Usha Rajan v. Joint Director of School Education, (Higher Secondary), Chennai
2012-07-19
K.CHANDRU
body2012
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- 1. The petitioner has filed the writ petition, seeking to cancel the appointment given in favour of the 5th respondent as P.G.Assistant (English) in the 4th respondent school and for a further direction to respondents 1 to 4 to appoint the petitioner as P.G.Assistant (English) as per the Rules. 2. The writ petition was admitted on 24.10.2008. Pending the writ petition, the application for interim injunction was dismissed. 3. On notice from this Court, 4th respondent has filed a counter affidavit dated 01.12.2008. The 5th respondent has also filed a counter affidavit dated 25.06.2012. 4. The case of the petitioner was that she is already working as Graduate Teacher in English in the 4th respondent school and she has been working since June 1982. The post of P.G.Assistant fell vacant on 31.07.2008 due to the retirement of one S.RajaSingh and she is the only eligible candidate for promotion in terms of the provisions of Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act and the Rules framed thereunder. But however, the school Management promoted one Mrs.Cecilia, Computer Teacher, the 5th respondent herein appointed by the Management under the Management category as PG Teacher on 01.08.2008. Since the petitioner was the senior most person, she ought to have been promoted as P.G.Assistant. In fact when vacancy for the post of P.G.Assistant arose, the Management gave an advertisement in the Deccan Chronicle on 21.06.2008 notifying that persons who were having both Basic and Master Degree in the English subject alone can apply thereby effectively prevented the petitioner from applying for the said post. She has already been working as B.T.Assistant (English) and taking classes in English. She also applied for the said post on 19.06.2008 requesting to consider her for promotion to the post of P.G.Assistant (English). 5. The petitioner has filed a writ petition before this Court being W.P.No.15408 of 2008 relying upon provisions of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act and the Rules framed thereunder, which prescribed the qualification as only Master's Degree in the concerned subject. When the said writ petition came up for hearing on 07.07.2008, noticing that the petitioner was allowed to attend the interview on 28.06.2008, no further orders were required and hence, the writ petition was dismissed as infructuous. 6.
When the said writ petition came up for hearing on 07.07.2008, noticing that the petitioner was allowed to attend the interview on 28.06.2008, no further orders were required and hence, the writ petition was dismissed as infructuous. 6. In that writ petition, the petitioner has raised the ground that she is the only qualified teacher working under the approved post and therefore, the Management cannot go for any direct recruitment and on that ground, the present writ petition is liable to be rejected. 7. Mr.C.Selvaraj, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Mr.P.Ganesan, counsel for the petitioner submitted that in so long as the school is having approved teachers, the Management is bound by Rule 15(4) of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools Regulation Rules, 1974 and they cannot go for any outside recruitment without getting prior approval of the competent authority. He also placed reliance on an order passed by the Madurai Bench of this Court in W.P(MD)No.1317 of 2008 dated 28.01.2011 [Judes Rosila Alex v. The District Educational Officer, Nagercoil]. The learned Senior Counsel contended that the said judgment will squarely apply to the facts on hand. As to the whether the minority school is bound to seek prior approval before filling up the vacancy and whether it is offending the right under Article 30(1) of the Constitution, he referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (2010) 1 SCC 133 [Kolawana Gram Vikas Kendra v. State of Gujarat and others].The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the 4th respondent school is not a minority school as they have not got any declaration under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. 8. In the counter affidavit filed by the 3rd respondent viz., Inspector of Anglo Indian Schools, it was stated that the school is a minority school and it is prerogative of the Management to issue advertisement calling for candidates based upon the requirement under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act and the Rules framed thereunder. It was further stated that language teachers should have the same subject both in their undergraduate and Post Graduate degree. 9. In the counter affidavit filed by the 4th respondent, it was stated that the school is declared as a minority school.
It was further stated that language teachers should have the same subject both in their undergraduate and Post Graduate degree. 9. In the counter affidavit filed by the 4th respondent, it was stated that the school is declared as a minority school. It was also stated that in the earlier writ petition viz W.P.No.15408 of 2008, the petitioner has challenged the said recruitment and that writ petition was dismissed as infructuos in view of the fact that the petitioner was permitted to attend the interview. Therefore, the question of the petitioner re-agitating the matter will not arise as her case was already considered by this Court. The petitioner neither chose to file any appeal against the said order nor retain the writ petition for further agitating the matter. Hence, she is estopped from raising the very same grounds. It was further stated that Selection Committee was constituted to select the candidates for the post of PG Assistant (English). The proceedings of the Selection Committee was placed before the Executive committee of the 4th respondent school on 30.07.2008 and the Executive Committee appointed the 5th respondent. On the allegation that one of the member of the Executive Committee is related to the 5th respondent, it was stated that he was kept out in the whole selection process and he was not involved in the selection process at any stage. The appointment was made on grounds of merit and hence, the petitioner's seniority alone cannot be considered as a relevant ground. 10. In the counter affidavit filed by the 5th respondent, she has stated that she is also working in the said school and had completed basic and PG degree in English. She has also completed her M.Phil in Engish. She has got additional qualification of P.G.Diploma in Computer Applications. She had worked as English Teacher at St.John's Matric Higher Secondary School for a period of two years. In the interview, there were three eligible candidates and the interview committee selected the 5th respondent. The petitioner having gone through the selection cannot challenge the selection criteria. The school was also declared as minority school run by the CSI Diocese of Madras. It was also stated that she is the sole breadwinner of the family and has got two children. 11. The petitioner has filed a re-joinder dated Nil April 2010 contending that the respondents cannot escape from the rigor of Rule 15(4).
The school was also declared as minority school run by the CSI Diocese of Madras. It was also stated that she is the sole breadwinner of the family and has got two children. 11. The petitioner has filed a re-joinder dated Nil April 2010 contending that the respondents cannot escape from the rigor of Rule 15(4). 12. Dr.Fr.A.Xavir Arulraj, learned counsel for the 4th respondent submitted that the school need not get a separate declaration since the Director of School Education has listed the Educational Agencies, which are admittedly minority institutions. In this context, he placed reliance upon the following two judgments of this Court:- i) The Correspondent St.Ignatius Higher Secondary School Kurumbanai v. Direction of School Education [ 1999 (1) CTC 121 ] ii) The Secretary, D.G.Vaishnav College, Arumbakkam v. Dr.T.Venkataraman Reader and Head, Post-Graduate and Research and others ( 2001 (4) CTC 641 ) 13. Hefurther submitted that the petitioner having participated in the earlier interview cannot turn back and challenge the selection method and for this context, he relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 2008 (2) Supreme 328 [Dhananjay Malik and others v. State of Uttaranchal and Others]and relied on the following passages found in paragraphs 7 and 8:-: "7.It is not disputed that the respondent-writ petitioners herein participated in the process of selection knowing fully well that the educational qualification was clearly indicated in the advertisement itself as BPE or graduate with diploma in Physical Education. Having unsuccessfully participated in the process of selection without any demur they are estopped from challenging the selection criterion inter alia that the advertisement and selection with regard to requisite educational qualifications were contrary to the Rules. 8.In Madan Lal v. State of J&K4 this Court pointed out that when the petitioners appeared at the oral interview conducted by the members concerned of the Commission who interviewed the petitioners as well as the contesting respondents concerned, the petitioners took a chance to get themselves selected at the said oral interview. Therefore, only because they did not find themselves to have emerged successful as a result of their combined performance both at written test and oral interview, they have filed writ petitions.
Therefore, only because they did not find themselves to have emerged successful as a result of their combined performance both at written test and oral interview, they have filed writ petitions. This Court further pointed out that if a candidate takes a calculated chance and appears at the interview, then, only because the result of the interview is not palatable to him, he cannot turn round and subsequently contend that the process of interview was unfair or the Selection Committee was not properly constituted. In the present case, as already pointed out, the respondent-writ petitioners herein participated in the selection process without any demur; they are estopped from complaining that the selection process was not in accordance with the Rules. If they think that the advertisement and selection process were not in accordance with the Rules they could have challenged the advertisement and selection process without participating in the selection process. This has not been done." 14. On the question of application of Rule 15(4), he again referred to the following judgments:- i) A.Belavendran v. The Joint Director of School Education (W.A.No.556 of 2008 dated 27.07.2009) ii) Eka Ratchagar Sabai Higher Secondary School v. K.Sumathi (2007-4-L.W.617) iii) M.Siluvi Rajan v. Director of School Education (2000 (III) CTC 242) iv) St.Mary's Higher Secondary School, Karaikal v. The Union of India, rep. By its Secretary to Government (2000 Writ L.R. 51) v) L. Paulraj v. The District Educational Officer, Tanjore (1991 Writ L.R.501) 15. However, it is unnecessary to go into the application of Rule 15(4) in the matter of filling up of any post in a minority school in this case. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner had earlier challenged an advertisement given by the Management before this Court and she was called for interview during the penendcy of the writ petition. Thereafter, the writ petition itself was dismissed has having become infructuous thereby the petitioner had abandoned her challenge to the main attack namely that the schoos cannot recruit any person from outside including unapproved staff without considering the claims of qualified staff in the school. It is not as if she had not raised these grounds in the earlier writ petition in W.P.No.15408 of 2008. Having raised an issue but did not pursue the course, the said matter cannot be re-agitated once again in the subsequent wit petition. 16.
It is not as if she had not raised these grounds in the earlier writ petition in W.P.No.15408 of 2008. Having raised an issue but did not pursue the course, the said matter cannot be re-agitated once again in the subsequent wit petition. 16. In such circumstances, the earlier order will operate against the petitioner in terms of the underlying principles of Order II Rule 2 CPC. That provision of CPC will also apply to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In this context, the Supreme Court vide its judgment in Executive Engineer, ZP Engg.Divn. and another v. Digambara Rao and others reported in (2004) 8 SCC 262 , in paragraphs 15 and 16 held as follows:- "15. ...The respondents, therefore, while filing the writ petition were bound to lay their whole claim having regard to the provisions contained in Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure or the principles analogous thereto. The very basis upon which the writ petitions were based was found to be incorrect. It was, thus, obligatory on the part of the respondents herein to question their orders of termination upon placing correct facts before the High Court. They did not choose to do so. They did not pray for and obtain any leave of the Court to raise the contention about the legality or otherwise of the orders of termination before an appropriate forum. Furthermore, their plea to the effect that they were entitled to continue in service was specifically rejected. In that view of the matter, the proceedings initiated before the Labour Court questioning the orders of termination passed against them by the appellants praying for their reinstatement with full back wages, in our opinion, were wholly misconceived. Such a plea was barred under the principles of res judicata. It is now well settled that the general principle of res judicata applies to an industrial adjudication. 16. In P.Kulothungan this Court held: (SCC p.72. 11) "11. The principle of res judicata operates on the court. It is the courts which are prohibited from tying the issue which was directly and substantially in issue in the earlier proceedings between the same parties, provided the court trying the subsequent proceeding is satisfied that the earlier court was competent to dispose of the earlier proceedings and that the matter had been heard and finally decided by such court.
It is the courts which are prohibited from tying the issue which was directly and substantially in issue in the earlier proceedings between the same parties, provided the court trying the subsequent proceeding is satisfied that the earlier court was competent to dispose of the earlier proceedings and that the matter had been heard and finally decided by such court. Here the parties to the writ petition filed by the respondent in the Madras High Court and the industrial dispute were the same. The cause of action in both was the refusal of the appellant to allow the respondent to rejoin service. The Madras High Court was competent to decide the issue which it did with a reasoned order on merits and after a contested hearing. This was not a case where the earlier proceedings had been disposed of on any technical ground as was the case in Workmen v. Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust and Pujari Bai v. Madan Gopal. The 'lesser relief' of reinstatement which was the subject-matter of the industrial dispute had already been claimed by the respondent in the writ petition. This was refused by the High Court. The correctness of the decision in the writ proceedings has not been challenged by the respondent. The decision was, therefore, final. Having got an adverse order in the writ petition, it was not open to the respondent to reagitate the issue before the Labour Court and the Labour Court was incompetent to entertain the dispute raised by the respondent and redecide the matter in the face of the earlier decision of the High Court in the writ proceedings". 17. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to go into the other contentions raised by the petitioner. It is suffice to state the petitioner having chosen to challenge the said selection in the earlier round of litigation and having been called for interview had abandoned the previous proceedings and hence, she cannot be allowed to raise the issue all over again. The writ petition will thus stand dismissed. No costs.