JUDGMENT This appeal is directed against judgment dated 24-2-2004 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Manendragarh, District Koriya in Sessions Trial No. 318/2011 whereby the appellant has been convicted under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 5 years and to pay fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for 5 months. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is as under:” On 14-5-2001, at about 10:00 p.m., appellant Manoj Kumar Mishra was selling liquor near Shiv Temple at Chirmiri. Injured Munnalal (PW-2), Iliyas (PW-3), Dinu Dewangan (PW-4) and one Sudhir Sharma went to the appellant and forbade the appellant from selling the liquor. The appellant started abusing Munnalal (PW-2) in filthy language, went inside his house, brought farsa and assaulted Munnalal (PW-2) with it. The appellant gave farsa blow on head, right shoulder, left hand and right hand of Munnalal (PW-2). Iliyas (PW-3), Dinu Dewangan (PW-4) and Sudhir Sharma intervened and saved Munnalal (PW-2). Munnalal (PW-2) lodged First Information Report (Ex. P-2) in Police Station Chirmiri. Munnalal (PW-2) was sent to Community Health Centre, Chirmiri for medical examination. Dr. A. K. Agrawal (PW-1) examined Munnalal (PW-2) and gave his report (Ex. P-1), in which, he found- (i) incised wound, 5x0.6c.m. into bone deep on right parieto and temporal region of scalp. (ii) incised wound, 4x0.5c.m. into bone deep on occipital region of scalp. (iii) incised wound, 2x0.3c.m. into bone deep on left wrist, (iv) incised wound, 1x0.2c.m. into skin deep on left thumb base, (v) incised wound, 1x0.1c.m. into skin deep on left index finger, (vi) incised wound 1x01.c.m. into skin deep on left middle finger, (vii) incised wound, 1.5x0.2c.m. into skin deep on middle part of left ring finger, (viii) incised wound, 1x0.2c.m. into skin deep on right shoulder joint, (ix) incised wound, 1x0.2c.m. into skin deep on right shoulder. He advised for x-ray. In further investigation, plain soil and blood stained soil were seized from the place of occurrence vide Ex. P-5. Full pant of injured Munnalal (PW-2) was also seized vide Ex. P-3. Patwari B. R. Jaiswal prepared site map (Ex. P-4). Investigating Officer also prepared site map (Ex. P-7). He advised for x-ray. In further investigation, plain soil and blood stained soil were seized from the place of occurrence vide Ex. P-5. Full pant of injured Munnalal (PW-2) was also seized vide Ex. P-3. Patwari B. R. Jaiswal prepared site map (Ex. P-4). Investigating Officer also prepared site map (Ex. P-7). After completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the appellant in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Manendragarh, who, in turn, committed the case to the Court of Session, Surguja, from where, it was received on transfer by the Additional Sessions Judge, Manendragarh, who, conducted the trial and convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned above. 3. Shri Prafull Bharat and Shri Keshav Dewangan, learned counsel for the appellant, argued that evidence of Munnalal (PW-2) is full of contradictions. Iliyas (PW-3) and Dinu Dewangan (PW-4) did not support the case of the prosecution. The prosecution has not been able to prove the offence against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the conviction recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge against the appellant is not sustainable and the appellant deserves to be acquitted. 4. On the contrary, Shri Vinay Harit, learned Deputy Advocate General for the State/respondent, supporting the impugned judgment, submitted that the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant do not warrant any interference by this Court. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have also perused the record of Sessions Trial No. 318/2001 with utmost circumspection. Conviction of the appellant is based on the evidence of injured Munnalal (PW-2). 6. In Ranjit Singh and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2011 SC 255 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows :” 17. ...... .... under the Indian Evidence Act, trustworthy evidence given by a single witness would be enough to convict an accused person, whereas evidence given by half a dozen witnesses which is not trustworthy would not be enough to sustain the conviction. That, no doubt is true; but where a criminal Court has to deal with evidence pertaining to the commission of an offence involving a large number of offenders and a large number of victims, it is usual to adopt the test that the conviction could be sustained only if it is supported by two or three or more witnesses who give a consistent account of the incident. In a sense, the test may be described as mechanical; but it is difficult to see how it can be treated as irrational or unreasonable. 18. In Muthu Naicker and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1978 SC 1647 , this Court explained the aforesaid judgment by stating that in a situation where a witness has been attacked by the members of an unlawful assembly composed of a large number of persons, the Court should carefully consider the question of the credibility of such a witness. Where the Court is of the view that the testimony of such a witness is in the facts and circumstances of the case not reliable, it should insist such testimony be corroborated by one or more other witness before it can be accepted by the Court. 19. ..... There is no rule of evidence that no conviction can be based unless a certain minimum number of witnesses have identified a particular accused as a member of the unlawful assembly. It is axiomatic that evidence is not to be counted but only weighed and it is not the quantity of evidence but the quality that matters. Even the testimony of one single witness, if wholly reliable, is sufficient to establish the identification of an accused as a member of an unlawful assembly. All the same when the size of the unlawful assembly is quite large (as in this case) and many persons would have witnessed the incident. ...... 7. In Takdir Samsuddin Sheikh v. State of Gujarat and another, AIR 2012 SC 37 , the Hon™ble Supreme Court observed as follows :” 10. The submissions advanced in this respect had been that Shri Bharat Rajendra-prasad Trivedi (PW-1) being a partner in the Firm would be beneficiary in the transaction of land involved herein in case one partner had been eliminated and other partner landed in jail. Such an argument is not acceptable for two reasons : (i) While appreciating the evidence of witness considering him as the interested witness, the Court must bear in mind that the term interested postulates that the witness must have some direct interest in having the accused somehow or the other convicted for some other reason. .... (ii) This Court has consistently held that as a general rule the Court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. .... (ii) This Court has consistently held that as a general rule the Court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872. But if there are doubts about the testimony, the Court will insist on corroboration. In fact, it is not the number, the quantity, but the quality that is material. The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy or otherwise. The legal system has laid emphasis on value, weight and quality of evidence rather than on quantity, multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It is, therefore, open to a competent Court to fully and completely rely on a solitary witness and record conviction. Conversely, it may acquit the accused in spite of testimony of several witnesses if it is not satisfied about the quality of evidence. .... 8. In Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of West Bengal, 2010 AIR SCW 4470, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed thus : 25. In Sunil Kumar v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2003) 11 SCC 367 : ( AIR 2004 SC 552 : 2003 AIR SCW 6026), this Court repelled a similar submission observing that as a general rule the Court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872. But if there are doubts about the testimony the Court will insist on corroboration. In fact, it is not the number, the quantity, but the quality that is material. The time-honoured principles is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy or otherwise. 9. Munnalal (PW-2) deposed that on the date of incident appellant Manoj Kumar Mishra was selling liquor near Shiv Temple at Chirmiri. He along with Iliyas (PW-3), Dinu Dewangan (PW-4) and Sudhir Sharma went to the appellant and forbade him from selling the liquor. 9. Munnalal (PW-2) deposed that on the date of incident appellant Manoj Kumar Mishra was selling liquor near Shiv Temple at Chirmiri. He along with Iliyas (PW-3), Dinu Dewangan (PW-4) and Sudhir Sharma went to the appellant and forbade him from selling the liquor. The appellant started abusing him in filthy language. He further deposed that the appellant went inside his house, brought Farsa and assaulted him with it on his head, shoulder, left hand and right hand. He further deposed that Iliyas (PW-3), Dinu Dewangan (PW-4) and Sudhir Sharma intervened and took him to the hospital. Dinu Dewangan (PW-4) deposed that Munnalal (PW-2) had sustained two injuries on the head. 10. Munnalal (PW-2) deposed that he lodged the FIR (Ex. P-2) in Police Station Chirmiri and he was sent to Central Hospital, Chirmiri for medical examination. Dr. Baldeo Prasad (PW-6) deposed that he was posted as Medical Officer in Regional Hospital, Kurasiya, Chirmiri since 1999. On 15-5-2001, he examined the injured Munnalal (PW-2) and gave his report (Ex. P-8), in which, he found multiple lacerated wounds on left hand and incised wound on forehead. Dr. A. K. Agrawal (PW-1) deposed that he examined Munnalal (PW-2) and gave his report (Ex. P-1) in which he found (i) incised wound, 5 x 0.6cm into bone deep on right parieto and temporal region of scalp, (ii) incised wound, 4 x 0.5cm into bone deep on occipital region of scalp, (iii) incised wound, 2 x 0.3cm into bone deep on left wrist, (iv) incised wound, 1 x 0.2cm into skin deep on left thumb base, (v) incised wound, 1 x 0.1cm into skin deep on left index finger, (vi) incised wound, 1 x 0.1cm into skin deep on left middle finger, (vii) incised wound, 1.5 x 0.2cm into skin deep on middle part of left ring finger, (viii) incised wound, 1 x 0.2cm into skin deep on right shoulder joint, (ix) incised wound, 1 x 0.2cm into skin deep on right shoulder. He further deposed that he had advised the injured for X-Ray. He further deposed that injuries No. (i) and (ii) were dangerous to life. 11. The date and time of the incident is 14-5-2001 at about 10:00 p.m. and the FIR (Ex. P-2) was lodged on the same day at about 11.45 p.m. The FIR (Ex. P-2) was lodged within two hours of the incident. It appears that the FIR (Ex. He further deposed that injuries No. (i) and (ii) were dangerous to life. 11. The date and time of the incident is 14-5-2001 at about 10:00 p.m. and the FIR (Ex. P-2) was lodged on the same day at about 11.45 p.m. The FIR (Ex. P-2) was lodged within two hours of the incident. It appears that the FIR (Ex. P-2) was lodged without delay. 12. I have carefully perused the evidence of Munnalal (PW-2). He specifically deposed that on the date of incident, the appellant assaulted him with Farsa and he sustained multiple incised injuries on his body. Dinu Dewangan (PW-4) witnessed the injuries sustained by injured Munnalal (PW-2). He sustained grievous injury on his head and also sustained multiple injuries on other parts of his body. Evidence of Munnalal (PW-2) is corroborated by medical evidence. From the above, it is apparent that the testimony of Munnalal (PW-2) is reliable and cogent. 13. Now, it is to be seen whether the offence of the appellant is punishable under Section 307, IPC. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that it is obvious from the evidence of Munnalal (PW-2) itself that the quarrel took place between him and the appellant due to selling of liquor. The prosecution did not prove the nature of the injuries. Therefore, it appears that the injuries sustained by Munnalal (PW-2) were not fatal to life and hence, the offence under Section 307, IPC is not made out. The act of the appellant is punishable under Section 324, IPC. The appellant remained in jail from 16-7-2001 to 21-8-2001, i.e., about 1 month and 5 days. Thereafter, the appellant remained in jail from 24-2-2004 to 12-3-2004, i.e., about 18 days. In total, the appellant remained in jail for about 1 month and 23 days. The ends of justice would be met if the appellant is sentenced for the period already undergone by him. 15. Shri Vinay Harit, learned Deputy Advocate General for the State/respondent opposed the above arguments. 16. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kedar Yadav, (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 1008, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows : 12. To justify a conviction under this section, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. 15. Shri Vinay Harit, learned Deputy Advocate General for the State/respondent opposed the above arguments. 16. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kedar Yadav, (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 1008, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows : 12. To justify a conviction under this section, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in which the culprit would be liable under this section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. What the Court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some over act in execution thereof. 13. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The Court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. Therefore, an accused charged under Section 307, IPC cannot be acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt. 17. Munnalal (PW-2) deposed that on the date of incident, the appellant assaulted him with Farsa on his head. Dr. Therefore, an accused charged under Section 307, IPC cannot be acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt. 17. Munnalal (PW-2) deposed that on the date of incident, the appellant assaulted him with Farsa on his head. Dr. A. K. Agrawal (PW-1) opined that injury No.(i) was found on parieto-temporal region and injury No.(ii) was present on the occipital region and both the injuries were fatal to life. In the instant case, the nature of weapon used, the manner of assault given by the appellant, the nature of injuries caused, severity of the blow and the above parts of the body chosen for assault, clearly communicate the intention of the appellant which was none else than attempt to end the life of the victim. Therefore, the learned Additional Sessions Judge rightly held the appellant guilty for the offence under Section 307, IPC. 18. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any infirmity in the findings recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. 19. In the result, the appeal, being devoid of any merit, is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Appeal dismissed.