JUDGMENT : Kuldip Singh, J. 1. This petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed for quashing notice of accusation dated 03.09.2011 and complaint No. 46/3 of 2011/04 pending before learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Court No. 3, Ghumarwin, under Sections 16(1)(a)(i), 2(ix)(k), 7(ii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 ( for short 'Act'), read with Rule 32 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 ( for short 'Rules'). The petitioner has stated that petitioner is a Public Limited Company, registered under the Companies Act, 1956, having its registered Office at Village Main, Patiala, Punjab and one of its works at Baddi. S.K.Modi is the Managing Director of the Company. The company is a distillery manufacturing country liquor under a licence granted under the Punjab Excise Act, 1914( for short 'Excise Act'), as applicable to the State of Himachal Pradesh. The manufacturing activities are carried out under direct control and supervision of the State Excise Department in terms of Punjab Distillery Rules, 1932, as applicable to the State of Himachal Pradesh. 2. The country liquor manufactured by petitioner is required to be packed in the form and as per norms prescribed and approved by the State Excise Department. The petitioner had been manufacturing and selling country liquor as per statutory guidelines. The petitioner in terms of statutory provisions is required to strictly follow and adhere the norms prescribed for packing and sale of liquor. All labels, tags, holograms and the writing must conform to statutory norms. 3. On 24.06.2004, Food Inspector, purchased a sample of country liquor bearing No. SFD-1,21/04 allegedly manufactured by petitioner distillery from L-14A retail vend, Ghumarwin. The sample was sent to laboratory on 29.06.2004 and the public analyst examined the same. The public analyst gave the report dated 03.07.2004 and observed that the batch number, month and year of manufacture or packing, month and year up to which product is best for consumption and symbol to indicate that the product is vegetarian food has not been mentioned in the label. The sample of double distilled spice country liquor ( Patiala Orange) is, therefore, misbranded. The public analyst proceeded to declare the product as misbranded without ascertaining the authenticity/source of its origin without reference to batch number etc. and without taking cognizance of the fact that liquor has never been considered as an item of food to which provisions of the Act would apply. 4. The public analyst proceeded to declare the product as misbranded without ascertaining the authenticity/source of its origin without reference to batch number etc. and without taking cognizance of the fact that liquor has never been considered as an item of food to which provisions of the Act would apply. 4. The Chief Medical Officer, Bilaspur, on 29.11.2004 granted written consent to proceed against the petitioner under the Act. On 20.12.2004, the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate summoned salesman of L-14 licensee. On the request of accused No. 1 and 2, the petitioner was impleaded as accused No. 3 on 27.06.2006. The notice of accusation was put to the petitioner on 03.09.2011 for offence punishable under Sections 16(1)(a)(i), 2(ix)(k), 7(ii) of the Act read with Rule 32. 5. It has been stated that product as "misbranded" is not applicable to the country liquor, which is governed by Excise Act and Rules made thereunder. The proceedings against the petitioner are totally illegal without application of mind and is an abuse of process of the Court. The product manufactured by the petitioner-company is packed and sold under the direct control of Excise Department in terms of statutory provisions of Excise Act. The label of product conforms to norms laid down in excise policy. The sample cannot be described as misbranded. 6. The packing and sale of country liquor are subject to provisions of Special Act and the Rules made thereunder. The Act is general which is not applicable for the packaging of country liquor. The specific statute namely Excise Act for purpose of packaging and sale of country liquor is applicable and not the Act and Rules. The Special law over-rides the general law. Even otherwise under Rule 32 of the Rules, the alcoholic liquors are exempted from the requirement of mentioning "best before date". 7. The summoning of the petitioner by trial Court is without application of mind. The Magistrate has not considered the nature of the product nor statutory provisions governing the same nor the law applicable to the country liquor. The evidence on record has not been scrutinized. The summoning of the petitioner is liable to be set aside. 8. The complaint does not make out any case against the petitioner, still petitioner is compelled to undergo the agony of criminal law. The submission has been made for quashing proceedings exercising the inherent powers of the Court. The evidence on record has not been scrutinized. The summoning of the petitioner is liable to be set aside. 8. The complaint does not make out any case against the petitioner, still petitioner is compelled to undergo the agony of criminal law. The submission has been made for quashing proceedings exercising the inherent powers of the Court. The petitioner is complying the terms and conditions of distillery licence. The petitioner is entitled to protection from criminal prosecution. 9. The respondents filed reply and have taken preliminary objections of non-joinder of necessary parties. The trial Court has taken cognizance against the petitioner. The petitioner has alternative remedy u/s 239 Cr.P.C. for discharge. The Food Inspector in the year 2004 inspected the shop of Karamveer Singh salesman of L-14 Morsinghi, Tehsil Ghumarwin and took sample of spiced (Patiala Orange) manufactured by Patiala Distillers and Manufactures, Baddi, i.e. the petitioner. The sample was found misbranded. After obtaining written consent from Chief Medical Officer, Bilaspur, complaint was filed on 13.12.2004 against Karamveer Singh salesman of M/s Ashwani Kumar, L-14, Morsinghi, Tehsil Ghumarwin as well as Ashwani Kumar, L-14, Tehsil Ghumarwin. 10. M/s Ashwani Kumar, L-14, Morsinghi, moved an application u/s 20-A to implead M/s Patiala Distillers and Manufactures, Baddi, i.e. the present petitioner through Managing Director. The trial Court on 27.07.2006 allowed the application and impleaded M/s Patiala Distillers and Manufactures, Baddi, through its Managing Director as co-accused. After putting notice of accusation, complainant evidence is in progress in the trial Court and in the meantime the petitioner has filed the present petition. 11. On merits, it has been stated that proviso relied by petitioner in Para-16 of the petition has been inserted and made effective vide GOI Notification dated 23.11.2005, the sample was taken on 24.06.2004 prior to the date of insertion of proviso relied by the petitioner. The petitioner has been rightly impleaded as an accused u/s 20-A of the Act. The submission has been made for dismissal of the petition. 12. The petitioner has filed rejoinder and reiterated the stand taken in the petition. It has been stated that even if violation mentioned in the complaint is taken to be true, no offence of misbranding is made out as requirement of labelling country liquor stands relaxed under Rule 32 and after fourth proviso the "best before date" is not required to be given for wines and liquors. It has been stated that even if violation mentioned in the complaint is taken to be true, no offence of misbranding is made out as requirement of labelling country liquor stands relaxed under Rule 32 and after fourth proviso the "best before date" is not required to be given for wines and liquors. The Act has been repealed and has been substituted by Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (for short 'the new Act') which has come into force. The labelling requirements as alleged in the complaint do not constitute an offence of misbranding under the new Act. 13. There is no allegation of neglect, consent, connivance attributable to any Director, Manager, Secretary or other Officer of the Company which is pre-requisite u/s 17(4) of the Act. In these circumstances, the impleadment of petitioner through Managing Director is wrong, illegal. 14. The application of petitioner being Cr.M.P.No. 371 of 2012 for placing on record certain documents was allowed subject to objection of respondents. The petitioner has placed on record copy of complaint dated 13.12.2004 filed by Food Inspector in the trial Court, copy of extract of resolution dated 08.06.2002 of petitioner nominating D.K.Malik u/s 17(2) of the Act, copy of form (VIII) dated 05.07.2002 nominating D.K.Malik, Manager, of the petitioner under the Act and the Rules along with acknowledgement receipt of Local Health Authority, copy of letter dated 28.08.2002 addressed to Civil Surgeon, Solan, regarding nomination of D.K.Malik, Manager, of the petitioner under the Act and the Rules. 15. Heard. On behalf of the petitioner, it has been submitted that (i) liquor is not an item of food under the Act and, therefore, learned Magistrate has erred in impleading the petitioner as an accused u/s 20-A of the Act. (ii) The packing of the liquor is done by the petitioner in accordance with the Excise Act and the rules framed under that Act as applicable to the State of Himachal Pradesh and in accordance with the instructions, directions of the Excise Department of State of Himachal Pradesh. The Excise Act is a special statute and over-rides the general provisions under the Act. The learned Magistrate has impleaded the petitioner as an accused without application of mind. The Excise Act is a special statute and over-rides the general provisions under the Act. The learned Magistrate has impleaded the petitioner as an accused without application of mind. (iii) The learned Magistrate has erred in impleading the petitioner through Managing Director in absence of specific allegations in the complaint against Managing Director and in presence of nomination of D.K.Malik, Manager, of the petitioner u/s 17(2) of the Act. (iv)The fourth proviso to Rule 32(i) provides that declaration of "best before date" for consumption shall not be applicable to wines and liquor and, therefore, petitioner has not committed an offence of misbranded as defined in Section 2(ix)(k) of the Act. (v) In any case, new Act has come into force which has repealed the Act and, therefore, continuation of prosecution of petitioner under the Act is wrong, illegal. 16. The learned Additional Advocate General has opposed the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. She has submitted that the Excise Act has nothing to do with food adulteration. The Act operates in the field of food adulteration, whereas, the object of Excise Act is to regulate the manufacture, possession, sale etc. of the liquor. The liquor is 'food' under the Act. The petitioner has been impleaded u/s 20-A of the Act under special power given to the Magistrate in the Act. The Managing Director is overall Incharge of the Company. The alleged nomination in favour of D.K.Malik, Manager, relied in the petition cannot be considered as in the Court below it was never the case of the petitioner that D.K.Malik, Manager, is the nominee of the Company. The fourth proviso to Rule 32(i) is not applicable nor new Act has any bearing on the prosecution of the petitioner. She has prayed for dismissal of the petition. 17. The 'food' has been defined in Section 2(v) of the Act and means any article used as food or drink for human consumption other than drugs and water and includes (a) any article which ordinarily enters into, or is used in the composition or preparation of, human food, (b) any flavouring matter or condiments, and ( c) any other article which the Central Government may, having regard to its use, nature, substance or quality, declare, by notification in the Official Gazette, as food for the purposes of this Act. In State of Himachal Pradesh Versus Sh. In State of Himachal Pradesh Versus Sh. Raja Ram and another (1990) 2 FAC 231, the Division Bench has held that for purposes of the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 'liquor' ( including 'country liquor') is included in the definition of 'food' as contained in Section 2(v) of the Act. Therefore, contention of the petitioner that liquor is not 'food' under the Act has no force and is rejected. 18. It has been submitted that packing of the liquor according to the petitioner is done by the petitioner under the Excise Act as applicable to the State of Himachal Pradesh along with instructions and directions of the Excise Department which is special statute and over-rides the general Act for purposes of packing. The sample was taken on 24.06.2004. It has not been stated in the petition what was the requirement for packing of country liquor under the Excise Act, read with instructions and directions of the Excise Department when the sample was taken. The object of the Excise Act is to control manufacture, possession, sale etc. of the items covered by the Excise Act. It has nothing to do with food adulteration for which Act was enacted. The term 'misbranded' has been defined in Section 2(ix) of the Act. The Section 2(ix)(k) provides an article of food shall be deemed to be misbranded if it is not labelled in accordance with the requirements of the Act or the rules made thereunder. The Public Analyst in the report dated 03.07.2004 has opined that batch number, month and year of manufacture or packing, month or year up to which the product is best for consumption and symbol to indicate that the product is a vegetarian food have not been mentioned on the label. The sample of double distilled Spiced Country Liquor (Patiala Orange) is therefore misbranded and an offence u/s 7 and punishable u/s 16 of the Act. 19. The misbranded has been made punishable under the Act. It has not been pointed out that misbranded is also an offence and punishable under the Excise Act nor it has been contended that misbranded has been separately defined under the Excise Act. Therefore, it cannot be said in Excise Act there is a special provision for misbranded 'food' for which the petitioner has been prosecuted. It has not been pointed out that misbranded is also an offence and punishable under the Excise Act nor it has been contended that misbranded has been separately defined under the Excise Act. Therefore, it cannot be said in Excise Act there is a special provision for misbranded 'food' for which the petitioner has been prosecuted. The contention of the petitioner that since the petitioner had packed the liquor in accordance with Excise Act, instructions and directions of the Excise Department of State of Himachal Pradesh, therefore, petitioner cannot be prosecuted for the offence of misbranded under the Act is rejected. It cannot be said that learned Magistrate has erred in impleading the petitioner as an accused under the Act. 20. The contention of the petitioner that D.K.Malik, Manager, has already been nominated u/s 17(2) of the Act, therefore, the petitioner has been wrongly impleaded through Managing Director. It has also been submitted that there is no specific allegations against the Managing Director in the complaint in order to show his control over the petitioner. The impleadment of petitioner through S.K.Modi, Managing Director, is wrong and illegal. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied Pepsico India Holdings Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Food Inspector and Another, (2011) 1 SCC 176 . 21. The learned Additional Advocate General has submitted that petitioner, for the first time, has taken the plea in the petition that D.K.Malik, Manager, is the nominee of the petitioner u/s 17(2) of the Act as per resolution dated 08.06.2002. She has submitted that this was never the case of the petitioner. In the petition, there is no averment that at any point of time S.K.Modi, Managing Director, of the petitioner brought to the notice of the learned Magistrate that the petitioner had already nominated D.K.Malik, Manager, as nominee of the petitioner, therefore, the petitioner should be impleaded through D.K.Malik, Manager, and not through S.K.Modi, Managing Director. The contention of learned Additional Advocate General that nomination of D.K.Malik has been first time brought on record in the petition has not been refuted at the time of hearing. Therefore, the contention of petitioner that petitioner has been wrongly impleaded through S.K.Modi, Managing Director, instead of D.K.Malik, Manager, cannot be considered in the petition. 22. In Pepsico India (supra), the public analyst submitted report that the sample of Pepsi Sweetened carbonated water has pesticide residue carbofuran and the sample was adulterated. Therefore, the contention of petitioner that petitioner has been wrongly impleaded through S.K.Modi, Managing Director, instead of D.K.Malik, Manager, cannot be considered in the petition. 22. In Pepsico India (supra), the public analyst submitted report that the sample of Pepsi Sweetened carbonated water has pesticide residue carbofuran and the sample was adulterated. The Chief Judicial Magistrate upon the report of public analyst took cognizance of the offence and issued process against the appellants. The Supreme Court held that it is now well established that in a complaint against a Company and its Directors, the complainant has to indicate in the complaint itself as to whether the Directors concerned were either incharge of or responsible to the Company for its day-to-day management or whether they were responsible to the Company for the conduct of its business. A mere bald statement that a person was a Director of the Company against which certain allegations had been made is not sufficient to make such Director liable in the absence of any specific allegations regarding his role in the management of the Company. 23. In the present case the process was not issued against the petitioner directly on the complaint of the Food Inspector. The learned Magistrate on the application of L-14 licensee impleaded petitioner u/s 20-A of the Act. The Section 20-A provides where at any time during the trial of any offence under the Act alleged to have been committed by any person, not being the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of food, the Court is satisfied, on the evidence adduced before it, that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with that offence, then, the Court may, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section 3 of section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or in section 20 proceed against him as though a prosecution had been instituted against him u/s 20. In National Small Industries Corp. Ltd. Vs. Harmeet Singh Paintal and Another, (2010) 3 SCC 330 , it has been held that a company, though a legal entity, can act only through its Board of Directors. The settled position is that a Managing Director is prima facie in charge of and responsible for the company's business and affairs and can be prosecuted for the offences by the company. The settled position is that a Managing Director is prima facie in charge of and responsible for the company's business and affairs and can be prosecuted for the offences by the company. But insofar as other Directors are concerned, they can be prosecuted only if they were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. 24. The Magistrate u/s 20-A is to proceed against the manufacturer, distributor or dealer on the basis of evidence adduced before him. It is a special provision. The L-14 licensee at whose instance petitioner has been impleaded as an accused by learned Magistrate, has not been impleaded as a party in the petition. Therefore, in absence of L-14 licensee, the petitioner cannot be heard to say that impleadment of petitioner u/s 20-A is bad for want of allegations that S.K.Modi was incharge or responsible to the petitioner for its day-to-day management or whether he was responsible to the petitioner for the conduct of its business. 25. It has been contended that Rule 32(i) fourth proviso exempts declaration 'best before date' for consumption to wines and liquors. It has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that now proviso to Regulation 2.2.2(4) of Food Safety and Standards (Packing and labelling) Regulation, 2011 (for short 'Regulation'), exempts declaration regarding veg or non-veg to alcoholic drinks, similarly, according to first proviso to regulation 2.2.2(10) best before and use by date, declaration shall not be applicable to wines and liquors. It has been contended that on the basis of new Act and regulations, the petitioner is entitled to benefit of new Act and Regulations and petitioner cannot be prosecuted under the Act and the Rules. The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his submission has relied T. Barai Vs. Henry Ah Hoe and Another, State Through CBI, (1983) 1 SCC 177 , Delhi Vs. Gian Singh, (1999) 9 SCC 312 26. The sample was taken on 24.06.2004. The fourth proviso to Rule32(i) exempting declaration 'best before date' was added on 23.11.2005 with effect from 25.11.2005, therefore, petitioner cannot take benefit of exemption granted vide fourth proviso to Rule 32(i) as claimed by petitioner. The petitioner has been prosecuted under the Act and the Rules. It is the case of the petitioner that new Act has come into force. The petitioner has been prosecuted under the Act and the Rules. It is the case of the petitioner that new Act has come into force. The Section 97 repeal and savings under the new Act is as follows: [97. Repeal and savings. (1) With effect from such date as the Central Government may appoint in this behalf, the enactment and Orders specified in the Second Schedule shall stand repealed: Provided that such repeal shall not affect:- (i) the previous operations of the enactment and Orders under repeal or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (ii) any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any of the enactment or Orders under repeal; or (iii) any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offences committed against the enactment and Orders under repeal; or (iv) any investigation or remedy in respect of any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment, and any such investigation, legal proceedings or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed, as if this Act had not been passed: (2) If there is any other law for the time being in force in any State, corresponding to this Act, the same shall upon the commencement of this Act, stand repealed and in such case, the provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) shall apply as if such provisions of the State law had been repealed. (3) Notwithstanding the repeal of the aforesaid enactment and Orders, the licences issued under any such enactment or Order, which are in force on the date of commencement of this Act, shall continue to be in force till the date of their expiry for all purposes, as if they had been issued under the provisions of this Act or the rules or regulations made thereunder. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no court shall take cognizance of an offence under the repealed Act or Orders after the expiry of a period of three years from the date of the commencement of this Act.] 27. In T.S. Baliah Vs. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no court shall take cognizance of an offence under the repealed Act or Orders after the expiry of a period of three years from the date of the commencement of this Act.] 27. In T.S. Baliah Vs. T.S. Rengachari, AIR 1969 SC 701 one of the question before the Supreme Court was whether by reason of the repeal of the 1922 Act by the 1961 Act,the prosecution in respect of the prior proceedings under the 1922 Act were not saved and therefore the prosecution u/s 52 of the 1922 Act was not sustainable. The Supreme Court has noticed Section 6 of the General Clauses Act and held that u/s 6 of the General Clauses Act a legal proceeding in respect of an offence committed under the 1922 Act may be instituted even after the repeal of the 1922 Act by the 1961 Act and punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act had not been passed. 28. In T. Barai (supra), it has been held as under:- 25. It is settled both on authority and principle that when a later statue again describes an offence created by an earlier statute and imposes a different punishment, or varies the procedure, the earlier statute is repealed by implication. In Michell v. Brown (1958) 120 ER 909, Lord Campbell put the matter thus: It is well settled rule of construction that, if a later statute again describes an offence created by a former statute and affixes a different punishment, varying the procedure, the earlier statute is repealed by the later statute; see also Smit v. Benabo (1937) 1 ALL ER 523. In Regina v. Youle (1861) 158 ER 311, Martin, B. said in the oft-quoted passage: If a statute deals with a particular class of offences, and a subsequent Act is passed which deals with precisely the same offences, and a different punishment is imposed by the later Act, I think that, in effect, the legislature has declared that the new Act shall be substituted for the earlier Act. The rule is however subject to the limitation contained in Article 20(1) against ex post facto law providing for a greater punishment and has also no application where the offence described in the later Act is not the same as in the earlier Act i.e. when the essential ingredients of the two offences are different. In T.Barai (supra), the Supreme Court has held that when a later statue again describes an offence created by an earlier statute and imposes a different punishment, or varies the procedure, the earlier statute is repealed by implication. In the present case, it has not been contended that new Act has imposed a different punishment for offence for which notice of accusation has been put to petitioner. On the contrary, Section 97 of the new Act saves the applicability of the Act and Rules. Therefore, petitioner cannot take help from T.Barai (supra). 29. In State Through CBI, Delhi Versus Gian Singh, the Supreme Court noticed Section 25 of the TADA Act, 1987 and found inconsistency between sentencing scope in Section 3(2) of the TADA Act, 1985 and the corresponding provision in TADA Act, 1987 and held that extreme sentence contained in Section 3(2) must be superseded by the corresponding benevolent provision of 1987 Act. On behalf of the petitioner, over-riding effect of the new Act on the question of punishment under the Act has not been pointed out, therefore, in view of Section 97 of the new Act, petitioner cannot take benefit of State Through CBI, Delhi Versus Gian Singh(supra). 30. It is clear from Section 97 of the new Act that Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, which is included in Second Schedule of the new Act has been repealed. However, Section 97 of the new Act further provides that the repeal shall not affect the previous operations of the enactment and Orders under repeal or anything duly done or suffered thereunder and any such investigation, legal proceedings or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced and any such penalty forfeiture or punishment may be imposed, as if the new Act had not been passed. In other words, the prosecution instituted under the Act shall continue under the Act. 31. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that summoning of a person is a serious matter and the Magistrate has erred in summoning the petitioner. In other words, the prosecution instituted under the Act shall continue under the Act. 31. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that summoning of a person is a serious matter and the Magistrate has erred in summoning the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Another Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and Others, (1998) 5 SCC 749 . The summoning order dated 27.07.2006 has been reproduced in the petition. The learned Magistrate has observed that in support of the application u/s 20-A of the Act, the applicant has placed on record original bill dated 01.06.2004 pass of transportation of liquor. In the complaint filed by the Food Inspector, the manufacturer is shown as Patiala Distillers Limited, Baddi. The learned Magistrate has recorded satisfaction that a prima facie case is made out against Patiala Distillers and Manufacturers Limited and thereafter the learned Magistrate summoned the petitioner. The impleadment order dated 27.07.2006 of the petitioner as an accused u/s 20-A of the Act reflects application of mind by the learned Magistrate. It cannot be said that the learned Magistrate made petitioner as an accused in routine or there is no material on record in impleading the petitioner as an accused. 32. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied Dwarka Nath and Another Vs. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1971) 2 SCC 314 . In that case the complaints were on the ground that the appellants had not conformed to the packing and labelling rules under the Act inasmuch as the name and the business address of the manufacturer or packer or vendor and batch or code numbers had not been specifically mentioned on the label. The appellants were prosecuted under Sections 7/16 of the Act and Rule 32(b),(e). The Supreme Court held that there is substantial compliance with Rule 32(b), but according to the requirements of the rule some more particulars should have been given and, therefore, it has been held that there can be no conviction for technical breach of Rule 32(b) alone and conviction of the appellants for offences under Rule 32(b) (e) as well as fine were set-aside. 33. 33. In the present case, the allegation against the petitioner is of misbranded with the allegations that batch number, month and year of manufacture or packing, month and year up to which the product is best for consumption and symbol to indicate that the product is a vegetarian food have not been mentioned on the label. In Dwarka Nath (supra), the Supreme Court has held that there is substantial compliance of Rule 32(b). There is no material on record to consider that Rule 32 has been substantially complied by the petitioner in the present case. Thus, seen from any angle, the petitioner has failed to make out a case for interference. In view of above discussion, petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. All the pending applications, if any, are also disposed of. All interim orders are vacated. The parties through counsel are directed to appear before the trial Court on 28.06.2012.