JUDGMENT Gangele, J. -- 1. This judgment shall also govern disposal of following writ appeals : (1) Writ Appeal No. 644/2011, Rajesh Singh Tomar v. M.P. Road Transport Corporation; (2) Writ Appeal No.645/2011, Mahaveer Prasad Sharma v. M.P. Road Transport Corporation; (3) Writ Appeal No. 646/2011, Anaar Singh Narwariya v. M.P. Road Transport Corporation; (4) Writ Appeal No.648/2011, Madhya Pradesh Transport Workers Federation v. M.P. Road Transport Corporation; (5) Writ Appeal No.6522/2011, Suresh Babu Parashar v. The State of Madhya Pradesh; (6) Writ Appeal No.674/2011 Madhya Pradesh Road Transport Corporation v. Umesh Kumar Verma; (7) Writ Appeal No.675/2011, M.P. Road Transport Corporation v. Maksood Ahmad; (8) Writ Appeal No.676/2011, M.P. Road Transport Corporation v. Mahaveer Prasad Sharma; (9) Writ Appeal No.677/2011, M.P. Road Transport Corporation v. M.P. Transport Workers Federation; (10) Writ AppealNo.678/2011, The Managing Director, M.P.R.T.C. v. Suresh Babu Parashar; (11) Writ Appeal No.679/2011, M.P. Road Transport Corporation v. Rajesh Singh Tomar; (12) Writ Appeal No.680/2011, M.P. Road Transport Corporation v. Mangal Singh Tomar; (13) Writ Appeal No.781/2011, Madhya Pradesh Road Transport Corporation v. Dinesh Kumar Sharma and Writ Appeal No.682/2011, Madhya Pradesh Road Transport Corporation v. Annar Singh Narwariya. 2. This appeal has been filed against the order dated 19.9.2011 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No.5614/2010(S). 3. The question for consideration before this Court in this writ appeal is that whether respondent No.1, Madhya Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, hereinafter referred to as the ‘Corporation’, had power and authority to retire its employees after completing 20 years of service or attaining the age of 50 years, on the ground that the employee is not fit to continue in service at par with the powers of the State Government in regard to premature retirement of its employees. 4. The Coporation was constituted under the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950. Section 45(1) of the Act provides that a Corporation may with previous sanction of the State Government make regulations not inconsistent with this Act and rules made thereunder for the administration of the affairs of the Corporation. The Corporation in exercise of powers conferred by the aforesaid provision made the employees service regulations, named as ‘Madhya Pradesh State Road Trannsport Corporation Employees Service Regulations. These regulations were in force from 1st of June 1970. The Corporation in exercise of powers conferred by the aforesaid provision made the employees service regulations, named as ‘Madhya Pradesh State Road Trannsport Corporation Employees Service Regulations. These regulations were in force from 1st of June 1970. Regulation 59 prescribes that the employees of the State Road Transport Corporation could be compulsorily retired after completion of age of 58 years. 5. The Corporation also made regulations in exercise of powers conferred by section 45 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, named as ‘Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, Employees Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Regulations, 1975, herein after referred to as the ‘Regulations of 1975’. Regulation 32 of the aforesaid regulations prescribes penalties and under the head ‘Major Penalties’ is ‘compulsory retirement’. In the aforesaid regulations framed by the Corporation, there is no provision in regard to retirement of employees of the Corporation after completing 20 years of service or on attaining the age of 50 years on the basis of screening of their service record. Fundamental Rule 56 prescribes provision in regard to premature retirement of a Government employee after completing 20 years of service or attaining the age of 50 years. The relevant provision is as under : “56. Age of Superannuation. -- (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) every Government servant shall retire from service on the afternoon of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of sixty years. (2) (a) A Government servant may, in the public interest, be retired at any time after he has completed 20 years qualifying service, or he attains the age of fifty years, whichever is earlier, without assigning any reason by giving him a notice in writing. (b) The period of such notice shall be three months : Provided that such Government servant may be retired forthwith and on such retirement the Government servant shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the period of the notice at the same rates at which he was drawing them immediately before him retirement or, as the case may be, for the period by which such notice falls short of three months.” 6. The General Administration Department vide a letter dated 13th of August 2009 directed the Managing Director, M.P. State Road Transport Corporation to consider the compulsory retirement of employees after completing 20 years of service or attaining the age of 50 years. Thereafter, the Under Secretary vide letter dated 31.8.2009 directed the Managing Director to initiate proceedings in regard to premature retirement of employees in accordance with letter of the General Administration Department dated 13th August 2009. Consequently, a screening committee was constituted on the basis of the recommendations and the screening committee retired the appellant compulsorily w.e.f. 24.2.2012. The appellant challenged the order of compulsory retirement in the writ petition and the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition on the basis of an order passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.13483/2010(s) decided on 26.8.2011 and other connected matters at the Main Seat at Jabalpur. The learned Single Judge has held that the Corporation had no power and authority to retire its employees prematurely and allowed the petition. The learned Single Judge denied the back wages. The employees filed the appeals in regard to denial of back wages and the Corporation also filed appeals against the order of learned Single Judge in regard to questioning the findings of the learned Single Judge that the Corporation had no power and authority to retire its employees prematurely. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent-Corporation has contended that in accordance with the circular issued by the General Administration Department, the Corporation has had power and authority to retire its employees compulsorily after attaining the age of 50 years or on completion of 20 years’ service, whichever is earlier, at par with the provisions of F.R. 56. The State Government is competent to issue directions in this regard in accordance with the provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950. In support of his arguments, the learned counsel has relied on the judgments of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the cases of The Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Gopinath Gundachar Char, reported in AIR 1968 SC 464 and The General Manager, Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Deveraj Urs, reported in AIR 1976 SC 1027 . 8. Contrary to this, the learned counsel for employee has contended that the Corporation has framed statutory regulations in regard to service conditions of its employees. 8. Contrary to this, the learned counsel for employee has contended that the Corporation has framed statutory regulations in regard to service conditions of its employees. In the aforesaid regulation, there is no provision of premature retirement, hence, the State Government has had no power and authorityto issue its executive instructions contrary to statutory regulations in regard to premature retirement. In support of his contentions learned counsel relied on the judgment of Five Judges Bench of this Court in the case of Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Heeralal Oghhelal, 1980 JLJ 16 =1980 MPLJ 8. 9. It is an admitted position that in Regulations of 1975, framed by the Corporation under section 45 of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950, there is no provision of premature retirement of its employees. Along with the writ petition the Corporation also filed M.P. Road Transport Corporation Employees’ Service Regulations. In the aforesaid regulations the age of retirement of an employee of the Corporation is 58 years. The State Government has power under F.R. 56 to retire its employees after completing 20 years of service or on attaining the age of 50 years. 10. The General Administration Department vide letter dated 13th of August 2009 directed the Managing Director, M.P. State Road Transport Corporation to consider the cases for compulsory retirement of its employees after completing 20 years of service or attaining the age of 50 years and thereafter the Under Secretary vide letter dated 31.8.2009 directed the Managing Director to initiate proceedings in this regard. These letters are in contravention to the statutory regulations framed by the Corporation. It is well settled principle of law that the executive instructions may supplement the statutory provisions but they cannot supplant the statutory provisions. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Jagannath Achyut Karandikar, reported inAIR 1989 SC p.1133, has held as under : “The circular is an executive instruction whereas the 1955 Rules are statutory since framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. The Government could not have restricted the operation of the statutory rules by issuing the executive instructions. The executive instructions may supplement but not supplant statutory rules. The High Court was in error in ignoring this well accepted principle.” 11. The Government could not have restricted the operation of the statutory rules by issuing the executive instructions. The executive instructions may supplement but not supplant statutory rules. The High Court was in error in ignoring this well accepted principle.” 11. Apart from this Five Judges Bench of this Court in the case of Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Heeralal Oghhelal, reported in 1980 JLJ 16 =1980 MPLJ 8, has held that the regulations made under section 45(2)(c) of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950 are to be subordinated to Standard Standing Orders on matters specified in the schedule to the Standard Standing Orders Act. The relevant findings of the Five Judges Bench are as under : “13. Before parting with the case we desire to point out that in Ramchandra’s case the conflict between the regulations made under the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950 and the Standard Standing Orders made under the Madhya Pradesh Standing Orders Act was solved by recourse to Article 254 of the Constitution. It was held in that case that the Road Transport Corporations Act was enacted by Parliament in exercise of its powers under Entries 43 and 44 of the Union List and the Standing Orders Act by the State Legislature under entry 24 of the Concurrent List. The conclusion that one of the competing legislations pertained to a matter in the Union List, made Article 254 wholly inapplicable for now it is well settled that Article applies only when the competing legislations, one made by Parliament and the other made by the State Legislature, both pertain to a subject in the Concurrent List. Article 254(2) is in terms limited to matters in the Concurrent List and although in Article 254(1) the language while referring to a law made by Parliament is not that specific, judicial decisions have confined its application to Concurrent List. In A.S. Krishna v. State of Madras [ AIR 1957 SC 297 , p.300], while dealing with section 107(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935 which was identically worded as Article 254(1) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court observed; “For this section to apply, two conditions must be fulfilled : (1) Provisions of the provincial law and those of the Central Legislation must both be in respect of a matter which is enumerated in the concurrent list and (2) they must be repugnant to each other”. These observations were adopted as correct exposition of Article 254(1) Premnath v. State of Jammu and Kashmir [ AIR 1959 SC 749 , p.763], and Kerala State Electricity Board v. Indian Aluminium Co. [AIR 1975 SC 1031, p.1039]. Further, in M. Karunnadhi v. Union of India [ AIR 1979 SC 898 , p.902], the Supreme Court again read Article 254(1) as confined to matters in the concurrent list. If a legislation made by Parliament, which in pith and substance is under the Union List, incidentally trenches upon a subject in the concurrent list or State list covered by a State Legislation, the legislation made by Parliament whether before or after the State Legislation will prevail in case of conflict not because of something contained in Article 254 but because of inherent supremacy of Parliament’s power of legislation in respect of a matter in the Union List conferred by clause (1) of Article 245 of the Constitution which operates “notwithstanding anything contained in clauses (2) and (3)” which deal with legislations in the Concurrent and State Lists and which clearly provide that the power of the State Legislature to legislate in matters contained in those lists is “subject to” Parliament’s power of legislation in the Union List. A conflict of this nature is conceivable and can arise because of the doctrine of pith and substance which permits incidental encroachment in the domain of the rival Legislature. However, such a conflict must be inferred only as a matter of last resort when it is impossible to reconcile the competing legislations by recourse to the rules of harmonious construction which include the rule that a general provision is not intended to come in the way of or to supersede a special provision. We may only add that it is on this principle that regulations made under section 45(2)(c) of the Road Transport Corporations Act are to be subordinated to Standard Standing Orders on matters specified in the schedule to the Standard Standing Orders Act unless the regulations are notified under section 2(2) or certified as Standing Orders in accordance with the procedure laid down in the said Act.” 12. The State Government has also framed Standard Standing Orders under section 3(b) and section 6(3) of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1961 and clause 14-A was inserted in the Standing Orders and the aforesaid clause prescribes the age of retirement of an employee from service as 58 years. There is no provision of premature retirement in Standard Standing Orders. It is not in dispute that these orders are applicable in the establishment of the Road Transport Corporation Act, hence, the order of compulsory retirement of the employee is beyond the power of the Corporation. The reasoning put forth by the learned Single Judge in this regard is in accordance with law. 13. In regard to grant of back wages, as held earlier, the order of compulsory retirement was passed without any power and authority. It is also a fact that the Corporation was in huge loss. It has accumulated loss as on 31.3.2004 of Rs.735 crore, which was increased subsequently. However, the fact remains that the employee had been retired prematurely without any power and authority. In regard to grant of back wages, Hon’ble the Supreme Court in General Manager, Haryana Roadways v. Rudhan Singh [ (2005)5 SCC 591 ], has held, as under : “8. There is no rule of thumb that in every case where the Industrial Tribunal gives a finding that the termination of service was in violation of section 25-F of the Act, entire back wages should be awarded. A host of factors like the manner and method of selection and appointment i.e. whether after proper advertisement of the vacancy or inviting applications from the employment exchange, nature of appointment, namely, whether ad hoc, short term, daily wage, temporary or permanent in character, any special qualification required for the job and the like should be weighed and balanced in taking a decision regarding award of back wages. One of the important factors, which has to be taken into consideration, is the length of service, which the workman had rendered with the employer. If the workman has rendered a considerable period of service and his services are wrongfully terminated, he may be awarded full or partial back wages keeping in view the fact that at his age and the qualification possessed by him he may not be in a position to get another employment. If the workman has rendered a considerable period of service and his services are wrongfully terminated, he may be awarded full or partial back wages keeping in view the fact that at his age and the qualification possessed by him he may not be in a position to get another employment. However, where the total length of service rendered by a workman is very small, the award of back wages for the complete period i.e. from the date of termination till the date of the award, which our experience shows is often quite large, would be wholly in appropriate. Another important factor, which requires to be taken into consideration is the nature of employment. A regular service of permanent character cannot be compared to short or intermittent daily wage employment though it may be for 240 days in a calender year.” 14. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Reshma Ramesh Meher [ (2008)8 SCC 664 ], has further held as under : “24. It is true that once the order of termination of service of an employee is set aside, ordinarily the relief of reinstatment is available to him. However, the entitlement of an employee to get reinstated does not necessarily result in payment of full or partial back wages, which is independent of reinstatement. While dealing with the prayer of back wages, factual scenario, equity and good conscience, a number of other factors, like the manner of selection, nature of appointment, the period for which the employee has worked with the employer etc., have to be kept in view. All these factors and circumstances are illustrative and no precise or abstract formula can be laid down as to under what circumstances full or partial back wages should be awarded. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.” 15. Looking to the aforesaid principle of law laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court and the facts of the present case, in our opinion, the employee is entitled 50% back wages. Hence, all the appeals are disposed of with the following directions : (1) That, the appeals filed by the M.P. State Road Transport Corporation are hereby dismissed. (2) The appeals filed by the employees are hereby allowed to the extent that the employees would be entitled 50% back wages. (3) No order as to costs. .............