Judgment :- 1. Animadverting upon the order dated 9.6.2011 passed by the Principal District Munsif, Ambur, Vellore, in E.A.No.2 of 2010 in E.P.No.77 of 2009 in O.S.No.29 of 2004, this civil revision petition is filed. 2. A thumbnail sketch of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this civil revision petition, in a few broad strokes can be encapsulated thus: (i) The respondent herein filed the suit O.S.No.29 of 2004 for specific performance as against the revision petitioner herein/defendant. After contest, the suit was decreed as under: “Tamil” (extracted as such) (ii) The revision petitioner/defendant did not pay the amount as contemplated in clause (1) of the decree. Whereupon, the respondent herein/decree holder, by placing reliance on clause (2) of the decree, deposited the remaining sale consideration of Rs.5000/-and took steps to get the sale deed executed and at the E.P.stage, on receipt of notice, the revision petitioner/defendant filed necessary application to get the time extended for complying with Clause (1) of the decree. (iii) After hearing both sides, the lower Court refused to extend the time to comply with clause (1) of the decree by the defendant. 3. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order, this revision has been focussed by the defendant on various grounds. 4. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/defendant, by placing reliance on the grounds of revision and also the decree passed, would pilot his arguements, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus: The decree is ex facie a wrong one. There cannot be any decree to the effect that in the event of the defendant not refunding the advance amount with interest, the plaintiff would be entitled for specific performance. As such, clause (2) of the decree should be taken as void, ab-initio and the revision petitioner/defendant has to be given time to comply with clause (1) of the decree and that too, in view of the fact that the petitioner herein/defendant is a widow; that she shifted her residence from the suit property to her daughter's house and that there was communication gap between herself and her advocate. 5. 5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent herein/plaintiff, in a bid to extirpate and torpedo the pleas and averments on the side of the revision petitioner/defendant would pilot his arguements, the gist and kernal of them would run thus: (i) It is too late in the day on the part of the revision petitioner/defendant to find fault with the decree; she allowed the grass to grow under her feet and she slept over the matter and such a person is not entitled to any relief before this Court. (ii) The delay of more than 5 years cannot simply be ignored and if that is done so, that would amount to encouraging the petitioner/defendant to place reliance on her own fault. Accordingly, the learned counsel would pray for dismissal of the C.R.P. 6. The point for consideration are as under: (i) Whether the decree passed by the lower Court in granting alternatively the relief of specific performance is tenable under the law? (ii) Whether there is adequate reason for extending the time for the petitioner/defendant to comply with clause (1) of the decree? 7. Both these points are taken together for discussion as they are interwoven and interlinked, interconnected and entwined with each other. 8. I recollect the following maxims: (i) Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt. The laws aid the vigilant, not those who sleep. (ii) Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium. It is in the interest of the state that there be a limit to litigation. 9. The cumulative effect of both those maxims would be to the effect that a litigant should be vigilant in prosecuting his case and he cannot simply dilly-dally or shilly-shally with the litigation. 10. However, in this case, the petitioner/defendant would try to project her case by pointing out that she happens to be a helpless widow and not worldly wise in understanding things and that there is communication gap between herself and her advocate, in view of her having shifted her residence. 11. One important fact should not be lost sight of. Clause (1) of the decree virtually happened to be a low hanging fruit for the revision petitioner/defendant to make use of it and in my considered opinion, no man having head over shoulder would ever venture to belittle or pooh-pooh the benefit given by the lower Court. 12. 11. One important fact should not be lost sight of. Clause (1) of the decree virtually happened to be a low hanging fruit for the revision petitioner/defendant to make use of it and in my considered opinion, no man having head over shoulder would ever venture to belittle or pooh-pooh the benefit given by the lower Court. 12. Here instead of losing the immovable property, the revision petitioner/defendant, who was given the option to pay a sum of Rs.30,000/--the advance amount with interest at the rate of 9% per annum, should have urgently and diligently complied with clause (i) of the decree. Even by phantasmagorical thoughts it cannot be stated that the defendant might have been wilful in refraining from enjoying the fruit of that decree. 13. Then the question arises as to whether such long delay could be condoned simply. 14. I am of the view that without any enhancement of the amount to be refunded, the defendant cannot be allowed to enjoy the benefit of getting the time of two months extended for complying with clause (1) of the decree. 15. Over and above that, clause (2) of the decree, in my opinion, is non-est in the eye of the law. 16. At this juncture, I would like to recollect the following decisions of the Honourable Apex Court emerged under Sections 16 read with Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act: (i) 2010(10) SCC 512 [Man Kaur (Dead) By L.Rs. v. Hartar Singh Sangha]; certain excerpts from it would run thus: "40. This contention has no merit. There are two distinct issues. The first issue is the breach by the defendant vendor which gives a cause of action to the plaintiff to file a suit for specific performance. The second issue relates to the personal bar to enforcement of a specific performance by persons enumerated in Section 16 of the Act. A person who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him (other than the terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant) is barred from claiming specific performance. A person who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him (other than the terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant) is barred from claiming specific performance. Therefore, even assuming that the defendant had committed breach, if the plaintiff fails to aver in the plaint or prove that he was always ready and willing to perform the essential terms of contract which are required to be performed by him (other than the terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the plaintiff), there is a bar to specific performance in his favour. Therefore, the assumption of the respondent that readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is something which need not be proved, if the plaintiff is able to establish that the defendant refused to execute the sale deed and thereby committed breach, is not correct. Let us give an example. Take a case where there is a contract for sale for a consideration of Rs.10 lakhs and earnest money of Rs.1 lakh was paid and the vendor wrongly refuses to execute the sale deed unless the purchaser is ready to pay Rs.15 lakhs. In such a case there is a clear breach by the defendant. But in that case, if the plaintiff did not have the balance Rs.9 lakhs (and the money required for stamp duty and registration) or the capacity to arrange and pay such money, when the contract has to be performed, the plaintiff will not be entitled to specific performance, even if he proves breach by the defendant, as he was not "ready and willing" to perform his obligations." (ii) (2011) 1 SUPREME COURT CASES 429 – J.P.BUILDERS AND ANOTHER V. A.RAMADAS RAO AND ANOTHER would run thus: "27. It is settled law that even in the absence of specific plea by the opposite party, it is the mandate of the statute that the plaintiff has to comply with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and when there is non-compliance with this statutory mandate, the Court is not bound to grant specific performance and is left with no other alternative but to dismiss the suit. It is also clear that readiness to perform must be established throughout the relevant points of time. "Readiness and willingness" to perform the part of the contract has to be determined/ascertained from the conduct of the parties." 17. A bare perusal of the above precedents would show that the suit for specific performance cannot be ordered alternatively, as it has been done in this case, which would fall foul of the mandates as contained in the Specific Relief Act. 18. On the side of the respondent/plaintiff also no plausible arguement was put forth so as to maintain clause (2) of the decree. This Court, by virtue of its power under Article 227 of the Indian Constitution could very well interfere with such sort of illegal decrees and wherefore clause (2) of the decree is declared as non-est in the eye of the law. 19. As has been already highlighted supra by me because of such defect in the decree, the petitioner herein/defendant cannot try to capitalize her own fault to the detriment of the other side. 20. I recollect the following maxims: (i) Nul Prendra advantage de son tort demesne. -No one shall take advantage of his own wrong. (ii) Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria. - No one can gain advantage by his own wrong. 21. A person cannot capitalizwe his own fault and then come before the Court and try to get benefit. 22. Considering the pro et contra, I am of the considered view that the amount due payable under clause (1) of the decree should be enhanced to Rs.1,00,000/-(rupees one lakh), which sum along with the cost of Rs.5314.00 (Rupees five thousand three hundred and fourteen) shall be paid by the revision petitioner herein/defendant in favour of the respondent/plaintiff within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, as otherwise this order will not enure to the benefit of the petitioner/defendant. 23. The civil revision petition is ordered accordingly. However, there is no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.