Judgment :- 1. The petitioner challenges the award of the second respondent passed in I.D.No.131 of 2004 dated 03.02.2006. 2. The petitioner is a company engaged in the manufacture of Light Diesel Engines in its factory at Sipcot Industrial Estate, Ranipet. The petitioner informs that the first respondent was engaged as an operator in the Engine Assembly which comprises of 12 stages. At each of such stages, an operator fixes the components in the engine resulting in bringing out an assembled engine at the end of the assembly line. The petitioner informs as follows: The conveyor stops for preset intervals and moves from one stage to another. The conveyor is preset to stop for 3½ minutes at each stage for fixing of components. There are 6 stop switches at critical stages of the conveyor, which when switched on stops the conveyor for more than the preset time. The conveyor's motion is controlled by motors on two ends. The groove wheels of the conveyor on either side are moved by the motors. Each motor is covered by metal mesh on the sides with a hole near the axle of the motor for cleaning. The distance between the motor and the first stage of operation is about 1½ ft. The conveyor runs at a height of about 3½ ft. from the ground level and is about 1½ ft. in breadth. Below the conveyor there is a metal bed on which, components which slip from the hands of the operators would fall. The conveyor rests on metal girders and cross bars on both sides. Nothing of the size of a torque meter can travel on the bottom layer of the conveyor. 3. An occurrence of the conveyor belt breaking down took place at about 9.25 p.m. on 22.11.2002. A torque meter was found on the groove wheels of the motor which runs the conveyor, prior to the first stage. The first respondent was then engaged at the first stage. The petitioners contention is that since the torque meter, an equipment used for measuring the strength of bolts after fixation by the operators was found on the conveyor motor wheels next to the place where the first respondent was working, the first respondent was responsible for the said incident. The petitioner issued a charge memo to the first respondent on 29.11.2002 and placed him under suspension pending enquiry. The petitioner issued a charge memo to the first respondent on 29.11.2002 and placed him under suspension pending enquiry. The charges against the first respondent were under Clause 16(iv) and 16(v) of the certified Standing Orders of the petitioner company viz., "Clause 16(iv): Theft, fraud or dishonesty in connection with the Company's business or property or theft of another employee's property within the Company. Clause 16(v): Damage, whether willful or due to irresponsible action or damage due to negligence or carelessness to work in process or to any property of the Establishment or within the Establishment or any instigation or abetment thereof." 4. The first respondent submitted his explanation dated 11.12.2002. Being not satisfied therewith, an enquiry was conducted. At the conclusion thereof, the first respondent was found guilty of the charges. After calling for his views on the findings of the enquiry officer and on receipt of his explanation, a second show cause notice was issued to the first respondent on 14.06.2003, proposing the punishment of dismissal. The first respondent's explanation dated 26.06.2003 was considered untenable and since there was loss of Rs.14 lakhs suffered by the petitioner due to non-production of engines for about six hours, as a result of damage caused to the conveyor and damage to torque meter, the petitioner passed an order of dismissal dismissing the first respondent from service from 12.07.2003. 5. Aggrieved thereby, the first respondent raised a dispute under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act before the Labour Officer, Vellore. On the Labour Officer reporting failure of conciliation, the first respondent filed a petition before the second respondent under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act challenging his nonemployment. The case was numbered as I.D.No.131 of 2004. The first respondent contended that the damage caused to the torque meter was not due to his fault and negligence and he was not responsible for the same. Wrong doing on his part had been assumed since the incident occurred at the first stage where he was stationed. On completion of proceedings before him, the second respondent held that the charges against the first respondent were not proved and arrived at a conclusion that the termination order passed against the first respondent by the petitioner based upon the domestic enquiry was not correct. On completion of proceedings before him, the second respondent held that the charges against the first respondent were not proved and arrived at a conclusion that the termination order passed against the first respondent by the petitioner based upon the domestic enquiry was not correct. On the materials placed before him, the second respondent held that the first respondent was not responsible for the occurrence that had happened on 22.11.2002 and that the conclusion reached on the basis of domestic enquiry was not acceptable. The second respondent, however, had found that the incident could have been avoided if the first respondent had acted carefully as the accident happened at the first stage where the first respondent was working on the date of incident. The second respondent, therefore, directed the reinstatement of the first respondent with continuity of service with attendant benefits, but with 50% back wages. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that a just and fair domestic enquiry stood conducted and the finding therein had been arrived at upon preponderance of probabilities. Once the enquiry officer had concluded that the first respondent was guilty, it was for the management to accord proper punishment, which in this case was given. The nature of accident and the loss suffered by the management could not be considered disproportionate. In any event, on a proper finding rendered upon preponderance of probabilities, the labour Court easily could not interfere. The present was not a case which was based on no evidence or where the finding of the enquiry officer was perverse or where the punishment imposed was shockingly disproportionate. 7. The next line of submission is that even if the findings at the domestic enquiry were found to be improper, the relief of reinstatement was not automatic. When the management had lost confidence in the employee then the order of termination still could be sustained and the labour Court in such instance could only award damages. In the instant case, the defence of the first respondent is that he was a person who concentrated in carrying out his job and therefore, he could not observe anything else. It is submitted that such stand of the first respondent is unbecoming and honestywould require him to explain how the occurrence took place. It could easily be understood that the petitioner/management had lost confidence in the first respondent. It is submitted that such stand of the first respondent is unbecoming and honestywould require him to explain how the occurrence took place. It could easily be understood that the petitioner/management had lost confidence in the first respondent. Learned counsel in support of the contention of non interference with finding of the domestic enquiry officer on preponderance of probabilities, relied on the decision of the Apex Court in State of Haryana and another v. Rattan Singh [ 1982 (1) LLJ 46 ], at paragraph 4: "4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to heresay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and creditability. It is true that departmental authorities and administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition, it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fair play is basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic Tribunal, cannot be held good. However, the Courts below misdirected themselves, perhaps, in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out should be chased, and brought before the Tribunal before the valid finding could be recorded. The "residium" rule to which counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain passages from the American Jurisprudence does not go to that extent nor does the passage from the Halsbury insist on such rigid requirement. The simple point is was there some evidence or was there no evidence – not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way, as men of understanding and worldy wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic Tribunal is beyond scrutiny. The simple point is was there some evidence or was there no evidence – not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way, as men of understanding and worldy wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic Tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for the Court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal, Inspector of the Flying Squad, is some evidence which has relevance to the charge levelled against the respondent. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the order is invalid on that ground." 8. Towards informing that once a domestic tribunal arrived at a particular conclusion based on evidence, it would not be open to the appellate Tribunal and Court to substitute their subjective opinion in the place of one arrived at by domestic Tribunal, learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Honourable Apex Court in West Bokaro Colliery (TISCO Ltd.) and Ram Pravesh Singh [ 2009 (1) LLJ 220 ]. 9. To support the contention on loss of confidence suffered by the petitioner vis-a-vis, the first respondent, learned counsel relied on the following in decision of the Apex Court in Hindustan Steels, Ltd., Rourkela v. Roy (A.K.) and others [ 1970 (1) LLJ 228 ]: "16. ..... But, if the management truly believed that it was not possible to retain the workman in the company's service on grounds of security and consequently could not place confidence in him any longer, the present case would be one of those exceptional cases where the general rule as to reinstatement could not properly be applied. This of course does not mean that in every case where the employer says that he has lost confidence in the workman, and therefore, has terminated his service that reinstatement cannot be granted and the tribunal has to award compensation. This of course does not mean that in every case where the employer says that he has lost confidence in the workman, and therefore, has terminated his service that reinstatement cannot be granted and the tribunal has to award compensation. On the other hand, if on an examination of all the circumstances of the case, the tribunal comes to the conclusion that the apprehensions of the employer were genuine and the employer truly felt that it was hazardous or prejudicial to the interests of the industry to retain the workman in his service on grounds of security, the case would be properly one where compensation would meet the ends of justice." 10. Reliance is also placed in this regard in decision of the Honourable Apex Court in M/s.Francis Klein & Co. (P.) Ltd., v. Their Workmen & another [ 1971 (2) LLJ 615 ]. Paragraph 9 reads as follows: "9. Even this direction is not a valid direction because if once the company has lost confidence in its employee it is idle to ask them to employ such a person in another job. What job can there be in a company which a person can be entrusted with and which does not entail reposing of confidence in that person. We are informed that Nayan Singh has been receiving half his salary until now which works out to about Rs.9,000. While setting aside the award of the Tribunal by allowing this appeal we maintain the order terminating Nayan Singh and direct the appellant to pay Rs.5,000 within two months as compensation for termination on account of loss of confidence which in the circumstances will meet the ends of justice. Each party will bear its own cost in this appeal." 11. Judgment of this Court in Engine Valves Ltd., v. Labour Court, Madras & another [ 1991 (1) LLJ 372 ] was relied upon to inform the following: "18. ..... The Court exercising powers under Section 11A of the Act after finding the misconduct to have been proved is first obliged to advert itself to the question of necessity or desirability to interfere with the punishment imposed by the management and, if the management could not justify the punishment imposed thereafter it must consider the question as to the relief that is to be granted to the employee. In so considering the relief to be granted, the Court has an obligation to consider whether the punishment imposed is disproportionate or shockingly severe to the charges held proved and if so whether a reinstatement has to be ordered or whether any other lesser punishment has to be imposed. A specific finding must be recorded whether it was expedient and proper to reinstate the employee or whether award of compensation in lieu of reinstatement will meet the requirements and ends of justice of the case concerned. Absence of reasons to invoke the power and interfere under provisions of Section 11A in a particular case would render the very exercise of powers arbitrary and perverse and the order consequently would stand vitiated." 12. Learned counsel also referred to the decision of the Apex Court in Air India Corporation, Bombay v. V.A.Rebellow & another [ 1972 (1) LLJ 501 ] which was a case where the decision of the management to terminate the services of an employee was found justified on the ground of loss of confidence since in such case, the employee who was an officer with an Airline had, in the line of duty, to deal with Air Hostesses, and the employer had reason to suspect his private conduct and behaviour with them. 13. From perusal of the order under challenge, this Court finds that the same reflects a very reasoned decision making process. It records that the torque meter, wrongful placement of which, had led to the occurrence, was to be handled by a quality control supervisor who was at stage 7 of the assembly line. It also informs that when not in use it was for such person to place it in a box handled by such person. The torque meter was not an apparatus which was to be handled by the first respondent. It found well-reasoned the explanation of the first respondent that since the conveyor belt moved on a time frame and it was necessary to carry out his work within such time he had no opportunity to notice the wrongful placement of the torque meter. The torque meter was not an apparatus which was to be handled by the first respondent. It found well-reasoned the explanation of the first respondent that since the conveyor belt moved on a time frame and it was necessary to carry out his work within such time he had no opportunity to notice the wrongful placement of the torque meter. From the evidence, it found that it was the careless handling of the torque meter by PW-3 in whose care and custody it was to be, that had caused the occurrence and that there was no explanation of how such carelessly left behind torque meter was placed on the conveyor belt or how the same reached the sprocket wherein it was damaged and which employee at which stage had wrongfully used the same and placed it on the conveyor belt. It found totally unjustified the finding of the enquiry officer that the first respondent was the person responsible since he was a person placed closest to the point of occurrence. It further reasoned that in the absence of any direct evidence it erroneously was found against the the first respondent in respect of handling of the torque meter which he had nothing to do with. It found that even the domestic enquiry had thrown no light as to how the accident had taken place. 14. This Court is inclined to rely on the decision of the Apex Court in State of Haryana and another v. Rattan Singh [ 1982 (1) LLJ 46 ], to inform that as rightly found by the second respondent the decision arrived at in the domestic enquiry is absolutely arbitrary and not one which a fair commonsense approach would allow acceptance of. As regards the submission made on loss of confidence this Court holds that in the circumstance of the case, the petitioner/management informing the same would have no basis at all and would have to be found to be totally unjustified. This Court finds no reason to interfere with the findings of the Labour Court. 15. Accordingly, this Writ Petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.