ORDER Heard Shri Jai Prakash Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Dr. Maya Nand Jha, learned Additional Public Prosecutor. 2. Three petitioners, while invoking inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, have prayed for quashing of an order dated 5.1.2008 passed in Surajgarha P.S. Case No.210 of 2007/G.R. Case No.865 of 2007, whereby the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lakhisarai had taken cognizance of offence under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners, while assailing the order of cognizance, submits that no offence is made out even on the basis of F.I.R. itself. It was submitted that petitioners and informant of the case were co-sharers and allegation was made that the petitioners had sold lands in excess to their share and as such it was submitted that it was clear cut dispute of civil nature, for which the informant may not be allowed to proceed with the criminal case against the petitioners. It was submitted that for such dispute, civil case has also been instituted and matter is still pending. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that if on perusal of the F.I.R. no offence is made out, the court, while exercising inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may interfere with the case at initial stage. Learned counsel for the petitioners, in support of his argument, has relied on Apex Court judgment reported in 2009(8) SCC 751 (Mohammed Ibrahim and others Vs. State of Bihar and another) and 2009(7) SCC 495 (Devendra and others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another). While referring to Md. Md. Ibrahim’s case (supra), learned counsel for the petitioners has specifically relied on paragraphs 7 and 8 of the judgment, which are quoted herein below : “7. The question that therefore arises for consideration is whether the material on record prima facie constitutes any offences against the accused. State of Uttar Pradesh and another). While referring to Md. Md. Ibrahim’s case (supra), learned counsel for the petitioners has specifically relied on paragraphs 7 and 8 of the judgment, which are quoted herein below : “7. The question that therefore arises for consideration is whether the material on record prima facie constitutes any offences against the accused. The contention of the appellant is that if the allegations made in the complaint and FIR, even if accepted to be true in entirety did not disclose the ingredients of any offence of forgery (Sections 467 and 471) or cheating (Section 420) or insult (Section 504) or wrongful restraint (Section 341) or causing hurt (Section 323) and there was no other material to show any offence and therefore, their application ought to have been accepted.” “8. This Court has time and again drawn attention to the growing tendency of the complainants attempting to give the cloak of a criminal offence to matters which are essentially and purely civil in nature, obviously either to apply pressure on the accused, or out of enmity towards the accused, or to subject the accused to harassment. Criminal courts should ensure that proceedings before it are not used for settling scores or to pressurise parties to settle civil disputes. But at the same time, it should be noted that several disputes of a civil nature may also contain the ingredients of criminal offences and if so, will have to be tried as criminal offences, even if they also amount to civil disputes. (See G. Sagar Suri Vs. State of U.P. and Indian Oil Corpn. Vs. NEPC India Ltd.) Let us examine the matter keeping the said principles in mind.” 4. Learned counsel has also referred to paragraphs 11 and 24 of Devendra‘s case (supra). For just decision in the matter, it would be appropriate to quote paragraphs 11 and 24 of the said judgment, which are as follows : “11. The fact that the appellants are co-sharers is not in dispute. The dispute between them is confined to the extent of their respective shares. It must be determined only in a civil suit. If Appellants 1 and 2 had executed a deed of sale in favour of a third party stating that they have one-third share over the entire properties, the same would not be binding on the respondent complainant. The dispute between them is confined to the extent of their respective shares. It must be determined only in a civil suit. If Appellants 1 and 2 had executed a deed of sale in favour of a third party stating that they have one-third share over the entire properties, the same would not be binding on the respondent complainant. If any cause of action arose by reason of a threat of dispossession at the hands of the co-sharer or at the hands of the third party, as was contended, recourse to legal action could always be taken. Even for that purpose, a proceeding under Sections 144 and 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be maintainable. The decision of a criminal court in a case of this nature would not be binding on the civil court.” “24. There is no dispute with regard to the aforementioned propositions of law. However, it is now well settled that the High Court ordinarily would exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the allegations made in the first information report, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, do not make out any offence. When the allegations made in the first information report or the evidences collected during investigation do not satisfy the ingredients of an offence, the superior courts would not encourage harassment of a person in a criminal court for nothing.” 5. On aforesaid ground, it has been pleaded that this Court may interfere with the order of cognizance and allow the petition. 6. Dr. Maya Nand Jha, learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits that perusal of the F.I.R. itself makes it clear that cognizable offence has been made out keeping in view the fact that partition in between the parties had already taken place long back in the year 1952 in Partition Case No.28/17/1950/52 and once partition had taken, the petitioners were not at all authorized to execute any sale deed pertaining to the land, which had already been transferred to the informant and as such it was specific case of creation of incorrect and forged sale deed. 7. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners, in reply, submits that subsequent to partition, which had taken place in 1952 again a partition suit was filed vide Partition Suit No.36 of 1996 by the informant, which was decreed ex-parte and execution case was subsequently filed. Thereafter, some orders in favour of the petitioners was passed and execution proceeding in ex-parte decree has been directed to be stayed kept in abeyance by order dated 8.5.2008 passed by the executing court. Learned counsel for the petitioners has referred to Annexure-8 to the supplementary affidavit. 8. Besides hearing learned counsel for the parties, I have perused the materials available on record. At the moment, the court is persuaded to peruse the F.I.R. to ascertain whether any cognizable offence on the basis of F.I.R. is made out or not. From the F.I.R. itself, it is evident that the accused petitioners had executed sale deed in respect of land, which was of informant. Whether any suit was filed or not, those facts may not be looked into at this stage. 9. At the moment, the court is required to see as to whether a prima facie cognizable offence is made out for not on perusal of the F.I.R. So far as judgments referred by learned counsel for the petitioners are concerned, it itself indicates that interference at any stage is required in a case where no offence is made out on perusal of the F.I.R. After registering F.I.R., which relating to a cognizable offence, police had conducted investigation and thereafter, submitted charge sheet. After submission of the charge sheet, the learned Magistrate, on the basis of material in the case diary and record, has passed order of cognizance. If in criminal case, charge is led, in normal course, trial is rule and discharge is exception. Moreover, there are remedies available to the parties to take any plea at appropriate stage. There are certain provisions for filing petition for discharge, which are Sections 227, 239 and 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If after filing of such petition, the court is satisfied that the materials on record warrants discharge of an accused, the concerned court is well competent to pass an order for discharge, but for discharging, it is required on the part of the concerned court to assign a reason for discharging an accused. 10. If after filing of such petition, the court is satisfied that the materials on record warrants discharge of an accused, the concerned court is well competent to pass an order for discharge, but for discharging, it is required on the part of the concerned court to assign a reason for discharging an accused. 10. Time without number, the Apex Court has reiterated that at initial or interlocutory stages, superior court should refrain from interfering with a criminal case. At this moment, this Court is tempted to quote an observation of the Apex Court, which was reiterated in 1995(3) Cr. Law Journal 2935 (G.N. Hegre Vs. S.Bangarappa and others) in its paragraph-18, which is as follows : “18. ...........It is common knowledge that currently in our country criminal Courts excel in slow-motion. The procedure is dilatory, the dockets are heavy, even the service of process is delayed and, still more exasperating, there are appeals upon appeals and revisions and supervisory jurisdictions, baffling and baulking speedy termination of prosecution .....”. The slow-motion becomes much slow-motion when politically powerful or rich and influential persons figure as accused. F.I.Rs. are quashed. Charges are quashed. Interlocutory orders are interfered with. At every step, there will be revisions and applications for quashing and writ petitions. In short, no progress is ever allowed to be made. And if ever the case reaches the stage of trial after all these interruptions, the time would have taken its own toll : the witnesses are won over; evidence disappears; the prosecution loses interest-the result is an all too familiar one. We are sad to say that repeated admonitions of this Court have not deterred superior Courts from interfering at initial or interlocutory stages of criminal cases. Such interference should be only in exceptional cases where the interests of justice demand it; it cannot be a matter of course.........” 11. Besides this at the time of cognizance or even at the stage of charge only requirement is to see as to whether a prima facie case is made out or not. The word ‘prima facie’ has been properly dealt with by the Apex Court in a case reported in 1996 (3) Cr. Law Journal 2448 (State of Maharashtra Vs. Som Nath Thapa). Paragraphs 30, 31 and 32 of the judgment would appropriate to be quoted at this stage, which are as follows : “30. The word ‘prima facie’ has been properly dealt with by the Apex Court in a case reported in 1996 (3) Cr. Law Journal 2448 (State of Maharashtra Vs. Som Nath Thapa). Paragraphs 30, 31 and 32 of the judgment would appropriate to be quoted at this stage, which are as follows : “30. In Antulay’s case, ( AIR 1986 SC 2045 ), Bhagwati, C.J., opined, after noting the difference in the language of the three pairs of section, that despite the difference there is no scope for doubt that at the stage at which the Court is required to consider the question of framing of charge, the test of “prima facie” case has to be applied. According to Shri Jethmalani, a prima facie case can be said to have been made out when the evidence, unless rebutted, would make the accused liable to conviction. In our view, better and clearer statement of law would be that if there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence, a Court can justifiably say that a prima facie case against him exists, and so, frame charge against him for committing that offence”. “31. Let us note the meaning of the word “presume”. In Black’s Law Dictionary, it has been defined to mean “to believe or accept upon probable evidence”. (Emphasis ours). In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary it has been mentioned that in law “presume” means “to take as proved until evidence to the contrary is forthcoming”. Stroud’s Legal Dictionary has quoted in this context a certain judgment according to which “A presumption is a probable consequence drawn from facts (either certain, or proved by direct testimony) as to the truth of a fact alleged.” (Emphasis supplied). In Law Lexicon by P. Ramanath Aiyer the same quotation finds place at page 1007 of 1987 edition.” “32. The aforesaid shows that if on the basis of materials on record, a Court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exists. To put it differently, if the Court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed the offence. To put it differently, if the Court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage.” 12. In view of the facts and circumstances as well as law laid down by the Apex Court and also the fact that F.I.R. in the present case, prima facie discloses commission of cognizable offence, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the order of cognizance and as such the petition stands dismissed. 13. It goes without saying that if at appropriate stage, petition is filed by the accused persons, the learned court below, without being prejudiced by this order, may examine the same and pass appropriate order in accordance with law. ?