Judgment :- 1. The challenge in this writ petition to the award passed by the learned Labour Court, Chennai on a petition moved by the respondent No.1 under Sec.33-C(2) of the Industrial Dispute Act. 2. The pleaded case of the respondent No.1 in the petition under Sec.33-C(2) of the Industrial Dispute Act is that he joined the office of the Director of Agricultural Marketing as a Clerk in the year 1964 and voluntarily retired from service in 1979 due to ill health. The respondent No.1 was paid adhoc pension of Rs.26,625/-(Rupees twenty six thousand six hundred and twenty five only) for the period 12.06.1995 to 30.04.2001. 3. The respondent No.1 thereafter filed representation with the employer for grant of total pension and on the failure of the petitioners to grant pension, a sum of Rs.1,60,499/- (Rupees one lakh sixty thousand four hundred and ninety nine only) was claimed as amount due as determined sum of pension due to the respondent No.1. 4. The petitioners contested the petition under Sec.33-C(2) of the Industrial Dispute Act, by pleading that the respondent No.1 joined as Clerk in the office of the Director of Agricultural Marketing, but was subsequently promoted as Supervisor on 16.02.1972. The respondent No.1 thereafter resigned from the post with effect from 06.02.1979. The stand in the counter was that the respondent No.1 having resigned from service, was not entitled to claim any pension. This stand was based on the service rules governing service conditions of the respondent No.1 which stipulates forfeiture of past service on resignation. Reliance in support was placed on Rule 2(10) of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Produce Market Rules 1962. 5. The stand of the petitioners further was that adhoc pension was paid to the respondent No.1 on sympathetic consideration. The State Government sanctioned adhoc pension of Rs.370/- (Rupees three hundred and seventy only) per month with effect from 12.06.1995. The adhoc pension by way of concession did not entitle the respondent No.1 to claim liberalised pension or full pension. 6. The jurisdiction of the learned Labour Court was also questioned on the ground that the respondent No.1 was not a Workman, as he was performing duties of Supervisor since 16.02.1979. 7. The respondent No.1 in support of the claim petition appeared as P.W.1 and produced documentary evidence Ex.P1 to P8. Whereas the petitioners examined Thiru V.Arulpragasam as R.W.1 and produced documentary evidence Ex.R1 and R2. 8. 7. The respondent No.1 in support of the claim petition appeared as P.W.1 and produced documentary evidence Ex.P1 to P8. Whereas the petitioners examined Thiru V.Arulpragasam as R.W.1 and produced documentary evidence Ex.R1 and R2. 8. On consideration of the pleadings and the evidence lead before the learned Labour Court, a finding was recorded that the petitioner had joined service in 1964 and voluntarily retired from service in the year 1979 due to ill-health. It was therefore held that the respondent No.1 was entitled to pension under the pension rules as also to liberalised pension. 9. The learned Labour Court also took note of the adhoc pension paid to the petitioner, and accepted the stand of the respondent No.1. The learned Labour Court did not accept the petitioners' stand that the State Government out of sympathetic consideration had granted adhoc pension of Rs.370/-(Rupees three hundred and seventy only) per month with effect from 12.06.1995 on his resignation. The learned Labour Court also took note of Rule 23 of Pension Rule which reads as under: "Forfeiture of service on resignation:-(1) Resignation from a service or post entails forfeiture of past service: Provided that a resignation shall not entail forfeiture of past service if it has been submitted to take up with proper permission, another appointment whether temporary or permanent under the Government where service qualifies. (2) Interruption in service in a case falling under the proviso to sub-rule (1), due to the two appointments being at diferent stations, not exceeding the joining time permissible of any kind due to the Government servant on the date of relief or by formal condonation to the extent to which the period is not covered by leave due to the Government servant." 10. The learned Labour Court taking note of correspondence of Ex.P4 and P5, wherein the Secretary, Cuddalore Market Committee had written a letter to the Commissioner, Agricultural Marketing and Agriculture Business, that there would be no monetary loss to grant pension to the petitioner, as the Marketing Committee was making profits held that respondent No.1 was entitled to amount claimed. 11. The learned Labour Court also recorded a finding that other similarly situated workers were granted pension. 11. The learned Labour Court also recorded a finding that other similarly situated workers were granted pension. The learned Labour Court also interpreted Rule 23 of the Pension Rules to hold that if the resignation is accepted with proper permission, it need not result in forfeiture of past service and therefore, the respondent No.1 was entitled to grant of pension. Reliance in support of grant of pension was placed on the statement of respondent No.1 to the effect that the liberalised pension was granted to Mr.Sankaranarayanan under the orders of this Court. 12. The objection to the maintainability of the claim petition on the ground of the respondent No.1 being a Supervisor was rejected for want of evidence to prove that the respondent No.1 was performing executive function. 13. On consideration, I find that the award passed by the learned Labour Court cannot be sustained in law for the following reasons: (1) It was not within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Sec.33-C(2) of I.D. Act to determine the eligibility for pension as the proceedings were in the nature of execution. The dispute as to whether the Workman is entitled to a particular benefit on disputed stands can only be determined in Reference under Sec.10 of the I.D. Act, and not in exercise of power under Sec.33-C(2) of the Act. (2) The finding recorded by the learned Labour Court on the face of it is perverse and outcome of misreading of Rule 23 of Pension Rules. Once it was proved on record that the respondent No.1 had resigned from service which resulted in forfeiture of past service, the learned Labour Court in exercise of powers under 33-C(2) was not competent to decide this question. It was not a case where the respondent No.1 had resigned with permission to join other post in the Government. (3) The learned Labour Court wrongly applied the proviso to Rule 23 of the pension rules to hold that the resignation by the respondent No.1 did not result in forfeiture of past service. (4) That grant of adhoc pension by the State Government did not authorise the respondent No.1 to claim full pension or liberalised pension. (3) The learned Labour Court wrongly applied the proviso to Rule 23 of the pension rules to hold that the resignation by the respondent No.1 did not result in forfeiture of past service. (4) That grant of adhoc pension by the State Government did not authorise the respondent No.1 to claim full pension or liberalised pension. The order of grant of adhoc pension itself was bad in law, as the Government did not have any such powers to grant pension to the employee who was not entitled to pension under the pension rules. 14. The learned counsel for the Workman/Respondent No.1 made an attempt to support to the award passed by the learned Labour Court by placing the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SheelkumarJain vs New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. decided on 28 July, 2011 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to lay down as under: "10. The Pension Scheme, 1995 was framed and notified only in 1995 and yet the Pension Scheme, 1995 was made applicable also to employees who had left the services of the respondent No.1-Company before 1995. Clauses 22 and 30 of the Pension Scheme, 1995 quoted above were not in existence when the appellant submitted his letter dated 16.09.1991 to the General Manager of respondent No.1-Company. Hence, when the appellant served his letter dated 16.09.1991 to the General Manager of respondent No.1- Company, he had no knowledge of the difference between `resignation' under Clause 22 and `voluntary retirement' under Clause 30 of the Pension 17 Scheme, 1995. Similarly, the respondent No.1-Company employer had no knowledge of the difference between `resignation' and `voluntary retirement' under Clauses 22 and 33 of the Pension Scheme, 1995 respectively. Both the appellant and the respondent No.1 have acted in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (1) of Clause 5 of the Scheme, 1976 at the time of determination of service of the appellant in the year 1991. It is in this background that we have now to decide whether the determination of service of the appellant under sub-clause (1) of Clause 5 of the Scheme, 1976 amounts to resignation in terms of Clause 22 of the Pension Scheme, 1995 or amounts to voluntary retirement in terms of Clause 30 of the Pension Scheme, 1995. It is in this background that we have now to decide whether the determination of service of the appellant under sub-clause (1) of Clause 5 of the Scheme, 1976 amounts to resignation in terms of Clause 22 of the Pension Scheme, 1995 or amounts to voluntary retirement in terms of Clause 30 of the Pension Scheme, 1995. Clause 22 of the Pension Scheme, 1995 states that resignation of an employee from the service of the Corporation or a Company shall entail forfeiture of his entire past service and consequently shall not qualify for pensionary benefits, but does not define the term; 'resignation'. Under sub-clause (1) of Clause 30 of the Pension Scheme, 1995, an employee, who has completed 20 years of qualifying service, may by giving notice 18 of not less than 90 days in writing to the appointing authority retire from service and under sub-clause (2) of Clause 30 of the Pension Scheme, 1995, the notice of voluntary retirement shall require acceptance by the appointing authority. Since `voluntary retirement' unlike `resignation' does not entail forfeiture of past services and instead qualifies for pension, an employee to whom Clause 30 of the Pension Scheme, 1995 applies cannot be said to have `resigned' from service. In the facts of the present case, we find that the appellant had completed 20 years qualifying service and had given notice of not less than 90 days in writing to the appointing authority of his intention to leave service and the appointing authority had accepted notice of the appellant and relieved him from service. Hence, Clause 30 of the Pension Scheme, 1995 applied to the appellant even though in his letter dated 16.09.1991 to the General Manager of respondent no.1-Company he had used the word `resign'." 15. The judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the Workman/Respondent No.1 goes against him. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case was pleased to hold that resignation resulted in forfeiture of past service. The pension in that case was allowed for the reason that the appellant had retired from service voluntarily. 16. It was in view of this judgment that unsuccessful attempt was made by the respondent No.1 to plead in the claim petition that he had sought voluntary retirement on the ground of ill-health, which was found to be false, as the respondent No.1 had in fact resigned from service. 17. 16. It was in view of this judgment that unsuccessful attempt was made by the respondent No.1 to plead in the claim petition that he had sought voluntary retirement on the ground of ill-health, which was found to be false, as the respondent No.1 had in fact resigned from service. 17. The learned counsel for the Workman/respondent No.1 thereafter placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.1651 of 2000 decided on 08.07.2009 (The State of Tamil Nadu and another vs. V.Jesudoss and another) wherein the Hon'ble Division Bench was pleased to lay down as under: "15. In view of the observation made by us and the decision of this Court as noticed above, we find no ground made out to interfere with the order made by the learned single Judge. We are not inclined to accept that the first respondent having resigned from service, his services stood forfeited for the purpose of pension. So far as the question of quantum of payment of pension is concerned, we are leving that matter open to the competent authority, who has to calculate the period of service for calculating the pension and pay the admitted pensionary benefit to the firs respondent in terms with the order passed by the learned single Judge. The writ appeal thus stand disposed of with the aforesaid observation. There shall be no order as to costs." 18. This judgment again does not advance the case of the respondent No.1 as the Hon'ble Division Bench did not accept the plea that the respondent in that case had resigned from service, but in the case in hand, it was proved beyond doubt that the respondent No.1 had resigned from service which resulted in forfeiture of his past service which did not entitle him liberalised pension or full pension. 19. The learned counsel for the respondent No.1 thereafter placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in D.Vijayaranganvs Secretary, Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (Addl. 19. The learned counsel for the respondent No.1 thereafter placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in D.Vijayaranganvs Secretary, Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (Addl. Bench), Madurai 20 and another (2009 Writ L.R. 12) wherein the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court was pleased to hold that those who resigned because of illness or ill-health and not because of misconduct or adverse record and if allowed to do so by the State, are entitled to same benefit which are allowed to those who resigned to join another service under the State. 20. Though this judgment prima facie support the case of the Workman, but with due respect to the Hon'ble Division Bench, this judgment cannot be a precedent, in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others vs. Braj nandan singh (2005)8 SCC 325 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to lay down as under: "5. In order to appreciate rival submissions Rule 26 which is the pivotal provision needs to be quoted. The same reads as under: "26. Forfeiture of service on resignation (1) Resignation from a service or post, unless it is allowed to be withdrawn in the public interest by the Appointing Authority, entails forfeiture of past service. (2) A resignation shall not entail forfeiture of past service if it has been submitted to take up, with proper permission, another appointment, whether temporary or permanent, under the Government where service qualifies." Rule 26 as the heading itself shows relates to forfeiture of service on resignation. In clear terms it provides that resignation from a service or a post, unless it is allowed to be withdrawn in the public interest by the Appointing Authority, entails forfeiture of past service. The language is couched in mandatory terms. However, sub- rule (2) is in the nature of an exception. It provides that resignation shall not entail forfeiture of past service if it has been submitted to take up, with proper permission, another appointment, whether temporary or permanent, under the Government where service qualifies. Admittedly this is not the case in the present appeal. Rule 5 on which great emphasis was laid down by the learned counsel for the respondent deals with regulation of claims to pension or family pension. Qualifying service is dealt with in Chapter III. Admittedly this is not the case in the present appeal. Rule 5 on which great emphasis was laid down by the learned counsel for the respondent deals with regulation of claims to pension or family pension. Qualifying service is dealt with in Chapter III. The conditions subject to which service qualifies are provided in Rule 14. Chapter V deals with classes of pensions and conditions governing their grant. The effect of Rule 26 sub-rules (1) and (2) cannot be lost sight of while deciding the question of entitlement of pension. The High Court was not justified in its conclusion that the rule was being torn out of context. After the past service is forfeited the same has to be excluded from the period of qualifying service. The language of Rule 26 sub-rules (1) and (2) is very clear and unambiguous. It is trite law that all the provisions of a statute have to be read together and no particular provision should be treated as superfluous. That being the position after the acceptance of resignation, in terms of Rule 26 sub-rule (1) the past service stands forfeited. That being so, it has to be held that for the purpose of deciding question of entitlement to pension the respondent did not have the qualifying period of service. There is no substance in the plea of the leaned counsel for the respondent that Rule 26 sub-rules (1) and (2) has limited operation and does not wipe out entitlement to pension as quantified in Rule 49. Said Rule deals with amount of pension and not with entitlement. 6.) It is well settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent." 21. It is therefore, not possible for this Court to add words to the statutory rules, to hold that a person who resigned from service on medical ground or for some other reason can be treated at par with those employees who resign to join other service. 22. It is therefore, not possible for this Court to add words to the statutory rules, to hold that a person who resigned from service on medical ground or for some other reason can be treated at par with those employees who resign to join other service. 22. Otherwise also, the award deserves to be set aside only on the ground that it was not open to the learned Labour Court to decide the controversy with regard to entitlement of pension in exercise of powers under Sec.33-C(2) as powers under this section are in the nature of execution proceedings. 23. For the reasons stated hereinabove, writ petition is allowed. The impugned award is set aside, but with no order as to cost. Connected miscellaneous petition is closed.