Judgment :- 1. Animadverting upon the judgment and decree dated 01.11.2006 passed by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, (Rent Control Appellate Authority), Chengalpattu in R.C.A.No.3 of 2005 reversing the order and decree dated 22.07.2004 passed by the learned District Munsif (Rent Controller), Tambaram in RCOP No.7 of 2003, this revision is focussed by the tenant. 2. The parties, for convenience sake, are referred to here under according to their litigative status and ranking before the Rent Controller. 3. A summation and summarisation of the relevant facts, absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this civil revision petition would run thus: .(i) The respondent/landlord filed the RCOP No.7 of 2003 seeking eviction of the revision petitioner/tenant on the ground of change in user and also on the ground of additional accommodation for the landlord's wife's business by invoking Sections 10(2) (ii) (b) and 10(3) (c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings [Lease and Rent Control] Act (hereinafter referred to as "Act" in short). (ii) The tenant resisted the RCOP. (iii) During enquiry, the respondent/landlord examined himself as PW1 and marked and Exs.P1 to P23. On the side of the revision petitioner/tenant, R.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.R1 to R3 were marked. (iv) Ultimately, the Rent controller dismissed the RCOP on both the grounds. (v) Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the same, appeal was filed before the appellate forum; whereupon, the appellate authority reversed the findings of the Rent Controller and allowed the RCOP ordering eviction on both the grounds. (vi) Challenging and impugning the judgment and decree passed by the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority, this revision has been preferred by the tenant on various grounds. 4. Heard both sides. 5. The learned senior counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant placing reliance on the grounds of revision would pilot his argument, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus: a] The alleged conversion of the non-residential premises taken on lease for running a godown into one for being used as showroom can never be portrayed or projected as one of conversion attracting Section 10 (2) (ii) (b) of the Act. b) It is an admitted fact by the tenant that during the year 1985 the demised premises was used by the tenant for furniture shop and thereafter it was used as a godown for the same tenant's show room, which was situated opposite to the demised premises in the same locality. Subsequently, the tenant thought fit to have one other showroom in the demised premises where he was running his godown. c) Absolutely, there is no rhyme or reason on the part of the landlord in looking askance at such starting of showroom and filing this petition on the ground of conversion. d) The demised premises was leased out for non-residential purposes and in such a case, the landlord cannot question the demised premises being used as showroom, instead of godown. e) There is nothing to show that the landlord's wife was carrying on business and that it was flourishing. Absolutely, there is no iota of evidence to show that she required the demised premises for her additional accommodation. She was not even examined as a witness before the Rent Controller and as such adverse inference also has to be drawn. f) The account books, ledger books and other bill books, which the landlord relied upon to prove the alleged business of his wife were not authenticated by the official of the Commercial Taxes Department and no credence could be attached to them. As such, the Rent Controller taking into account all those defects dismissed correctly the RCOP. However, the appellate authority without any sound reason simply reversed the reasoned findings of the Rent Controller warranting interference in revision. g) The balance of convenience also was not taken note of by the appellate authority. The disadvantage to which, the tenant would be put into was not considered at all. It is in evidence that as many as 15 persons are working in the demised premises and if suddenly the tenant was made to vacate the premises, certainly, they will lose their job; on the other hand, the landlord's wife claiming to be running a hardware shop would not be affected as pendente lite, the first floor in the same building fell vacant and she can very well by way of expanding her alleged business can utilise the said first floor of the same building. h) There is absolutely no bona fides on the part of the landlord in seeking the demised premises for additional accommodation for expanding his wife's business. Accordingly, he would pray for allowing the civil revision petition. 6. Per contra, in a bid to torpedo and pulverise the arguments as put forth and set forth on the side of the revision petitioner/tenant, the learned counsel for the respondent/landlord would pilot his argument, the gist and kernel of them would run thus: (i) Nowhere the landlord admitted as PW1 that during the year 1985, the demised premises was leased out for carrying on a furniture shop by the tenant. One isolated sentence in his cross examination cannot be tried to be capitalised by the tenant as though the premises was leased out initially for furniture shop business. (ii) The evidence on record, so to say, the rent receipts and the challans issued by the tenant himself would evidence and convey that the demised premises was let out by the landlord in favour of the tenant for the purpose of the latter running his godown. iii) Undoubtedly, the tenant has been running a showroom in a different premises opposite to the demised premises. Without either the written permission or the oral permission of the landlord, the tenant all of a sudden opened another showroom in the demised premises, which is totally antithetical to the purpose for which, it was leased out so to say for running godown. iv) Running a godown in the demised premises is entirely different from running a showroom and this glaring fact was failed to be taken note of by the Rent Controller. Whereas the appellate authority appropriately and appositely in the light of the current law on that point, ordered eviction warranting no interference in this revision. v) The non-examination of the wife of the landlord is not fatal to the case, as husband can depose on behalf of the wife. Above all, in Exs.P17 and P18, the seal of the Commercial Taxes Department could be seen along with the signature of the official concerned, which would be indicative of the fact that the wife of the landlord is running a business in a portion of the building adjacent to the demised premises and a wall alone separates the two portions. Above all, in Exs.P17 and P18, the seal of the Commercial Taxes Department could be seen along with the signature of the official concerned, which would be indicative of the fact that the wife of the landlord is running a business in a portion of the building adjacent to the demised premises and a wall alone separates the two portions. vi) The contention on the side of the tenant that the business of the landlord's wife was not flourishing is neither here nor there. Vii) There was no necessity on the part of the said lady to prove that her business has been flourishing and therefore, she wants additional accommodation, even if it is not so flourishing yet she could seek for expanding her business and accordingly, the husband can ask for additional accommodation on behalf of his wife and the law is settled in that regard. Viii) The first floor, which has fallen vacant pendente lite cannot be cited as the appropriate place for the said lady to extend her business because she has been doing business in hard wares in the ground floor. She has to store heavy articles also and it would be too cumbersome for carrying hard wares to the first floor. ix) The tenant as well as the landlord's wife are carrying on business in separate portions in the ground floor itself. As such, the wife of the landlord requires the demised premises for extending her hardware business and it cannot be looked askance at. x) There is absolutely nothing to show that such a prayer on the part of the landlord is actuated by landlord's ill-will, spite etc. As such, the appellate authority considering the pros and cons of the matter ordered eviction, warranting no interference in revision. 7. The points for consideration are as under: 1. Whether without the written or oral permission of the landlord, starting of a show room by the tenant in the premises where he was running a godown, is tenable under law? 2. Whether the requirement of the landlord for accommodating his wife for expanding her business in the demised premises is bona fide? 3. Whether there is any perversity or illegality in the findings of the appellate authority in reversing the order of the Rent Controller in dismissing the RCOP ? 8. 2. Whether the requirement of the landlord for accommodating his wife for expanding her business in the demised premises is bona fide? 3. Whether there is any perversity or illegality in the findings of the appellate authority in reversing the order of the Rent Controller in dismissing the RCOP ? 8. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the decisions cited on both sides concerning the change in user: Decisions cited on the side of the landlord: 1. 1960(1) MLJ 62 of this court [The Union of India vs. V.M.P.Swami] 2. AIR 1980 Punjab & Haryana, Des Raj vs. Shamlal 3. 1993(1) SCC 566 (Bishamber Dass Kohli vs. Satya Bhalla) 4. 1993(1) MLJ 512 [ K.R.Murugesan vs. The Chairman) 5. 1994 STPL (LE) 19076 SC, Ram Gopal vs Jain Narayan) 6. AIR 2000 SC 1122 [ M.Arul Jothi vs. Lajja Bal] 7. 2004(6) SCC 166 [Goa Urban Co-opertive Bank vs. Noor Mohammed] Decisions cited on the side of the tenant: 1. 1996(1) MLJ 231 -Madras High Court [Ammasai Gounder vs. Lakshmiammal] 2. 1998-1-LW-651(Madras High Court) [A.gurusami vs. Dr.(Mrs.)Jacob (died) and others] 3. (2005) 4 MLJ 115 (S.C.) [Hari Rao vs. N.Govindachari and others] A mere running of the eye over those precedents would make me to observe that the recent decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court cited by the learned senior counsel for the tenant reported in 2005(4) MLJ 115 (SC) = (2005) 7 SCC 643 [Hari Rao case for 'short') virtually refers to the earlier decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in this regard. Certain excerpts from it would run thus: 7. Learned counsel for the landlord placed considerable reliance on the decision in M. Arul Jothi v. Lajja Bal1. That case also arose under Section 10(2)(ii)(b) of the Act. The transaction between the parties was governed by a lease deed. The tenant covenanted that the premises, “shall be used by the tenant only for carrying on his own business … and the tenant shall not carry on any other business than the abovesaid business” (emphasis in original) (SCC pp. 730-31, para 10). The business intended was dealing in radios, cycles, fans, clocks and steel furniture. Subsequently, the tenant also started a trade in provisions (spices and dals, etc.). The landlord sought eviction and the courts below ordered eviction under Section 10(2)(ii)(b) of the Act. The tenant had appealed to this Court. 730-31, para 10). The business intended was dealing in radios, cycles, fans, clocks and steel furniture. Subsequently, the tenant also started a trade in provisions (spices and dals, etc.). The landlord sought eviction and the courts below ordered eviction under Section 10(2)(ii)(b) of the Act. The tenant had appealed to this Court. This Court referred to the earlier decisions of this Court including the one in M.K. Palaniappa Chettiar v. A. Pennuswami Pillai2. It also referred to Section 108(o) of the Transfer of Property Act. This Court distinguished the various decisions brought to its notice under other sister enactments and took the view that the covenant in the rent deed not to use the premises for any purpose, other than the one referred to in the rent deed, brought the user by the tenant within the mischief of Section 10(2)(ii)(b) of the Act and, therefore, the order for eviction was justified. With respect, as we see it, Their Lordships rested their decision on the existence of the negative covenant in the lease deed and on the view that a breach of that covenant would attract Section 10(2)(ii) (b) of the Act, and make the user one coming within the mischief of that provision. In this case, as observed, there is no covenant as the one involved in Arul Jothi case1. In M.K. Palaniappa Chettiar v. A. Pennuswami Pillai2 the tenant, while continuing the business for which the building was taken on rent, was using a negligible portion of the building for the purpose of cooking. This Court held that the High Court was in error in reversing the decision of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority to the effect that no ground for eviction under Section 10(2)(ii)(b) of the Act was made out. This Court dismissed the petition for eviction. In Mohan Lal v. Jai Bhagwan3 this Court, interpreting the corresponding provision in the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973, held that when a tenant who had taken a building on lease for the purpose of running a business in liquor, converted the business into that of general merchandise, in the absence of a negative covenant, the user did not amount to user for a purpose other than that for which the building was leased. The same position was adopted in Gurdial Batra v. Raj Kumar Jain4 where the premises were let out for repairing business and the tenant along with the repairing business, also carried on sale of television sets for a while. This Court held that there was no change of user which would attract the liability for eviction under the corresponding provision of the East-Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. It was clearly stated that the concept of injury to the premises which forms the foundation of Section 108(o) of the Transfer of Property Act is the main basis for a provision similar to the one in Section 10(2)(ii)(b) of the Act. We think that the case on hand is governed by the principles recognised in the latter decisions and the ratio of the decision in Arul Jothi1 has no application in the absence of a negative covenant as the one obtaining in that case. Dashrath Baburao Sangale v. Kashimath Bhaskar Data5 was a case where the premises were taken on rent for “sugarcane crushing with the help of an ox and for the shop thereof” and the tenant was to get constructed a temporary shed of tin-sheet for that purpose. The tenant started a cloth business in the premises. The courts below found that this was a user for a purpose other than that for which the premises were leased and this Court found no ground to interfere. This decision only reaffirms the position that everything would depend on the terms of the letting and the facts of the case. Obviously, the cloth business started, had no connection with crushing of sugarcane. The decision in Ram Gopal v. Jai Narain6 shows that the user by the tenant of a building taken on rent for the purpose of running a shop (commercial), for a manufacturing purpose, would entail his eviction on the ground of change of user. The tenant, in that case, installed an atta chakki and an oil kolhu in the shop. The case on hand is not one of that nature. In other words, in the present case, there was no change of user, from non-residential to residential or from business to manufacturing or industrial. As emphasised already, there was also no negative covenant as was available in Arul Jothi case1. The case on hand is not one of that nature. In other words, in the present case, there was no change of user, from non-residential to residential or from business to manufacturing or industrial. As emphasised already, there was also no negative covenant as was available in Arul Jothi case1. In such a situation, we are satisfied that the High Court was clearly in error in interfering with the decision of the Appellate Authority that there was no change of user in the case on hand attracting Section 10(2)(ii)(b) of the Act. Merely because a tenant, who has taken a building for the purpose of running a trade, alters the commodity in which he was trading when he took the building on lease or trades in other commodities also, he could not be held to be using the premises for a purpose other than the purpose for which it was let. The purpose has to be understood, as the purpose of trade and in the absence of a covenant barring the using of it for any other trade, it will be open to the tenant to use the premises for expanding his trade or even for taking up other lines of trade as befits a prudent trader. 8. It is true that this Court has held in Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra7 that the rent control legislation is enacted in the larger interest of the society as a whole and it is not intended to confer any disproportionately larger benefit on the tenant to the disadvantage of the landlord. But that does not mean that the rent control legislation should not be approached as a beneficial piece of legislation and with the recognition that reasonable protection to the tenant is one of the objects of that legislation. While construing a provision of law imposing a liability for eviction, like Section 10(2)(ii)(b) of the Act, one must see whether there has been such a change of user of the premises as to make it alien to the purpose for which the building was let and deny eviction when the basic activity remains the same and there is only a variation in the manner or mode of carrying on of that activity. Therefore, the interpretation placed on Section 10(2)(ii)(b) of the Act by the High Court in the decision under appeal and in some other decisions of that Court referred to in the orders of the Rent Controller and the High Court, has to be held to be not warranted or justified. The order of eviction passed by the High Court under Section 10(2)(ii)(b) of the Act has, therefore, to be reversed. The aforesaid excerpts in addition to reading of the entire judgment would exemplify and demonstrate that simply because a building is let out for non residential purpose, it does not mean that any business could be run or other than residential purpose it could be run there. There are also restrictions on the part of the tenant in using the building for non-residential purpose. If the building is taken on lease for a particular non-residential business, then normally the tenant is enjoined to carry on with that business. While doing such business, he is also at liberty to change the nature of the commodity, article, apparatus etc., that he is selling in the premises, unless there is a negative covenant to the contrary. 9. At this juncture, I would like to refer to the Doctrine of 'Ejusdem generis rule' and 'Noscitur a sociis' as set out in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edition by P.St.J.Langan and certain excerpts from it would run thus: "The Ejusdem generis rule In the abstract, general words, like all others, receive their full and natural meaning, and the courts will not impose on them limitations not called for by the sense or objects of the enactment. Thus Section 3 of the Civil Procedure Act, 1833, which limited the time for suing "upon any bond or other specialty" comprehended, under the last expression, every kind of specialty including a statute. But the general word which follows particular and specific words of the same nature as itself takes its meaning from them and is presumed to be restricted to the same genus as those words. For "according to a well established rule in the construction of statutes, general terms following particular ones apply only to such persons or things as are ejusdem generis with those comprehended in the language of the Legislature". For "according to a well established rule in the construction of statutes, general terms following particular ones apply only to such persons or things as are ejusdem generis with those comprehended in the language of the Legislature". In other words, the general expression is to be read as comprehending only things of the same kind as that designated by the preceding particular expressions, unless there is something to show that a wider sense was intended, as where there is a provision specifically excepting certain classes clearly not within the suggested genus." Noscitur a sociis Where two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together, noscuntur a sociis. They are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take, as it were, their colour from each other, the meaning of the more general being restricted to a sense analogous to that of the less general. (One application of this general principle is the ejusdem generis rule)." As such in order to understand as to whether the tenant converted the demised premises into a different user, it has to be seen as to what was for the purpose earlier the demised premises was let out and what actually is now being carried on, in the premises. If as per the principles of ejusdem generis there is connectivity between the two types of business, then it cannot be held that there is change in user and that is subject to absence of negative covenant. This is the gist and kernel of the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court, which got crystallised in the precedent reported in Hari Rao's case. 10. Additionally, the learned counsel for the landlord would highlight the point, in the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2004(6) SCC 166 [Goa Urban Coopertive Bank vs. Noor Mohammed] (for short 'Goa case'). In fact, the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in Hari Rao's case is not in any way different from the dictum found enunciated in the Goacase. In fact, in Goa case, the Full Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana case reported in AIR 1980 Punjab & Haryana, Des Raj vs. Shamlal, is found referred to. 11. With that proposition in mind, I would like to analyse the facts and figures and the findings of the lower authorities. 12. In fact, in Goa case, the Full Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana case reported in AIR 1980 Punjab & Haryana, Des Raj vs. Shamlal, is found referred to. 11. With that proposition in mind, I would like to analyse the facts and figures and the findings of the lower authorities. 12. If a shop is converted into a godown, as per the view of the Hon'ble Apex Court, which found exemplified in Hari Rao case, it is change in user only and in fact the said judgment in Hari Rao case relates to Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 13. The learned senior counsel for the tenant would submit that even though in para No.6 of the judgment in Hari Rao's case, it is found stated that the user of a building let out for trade, cannot be converted into a godown, yet the judgment does not say that the converse is true. There is no knowing of the fact as to how such a ratiocination as put forth by the learned senior counsel for the tenant, could be accepted. 14. Once the Hon'ble Apex Court points out that the premises let out for a trade should not be used as a godown, then unambiguously and unequivocally, it should be taken as the one connoting and denoting, highlighting and spotlighting the fact that using the premises for a trade is different from using the premises as a godown. Once such a concept stood exemplified in the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court, there is no point in assuming that the converse is not true. Once the shop cannot be used as a godown, it is quite obvious and axiomatic that a godown cannot be converted into a shop and I am of the view that no more elaboration in this regard is required and as such, the findings of the appellate authority that the change of the godown admittedly into a showroom by the tenant false foul of Section 10(2) (ii) (b) of the Act. 15. 15. The contention on the side of the tenant to the effect that PW1 admitted during cross examination that earlier the premises was let out for furniture shop and subsequently, it was converted into a godown and thereafter, it was converted into a showroom are not all germane for deciding this case, in view of the ratiocination adhered to by me supra in the matter. Even assuming that earlier the building was let out for running a furniture shop and subsequently with the consent or connivance or implied understanding with the landlord, the tenant started running a godown, in the demised premises, there is nothing to show that subsequently the tenant started his TV showroom, with the consent of the landlord. 16. No sooner the tenant corrected the entry in the relevant document Ex.R3 evidencing payment of rent by replacing the word godown with showroom, the landlord bounced back by sending the Advocate Notice Ex.P5, which would convey and indicate that he never gave his oral or written consent for such conversion. 17. In view of the dictum found enunciated in the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Goa case as well as in Hari Rao case such conduct on the part of the tenant false foul of Section 10(2) (ii) (b) of the Act, warranting eviction and accordingly, the appellate authority correctly ordered eviction accepting the contention of the landlord, warranting no interference in this revision. Wherefore, Point No.1 is decided in favour of the landlord and as against the tenant. 18. My mind is reminiscent and redolent of the following precedents concerning the ground of additional accommodation and certain excerpts from those decisions would run thus: (i) (2001) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 110 – S.R.BABU V. T.K.VASUDEVAN AND OTHERS, certain excerpt from it would run thus: "10. Sub-Section (8) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) reads thus: "11.(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use." 11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section the landlord must show that (i) he is occupying only a part of the building; (ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and (iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use. 12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8) of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal occupation. 13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act. 14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters." (ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152 – RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus: "12. . . . . . The appellant has no say in such matters." (ii) 2007( 3) CTC 152 – RASI SILKS BY ITS PARTNER K.ARUNACHALAM VS. RASI SILKS T.A.VENKATACHALAM, an excerpt from it would run thus: "12. . . . . . Holding that the crucial aspect is a special instance in matters arising under Section 10-(3)(c) of the Act and that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities on hardship that may be caused to the Tenant by granting it, will outweigh the advantage to the landlords in K.A.Loganatha Naicker v. S.R.Balasundaram Mudaliar, 1974(2) MLJ 256 , it was held thus: "It is imperative for the authorities in cases arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Act (XVIII of 1960), to give specific finding whether the hardship the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa. Unless this aspect is noticed and adjudged upon by the statutory authorities, there is no complete enquiry as contemplated in respect of the petitions arising under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act." 21. Contention of Tenant is that the landlords can expand the hotel business on the open space available, which is abutting the premises. In his evidence, P.W.1 has stated the open space cannot be utilised for running the hotel. It is well settled that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the Tenants to dictate terms. In Mookkan v. Abdul Rasheeth (deceased) and others, 1999(1) MLJ 233 , this Court has held that the landlord can choose the portion required and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms. It is not the object of the provision to weigh the hardship of the Tenant as against the test of the landlord on a delicate scale, giving the benefit of the slight tilt in favour of the tenant." 19. Both sides cited decisions on the above point. Decisions cited on the side of the landlord 1. 1981 (3) SCC 502 [Bhaichand Ratanshi vs. Laxmishanker Tribhoyan] 2. 1986(2) SCC 428 [Om Prakash vs. Bhagwan Das] 3. Both sides cited decisions on the above point. Decisions cited on the side of the landlord 1. 1981 (3) SCC 502 [Bhaichand Ratanshi vs. Laxmishanker Tribhoyan] 2. 1986(2) SCC 428 [Om Prakash vs. Bhagwan Das] 3. 2008(7) SCC 770 [Ganga Devi vs. District Judge, Nainital and others] Whereas the learned counsel for the tenant would cite the decision of this court reported in (2006) 1 MLJ 663 [D.Periyagopal alias Gopal vs. K.Viswanathan] A mere poring over and perusal of those precedents would make me understand that no doubt the landlord should have a bona fide intention in demanding as against the tenant, the demised premises for additional accommodation of his wife for expanding her business and for that he should establish and prove that by such eviction of the tenant, the landlord's wife would be in an advantageous position; whereas comparatively, the tenant would not be put into any disadvantageous position. 20. Here it has to be seen as to how far there is evidence available on record. One fact should not be forgotten. As per Exs.P17 and P18, it is pellucidly and palpably, clear that the landlord's wife is running business in hardware in the same ground floor in the adjacent portion to the demised portion and there is no denying of it, even though the tenant would not come forward to accept candidly such a fact. 21. Trite the proposition of law is that the tenant cannot dictate terms to the landlord as to which place he has to choose for additional accommodation. As on the date of filing of the RCOP, the first floor of the said building, was not vacant. But, pendente lite, it fell vacant. Even then, it is at the first floor. Whereas the wife of the landlord is having business in the ground floor in one portion and the tenant is having his business in another portion and presently using it as a showroom. 22. The learned counsel for the landlord would appropriately and appositely point out that removing the wall situated in between the two shops, the landlord's wife would have one larger place for having her business. Such a fact could be seen in Ex.P5 as well as in the oral evidence of PW1. 22. The learned counsel for the landlord would appropriately and appositely point out that removing the wall situated in between the two shops, the landlord's wife would have one larger place for having her business. Such a fact could be seen in Ex.P5 as well as in the oral evidence of PW1. No doubt, PW1 while deposing before the court in so many words did not say as to how the business of his wife was flourishing etc and he could not pin point by saying as to how much was her increase in income, for which the learned counsel for the landlord would put forth an argument to the effect that absolutely there is no necessity on the part of the landlord to detail and delineate, portray and parody all the facts to establish and demonstrate, display and indicate that the business of his wife is flourishing. Even for argument sake, it is taken that she was not carrying on a lucrative business, nonetheless she is entitled to have her business expanded by evicting the tenant. 23. However, the learned senior counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant would contradict such an argument by pointing out that once the landlord pleaded that his wife's business was flourishing, he was duty bound to prove it; on his non-proving of the said fact due to lack of evidence on his side, the lack of bonafides might be presumed by this court. 24. Even though such an argument put forth on the side of the tenant was attractive at first blush, law does not contemplate such a factual scenario that only if the landlord or his wife's business is flourishing, then only there could be a prayer for seeking additional accommodation. 25. Then the core question arises as to why then the landlord should put forth such a plea. Simply because in precise terms with reference to accounts and tax assessment etc, the quantum of the increase in the income is not proved, no adverse inference could be drawn that the business is not flourishing or that such a statement is false. Lack of clinching evidence to prove the version of the landlord would not smack mendacity. 26. The landlord on behalf of his wife, no doubt, pleaded that his wife's business was progressing and simply because such clinching fact is not proved, no adverse inference can be drawn. 27. Lack of clinching evidence to prove the version of the landlord would not smack mendacity. 26. The landlord on behalf of his wife, no doubt, pleaded that his wife's business was progressing and simply because such clinching fact is not proved, no adverse inference can be drawn. 27. The landlord's wife as well as the tenant, both are business people and in such a case, the court cannot mandate that the landlord's wife should sacrifice her convenience and progress in business in view of the tenant's unwillingness to vacate the premises. No doubt, on the tenant's side, it has been pleaded that as many as 15 persons are working under him in the demised premises. But his contention that if he has to shift his business from the demised premises, then they have to lose their job is something, which cannot be countenanced. 28. Indubitably and indisputably, unassailably and unarguably, the tenant is having showroom in as many as 21 places in the Chennai city and his Head office is at Saidapet, Chennai. In such a case, there is no knowing of the fact that as to how the tenant could plead that simply because on his shifting his showroom from the demised premises, his workers 15 in number would lose job. Such a big business man can always accommodate the small number of employees in his other branches. There is also one showroom in the same locality and he can accommodate them either in Tambaram itself or in other places. As such, the tenant with 15 employees under him would lose the job is nothing but a ruse to wriggle out of his liability. The fact remains that the landlord's wife is not that much a big business lady and she is running only a hardware shop, having a total turnover of Rs.6 lakhs per annum and getting Rs.50,000/-as annual income and she wants to expand her business and earn more by getting the tenant evicted. 29. Hence, the benefit would certainly accrue to the lady, which certainly would outweigh the difficulty or discomfiture, if any, to which the tenant would be put into. As such, I am of the considered view that nothing could be found fault with the findings given by the appellate authority in ordering eviction on the ground of additional accommodation. 30. 29. Hence, the benefit would certainly accrue to the lady, which certainly would outweigh the difficulty or discomfiture, if any, to which the tenant would be put into. As such, I am of the considered view that nothing could be found fault with the findings given by the appellate authority in ordering eviction on the ground of additional accommodation. 30. Accordingly, Point No.2 is also decided in favour of the landlord and as against the tenant. 31. In the result, this civil revision petition is dismissed by confirming the judgment and decree of the appellate authority. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed.