JUDGMENT A.K. Goel, C.J. 1. The matter has been placed before this Bench in pursuance of the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 08.02.2012 to reconsider the earlier judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 22.12.2011 passed in W.P.(C) No. 161 of 2011 (Manas Mukherjee Vs. State of Tripura & anr.) holding that the amendment made to the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules vide Notification dated 23.12.2003 will automatically become applicable to the State of Tripura, even though the State of Tripura had adopted the said rules as applicable before 21.01.1972. 2. The petitioner is employed in the State of Tripura under the Revenue Department. He was placed under suspension on 06.06.2011 pending enquiry into the allegation of misconduct in issuing a land clearance certificate. Since the suspension continued beyond 90 days, without review, the petitioner filed this writ petition in this Court challenging the order of suspension on the ground that under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, as amended in the year 2003, the order of suspension is liable to be revoked after 90 days in absence of review. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of learned Single Judge in Manas Mukherjee Vs. State of Tripura (supra). 3. The writ petition was opposed by the State of Tripura by submitting that sub-clause (6) and (7) of Rule 10 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules were not applicable to the State of Tripura as the State of Tripura had adopted the said rules, as they stood before 21.01.1972. The view taken in Manas Mukherjee (supra) that amendment to rules will automatically apply to the State of Tripura required reconsideration. 4. The learned Single Judge formulated following question for consideration:- As held by Apex Court in Bijaya vs. Gopikabai & anr. Reported in (1978) 2 SCC 542 legislation by referential incorporation falls in two categories, namely, (i) where a statute by specific reference incorporates the provisions of another statute as of the time of adoption and (ii) where a statute incorporates by general reference the law concerning a particular subject, as a genus and in case of former, the subsequent amendments made to the referred statute cannot automatically be read in to the adopting stature. However, in case of latter category, it may be presumed that the legislative intent was to include all the subsequent amendments also made from time to time in the generic law on the subject adopted by general reference. The question which requires determination in the present writ petition, as noticed above, is whether the present cases fall within the first or the second category. A Single Bench of this Court in Manas Mukherjee(supra) has rejected the contention of the learned State counsel in that regard only on the ground that there was a review of the order of suspension in that case, without, however, recording any finding as to whether the case comes under the first or the second category of the legislation by referential incorporation. In view of the above, since a Single Bench of this Court has recorded a finding as aforesaid, I am of the considered opinion that the matters require consideration by a larger Bench. 5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner relying upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bajaya vs. Gopikabai & Anr. (1978) 2 SCC 542 submitted that the case falls in second of the two categories, referred to in the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as incorporation is not by specific reference but by general reference, in which case the subsequent amendment to the statute adopted will automatically become applicable. 7. Learned counsel for the State, on the other hand, submitted that the present case clearly falls in the first of two categories, as the adoption was by specific reference to the rules and conditions of the service as applicable before 21.01.1972. 8. To appreciate the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, it may be worthwhile to reproduce the Notification dated 21.01.1972, issued by the State of Tripura continuing the rules as applicable before 21.01.1972: It is hereby ordered that subject to the provisions of the Constitution of India and the North Eastern Areas(Reorganisation) Act, 1971, all rules regulations and orders regulating financial matters and the recruitment and conditions of service which were applicable before the 21st day of January, 1972 to matters connected with the administration of the Union Territory of Tripura will continue to apply to matters connected with affairs of the State of Tripura.... 9. 9. Incorporation of an earlier Act into a later Act is a legislative device adopted for the sake of convenience, in order to avoid verbatim reproduction of the provisions of the earlier Act into the later. The statute, so incorporated, continues to be operative as adopted statute irrespective of amendment or repeal of the statute. So, similarly, any subsequent amendment does not automatically applicable to the adopted statute. Whether a particular former statute is merely referred to or incorporated is a question, which has to be decided from case to case. 10. The legislation by referential incorporation falls into two categories: Where reference is made to the provision applicable as at the time of adoption and where reference is made to the law concerning a particular subject. In the case of the former, the subsequent amendments do not automatically apply while in the case of later category, subsequent amendments also become applicable without any further adoption. To this effect law has been succinctly laid down in Bajaya, supra as follows:- 26. Broadly speaking, legislation by referential incorporation falls in two categories: First, where a statute by specific reference incorporates the provisions of another statute as the time of adoption. Second, where a statute incorporates by general reference the law concerning a particular subject, as a genus. In the case of the former, the subsequent amendments made in the referred statute cannot automatically be read into the adopting statute. In the case of latter category, it may be presumed that the legislative intent was to include all the subsequent amendments also made from time to time in the generic law on the subject adopted by general reference. This principle of construction of a reference statute has been neatly summed up by Sutherland thus: A statute which refers to the law of a subject generally adopts the law on the subject as of the time the law is invoked. This will include all the amendments and modifications of the law subsequent to the time the reference statute was enacted. Corpus Juris Secundum also enunciates the same principle in these terms: .....Where the reference in an adopting statute is to the law generally which governs the particular subject, and not to any specific statute or part thereof,.... This will include all the amendments and modifications of the law subsequent to the time the reference statute was enacted. Corpus Juris Secundum also enunciates the same principle in these terms: .....Where the reference in an adopting statute is to the law generally which governs the particular subject, and not to any specific statute or part thereof,.... the reference will be held to include the law as it stands at the time it is sought to be applied, with all the changes made from time to time, at least as far as the changes are consistent with the purpose of the adopting statute. 11. In the present case, as is shown by Notification in question, incorporation was only of rules as applicable on 21.01.1972, thereby making it clear that subsequent amendments will not be automatically applicable. Accordingly, we are of the view amendment to the CCS(CC&A) Rules in the year 2003 will not automatically become applicable to the State of Tripura. 12. The question referred to will stand answered accordingly. 13. Even if the amended rule providing for automatic cessation of suspension after three months is not applicable, the principle of fairness requires speedy conclusion of a departmental enquiry and if the departmental enquiry takes more time, continued suspension may be rendered invalid. We would have gone into this aspect of the matter but since learned counsel for the petitioner states that the suspension has been revoked, no further order is necessary. The writ petition will accordingly stand disposed of.