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2012 DIGILAW 3235 (MAD)

A. Venkatesan v. Banu Sundaram

2012-07-24

G.RAJASURIA

body2012
Judgment :- 1. Animadverting upon the the judgment and decrees dated 28.2.2012 passed by the VIII Small Causes Court, Chennai, in R.C.A.Nos.116 & 118 of 2011 confirming the orders dated 22.10.2010 passed by the XII Small Causes Court, Chennai, in M.P.No.263 of 2010 and RCOP No.1344 of 2009, respectively, these civil revision petitions are filed. 2. The parties, for the sake of convenience are referred to hereunder according to their litigative status and ranking before the Rent Controller. 3. Compendiously and concisely, the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of both these civil revision petitions would run thus: (i) The respondent herein/landlady filed the RCOP No.1344 of 2009, invoking Sections 10(2)(i) and 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, seeking eviction on the following grounds: (a) de-fault in paying the rents; (b) additional accommodation. (ii) Whereupon counter was filed. (iii) In the meanwhile, the same respondent herein/landlady filed the application M.P.No.263 of 2010 under Sections 11(3) and 11(4) of the Act. Whereupon counter was filed. (iv) After hearing both sides, the learned Rent Controller in the said M.P.No.263 of 2010, vide order dated 8.10.2010, mandated the revision petitioner herein/tenant thus: "In the result, the respondent is directed to pay/deposit the rental arrears from July 2008 to September 2010 @ Rs.3000/- p.m. Totally Rs.81,000/-to the petitioner on or before 21.10.2010 and should pay the subsequent rents from October 2010 to the petitioner on or before the 7th day of succeeding month failing which, this petition will be allowed. Reporting compliance call on 22.10.2010." (v) However, there was non-compliance with the said order. (vi) Thereafter, the Rent Controller passed the order dated 22.10.2010 in the RCOP No.1344 of 2009 thus: "5. After close and careful perusal of the documents in M.P.No.263 of 2010, this Court passed the conditional order directing the respondent to deposit the arrears on or before 21.10.2010. The case was posted for reporting compliance call on 22.10.2010. But the respondent failed to comply the conditional order and did not take any steps to pay the arrears to the petitioner or to deposit the said arrears before this Court, Hence, M.P.No.263 of 2010 is allowed to day due to non-compliance of conditional order. In the circumstances, this Court finds that further proceedings have to be stopped and eviction is to be ordered. In the result, this petition is allowed. Eviction is ordered. In the circumstances, this Court finds that further proceedings have to be stopped and eviction is to be ordered. In the result, this petition is allowed. Eviction is ordered. Time for eviction is one month. The respondent to pay costs of Rs.1,000/-." (vii) Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said orders passed in the M.P. and in the RCOP, two appeals, R.C.A.Nos.116 and 118 of 2011 were filed. (viii) During the pendency of the said appeals, M.P.No.190 of 2011 was filed and stay was sought for. (ix) At that time, the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority ordered that the rent arrears should be paid as ordered by the Rent Controller and the said order is extracted hereunder: "petition to pass an order of stay of all further proceedings in pursuance of order dated 22.10.10 in RCOP No.1343-09 on the file of the XII Judge CSC, Ch.104. C.C not furnished. Hg.17.3.11 Submitted for orders Heard The petitioner undertake to deposit the rent before the court without prejudice my (sic) claim. 17.2.11 Counsel for petitioner. Filed a petition the petitioner is undertake to pay the rent. Hence interim stay is granted on condition that the petitioners is directed to pay or deposit the rental arrears as directed by the learned rent controller on or before 4.3.11. now by 4.3.11. M.P.190-11 RCA 116-11 4.3.11 vak. Conditional order not complied. Memo filed condition order complied for produce of receipt by 21.3.11. Vaklatfiled by Mr.K.P. Asok adj. to counter. (extracted as such) (x) Thereupon the arrears were paid, however, subsequently the future rents were not paid pending the RCA. The records would show that M.P.No.63 of 2012 was filed by the tenant with the following prayer: "It is prayed that this Ho'ble Court may be pleased to permit the petitioner to deposit the further rents and the further rents and the future rents every month in M.P.No.190/11 in RCA No.116 of 2011 without prejudice to the case of the petitioner and pass suitable orders therefore." (xi) The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant would submit that in the said application, no order was passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority under the Rent Control Act. (xii) Ultimately, the Rent Control Appellate Authority dismissed both the RCAs. 4. (xii) Ultimately, the Rent Control Appellate Authority dismissed both the RCAs. 4. Challenging and impugning, questioning and disputing the correctness of the orders and judgements passed by the Courts below, these two civil revision petitions are focussed by the tenant on various grounds. 5. The learned Senior counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant, by placing reliance on the grounds of revisions, would pilot his arguements, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus: (a) The revision petitioner herein candidly and categorically, without mincing words, disputed the landlady and tenant relationship between the respondent herein and the revision petitioner. Whereupon, the Rent Controller, as per the second proviso appended to Section 10(1) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, should have conducted enquiry as to whether such denial of landlady and tenant relationship is a bona fide one or not. Without resorting to such exercise, holus-bolus, i.e. all of a sudden, the Rent Controller entertained the application filed by the respondent herein/landlady under Section 11 of the Act, and even without giving due opportunity of being heard to the revision petitioner herein, he simply mandated the revision petitioner herein to deposit the rent arrears and still thereafter, without even giving opportunity to explain about the non-compliance with the said order, the Rent Controller, passed virtually the eviction order. (b) The learned counsel for the revision petitioner herein, who appeared before the Rent Controller, did not appear before him and argue the matter relating to the application under Section 11 of the Act and no opportunity also was given to him to file documents to substantiate the plea of the revision petitioner herein/tenant that there was no landlady and tenant relationship. As such, another application was filed by the revision petitioner herein to get the ex-parte order set aside. But that was returned with the following endorsement: "The order in M.P.No.263 of 2010 is not an exparte order. Hence, set-aside petition is not maintainable. An appeal to be filed Hence returned" (extracted as such) (c) Thereupon regular RCAs were filed as against the orders passed in M.P.No.263 of 2010 and in the RCOP NO.1344 of 2009. (d) The appellate authority, at the time of granting stay, ordered that the arrears should be paid; whereupon the entire arrears as it stood as on that day was paid. (d) The appellate authority, at the time of granting stay, ordered that the arrears should be paid; whereupon the entire arrears as it stood as on that day was paid. In such a case, absolutely there is nothing to show that there was non-compliance with the order passed by the Rent Controller. (e) No application under Section 11 of the Act was filed before the appellate authority by the landlady for stoppage of the proceedings in the RCAs. (f) After facing dismissal of the RCAs by the revision petitioner herein/tenant, these civil revision petitions were filed and at that time, as per the order of this Court dated 27.4.2012, the entire arrears of Rs.57,000/-, as it stood as on that date, was deposited. As such, without prejudice, the said amounts also were paid and there is nothing to indicate that there was non-compliance with the order of the Rent Controller. (g) Irrespective of the fact whether the Rent Controller passed the order under Section 11 of the Act or not, the Rent Controller was enjoined to conduct enquiry as per the second proviso appended to Section 10(1) of the Act as to whether the plea of the revision petitioner herein/tenant that there was no relationship of landlady and tenant was bona fide or not. Without conducting such enquiry, the order passed in the application under Section 11 of the Act cannot be implemented. (h) If at all there is no dispute relating to landlady and tenant relationship, then Section 11 can be pressed into service, as a matter of course. But that is not the case here. It is the specific case of the revision petitioner/tenant that vacant site was taken on lease from the original lessor-the erstwhile owner of the property and a superstructure was put up by the revision petitioner herein/tenant and the respondent herein claims that she purchased from the original owner the entire property and that too, as a garage. The alleged garage was not put up by the vendor of the respondent herein, but the superstructure was put up by the revision petitioner herein. As such, without taking into account all these facts, the Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority simply ordered eviction, warranting interference in revision. 6. The alleged garage was not put up by the vendor of the respondent herein, but the superstructure was put up by the revision petitioner herein. As such, without taking into account all these facts, the Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority simply ordered eviction, warranting interference in revision. 6. In a bid to torpedo and extirpate the arguements and pleas as put forth on the side of the revision petitioner/tenant, the learned Senior counsel for the respondent/landlady would pilot his arguements, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus: (i) Dubbing or describing, projecting or portraying the orders of the Rent Controller dated 8.10.2010 and 22.10.2010 as ex-parte ones, would lead to travesty of justice. The orders would read that the Rent Controller heard both sides and thereafter passed the orders and the revision petitioner/tenant cannot be heard to contend otherwise. (ii) The matter has been pending ever since July 2009 before the Rent Controller and the first order was passed on 8.10.2010, and thereafter the eviction order was passed. As such, for more than a year the matter was pending and in such a case, it would not lie in the mouth of the revision petitioner/tenant to contend that opportunity was not given to file documents and put forth his case. (iii) In view of the recitals in the sale deed in favour of the respondent herein/landlady, the learned Rent Controller found that there was prima facie evidence in favour of the landlady and reserving further probe relating to that fact, invoked Order 11 and passed the order dated 8.10.2010 mandating the revision petitioner/tenant to deposit the arrears. Consequent upon non-compliance with the said order by the revision petitioner herein, the eviction was ordered and in such a case, nothing could be find fault with the procedure adopted by the Rent Controller. (iv) The second proviso appended to Section 10(1) of the Act cannot be pressed into service so far this case is concerned, as Section 11 of the Act is independent and the Rent Controller, pending further and final adjudication on the pleas of the respondent there, who is the revision petitioner herein, passed such an order. (v) Once such an order was passed, it is the duty of the tenant to comply with the said order, despite his intention to challenge and object to it. But that was not done so. (v) Once such an order was passed, it is the duty of the tenant to comply with the said order, despite his intention to challenge and object to it. But that was not done so. (vi) Even after depositing the arrears as mandated by the appellate authority, there is default in paying the subsequent rents. Only when this Court, as a revisional Court ordered for deposit of the arrears, vide order dated 27.4.2012, the tenant deposited the arrears and that shows the conduct of the revision petitioner/tenant and no indulgence can be shown in favour of such person. (vii) There is no shard or shred, jot or miniscule evidence to show that any vacant site was taken on lease from the vendor of the respondent herein and in such a case, the Rent Controller, from the available evidence, invoked Section 11 of the Act, which cannot be found fault with. 7. Both sides cited precedents in support of their respective pleas and contentions. 8. The points for consideration are as under: (i) Whether there is any perversity or illegality in the order passed by the Rent Controller in mandating the revision petitioner/tenant to deposit the arrears of rent by invoking Section 11 of the Act, despite the tenant having taken the plea that the superstructure belonged to him and not to the vendor of the respondent herein/landlady and also the plea that there was no landlady and tenant relationship between the respondent herein and the revision petitioner? (ii) Whether the orders passed by the Rent Controller could be labelled as ex-parte ones in the facts and circumstances of this case? (iii) Whether there is any illegality in the order passed by the appellate authority in confirming the orders of the Rent Controller? 9. At the outset I would like to refer to the arguments advanced by the learned Senior counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant that the impugned orders passed by the Rent Controller were ex-parte ones. A plain reading of the orders passed by the Rent Controller on 8.10.2010 and 22.10.201 would clearly demonstrate and display that he heard advocates on both sides and at the pre-amble, he referred to that fact. Over and above that in the body of the order also he referred to the same fact. A plain reading of the orders passed by the Rent Controller on 8.10.2010 and 22.10.201 would clearly demonstrate and display that he heard advocates on both sides and at the pre-amble, he referred to that fact. Over and above that in the body of the order also he referred to the same fact. In such a case, as per the well settled proposition of law, the higher fora are normally expected to believe the endorsement of the lower Court. 10. The learned Senior counsel for the revision petitioner herein/tenant would look askance at it and point out that in view of the order having been passed ex-parte, the revision petitioner/tenant was constrained to file subsequently an application, which was returned. Had really the advocate for the revision petitioner/tenant before the lower Court appeared, then such an application would not have been filed. 11. However, the learned Senior counsel for the respondent herein/landlady would counter such arguement by pointing out that there was no ex-parte order passed and the matter has been pending for more than a year before the Rent Controller and after hearing both sides adequately, the order was passed and it cannot be labelled as an ex-parte order. 12. At this juncture I would like to point out that the Rent Controller on finding that the order was not ex-parte, he returned that the application filed by the revision petitioner/tenant for getting the ex-parte order set aside. What prevented the revision petitioner herein to file appeal as against such order, remains a mystery. If really, according to the revision petitioner herein/tenant, the order passed on 8.10.2010 is an ex-parte one, what prevented him from filing the RCA as against the said order. The learned Senior counsel for the tenant would submit that no such appeal was filed as against the said order, but straight away, the tenant preferred appeals as against the said two orders passed on 8.10.2010 and 22.10.2010. 13. I recollect Section 114(e) of the Indian Evidence Act, which runs thus: "Sec.114. Court may presume existence of certain facts – The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. The Court may presume- (a) . . . . . (b) . . The Court may presume- (a) . . . . . (b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (e) That judicial and official acts have been regularly performed;" which embodies the maxim "omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta', i.e. all acts are presumed to have been rightly and regularly done. 14. My mind is reminiscent and redolent of the following decisions of the Honourable Apex Court. (i) 1982 SC 1249, 1251 – STATE OF MAHARASHTRA V. RAMDAS SHRINIVAS NAYAK. Which would lay down the law to the effect that the statement of the Judges cannot be allowed to be contradicted by statements at the Bar or by affidavit and other evidence. If the Judges say in their judgement that something was done, said or admitted before them, that has to be last word on the subject. 15. A mere reading of the above precedent would show that whenever any dispute arises with regard to endorsements made by the lower Court relating to appearance of parties are concerned, the normal rule is that the Judge's endorsement should be given weightage, as otherwise, the Court proceedings cannot be conducted in a dignified manner. There is no prima facie or ex facie material which could lead to any suspicion concerning the endorsement of appearance made by the learned Rent Controller. Accordingly, I cannot legally treat the said orders as an ex-parte ones. 16. The contention as put forth by the learned Senior counsel on the side of the revision petitioner/tenant that whatever be the order passed under Section 11, the law enjoins the Rent Controller to give a finding as to whether the plea taken by the revision petitioner that there was no landlady and tenant relationship should be dealt with and a finding should be given before implementing such order. In support of his arguement, he would cite the following decisions of this Court: (i) 2000 M.L.J.(SUPP.) 243 – ABDUL HUQ AND OTHERS V. S.K.KANDASAMY NADAR AND ANOTHER, certain excerpts from it would run thus: "4. . . . It is clear that both the Rent Controller and the appellate authority proceeded on the wrong assumption that the petitioners have admitted that they are sub-lessess of S.K. Kandasamy Nadar. The said conclusions of both the authorities is liable to be set aside. . . . It is clear that both the Rent Controller and the appellate authority proceeded on the wrong assumption that the petitioners have admitted that they are sub-lessess of S.K. Kandasamy Nadar. The said conclusions of both the authorities is liable to be set aside. In a matter like this, when a specific plea is taken disputing the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, it is but proper to conduct an enquiry and decide the said question before dealing with an application filed under Sec.11 of the Act. It is clear from the provisions that in dealing with an applicatioin under Sec.11 of the Act, where the relationship of the landlord and tenant is admitted, no difficulty arises. However, in cases where such relationship was disputed by placing acceptable evidence, the Rent Controller has to adjudicate upon the relationship and pass appropriate orders and cannot throw out the application on the ground that there is a disputed relationship. It is the duty of the Rent Controller to decide the said question before dealing with an application under Sec.11, of the Act. The same view has been reiterated by Ratnam, J.,(as he then was) in Kesava Naicker v. Sivananda Mudaliar, 93 L.W.484. The legal position as well as the factual error committed by both the authorities has not been seriously disputed by the learned counsel for the respondent." (ii) 1999-M.L.J.740 – SCHWARTZ DASAN V. K.S.DEVADOSS AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus: "2. . . . . . The lower appellate authority has remitted the matter back to the rent controller for deciding the issue as to whether there is a relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and the first respondent and whether there was wilful default in payment of rent." 12. When we come to the order to be passed under Sec.11(4) it is no doubt on the petitioner of eviction. But as I have already indicated the order passed under Sec.11(4) is only consequential but the order passed under Sec.11(4) cannot stand by itself. In all the cases when an order is passed under Sec.11(3), the main appeal is invariably against that order. Therefore, in my view when a tenant prefers an appeal against the order passed under Sec.11(3), there is no necessity for him to deposit the arrears." 17. In all the cases when an order is passed under Sec.11(3), the main appeal is invariably against that order. Therefore, in my view when a tenant prefers an appeal against the order passed under Sec.11(3), there is no necessity for him to deposit the arrears." 17. I would like to point out that this is a singularly singular case, in which, the tenant would not go to the extent of alleging that there was no landlady and tenant relationship between himself and the vendor of the respondent herein. What he would try to canvass was that under the vendor of the respondent herein, he took on lease a small vacant portion of land and in that he had put up a structure and doing business in vulcanising. Accordingly, he would try to canvass his case to the effect that the demised premises cannot be taken as a structure or building, but it could only be construed as a vacant site, which is beyond the purview of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. In support of his plea, he would also cite the following decision of the Honourable Apex Court. (2000) M.L.J.(SUPP.) 126 (S.C.) -KAMALA DEVI V. LAXMI DEVI, certain excerpts from it would run thus: "17. . . . . . . The definition of the term 'building' in Sec.2, clause (2) of the Madras Act was in heac verba with the definition in the Delhi Act. It was held that in determining the question whether the lease was of a vacant land or a building within the meaning of the Madras Act the Court must take into account both form and substance of the transaction; the landlord was aware that there were certain structures on land but what was let out was not the structures but the land. Consequently, the appeal of the tenant was dismissed on the ground that the Madras Act was not applicable and the suit was maintainable in the Civil Court. 18. What is, however, next contended for the respondent is that since the respondent had raised the latrine on the suit plot, it will have to be treated as part of the building which was already in occupation of the respondent. We are afraid, we cannot accept this submission of the learned amicus curiae. The building which was let out to the respondent is a different premises under a different agreement. We are afraid, we cannot accept this submission of the learned amicus curiae. The building which was let out to the respondent is a different premises under a different agreement. The suit plot cannot be treated as part of that building as a separate tenancy was created in respect of the suit plot under the compromise." 18. At present this Court is not concerned with the fact as to whether in strictosensu, a vacant land was leased out or a land with superstructure was leased out. The Rent Controller, in my opinion, correctly in paragraph No.6 of his order dated 8.10.2010 observed that in order to decide the plea of landlady and tenant relationship evidence had to be entertained and accordingly it should be dealt with later; however, pending such further probe into the matter, the admitted rent should be paid. According to the learned Rent Controller, the admitted rent was Rs.3000/-per month and that arrears of such rent was mandated to be paid. 19. The learned Senior counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant would raise the point that when the revision petitioner/tenant was contending that the respondent was not the owner of the building and that he was not a tenant of that building under the respondent or her vendor, where is the question of mandating the revision petitioner/tenant to comply with Section 11 of the Act. 20. At first blush, his arguement may sound very attractive. However, the learned Senior counsel for the respondent herein/landlady would, in an attempt to counter such arguement, put forth the plea of the respondent herein that ex facie and prima facie there was evidence before the Rent Controller to pass orders under Section 11 of the Act. The Registered deed in favour of the respondent herein/landlady unambiguously and unequivocally highlighted the fact that the respondent herein purchased a garage, so to say, the site as well as the superstructure thereon, in which, the revision petitioner herein/tenant is occupying and doing vulcanising business. In such a case, no more evidence is required at that stage for passing interim order under Section 11 of the Act on 8.4.2010. 21. Thereafter, because of the non-compliance with that order and in view of the absence of any explanation forth coming from the side of the revision petitioner herein/tenant, the final order dated 22.10.2010 under Section 11 of the Act was passed, which cannot be found fault with. 21. Thereafter, because of the non-compliance with that order and in view of the absence of any explanation forth coming from the side of the revision petitioner herein/tenant, the final order dated 22.10.2010 under Section 11 of the Act was passed, which cannot be found fault with. 22. The learned Senior counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant would submit that his client is having some unregistered documents, which would show that he took on lease only the vacant site from the respondent's vendor. 23. If that be so, there is no knowing of the fact as to what prevented the tenant for one long year to file such document before the Rent Controller. Absolutely there is no explanation in that regard. 24. The contentions on the side of the revision petitioner/tenant that the finding of the Rent Controller under second proviso appended to Section 10(1)(3) of the Act is a must for passing order under Section 11 or that at least, after passing order under Section 11, such an undertaking should be taken as per the said second proviso appended to Section 10(1) of the Act and that in the absence of such exercise by the Rent Controller, the question of evicting the alleged tenant would not arise, are untenable. 25. I would like to point out that in a case where out and out there is no semblance of evidence showing the landlady and tenant relationship before passing order under Section 11 of the Act, as highlighted in the judgments of this Court reported in 2000 M.L.J.(SUPP.) 243 – ABDUL HUQ AND OTHERS V. S.K.KANDASAMY NADAR AND ANOTHER and 1999-M.L.J.740 – SCHWARTZ DASAN V. K.S.DEVADOSS AND OTHERS, there must be prima facie evidence of landlord and tenant relationship. In this case, it has to be seen as to whether before the Rent Controller there was any such evidence. 26. The sale deed in favour of the respondent herein/landlady was relied on by the Rent Controller and he referred to it in his order that the respondent/landlady is the owner of the structure. 27. No doubt, the revision petitioner herein did not accept it. But that has to be probed further, undoubtedly. 26. The sale deed in favour of the respondent herein/landlady was relied on by the Rent Controller and he referred to it in his order that the respondent/landlady is the owner of the structure. 27. No doubt, the revision petitioner herein did not accept it. But that has to be probed further, undoubtedly. Pending such probe and passing orders by the Court and filing appeal, revision etc., by the tenant, the revision petitioner herein/tenant cannot take it as a carte blanche on his part in refraining from paying the admitted rent of Rs.3000/- per month, even for the site. 28. Once again the learned Senior counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant would stress upon the fact the question of paying the admitted rent of Rs.3000/- for the site in favour of the respondent herein, who is not the owner of the building as contemplated in the Act, would not arise at all. 29. To the risk of repetition and pleonasm, but without being tautalogous, I would like to point out that the Rent Controller has to proceed from stage to stage. The Rent Controller was fully conscious of the dispute between the parties. It is not a case where out and out the revision petitioner/tenant is a stranger to the vendor of the respondent herein. The only dispute the revision petitioner/tenant raised was that on a vacant site, which he took on lease from the respondent's vendor, he put up the superstructure. 30. The Rent Controller felt that there was prima facie evidence in favour of the respondent herein/landlady relating to the superstructure; whereupon he passed the orders. In such a case, there is no knowing of the fact as to how the revision petitioner can go on perpetuating his plea and contend that unless his plea is finally decided on all possible fora under the Act, he would not pay the rent or comply with the order passed under Section 11 of the Act. 31. In this connection I would like to refer to the Supreme Court decision cited on the side of the respondent herein/landlady: 1999(III) CTC 5 – SANKARAN PILLAI (DEAD) BY LRS V. V.X.VENUUGUDUSWAMI AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus: "2. 31. In this connection I would like to refer to the Supreme Court decision cited on the side of the respondent herein/landlady: 1999(III) CTC 5 – SANKARAN PILLAI (DEAD) BY LRS V. V.X.VENUUGUDUSWAMI AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus: "2. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant urged that the facts that the tenant after having entered into an agreement with the erstwhile owner of the building paid considerable amount of money towards part performance of the agreement and his further filing of suit in the civil court for specific performance of the agreement constituted sufficient cause under sub-section (4) of Section 11 of the Act for non-depositing the arrears of rent within time, as well as monthly rent which became due in respect of the building and, therefore, this Court may, after condoning the delay, permit the appellant to deposit the entire arrears of rent and remand the matter to the Rent Controller to enable the appellant to contest the application filed by the landlord for his eviction from the premises on the ground of default in payment of rent. In order to appreciate the argument of learned counsel, it is necessary to look into the relevant provisions of Section 11 of the Act. Sub-sections (1), (2) and (4) of the Act runs as under: “11. (1) No tenant against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord under Section 10 shall be entitled to contest the application before the Controller under that section, or to prefer any appeal under Section 23 against any order made by the Controller on the application, unless he has paid or pays to the landlord, or deposits with the Controller or the appellate authority, as the case may be, all arrears of rent due in respect of the building up to the date of payment or deposit, and continues to pay or to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building until the termination of the proceedings before the Controller or the appellate authority, as the case may be. (2) The deposit of rent under sub-section (1) shall be made within the time and in the manner prescribed. (2) The deposit of rent under sub-section (1) shall be made within the time and in the manner prescribed. (3) * * * (4) If any tenant fails to pay or to deposit the rent as aforesaid, the Controller or the appellate authority, as the case may be, shall, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary, stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building.” 3.A perusal of the aforesaid provisions shows that where an application for eviction has been filed against a tenant on the ground of default in payment of rent the tenant is required (i) to deposit all the arrears of rent due in respect of the building with the Controller or the appellate authority, as the case may be; (ii) the tenant is further required to pay or deposit the rent which may subsequently fall due in respect of the building until the termination of the proceedings; (iii) the said deposit of rent is required to be paid or deposited within the time provided and in the manner prescribed; and (iv) if the deposit of rent is not made, the Controller or the appellate authority, as the case may be, shall, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary, stop all proceedings and pass an order of eviction against the tenant. It is true that the Controller or the appellate authority, as the case may be, if the tenant shows sufficient cause may permit the tenant to contest the application filed by the landlord for his eviction. The question that is required to be seen is, what does the expression “sufficient cause” mean in sub-section (4) of Section 11 of the Act. It is no doubt true that the expression “sufficient cause” has to be liberally construed to do substantial justice between the parties. But the expression “sufficient cause” necessarily implies an element of sincerity, bona fide, and reasonableness. It has to be shown by the tenant who has not deposited the rent within time, as directed by the Controller, that non-deposit of the rent was beyond his control and there was no element of negligence or inaction or lack of bona fides on his part in not depositing the rent within time. It has to be shown by the tenant who has not deposited the rent within time, as directed by the Controller, that non-deposit of the rent was beyond his control and there was no element of negligence or inaction or lack of bona fides on his part in not depositing the rent within time. Viewed in this light, what we find in the present case is that the tenant was required to deposit the rent by 3-8-1990. But the arrears of rent were not deposited by that date. On 7-8-1990, when the order of eviction was passed, no application was moved by the tenant before the Rent Controller for revoking the order striking out defence as he could not deposit the arrears of rent on account of reasons beyond his control. On the contrary, the tenant denied the relationship of landlord and tenant before the Rent Controller. The tenant's subsequent deposit of the arrears of rent before the appellate authority being requirement of law for hearing the appeal on merits, cannot be treated as bona fide deposit. Further, the tenant did not deposit the month to month rent as required under Section 11(1) of the Act and reiterated his stand that he is a landlord and not a tenant of the premises in dispute. Even before the High Court it was not the case of the tenant that under some bona fide mistake he could not deposit the arrears and month to month rent and, therefore, delay may be condoned. It appears that, after the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the suit filed by the tenant for specific performance of the agreement, the tenant has now come forward with a plea that since he under mistaken belief did not deposit arrears and month to month rent and, therefore, default may be condoned. As noticed earlier, this plea of non-depositing of arrears of rent on account of sufficient cause was not a case set up by the tenant before the Rent Controller, the appellate authority and the High Court. The tenant's consistent stand was that he was not required under law to deposit any arrears of rent and month to month rent as he himself was the landlord of the premises. The tenant's consistent stand was that he was not required under law to deposit any arrears of rent and month to month rent as he himself was the landlord of the premises. This plea of the tenant now advanced is an afterthought and is not bona fide and, therefore, we do not find it to constitute “sufficient cause” as to condone the non-deposit of arrears and also month to month rent which was required to be deposited by the tenant. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants" 32. Whereas, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant would cite the following judgement of the Andhra Pradesh High Court: VINUKONDA VENKATA RAMANA V. MOOTHA VENKATESWARA RAO. 33. The perusal of the aforesaid decisions would highlight and shed light on the fact that once the Rent Controller passes order under Section 11 of the Act and it gets crystallised in the form of an executable order, certainly that should be complied with, despite the alleged intention to challenge the same before the appellate forum as well as the revisional forum. 34. The Honourable Apex Court in the decision reported in 1999(III) CTC 5 – SANKARAN PILLAI (DEAD) BY LRS V. V.P.VENUUGUDUSWAMI AND OTHERS, cited supra, would visualise such a situation and point out that the tenant once if he chooses to take a specific plea that despite passing of order by the Rent Controller, he was not bound to pay such rent, then that would amount to violation of the order of the Rent Controller. 35. The learned Senior counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant would submit that during the pendency of the appeal and that too, after the deposit of the arrears by the revision petitioner herein/tenant, the respondent herein/landlady did not choose to file any application under Section 11 of the Act for the purpose of stopping the RCA proceedings for non-payment of further rents, for which, the learned Senior counsel for the respondent/landlady would submit that such a course is not contemplated and that too, in view of the order passed by the appellate Court that the rent should be paid as per the order of the Rent Controller. 36. In fact, the learned Senior counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant, realising the responsibility of the tenant, as appellants in the RCA, filed an application for deposit of future rents. 36. In fact, the learned Senior counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant, realising the responsibility of the tenant, as appellants in the RCA, filed an application for deposit of future rents. But for one reason or other, he had not chosen to get it processed and obtain orders. Subsequent deposit of rent is not a cumbersome job. Straight away the revision petitioner/tenant is expected to obtain challan from the office concerned and deposit the rents, but he has not chosen to do so. As such, the conduct of the revision petitioner/tenant in not paying the further rents bespeaks and betokens against him. 37. In the revision, this Court, vide order dated 27.4.2012, mandated the tenant to pay the arrears of Rs.57,000/- as it stood as on that date, payable by the revision petitioner/tenant and he paid it. 38. The learned Senior counsel for the respondent herein/landlady would point out that from April 2012 onwards, the arrears have not been paid. 39. As such, I am of the view that the tenant in the course of the litigation has not chosen to deposit the rents and that would show his conduct. 40. The learned Senior counsel for the revision petitioner /tenant would make an ultimate submission that an opportunity might be given to the revision petitioner/tenant to get an order on merits in the RCOP itself and whatever amounts still due payable, his client would deposit immediately. 41. Whereupon the learned Senior counsel for the respondent/landlady would detail and delineate that RCOP was filed during the month of July 2009 and by this time more than three yeas elapsed and if one more opportunity is given to the revision petitioner/tenant to contest the main RCOP, even though he had not complied with the mandate of the Rent Controller as per Section 11 of the Act, that would cause discomfiture and difficulties to the respondent herein/landlady. 42. I could see considerable force in the submission made on the side of the respondent/landlady. As such, in view of the aforesaid discussion, the points are decided in favour of the respondent/landlady and there is no merit in the revision petitions. 43. In the result, the revision petitions are dismissed. However, there is no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is dismissed. 44. As such, in view of the aforesaid discussion, the points are decided in favour of the respondent/landlady and there is no merit in the revision petitions. 43. In the result, the revision petitions are dismissed. However, there is no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is dismissed. 44. On hearing this order, the learned counsel on record for the revision petitioner/tenant would pray for sufficient time to vacate the premises. 45. I could see considerable force in his submission. Time is granted till 30.11.2012 for vacating the premises, subject to the condition that the tenant should pay past arrears as well as the future rents without any default. To that effect within 15 days, an affidavit shall be filed by the revision petitioner herein.