Judgment 1. The petitioner has filed the present contempt petition seeking to punish the respondents for having disobeyed the order passed by this Court in Application No.3458 of 2002 in C.S.No.326 of 2002 dated 06.09.2002. 2. When the contempt petition came up on 16.12.2003, neither the respondents nor their counsel was present. Hence, bailable warrant was issued. Subsequently, on an application being made, the warrant was re-called on 22.12.2003. 3. On notice from this Court, a counter affidavit dated 04.03.2004 was filed by respondents. 4. By the order of which contempt arose, this Court directed the respondents to restore stock of diamonds measuring 3640.65 Cts of the value of Rs.2,59,13,256/-as on 31.07.2000, reported vide their letter dated 03.07.2001 to have been given to the panch, at their office at No.143, Eldams Road, Teynampet, Chennai and report the same to the petitioner. 5. In the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, it was stated that they have cooperated with the bank and sold the goods rejected by the foreign buyer at a substantial loss only because the petitioner had advanced money. As a matter of fact, most of the goods were not paid by the foreign buyers. The petitioner was fully aware of the removal of goods that were hypothecated for various purposes such as polishing, showing samples and safe keeping and they were also permitted to market and sell them. The petitioner was also aware that the stocks were not with the respondents as already set out in the written statement. Even as early as February 2001, the petitioner was aware that the stocks were not available and there were no stock statement with them from October/November 2000 as the goods were sent for cutting and polishing to Buch and other places and were also being exported at that time. The goods were not in their control as early as February/April 2001 and several officials of the petitioner Bank were also aware of the same. They have incurred huge loss in their business and have given lot of security to the Bank and they are willing to sell the properties and pay back the dues to the Bank. It was further stated that they have not removed any stock after the order was passed by this Court. They have incurred huge loss in their business and have given lot of security to the Bank and they are willing to sell the properties and pay back the dues to the Bank. It was further stated that they have not removed any stock after the order was passed by this Court. The only difficulty was that they were not able to put back the stocks as this Court has directed them to do due to the circumstances beyond their control. The allegation that they had removed the stocks just few days before filing of the suit and it has been secreted somewhere was denied. The stocks were removed in the usual course of business which was permitted and it is not a case where the stocks were under pledge with the Bank and they had clandestinely removed it. The removal was done in the usual course of business and with the knowledge of the Bank. Even at the time of stock audit, which was as early as February 2001, the stocks were not available. 6. In the affidavit filed by Ketan A.Shah, it was stated that he had given a proposal to the Bank that he was willing to pay Rs.50 lakhs towards full and final settlement of all their dues. He had also furnished a cheque for Rs.5 lakhs, which the bank can encash if it accepts his proposal in full and final settlement of all claims. 7. In the light of these facts, it is not a case where respondents can be punished for contempt. In this context, it is necessary to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Iqbal Khanday v. Abdul Majid Rather reported in (1994) 4 SCC 34 , wherein the Supreme Court has held that impossibility of performance can be a legitimate defence in the contempt petition. The following passages found in paragraphs 14 to 16 of the said judgment may be usefully reproduced below: "14.) The law of contempt is based on sound public policy by punishing any conduct which shakes the public confidence in the administration of justice. The order dated 21-9-1992 while directing notice also required the appellant to accord promotion to the respondent as Associate Professor. It requires to be noticed here that is the main prayer in the writ petition itself. The order dated 21-9-1992 while directing notice also required the appellant to accord promotion to the respondent as Associate Professor. It requires to be noticed here that is the main prayer in the writ petition itself. In such circumstances, the correctness of such an interim order is open to serious doubt. For a moment, it is not to be understood that the court has no power to pass such an order but the question is whether while granting such interim reliefs the discretion of the court has been correctly exercised? If the writ petition is ultimately dismissed, the respondent would have gained an undue advantage of getting a promotion undeservedly. But we are not on the merits of the interim order. 15.) Right or wrong, the order has been passed. Normally speaking, it cannot be gainsaid that the order ought to have been obeyed but it appears that there are insuperable difficulties in implementing the order. First is that the post of Associate Professor, according to the respondent, is a selection post. Secondly, the mere seniority, even if that is assured in favour of the respondent, would not be enough to gain such a promotion. Thirdly, the specific order of the Government was to exclude the period of deputation on foreign assignment from reckoning the duration of the teaching experience of the respondent. Therefore, the respondent did not possess the requisite qualification. Fourthly, such necessary qualifications seem to be mandatory under the rules. That being the position to accord such a promotion, will be violative of the rules. Fifthly, the promotion could be granted only by the Public Service Commission and not by the appellant. 16.) From the above, it appears that the appellant was expressing his genuine difficulties with regard to the implementation of the order dated 21-9-1992. In such a situation the insistence of the courts on implementation may not square with realities of the situation and the practicability of implementation of the court?s direction. In our considered view, hooking a party to contempt proceedings and enforcing obedience to such orders hardly lends credence to judicial process and authority; more so, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. In our considered view, hooking a party to contempt proceedings and enforcing obedience to such orders hardly lends credence to judicial process and authority; more so, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. The court must always be zealous in preserving its authority and dignity but at the same time it will be inadvisable to require compliance of an order impossible of compliance at the instance of the person proceeding against for contempt. Practically, what the court by means of the contempt proceedings seeks is an execution which cannot meet with our approval." 8. In view of the above, the contempt petition stands dismissed.