Research. 8. Earlier these were only ship based and subsequently they became ship and shore based academies. Prior to becoming of T.S.Chanakya, it was a ship based academy called T.S.Rajendra. One of the DMET institutes also came to be called as Lal Bahadur Shastri Nautical College of Advanced Maritime Studies and Research. 8. It was stated that the Ministry of Shipping, Government of India under Section 457 of the Merchant Shipping Act, had promulgated the Merchant shipping (Continuous Discharge Certificate-cum-Seafarers Identity Document) Rules, 2001 to deal with various aspects which arose for the purpose of regulation of the process of granting of continuous discharge certificates. Rule 3(b) defines "approval institute" as a training institute approved by the DGS. Hence the first respondent is the statutory authority under the Act and has been vested with the power, authority and jurisdiction in regard to various provisions of the Act. Rule 47 of the Merchant Shipping (Standards of TCW) Rules, 1998 provides supervision by the DGS with reference to all training and assessment of seafarers for certification. During the last decade, in response to growing demand for seafarers, the Directorate had expanded the maritime education and training programme by permitting private colleges to be set up and to run Pre-sea courses for deck and marine engineering cadets. The programme allowed private organisations to create infrastructure and to set up pre-sea training institutions. Various approvals were given by the DGS for the conduct of maritime training courses from the year 1994 onwards. 9. It was further stated that in order to run the Government machinery to supervise, monitor and to guide the approved maritime training institutes which got largely expanded from the year 1998-99 onwards, the payment of 1% annual fee was imposed from the year 1998 onwards. The said payment of 1% annual fee of the total fees include tuition and all other fees chargeable from students for the sanctioned strength of all courses every financial year from 1st April to 31st March, the minimum of which payable is not less than Rs.10,000/-This amount of annual remittance to the Government of India is remitted to the DGS by the approved maritime training institutes. It is in turn credited to the Government of India account through its authorized nationalized bank in the Consolidated Fund of India. It is in turn credited to the Government of India account through its authorized nationalized bank in the Consolidated Fund of India. The petitioners themselves made payment of 1% from the year 2000 and have now raised various issues which are no way connected. It was also stated that the annual fee collected from the maritime training institutes are credited to the Government of India. For the academic year 20112012, a sum of Rs.2,77,60,763/- was credited to the Government account which in turn went to the Consolidated Fund of India. Therefore, the amount of Rs.500/-for the issuance of continuous discharge certificate by the Shipping master is paid by the pre-sea trainee candidates and not by the training institutes. It has got nothing to do with the 1% annual fee. Similarly, the process fee for approval of new courses are nothing to do with the annual fees collected. 10. The argument based upon Article 265 is misconceived as the annual fee claimed is not a tax levied by any Act of Parliament, but it is the fee charged by the DGS for the services rendered by them. As to the distinction between the fee and tax, the Supreme Court had occasions to consider the same in several cases. To cite a few, it is necessary to refer the following cases. 11. The Supreme Court in Sreenivasa General Traders and others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others reported in (1983) 4 SCC 353 held that the co-relationship between levy and service rendered is one of general character and not of mathematical exactitude. All that is necessary is that there should be reasonable relationship between levy of fee and service rendered. 12. The Supreme Court in B.S.E.Brokers' Forum, Bombay and others Vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India and others reported in (2001) 3 SCC 482 held that there was sea change in the judicial thinking as to the difference between a tax and a fee. The traditional concept of quid pro quo in a fee has undergone considerable transformation. So far as the regulatory fee is concerned, the service to be rendered is not a condition precedent and the same does not lose the character of a fee provided the fee so charged is not excessive. Once the levy is in public interest, then confining the services rendered only to the contributories does not arise. So far as the regulatory fee is concerned, the service to be rendered is not a condition precedent and the same does not lose the character of a fee provided the fee so charged is not excessive. Once the levy is in public interest, then confining the services rendered only to the contributories does not arise. The entire benefit of levy need not accrue only to the contributories. 13. The Supreme Court in Sona Chandi Oal Committee and others Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2005) 2 SCC 345 quoted its earlier case in B.S.E.Brokers' Forum, Bombay and others Vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India and others [ (2001) 3 SCC 482 ] with approval. In the said judgment it was held that the services to be rendered is not a condition precedent if there is reasonable relationship between levy of fee and service rendered is sufficient. Though ordinarily fee should be uniform, but the absence of uniformity by itself will not indicate that the levy is a tax. 14. The second contention that the DGS has no power to collect fees without any authority also cannot be countenanced. The said amount is collected under the authority of the Central Government as it is being credited to the Consolidated Fund of India. 15. The third contention that they are not rendering any service as already process fee was collected and the certificate fee was also collected has no bearing since the DGS has power to monitor the course by evaluating applications and to conduct periodical inspections which requires certain expenditures. Therefore, it cannot be said that the levy of annual fee is either arbitrary or unconstitutional. It is also surprising to note that the petitioners who have paid fees right from the year 2000 have now suddenly turn back to challenge the collection of the said fee without any justification. 16. In the light of the above, both writ petitions will stand dismissed. No costs. Consequently connected miscellaneous petitions stand closed.