Judgment Bhaskar Bhattacharya, ACJ.—The Misc. Civil Application No. 418 of 2012 is one for clarification at the instance of the State/Respondent nos. 1 to 4 of a Public Interest Litigation, [since disposed of by us]. They have prayed for clarification of our order dated January 20, 2012 by making it clear that the direction upon the State to pay the employees’ minimum of pay-scale, viz. pay band plus grade pay, should be effected only from the date of the delivery of the judgment and not earlier. 2. Opponent No. 1 of this application, on April 28, 2011 filed a Public Interest Litigation challenging the action of the State government in issuing Government Resolutions dated February 16, 2006 and April 29, 2010. The prayer was for a direction upon the State Government to pay to the employees recruited under the Scheme of fixed-pay for the initial contract-period of five years, the minimum pay scale available in the cadre of the employees who are appointed on regular post and discharging identical duties. 3. The said application was contested by the present applicants thereby opposing the prayer of the writ-petitioner. 4. This court, ultimately, by order dated January 20, 2012 partly allowed the said application by passing the following direction: “The newly appointed employees, before getting the benefit of the regular scale on being found to be suitable on completion of the fixed period, should get at least, the total amount payable to an employee in the lowest grade of pay scale for that post from the date of their appointment. Similarly, the period during which employees would remain in the fixed scale before completion of the period of probation should be treated to be part of their service-period for all future benefits including the retiral ones once they are found to be suitable on completion of probation period.” 5. Similarly, the period during which employees would remain in the fixed scale before completion of the period of probation should be treated to be part of their service-period for all future benefits including the retiral ones once they are found to be suitable on completion of probation period.” 5. By this application, the applicants have submitted that in case the said judgment is interpreted to have the effect that the same should be retrospective from the date of appointment encompassing all the fixed-pay-appointments of the post, and that not only the minimum of the pay band plus grade pay should be given during the fixed period of five years, but also all the other allowances such as Dearness Allowance, House Rent Allowance should be included and at the same time, if the fixed period of five years are counted as the period of service for all purposes including seniority, in that event, the implication of the judgment would be as under: [i] All the employees who were appointed on fixed pay basis will have to be paid arrears from the date of appointment. [ii] If the 5 years’ fixed pay period of the employees is to be counted for all the purposes, then that would result into the entitlement of such employees of seniority from due date which would, in turn, result into a large scale of litigations, as inclusion of such fixed pay employees in the gradation list would adversely affect the prospect of promotion of the other regular government employees who are already in services either through direct recruitment or by promotion or by semi-direct recruitment. Besides the above, the seniority from the date of appointment of such fixed-pay-employees would make them entitled for promotion to higher posts, grant of Higher Grade, etc. which is also likely to result in indirect financial burden in the form of grant of deemed dates for grant of Higher Grade from earlier dates, etc. In short, counting of 5 years’ fixed-pay-period for all purposes would have its large-scale ramifications in the administrative matters, which would likely to lead to certain level of confusion. [iii] The Government has introduced the Newly Defined Pension Scheme from April1, 2005 for the employees recruited after that date. All the employees who joined in government service after April1, 2005 are required to join compulsorily in the Newly Defined Pension Scheme. [iii] The Government has introduced the Newly Defined Pension Scheme from April1, 2005 for the employees recruited after that date. All the employees who joined in government service after April1, 2005 are required to join compulsorily in the Newly Defined Pension Scheme. If 5 years of service of the said fixed-pay-employees are taken into account for all purposes, then it would be mandatory for the Government to pay the government-contribution, i.e. 10% of the basic pay plus D.A. for each such fixed-pay-employee. In the case of fixed-pay-employees, who were recruited before April1, 2005 would have to be joined in the earlier GPF-cum-Pension scheme. However, such fixed-pay-employees will also get the pensionary benefits, which government has discontinued from April 1, 2005. 6. It is further contended that the number of fixed-pay-employees in the employment at the time of filing of the affidavit dated July 26, 2011 by the State Government was 93,369 and by this time, the recruitment of 50,000 fixed-pay-employees was under process. Thus, the total number of about 1, 43,369 employees would get the benefit of our judgment dated January 20, 2012 and consequently, the financial impact would be as follows: [i] If the said CAV judgment dated January 20, 2012 is interpreted to mean that the “minimum of the pay-scale” means Pay Band plus Grade Pay, then the annual additional recurrent additional financial burden would be approximately Rs. 365.00 crore [total employees taken into consideration are 1,43,369]. [ii] If the said CAV judgment dated January 20, 2012 is made applicable as such and if the concerned fixed-pay-employees are to be paid minimum of the Pay Band plus Grade Pay including other allowances, then the recurrent additional annual financial burden on the State Exchequer would be approximately Rs. 1348.00 crore [total employees taken into consideration are 1,43,369]. [iii] If the said CAV judgment dated January 20, 2012 is interpreted to mean that the “minimum of the pay-scale” i.e. Pay Band plus Grade Pay is to be given from the date of introduction of the fixed pay scheme as per the Government Resolution dated February 16, 2006, then the additional financial burden towards arrears would be approximately Rs. 1754.00 crore [total employees taken into consideration are 93,369]. 1754.00 crore [total employees taken into consideration are 93,369]. [iv] If the said CAV judgment dated January 20, 2012 is made applicable as such and if the concerned fixed-pay-employees are to be paid the minimum of the Pay Band plus Grade Pay including other allowances from the introduction of the fixed pay scheme i.e. February 16, 2006, then the financial burden of payment of arrears would be approximately Rs. 3360.00 crore [total employees taken into consideration are 93,369]. [v] If the said CAV judgment dated January 20, 2012 is implemented and five years’ service of all the fixed-pay- employees are taken into consideration for all purposes, then the Government has to pay contribution towards Newly Defined Pension Scheme i.e. 10% of the basic pay plus D.A. for each of such employee and also the pensionary benefits to be given to them which will lead to further huge financial burden. 7. In the above view of the matter, it is contended by Mr. Kamal B. Trivedi, the learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the applicants, that we should clarify our earlier judgment by specifically laying down that the State Government should be required to pay only the minimum of the pay band plus grade pay but not other allowances payable to the employees who have been in the service, with further direction that the added benefit should be payable only from the date of judgment, viz. January 20, 2012. 8. In support of the above contention, Mr. Trivedi has contended that since the State Government was so long following the earlier decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Joshi Tushar Tansukhbhai and others vs. State of Gujarat, reported in 2004 [2] GLR 1188, and we have held that in view of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Land Development Corporation and Another vs. Mohd. Khursheed Anwar and Anr. reported in AIR 2010 SC 2287 , the said decision of the Division Bench is no longer a good law, the above benefit should be given prospectively from the date of the judgment. Mr. Trivedi further contended that the employees having accepted the job being fully conscious that they would be getting less than the amount payable to the regular employees, the benefit should not be retrospectively given. In support of such contention, Mr. Mr. Trivedi further contended that the employees having accepted the job being fully conscious that they would be getting less than the amount payable to the regular employees, the benefit should not be retrospectively given. In support of such contention, Mr. Trivedi has relied upon the following decisions: [i] Orissa Cement Ltd. vs. State of Orissa and Ors., reported in 1991 Supp. [1] Supreme Court Cases 430. [ii] South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. and etc. vs. Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. and others etc., reported in AIR 1991 SC 1593 . [iii] Somaiya Organics [India] Ltd. and Another vs. State of U.P. and Anr. reported in [2001] 5 SCC 519. [iv] Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar and Ors. vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors., reported in [1974] 1 SCC 317. [v] State of U.P. and others vs. U.P. Sales Tax Officers Grade II Association, reported in [2003] 6 SCC 250. [vi] State of Haryana and Ors. vs. Charanjit Singh and Ors., reported in [2006] 9 SCC 321. [vii] State of Kerala and others vs. E.K. Bhaskaran Pilla, reported in [2007] 6 SCC 524. [viii] Galaji Gopalji Jadeja vs. State of Gujarat, reported in 2005 [2] G.L.H. 235. 9. On the other hand, Mr. D.J. Bhatt, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the opponent No. 1, opposed the aforesaid contentions of Mr. Trivedi. He has contended that whenever a policy is held to be ultra vires the Constitution of India and particularly violating any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, it should be treated to be illegal from the very beginning and thus, the employees, for whose benefit writ-application was filed, should get the benefit from the date of their appointment. He further contends that our order is clear enough to include not only the grade pay and pay band but also other allowances available to the regular employees. Mr. Bhatt, therefore, prays for dismissal of the application by pointing out that the benefit is available from the date of employment. 10. In support of his contention, Mr. Bhatt relies upon the following decisions of the Supreme Court: [1] India Cement Ltd. and Ors. vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., reported in [1990] 1 SCC 12. [2] Mahendra Lal Jaini vs. State of U.P. and others, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1019 . [3] Uttar Pradesh Land Development Corporation and Anr. vs. Mohd. Bhatt relies upon the following decisions of the Supreme Court: [1] India Cement Ltd. and Ors. vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., reported in [1990] 1 SCC 12. [2] Mahendra Lal Jaini vs. State of U.P. and others, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1019 . [3] Uttar Pradesh Land Development Corporation and Anr. vs. Mohd. Khursheed Anwar and Anr., reported in [2010] 7 SCC 739. [4] K.A. Ansari and Anr. vs. Indian Airlines Ltd., reported in AIR 2009 SC [Supp] 44. [5] Deep Chand vs. State of U.P., reported in AIR 1959 SC 648 [1]. [6] K.K. Pooncha vs. State of Karnataka and Ors, reported in [2010] 9 SCC 671. [7] Ram Jethmalani and Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in [2011] 9 SCC 751. [8] M/s. Jain Studios Ltd. vs. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd., reported in AIR 2006 SC 2986 . [9] Nawabkhan Abbaskhan vs. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1974 SC 1471 . 11. Therefore, the only question that arises for determination in this application is whether we should clarify our decision in the way suggested by Mr. Trivedi. 12. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the materials on record, we find that in our judgment indicated above, we specifically made it clear that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Land Development Corporation (Supra), the newly appointed employees should get at least, the total amount payable to an employee in the lowest grade of pay-scale in that post from the date of their appointment. We specifically clarified at para-18 of our judgment that the newly appointed employees, before getting the benefit of the first increment in the scale, should get the total amount payable to an employee in the lowest grade of the scale for the post, which means, the same is inclusive of all the allowances as well as grade pay plus pay band. Thus, there is no necessity of further clarification of our order regarding total quantum of amount directed to be paid by the State Government. 13. The next question is whether the amount payable should be given from the date of appointment or from the date of our judgment as contended by Mr. Trivedi. 14. Thus, there is no necessity of further clarification of our order regarding total quantum of amount directed to be paid by the State Government. 13. The next question is whether the amount payable should be given from the date of appointment or from the date of our judgment as contended by Mr. Trivedi. 14. On the above aspect, we first propose to deal with the question of financial implication of the matter as strenuously contended by Mr. Trivedi. 15. So far as the issue of financial implication is concerned, it is now settled by the Supreme Court that constitutional obligation cannot be avoided on the plea of financial implication. 16. At this stage, we may profitably refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Haryana State Minor Irrigation Tubewells Corporation and others vs. G.S. Uppal and others, reported in [2008] 7 SCC 375. The Supreme Court, in the above decision, made the following observations at paragraph 33: “The plea of the appellants that the Corporation is running under losses and it cannot meet the financial burden on account of revision of scales of pay has been rejected by the High Court and, in our view, rightly so. Whatever may be the factual position, there appears to be no basis for the action of the appellants in denying the claim of revision of pay scales to the respondents. If the Government feels that the Corporation is running into losses, measures of economy, avoidance of frequent writing off of dues, reduction of posts or repatriating deputationists may provide the possible solution to the problem. Be that as it may, such a contention may not be available to the appellants in the light of the principle enunciated by this Court in M.M.R. Khan vs. Union of India5 (sic) and Indian Overseas Bank vs. Staff Canteen Workers’ Union6 (sic). However, so long as the posts do exist and are manned, there appears to be no justification for granting the respondents a scale of pay lower than that sanctioned for those employees who are brought on deputation. In fact, the sequence of events discussed above clearly shows that the employees of the Corporation have been treated on a par with those in Government at the time of revision of scales of pay on every occasion.” 17. In fact, the sequence of events discussed above clearly shows that the employees of the Corporation have been treated on a par with those in Government at the time of revision of scales of pay on every occasion.” 17. Even more than 30 years ago, the Supreme Court in the case of Hussainara Khatoon and others vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna, reported in [1980] 1 SCC 98 = AIR 1979 SC 1369 , made the following observations on the above aspect in Paragraph 10: “The State cannot be permitted to deny the constitutional right of speedy trail to the accused on the ground that the State has no adequate financial resources to insure the necessary expenditure needed for improving the administrative and judicial apparatus with a view to ensuring speedy trial. The State may have its financial constraints and its priorities in expenditure, but, as pointed out by the Court in Rhem vs. Malclm, 377 F Supp 995 : ‘The law does not permit any Government to deprive its citizens of constitutional rights on a plea of poverty’. It is also interesting to notice what Justice, then Judge, Blackmum said in Jackson vs. Biship, 404 F Supp. 2d 571 : “Humane considerations and constitutional requirements are not, in this day, to be measured by dollar considerations...” (Emphasis supplied by us). 18. Subsequently, in the case of All India Judges’ Association and others vs. Union of India and others, reported in AIR 1993 SC 2493 , the Supreme Court in paragraph-6 dealt with similar contention in the following way: “The contention with regard to the financial burden likely to be imposed by the directions in question is equally misconceived. Firstly, the Courts do from time to time hand down decisions which have financial implications and the Government is obligated to loosen its purse recurrently pursuant to such decisions. Secondly, when the duties are obligatory, no grievance can be heard that they cast financial burden. Thirdly, compared to the other plan and non-plan expenditure, we find that the financial burden caused on account of the said directions is negligible. We should have thought that such plea was not raised to resist the discharge of the mandatory duties. The contention that the resources of all the States are not uniform has also to be rejected for the same reasons. We should have thought that such plea was not raised to resist the discharge of the mandatory duties. The contention that the resources of all the States are not uniform has also to be rejected for the same reasons. The directions prescribe, the minimum necessary service conditions and facilities for the proper administration of justice. We believe that the quality of justice administered and the calibre of the persons appointed to administer it are not of different grades in different States. Such contentions are ill-suited to the issues involved in the present case.” (Emphasis given by us). 19. On consideration of the above decisions of the Supreme Court, we are, therefore, of the opinion that on the plea of financial implication, a “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India should not be permitted to take the plea that notwithstanding exploitation of labour at its instance, such abuse in the past should not be remedied. 20. The next question is whether we can deny the benefit of just pay simply on the ground that the employees, with full knowledge of their disadvantage and violation of fundamental right, agreed to accept the fixed wages. 21. On this question, there is a direct judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Dhirendra Chamoli and another vs. State of U.P., reported in [1986] 1 SCC 637. 22. In the said case, two letters were received with a complaint that there were number of persons who were engaged by Nehru Yuvak Kendra as casual workers on daily wage basis and though they were doing the same work as was performed by Class-IV employees appointed on regular basis, they were not being given the same salary and allowances as were being paid to those Class-IV employees. 23. In such a case, the contention before the Supreme Court on behalf of the State of U.P. was that the Nehru Yuvak Kendras were started at different places of the country as temporary organizations and that they have not been made permanent, that there were no sanctioned posts of Class-IV employees and the employees who were engaged by different Nehru Yuvak Kendras were taken as casual employees on daily wage basis. 24. 24. It was further argued that since there were no sanctioned posts to which regular appointments could be made, the casual employees employed by different Kendras could not claim the same salary and perquisites as Class-IV employees appointed regularly to the sanctioned post. It was further argued before the Supreme Court that such persons took up employment with the Nehru Yuvak Kendras knowing fully well that they would be paid only daily wages, and therefore, the could not claim more. 25. In such a case, the Supreme took cognizance of an important fact that the persons engaged by the Nehru Yuvak Kendras performed the same duties as were performed by Class-IV employees appointed on regular basis against sanctioned post and came down heavily on such attitude exhibited by the government by observing as follows: “The argument envisaged in the counter-affidavit is that since there are no sanctioned posts to which regular appointments can be made, the casual employees employed by different Nehru Yuvak Kendras cannot claim to receive the same salary and perquisites as Class IV employees appointed regularly to sanctioned posts. But while raising this argument, it is conceded in the counter-affidavit that “the persons engaged by the Nehru Yuvak Kendras perform the same duties as is performed by Class IV employees appointed on regular basis against sanctioned posts”. If that be so, it is difficult to understand how the Central Government can deny to these employee the same salary and conditions of service as Class IV employees regularly appointed against sanctioned posts. It is peculiar on the part of the Central Government to urge that these persons took up employment with the Nehru Yuvak Kendras knowing fully well that they will be paid only daily wages and therefore they cannot claim more. This argument lies ill in the mouth of the Central Government for it is an all too familiar argument with the exploiting class and a welfare State committed to a socialist pattern of society cannot be permitted to advance such an argument. It must be remembered that in this country where there is so much unemployment, the choice for the majority of people is to starve or to take employment on whatever exploitative terms are offered by the employer. It must be remembered that in this country where there is so much unemployment, the choice for the majority of people is to starve or to take employment on whatever exploitative terms are offered by the employer. The fact that these employees accepted employment with full knowledge that they will be paid only daily wages and they will not get the same salary and conditions of service as other Class IV employees, cannot provide an escape to the Central Government to avoid the mandate of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. This article declares that there shall be equality before law and equal protection of the law and implicit in it is the further principle that there must be equal pay for work of equal value. These employees who are in the service of the different Nehru Yuvak Kendras in the country and who are admittedly performing the same duties as Class IV employees, must therefore get the same salary and conditions of service as Class IV employees. It makes no difference whether they are appointed in sanctioned posts or not. So long as they are performing the same duties, they must receive the same salary and conditions of service as Class IV employees. 3. We therefore allow the writ petitions and make the rule absolute and direct the Central Government to accord to these persons who are employed by the Nehru Yuvak Kendras and who are concededly performing the same duties as Class IV employees, the same salary and conditions of service as are being received by Class IV employees, except regularisation which cannot be done since there are no sanctioned posts. But we hope and trust that posts will be sanctioned by the Central Government in the different Nehru Yuvak Kendras, so that these persons can be regularised. It is not at all desirable that any management and particularly the Central Government should continue to employ persons on casual basis in organisations which have been in existence for over 12 years. The salary and allowances of Class IV employees shall be given to these persons employed in Nehru Yuvak Kendras with effect from the date when they were respectively employed. The Government of India will pay to the petitioners costs of the writ petitions fixed at a lump sum of Rs. 1000.” (Emphasis given by us). 26. The salary and allowances of Class IV employees shall be given to these persons employed in Nehru Yuvak Kendras with effect from the date when they were respectively employed. The Government of India will pay to the petitioners costs of the writ petitions fixed at a lump sum of Rs. 1000.” (Emphasis given by us). 26. It may be mentioned here that in Paragraph-3 of the judgment quoted above, the Supreme Court made it clear that the salary and allowances of Class-IV employees should be given to such persons employed in Nehru Yuvak Kendras with effect from the date they were respectively employed. 27. At this stage, it will also be profitable to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sanjit Roy vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in AIR 1983 SC 328 , where challenge before the Supreme Court was as to validity of Rajasthan Famine Relief Works Employees [Exemption from Labour Laws] Act, 1964 in so far as it excluded the applicability of the Minimum Wages Act, 1984 by reason of Section 3 of the Famine Relief Act. The principal grounds on which the constitutionality of the Exemption Act was challenged were based on Articles 14 and 23 of the Constitution of India. In such a case, the Supreme Court, relying on the judgment in the case of Peoples’ Union for Democratic Rights vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1982 SC 1473 , held as follows in Paragraph-4: “If this be the correct position in law, it is difficult to see how the constitutional validity of the Exemption Act in so far as it excludes the applicability of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 to the workmen employed in famine relief works can be sustained. Article 23, as pointed out above, mandates that no person shall be required or permitted to provide labour or service to another on payment of anything less than the minimum wage and if the Exemption Act, by excluding the applicability of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, provides that minimum wage may not be paid to a workman employed in any famine relief work, it would be clearly violative of Article 23. The respondent however contended that when the State undertakes famine relief work with a view to providing help to the persons affected by drought and scarcity conditions, it would be difficult for the State to comply with the labour laws, because if the State were required to observe the labour laws, the potential of the State to provide employment to the affected persons would be crippled and the State would not be able to render help to the maximum number of affected persons and it was for this reason that the applicability of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 was excluded, in relation to workmen employed in famine relief work. This contention, plausible though it may seem is, in my opinion, unsustainable and cannot be accepted. When the State undertakes famine relief work, it is no doubt true that it does so in order to provide relief to persons affected by drought and scarcity conditions but nonetheless, it is work which enures for the benefit of the State representing the society and if labour or service is provided by the affected persons for carrying out such work, there is no reason why the State should pay anything less than the minimum wage to the affected persons. It is not as if a dole or bounty is given by the State to the affected persons in order to provide relief to them against drought and scarcity conditions nor is the work to be carried out by the affected persons worthless or useless to the society so that under the guise of providing work what the State in effect and substance seeks to do is to give a dole or bounty to the affected persons. The Court cannot proceed on the basis that the State would undertake by way of famine relief, work which is worthless and without utility for the society and indeed no democratic State which is administered by a sane and sensible Government would do so because it would be sheer waste of human labour and resource which can usefully be diverted into fruitful and productive channels leading to the welfare of the community and creation of national asset or wealth. It is difficult to appreciate why the State should require the affected persons to provide labour or service on work which is of no use to the society, instead of simply distributing dole or bounty amongst the affected persons. It is difficult to appreciate why the State should require the affected persons to provide labour or service on work which is of no use to the society, instead of simply distributing dole or bounty amongst the affected persons. There is no reason why the State should resort to such a camouflage. The presumption therefore must be that the work undertaken by the State by way of famine relief is useful to the society and, productive in terms of creation of some asset or wealth and when the State exacts labour or service from the affected persons for carrying out such work, for example, a bridge or a road, which has utility for the society and which is going to augment the wealth of the State, there can be no justification for the State not to pay the minimum wage to the affected persons. The State cannot be permitted to take advantage of the helpless condition of the affected persons and exact labour or service from them on payment of less than the minimum wage. No work of utility and value can be allowed to be constructed on the blood and sweat of persons who are reduced to a state of helplessness on account of drought and scarcity conditions. The State cannot under the guise of helping these affected persons exact work of utility and value from them without paying them the minimum wage. Whenever any labour or service is taken by the State from any person, whether he be affected by drought and scarcity conditions or not, the State must pay, at the least minimum wage to such person on pain of violation of Article 23 and the Exemption Act in so far as it excludes the applicability of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 to workmen employed on famine relief work and permits payment of less than the minimum wage to such workmen, must be held to be invalid as offending the provisions of Article 23. The Exemption Act cannot in the circumstances be relied upon by the respondent as exempting it from the liability to pay minimum wage to the workmen engaged in the construction work of Madanganj Harman Road.” (Emphasis supplied). 27.1 At this stage, we cannot resist the temptation of quoting some portion of paragraph-14 of the judgment in the case of Peoples’ Union for Democratic Rights [Supra]. 27.1 At this stage, we cannot resist the temptation of quoting some portion of paragraph-14 of the judgment in the case of Peoples’ Union for Democratic Rights [Supra]. “What Article 23 prohibits is ‘forced labour’ that is labour or service which a person is forced to provide and ‘force’ which would make such labour or service ‘forced labour’ may arise; in several ways. It may be physical force which may compel a person to provide labour or service to another or it may be force exerted through a legal provision such as a provision for imprisonment or fine in case the employee fails to provide labour or service or it may even be compulsion arising from hunger and poverty, want and destitution. Any factor which deprives a person of a choice of alternatives and compels him to adopt one particular course of action may properly be regarded as ‘force’ and if labour or service is compelled as a result of such ‘force’, it would be ‘forced labour’. (Emphasis given by us). 28. Therefore, we find no substance in the contention of Mr. Trivedi, the learned Advocate General, appearing on behalf of the State, that the employees being fully aware of their disadvantageous position having accepted the job with their eyes open, they should not get the benefit of our judgment from the very date of the appointment. Approval of the above contention of Mr. Trivedi amounts to endorsement of “forced labour” or exploitation at the instance of the State. 29. The other contention of Mr. Trivedi that we having relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Land Development Corporation and Another vs. Mohd. Khursheed Anwar and Anr. (Supra) and the said decision being a new decision on the question deviating from the earlier one, the same should be given effect prospectively is also bereft of any substance. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of Assistant Commissioner, Income Tax, Rajkot vs. Saurastra Kutch Stock Exchange Limited reported in (2008) 14 SCC 171, the judicial decisions are generally retrospective unless specifically declared to be prospective. We propose to rely upon the following observations of C.K. Thakkar. J. delivering the judgment for the bench: “In our judgment, it is also well settled that a judicial decision acts retrospectively. We propose to rely upon the following observations of C.K. Thakkar. J. delivering the judgment for the bench: “In our judgment, it is also well settled that a judicial decision acts retrospectively. According to Blackstonian theory, it is not the function of the court to pronounce a “new rule” but to maintain and expound the “old one”. In other words, Judges do not make law, they only discover or find the correct law. The law has always been the same. If a subsequent decision alters the earlier one, it (the later decision) does not make new law. It only discovers the correct principle of law which has to be applied retrospectively. To put it differently, even where an earlier decision of the court operated for quite some time, the decision rendered later on would have retrospective effect clarifying the legal position which was earlier not correctly understood. 36. Salmond in his well known work states: “[The theory of case law is that a judge does not make law; he merely declares it; and the overruling of a previous decision is a declaration that the supposed rule never was law. Hence any intermediate transactions made on the strength of the supposed rule are governed by the law established in the overruling decision. The overruling is retrospective, except as regards matters that are res judicatae or accounts that have been settled in the meantime.” (emphasis supplied) 37. It is no doubt true that after a historic decision in Golak Nath vs. State of Punjab13 (sic) this Court has accepted the doctrine of “prospective overruling”. It is based on the philosophy: “The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.” It may, however, be stated that this is an exception to the general rule of the doctrine of precedent.” 29.1 In the above case of Golak Nath, the majority of the judges expressed the following view as regards the prospective overruling of the decisions: “In lndia there is no statutory prohibition against the Court refusing to give retroactivity to the law declared by it. Indeed, the doctrine of res judicata precludes any scope for retroactivity in respect of a subject matter that has been finally decided between the parties. Further, Indian Courts by interpretation reject retroactivity to statutory provisions though couched in general terms on the ground that they affect vested rights. Indeed, the doctrine of res judicata precludes any scope for retroactivity in respect of a subject matter that has been finally decided between the parties. Further, Indian Courts by interpretation reject retroactivity to statutory provisions though couched in general terms on the ground that they affect vested rights. The present case only attempts a further extension of the said rule against retroactivity. 50. Our Constitution does not expressly or by necessary implication speak against the doctrine of prospective overruling. Indeed, Arts. 32, 141 and 142 are couched in such wide and elastic terms as to enable this Court to formulate legal doctrines to meet the ends of justice. The only limitation thereon is reason, restraint and injustice. Under Art. 32, for the enforcement of the fundamental rights the Supreme Court has the power to issue suitable directions or orders or writs. Article 141 says that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Court s: and Art. 142 enables it in the exercise of its jurisdiction to pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. These articles are designedly made comprehensive to enable the Supreme Court to declare law and to give such directions or pass such orders, as are necessary to do complete justice. The expression “declared” is wider than the words “found or made”. To declare is to announce opinion. Indeed, the latter involves the process, while the former expresses result. Interpretation, ascertainment and evolution are parts of the process, while that interpreted, ascertained or evolved is declared as law. The law declared by the Supreme Court is the law of the land. If so, we do not see any acceptable reason why it, in declaring the law in supersession of the law declared by it earlier, could not restrict the operation of the law as declared to future and save the transactions, whether statutory or otherwise that were effected on the basis of the earlier law. To deny this power to the Supreme Court on the basis of some outmoded theory that the Court only finds law but does not make it is to make ineffective the powerful instrument of justice placed in the hands of the highest judiciary of this country. 51. To deny this power to the Supreme Court on the basis of some outmoded theory that the Court only finds law but does not make it is to make ineffective the powerful instrument of justice placed in the hands of the highest judiciary of this country. 51. As this Court for the first time has been called upon to apply the doctrine evolved in a different country under different circumstances, we would like to move warily in the beginning. We would lay down the following propositions: (1) The doctrine of prospective overruling can be invoked only in matters arising under our Constitution; (2) it can be applied only by the highest, court of the country, i.e., the Supreme Court as it has the constitutional jurisdiction to declare law binding on all the courts in India; (3) the scope of the retroactive operation of the law declared by the Supreme Court superseding its “earlier decisions” is left to its discretion to be moulded in accordance with the justice of the cause or matter before it.” (Emphasis supplied). 29.2 The above principles are still the law of the land as regards the doctrine of prospective precedent. 30. We find that in the case of U.P. Land Development Corporation and Another vs. Mohd. Khursheed Anwar and Anr. (Supra) relied upon by us in our judgment, the Supreme Court did not lay down the law prospectively; on the other hand, as it appears from paragraph 18 of the judgment, the Supreme Court directed the Government to pay to the respondents minimum of the pay-scale prescribed for the post of Assistant Engineer (as revised from time to time) from the date of their appointment till they continued in the employment of the Corporation. We are also not impressed by the submission of Mr. Trivedi that as we have not declared the entire resolution as ultra vires but only part of the same by accepting the other part as valid, we can, in the special fact of the case, save even the vitiated part of the resolution by declaring that part as ultra vires prospectively. 30.1 Thus, there is no scope of applying the above principle prospectively as suggested by Mr. Trivedi. 31. We, now propose to deal with the decisions cited by Mr. Trivedi. 32. In the case of Orissa Cement Ltd. vs. State of Orissa and Ors. 30.1 Thus, there is no scope of applying the above principle prospectively as suggested by Mr. Trivedi. 31. We, now propose to deal with the decisions cited by Mr. Trivedi. 32. In the case of Orissa Cement Ltd. vs. State of Orissa and Ors. (Supra), the Supreme Court held that although the levy of cess involved therein was unconstitutional, still, there should not be any direction to refund to the assessees any amount of cess collected until the date on which the levy in question had been declared unconstitutional. According to the Supreme Court, although it had found that the assessment was void, yet it was not bound to exercise its discretion directing repayment. By relying upon the said decision, Mr. Trivedi strenuously contended before us that we should also pass direction for arrears payment only from the date of the judgment. 33. We have already pointed out that the power to declare an ultra vires act only prospectively lies with the Supreme Court alone but not conferred on High Courts. Therefore, the said decision is not an authority for the proposition that even the High Court, after holding that an act of a “State” is unconstitutional, can nevertheless grant relief only prospectively. 34. In the case of South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. and etc. etc. vs. Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. and others etc. etc., (Supra), the Supreme Court took a similar view. 35. In our opinion, the Supreme Court in those cases decided to exercise such discretion in the facts of those cases by exercising its power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. 36. Similarly, in the case of Somaiya Organics [India] Ltd. and Another vs. State of U.P. and Anr. (Supra), the Supreme Court specifically exercised prospective overruling in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. 37. In the case of Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar and Ors. vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors. (Supra), the Supreme Court held that the relevant statutory provision involved in the said matter was violative of Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the reassessment should be made with retrospective effect and the petitioners should be given benefit of seniority, pay and other allowances from respective dates on which they would had been promoted, had the promotion been made on correct post indicated in the judgment. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the reassessment should be made with retrospective effect and the petitioners should be given benefit of seniority, pay and other allowances from respective dates on which they would had been promoted, had the promotion been made on correct post indicated in the judgment. The Supreme Court, however, clarified that as far as arrears of pay and other allowances were concerned, those should not be given for a period prior to the filing of the petition. 38. It is, therefore, apparent that in the facts of the said case, the Supreme Court passed such order prospectively to a limited extent and that this direction was passed in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution. 39. In the case of State of U.P. and others vs. U.P. Sales Tax Officers Grade II Association (Supra), it appears from paragraph 15 of the judgment that even after declaring a particular provision as unconstitutional, for the ends of justice, the Supreme Court directed that arrears of pay based on refixation in the revised scale should be given from the date of filing of the petition in the High Court. Thus, the said direction was passed in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution. 40. In the case of State of Haryana and Ors. vs. Charanjit Singh and Ors. (Supra), while remanding the matter, the Supreme Court directed the High Court that on the basis of material placed before it if it was convinced that there was equal work of equal quality and all other relevant factors were fulfilled then it might direct payment of equal pay from the date of filing of the respective petition. Therefore, the said case is also one passed by the Supreme Court in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution. 41. In the case of State of Kerala and others vs. E.K. Bhaskaran Pillai (Supra), the Supreme Court granted benefit from the date of filing of the petition before the Court without, however, giving any reason. Therefore, the said decision cannot be treated to be a precedent authorizing even the High Courts to exercise power similar to the one prescribed under Article 142 of the constitution. 42. Therefore, the said decision cannot be treated to be a precedent authorizing even the High Courts to exercise power similar to the one prescribed under Article 142 of the constitution. 42. Lastly, in the case of Gajaji Gopalji Jadeja vs. State of Gujarat (Supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court while allowing a writ-application on service matter, after accepting the allegation of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, ultimately, passed direction that the petitioner would be given arrears of service benefits and fixation of pay-scale from the date on which the petition had been filed. 43. By relying upon the above decisions, Mr. Trivedi tried to convince us that we should also exercise such discretion. We have already held that once an Act has been held to be ultra vires and that too on the basis of a decision of the Supreme Court, which did not enforce the said law prospectively, but specifically applied the same retrospectively, the said principle cannot be applied prospectively on the ground of adverse financial implication on the exploiter or for the reason of estoppel against an exploited employee which we have already discussed in detailed above. 44. All the decisions cited by Mr. Trivedi are thus of no assistance to his clients. 45. In view of what has been stated above, we find that there is no necessity of modifying or clarifying our judgment by giving prospective benefit to the employees, as suggested by the State. Similarly, in our original order, we have held with sufficient clarity that the employees should get the entire amount including all allowances and grade pay from very date of their joining. 46. The application for modification is thus dismissed. However, having regard to the fact that this application was pending, we extend the time for compliance of our order by further one month from today. The other application for extension of time of compliance of our order is also disposed of in terms of this order. After the above order is pronounced, Mr. Trivedi, the learned Advocate General prays for stay of operation of our aforesaid order. Since we have already stayed the operation of our order for one month for compliance, there is no necessity of passing any further order.