JUDGMENT 1. These appeals are directed against judgment dated 19-1-2004 passed by 4th Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Bastar at Jagdalpur in Sessions Trial No. 382/2003, whereby the appellants have been convicted and sentenced in the following manner: Appellant Budhram Conviction Sentence Under Section 307/34 IPC Rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo imprisonment for 6 months. Appellant Doomar Conviction Sentence Under Section 307/34 IPC Rigorous imprisonment for 3 years and to pay fine of Rs. 200/-, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo imprisonment for 2 months. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is as under :- On 4-6-2003, at about 11:30 P.M., injured Dharam Singh (PW-2), after taking his meals, was sleeping in the courtyard situated in front of his house. His wife Subhadra (PW-3) was sleeping inside the house along with their daughter. At about 1:30 A.M., Subhadra (PW-3) heard murmuring of her husband Dharam Singh (PW-2). She woke up and came out of the house. She saw that Dharam Singh (PW-2) was injured. He sustained injuries in his mouth and neck and blood was oozing out. Subhadra (PW-3) called the neighbourers and informed about the incident to the police station telephonically. Subhadra (PW3) took Dharam Singh (PW-2) to Police Station Bodhghat and lodged First Information Report (Ex.P-6) there. Dharam Singh (PW-2) was sent to Maharani Hospital, Jagdalpur for medical examination vide Ex.P-7. Dr. K.M. Gupta (PW-1) examined Dharam Singh (PW-2) and gave his report (Ex.P-1), in which, he found- (i) incised wound, 7 X 2 cm on the right angle of mouth going downwards, blood clot was present, (ii) incised wound, 4 X 1 X ½ cm on left side of the neck, (iii) incised wound, 3 X ½ cm, skin deep on the neck beneath thyroid cartilage, (iv) incised wound, 6 X ½, skin deep neat injury number (iii). He advised for X-Ray and injured Dharam Singh (PW-2) was referred to Surgical and ENT Specialist for further treatment. Dr. K.C. Meshram (PW-8) took out X-Ray of Dharam Singh (PW-2) and gave his report (Ex.P-5), in which, he found fracture on lower jaw. In further investigation, plain soil and blood stained soil were seized vide Ex.P-9. Spot map (Ex.P-10) was prepared Memorandum statement of appellant Budhram was recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act vide Ex.P-11. Dr. K.C. Meshram (PW-8) took out X-Ray of Dharam Singh (PW-2) and gave his report (Ex.P-5), in which, he found fracture on lower jaw. In further investigation, plain soil and blood stained soil were seized vide Ex.P-9. Spot map (Ex.P-10) was prepared Memorandum statement of appellant Budhram was recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act vide Ex.P-11. A Kadari (Chhoori) was seized at the instance of appellant Budhram vide Ex.P-12. The seized articles were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur for chemical examination vide Ex.P-15. Report was received there from. After completion of the investigation, charge sheet was filed against the appellants in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jagdalpur, who, in turn, committed the case to the Court of Session, Jagdalpur, from where, it was received on transfer by 4th Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Bastar at Jagdalpur, who, conducted the trial and convicted and sentenced the appellants as mentioned above. 3. Shri Praffull Bharat and Shri Suryakant Mishra, learned counsel for the appellants, argued that evidence of Dharam Singh (PW-2) is full of contradictions. Subhadra (PW-3) and Sahadai (PW-6) did not witness the incident and they did not state anything against the appellants. They further argued that the origin of blood group is not mentioned in the FSL Report. Therefore, the conviction recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge against the appellants is not sustainable and the appellants deserve to be acquitted. 4. On the contrary, Shri R.R. Sinha, learned Panel Lawyer for the State/respondent, supporting the impugned judgment, submitted that the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellants do not warrant any interference by this Court. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have also perused the material available on record with utmost circumspection. Conviction of the appellants is based on the evidence of injured Dharam Singh (PW-2). 6. In Takdir Samsuddin Sheikh Vs. State of Gujarat and another AIR 2012 SC 37 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows: "10. ......... The submissions advanced in this respect had been that Shri Bharat Rajendraprasad Trivedi (PW-1) being a partner in the Firm would be beneficiary in the transaction of land involved herein in case one partner had been eliminated and other partner landed in jail. ......... The submissions advanced in this respect had been that Shri Bharat Rajendraprasad Trivedi (PW-1) being a partner in the Firm would be beneficiary in the transaction of land involved herein in case one partner had been eliminated and other partner landed in jail. Such an argument is not acceptable for two reasons: (i) While appreciating the evidence of witness considering him as the interested witness, the court must bear in mind that the term 'interested' postulates that the witness must have some direct interest in having the accused somehow or the other convicted for some other reason. (ii) This Court has consistently held that as a general rule the Court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872. But if there are doubts about the testimony, the court will insist on corroboration. In fact, it is not the number, the quantity, but the quality that is material. The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy or otherwise. The legal system has laid emphasis on value, weight and quality of evidence rather than on quantity, multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It is, therefore, open to a competent court to fully and completely rely on a solitary witness and record conviction. Conversely, it may acquit the accused in spite of testimony of several witnesses if it is not satisfied about the quality of evidence.........” 7. In Brahm Swaroop and another Vs. State of U.P. AIR 2011 SC 280 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: "22. Where a witness to the occurrence has himself been injured in the incident, the testimony of such a witness is generally considered to be very reliable, as he is a witness that comes with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone. “Convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured witness”.........” 8. In Ranjit Singh and others Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 2011 SC 255 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: "17. ..........."........... “Convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured witness”.........” 8. In Ranjit Singh and others Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 2011 SC 255 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: "17. ..........."........... under the Indian Evidence Act, trustworthy evidence given by a single witness would be enough to convict an accused person, whereas evidence given by half a dozen witnesses which is not trustworthy would not be enough to sustain the conviction. That, no doubt is true; but where a criminal court has to deal with evidence pertaining to the commission of an offence involving a large number of offenders and a large number of victims, it is usual to adopt the test that the conviction could be sustained only if it is supported by two or three or more witnesses who give a consistent account of the incident. In a sense, the test may be described as mechanical; but it is difficult to see how it can be treated as irrational or unreasonable. 18. In Muthu Naicker and ors. vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1978 SC 1647 , this Court explained the aforesaid judgment by stating that in a situation where a witness has been attacked by the members of an unlawful assembly composed of a large number of persons, the Court should carefully consider the question of the credibility of such a witness. Where the Court is of the view that the testimony of such a witness is in the facts and circumstances of the case not reliable, it should insist that such testimony be corroborated by one or more other witness before it can be accepted by the Court. 19. ..........“There is no rule of evidence that no conviction can be based unless a certain minimum number of witnesses have identified a particular accused as a member of the unlawful assembly. It is axiomatic that evidence is not to be counted but only weighed and it is not the quantity of evidence but the quality that matters. Even the testimony of one single witness, if wholly reliable, is sufficient to establish the identification of an accused as a member of an unlawful assembly. All the same when the size of the unlawful assembly is quite large (as in this case) and many persons would have witnessed the incident. ........" 9. In Mano Dutt and another Vs. Even the testimony of one single witness, if wholly reliable, is sufficient to establish the identification of an accused as a member of an unlawful assembly. All the same when the size of the unlawful assembly is quite large (as in this case) and many persons would have witnessed the incident. ........" 9. In Mano Dutt and another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2012) 4 SCC 79 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows: "30. Normally, an injured witness would enjoy greater credibility because he is the sufferer himself and thus, there will be no occasion for such a person to state an incorrect version of the occurrence, or to involve anybody falsely and in the bargain protect the real culprit. We need not discuss more elaborately the weight-age that should be attached by the Court to the testimony of an injured witness. In fact, this aspect of criminal jurisprudence is no more res integra, as has been consistently stated by this Court in uniform language. 31. We may merely refer to Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P., (2010) 10 SCC 259 , where this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 271-72, paras 28-30) "28. The question of the weight to be attached to the evidence of a witness that was himself injured in the course of the occurrence has been extensively discussed by this Court. Where a witness to the occurrence has himself been injured in the incident, the testimony of such a witness is generally considered to be very reliable, as he is a witness that comes with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone. Where a witness to the occurrence has himself been injured in the incident, the testimony of such a witness is generally considered to be very reliable, as he is a witness that comes with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone. Convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured witness.' [Vide Ramlagan Singh v. State of Bihar, (1973) 3 SCC 881 , Malkhan Singh v. State of U.P., (1975) 3 SCC 311 , Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 3 SCC 470 , Appabhai v. State of Gujarat, 1988 Supp SCC 241, Bonkya v. State of Maharashtra, (1995) 6 SCC 447 , Bhag Singh v. State of Punjab, (1997) 7 SCC 712 , Mohar v. State of U.P., (2002) 7 SCC 606 (SCC p. 606b-c), Dinesh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, (2008) 8 SCC 270 , Vishnu v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 10 SCC 477 , Annareddy Sambasiva Reddy v. State of A.P., (2009) 12 SCC 546 and Balraje v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 6 SCC 673 ).] 29. While deciding this issue, a similar view was taken in Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719 , where this Court reiterated the special evidentiary status accorded to the testimony of an injured accused and relying on its earlier judgments held as under: (SCC pp. 726-27, paras 28-29) ‘28. Darshan Singh (PW 4) was an injured witness. He had been examined by the doctor. His testimony could not be brushed aside lightly. He had given full details of the incident as he was present at the time when the assailants reached the tubewell. In Shivalingappa Kallayanappa v. State of Karnataka, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 235, this Court has held that the deposition of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies, for the reason that his presence on the scene stands established in case it is proved that he suffered the injury during the said incident. 29. In State of U.P. v. Kishan Chand, (2004) 7 SCC 629 , a similar view has been reiterated observing that the testimony of a stamped witness has its own relevance and efficacy. 29. In State of U.P. v. Kishan Chand, (2004) 7 SCC 629 , a similar view has been reiterated observing that the testimony of a stamped witness has its own relevance and efficacy. The fact that the witness sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence, lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. In case the injured witness is subjected to lengthy cross-examination and nothing can be elicited to discard his testimony, it should be relied upon (vide Krishan v. State of Haryana, (2006) 12 SCC 459 ). Thus, we are of the considered opinion that evidence of Darshan Singh (PW 4) has rightly been relied upon by the courts below. 30. The law on the point can be summarized to the effect that the testimony of the injured witness is accorded a special status in law. This is as a consequence of the fact that the injury to the witness is an inbuilt guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and because the witness will not want to let his actual assailant go unpunished merely to falsely implicate a third party for the commission of the offence. Thus, the deposition of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein." 10. Dharam Singh (PW-2) deposed that on the date of incident, at about 6:00 P.M., he was in his house. The appellants came to his house and demanded for meat of cock. He told the appellants that the meat was not cooked and asked them to come after sometime. He further deposed that after ½ hours, he called his wife Subhadra (PW-3). Instead of Subhadra (PW-3), appellant Budhram replied. Then he asked Budhram where was his wife? Appellant Budhram started to quarrel with him. He further deposed that he slapped appellant Budhram twice. He further deposed that at about 11:30 P.M., the appellants again came to his house. At that time, he was sleeping outside of his house. Appellant Doomar caught him and appellant Budhram assaulted him with Chakoo. He sustained injuries on his mouth and neck. He was murmuring. Thereafter, the appellants fled from there. On being heard his murmuring, his wife Subhadra (PW-3) and daughter Sahadai (PW-6) came there. Wife of appellant Doomar also came there to see him. Appellant Doomar caught him and appellant Budhram assaulted him with Chakoo. He sustained injuries on his mouth and neck. He was murmuring. Thereafter, the appellants fled from there. On being heard his murmuring, his wife Subhadra (PW-3) and daughter Sahadai (PW-6) came there. Wife of appellant Doomar also came there to see him. He further deposed that Subhadra (PW-3) took him to police station. Police sent him to Jagdalpur hospital for medical examination, from where, he was referred to Raipur Hospital. 11. Subhadra (PW-3) and Sahadai (PW-6) deposed that Dharam Singh (PW-2) returned to his house in the evening. Subhadra (PW-3) cooked food. The appellants came to their house and asked for vegetables. They further deposed that Dharam Singh (PW-2) told the appellants that the meal was not cooked and asked them to come after sometime. They further deposed that after 1½ hours, Dharam Singh (PW-2) called Subhadra (PW-3), on which, appellant Budhram replied. They further deposed that Dharam Singh (PW-2) asked appellant Budhram where was his wife? Appellant Budhram started to quarrel with Dharam Singh (PW-2). They further deposed that Dharam Singh (PW-2) slapped appellant Budhram twice. 12. Subhadra (PW-3) and Sahadai (PW-6) deposed that having heard the murmuring of Dharam Singh (PW-2), they reached where Dharam Singh (PW-2) was sleeping. They saw that Dharam Singh (PW-2) sustained injury on the neck. Subhadra (PW-3) deposed that she informed to police station and police sent Dharam Singh (PW-2) to hospital for medical examination. 13. ASI S.L. Sinha (PW-9) deposed that he sent Dharam Singh (PW-2) to Maharani Hospital Jagdalpur for medical examination vide Ex.P-7. He further deposed that Subhadra (PW-3) lodged the FIR (Ex.P-6). Dr. K.N. Gupta (PW-1) deposed that he examined Dharam Singh (PW-2) and gave his report (Ex.P-2), in which, he found i) incised wound, 7 X 2cm on the right angle of mouth going downwards and blood clot was present, ii) incised wound, 4 X 1 X ½cm on left side of the neck, iii) incised wound, 3 X ½cm, skin deep on the neck beneath thyroid cartilage and iv) incised wound, 6 X ½, skin deep near injury number (iii). He advised for X-Ray and injured was referred to Surgical and ENT Specialist for further treatment. Dr. K.C. Meshram (PW-8) deposed that he took out X-Ray and gave his report (Ex.P-5), in which, he found fracture on lower jaw. 14. He advised for X-Ray and injured was referred to Surgical and ENT Specialist for further treatment. Dr. K.C. Meshram (PW-8) deposed that he took out X-Ray and gave his report (Ex.P-5), in which, he found fracture on lower jaw. 14. The date and time of the incident was 4-6-2003, at about 11:30 P.M. and the FIR (Ex.P-6) was lodged on 5-6-2003 at 2:10 A.M., i.e., within 3 hours. It appears that the FIR (Ex.P-6) was lodged without delay. 15. I have carefully perused the evidence of Dharam Singh (PW-2). He specifically deposed that on the date of incident, the appellants came his house and appellant Doomar caught him and appellant Budhram assaulted him with Chakoo (Chhura). Subhadra (PW-3) and Sahadai (PW-6) deposed that having heard the murmuring of Dharam Singh (PW-2), they woke up and reached near Dharam Singh (PW-2). They saw Dharam Singh (PW -2) in injured condition. Their evidence are corroborated by medical evidence. From the above, it is apparent that the testimonies of Dharam Singh (PW-2) and Subhadra (PW-3) are reliable and cogent. 16. Now, we shall consider whether there was any common intention on the part of the appellants and in furtherance thereof, they caused injuries to Dharam Singh (PW-2)? 17. It is well known that to establish the common intention of several persons so as to attract provisions of Section 34 IPC, the following two fundamental facts have to be established: (i) common intention to commit an offence and (ii) participation of the accused in commission of the offence. To attract Section 34 IPC, it is not necessary that each one of the accused persons must assault the deceased. It is enough if it is shown that they shared common intention to commit the offence in furtherance thereof and each one played his assigned role by doing separate acts, similar or diverse. Section 34 IPC is applicable even if no injury has been caused by the particular accused himself. For applying Section 34 IPC, it is not necessary to show some overt act on the part of the accused. 18. In Rangnath Sharma Vs. Satendra Sharma and others (2008) 12 SCC 259 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows: “21. Section 34 IPC is applicable even if no injury has been caused by the particular accused himself. For applying Section 34 IPC, it is not necessary to show some overt act on the part of the accused. 18. In Rangnath Sharma Vs. Satendra Sharma and others (2008) 12 SCC 259 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows: “21. In order to bring home the charge of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or meeting of minds of all the accused persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with the aid of Section 34, be it prearranged or on the spur of the moment; but it must necessarily be before the commission of the crime. The true concept of the section is that if two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly, the position in law is just the same as if each of them has done it individually by himself. The existence of a common intention amongst the participants in a crime is the essential element for application of this section. It is not necessary that the acts of the several persons charged with commission of an offence jointly must be the same or identically similar. The acts may be different in character, but must have been actuated by one and the same common intention pervading amongst all accused in order to attract the provision. Section 34 is applicable even if no injury has been caused by the particular accused himself. For applying Section 34, it is not necessary to show some specific overt act on the part of the accused, when it is shown that there was common intention and meeting of mind. 22. In Ram Tahal v. State of U.P., (1972) 1 SCC 136 , it has been laid down as under: (SCC p. 140, para 5) "5. ... There is no doubt that a common intention should be anterior in time to the commission of the crime showing a prearranged plan and prior concert, and though, it is difficult in most cases to prove the intention of an individual it has to be inferred from the act or conduct or other relevant circumstances of the case. ... There is no doubt that a common intention should be anterior in time to the commission of the crime showing a prearranged plan and prior concert, and though, it is difficult in most cases to prove the intention of an individual it has to be inferred from the act or conduct or other relevant circumstances of the case. This inference can be gathered by the manner in which the accused arrived on the scene and mounted the attack, the determination and concert with which the beating was given or the injuries, caused by one or some of them, the acts done by others to assist those causing the injuries the concerted conduct subsequent to the commission of the offence for instance that all of them had left the scene of the incident together and other acts which all or some may have done as would help in determining the common intention. In other words, the totality of the circumstances must be taken into consideration in arriving at the conclusion whether the accused had a common intention to commit an offence with which they could be convicted. This Court had in Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 1413 , already referred to earlier, held that the prearranged plan may develop on the spot during the course of the commission of the offence but the crucial circumstance is that the said plan must precede the act constituting the offence. If that be so before a court convicts a person under Section 302 or 304, read with Section 34 IPC, it should come to a definite conclusion that the said person had a prior concert with one or more persons named or unnamed for committing the offence." 19. In the instant case, the appellants came to the house of Dharam Singh (PW-2). At that time, appellant Budhram was armed with Chakoo and abused Dharam Singh (PW-2) and appellant Doomar caught him and thereafter appellant Budhram assaulted Dharam Singh (PW-2) with Chakoo, in which, Dharam Singh (PW-2) sustained injuries on his mouth and neck. The role played by the appellants was with a view to achieve the ultimate objective of assaulting Dharam Singh (PW-2). 20. Now, it is to be seen whether the offence of the appellants is punishable under Section 307 IPC. 21. The role played by the appellants was with a view to achieve the ultimate objective of assaulting Dharam Singh (PW-2). 20. Now, it is to be seen whether the offence of the appellants is punishable under Section 307 IPC. 21. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that it is obvious from the statement of Dharam Singh (PW-2) itself that the quarrel had taken place between him and the appellants. Dr. K.N. Gupta (PW-1) did not depose that the injuries were dangerous to life. The prosecution did not prove the nature of the injuries. Therefore, it appears that the injuries sustained by Dharam Singh (PW-2) were not dangerous to his life. The prosecution has not been able to prove that the injuries sustained by Dharam Singh (PW-2) were fatal to his life, therefore, the offence of the appellants is punishable under Section 324 IPC. The appellant Budhram remained in jail from 7-6-2003 to 30-7-2004, i.e., I year 1 month 23 days and appellant Doomar remained in jail from 23-62003 to 18-3-2004, i.e., 8 months 25 days. The ends of justice would be met if the appellants are sentenced for the period already undergone by them. 22. Shri R.R. Sinha, learned Panel Lawyer for the State opposed the above arguments. 23. In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Kedar Yadav (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 1008, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows: "12. To justify a conviction under this section, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in which the culprit would be liable under this section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. What the court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some over act in execution thereof. 13. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. Therefore, an accused charged under Section 307 IPC cannot be acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt." 24. To constitute an offence under Section 307 IPC, the following ingredients of the offence must be present : (a) An intention or knowledge relating to commission of murder and (b) doing of an act towards it. For the purpose of Section 307 IPC, what is material is the intention or knowledge, and not the consequence of the actual act done for the purpose of carrying out the intention. The section clearly contemplates an act which is done with the intention of causing death but which fails to bring about intended consequence on account of initiation on account of intervening circumstances. The intention or knowledge of the cause must be such as a necessary to constitute murder. In the absence of intention or knowledge which is necessary ingredient of Section 307 IPC, there can be no offence of attempt to murder. 25. Dharam Singh (PW-2) deposed that on the date of incident, the appellants came to his house and some quarrel took place between him and appellant Budhram. Thereafter, at about 11:30 P.M., the appellants again came to his house. Appellant Doomar caught him and appellant Budhram assaulted him with Chakoo and gave Chakooblow on his mouth and neck. Dr. 25. Dharam Singh (PW-2) deposed that on the date of incident, the appellants came to his house and some quarrel took place between him and appellant Budhram. Thereafter, at about 11:30 P.M., the appellants again came to his house. Appellant Doomar caught him and appellant Budhram assaulted him with Chakoo and gave Chakooblow on his mouth and neck. Dr. K.N. Gupta (PW-1) examined Dharam Singh (PW-2) and found incised wounds on the neck and mouth and he referred him to Surgical and ENT Department. 26. In the instant case, it is established that on the date of incident, the appellants came to the house of Dharam Singh (PW-2) and some quarrel took place between him and appellant Budhram. Thereafter, at about 11:30 P.M., the appellants again came to the house of Dharam Singh (PW-2). Appellant Doomar caught Dharam Singh (PW-2) and appellant Budhram assaulted Dharam Singh (PW-2) with Chakoo and gave Chakoo blow on his mouth and neck. Therefore, offence of the appellants falls within the purview of Section 307 IPC. 27. For the foregoing reasons, the conviction of the appellants by the learned Additional Sessions Judge does not suffer from any infirmity. 28. So far as the sentence part is concerned, appellant Budhram has been sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for 10 years for the offence under Section 307/34 IPC. The incident happened in the year 2003. In view of this and in view of the injuries sustained by Dharam Singh (PW-2), I feel that the sentence of 10 years awarded to appellant Budhram is somewhat excessive. So far as sentence awarded to appellant Doomar is concerned, it is just and proper and does not call for any interference. 29. Therefore, I partly allow the appeal. The conviction awarded to the appellants under Section 307/34 IPC is upheld. The sentence awarded to appellant Doomar there under is also upheld. So far as the jail sentence awarded to appellant Budhram there under is concerned, it is reduced from 10 years to 5 years and so far as sentence of fine imposed upon him is concerned, it is affirmed. The appellants shall surrender before the trial Court forthwith to serve remaining part of jail sentence, if any. Appeal Partly Allowed.