Judgment :- 1. The petitioner was appointed as an Automobile Engineer in Motor Vehicles Maintenance Department of Government of Tamil Nadu through the selection made by the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission with effect from 01.08.1984. As per the Service Rules, he was later on promoted as Deputy Director with effect from 18.05.1995 and finally he worked as Works Manager at Government Central Automobile Workshop, Chennai with effect from 18.05.1998. The Government of Tamil Nadu framed adhoc rules, in exercise of the powers conferred under Article 309 of the Constitution of India and the said Rules were duly published as per G.O.Ms.No.547 Transport Department dated 15.05.1979. As per the said adhoc Rules, the temporary post ‘of Director’, Motor Vehicles Maintenance Organization was created. As per the said Rules, the appointment to the said post shall be made as follows:- ‘(i) By promotion from the holders of the post of works manager in the motor vehicles maintenance organization. (ii) By recruitment by transfer from among the holders of the post of Superintending Engineer from Tamil Nadu Engineering Service or Tamil Nadu Highways Engineering Service.’ Rules 4 prescribes qualification for appointment to the said post which reads as follows:- ‘No person shall be eligible for appointment to the post by the methods specified in the Table below, unless the possession of qualification specified in the corresponding entries in column (2) thereof.’ 2. According to the petitioner, he became eligible for appointment by means of promotion to the post of Director even on 18.05.2000. But he was not considered for promotion and instead, the second respondent, who was then the Managing Director of a state Transport Corporation, was appointed as Director, Motor Vehicles Maintenance Department. All the representations made by the petitioner for promoting him were not considered by the first respondent. In those circumstances, the petitioner has come up with the present writ petition seeking mandamus to the first respondent to appoint the petitioner as the Director of Motor Vehicles Maintenance Department. 3. All the representations made by the petitioner for promoting him were not considered by the first respondent. In those circumstances, the petitioner has come up with the present writ petition seeking mandamus to the first respondent to appoint the petitioner as the Director of Motor Vehicles Maintenance Department. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner would rely on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Delhi Jal Board v. Mahinder Singh ( 2000 (7) SCC 210 ) wherein, while considering the right of an employee for being considered for promotion if he satisfies the required qualifications, the Hon’ble supreme court has held that, it is his fundamental right guaranteed under Article 16 of the Constitution of India for being considered. In paragraph No.5 of the said judgment, it has been held as follows:- ‘5. The right to be considered by the Departmental Promotion Committee is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 16 of the Constitution of India, provided a person is eligible and is in the zone of consideration. The sealed cover procedure permits the question of his promotion to be kept in abeyance till the result of any pending disciplinary inquiry, But the findings of the disciplinary inquiry exonerating the officer would have to be given effect to as they obviously relate back to the date on which the charges are framed. If the disciplinary inquiry ended in his favour, it is as if the officer had not been subjected to any disciplinary inquiry. The sealed cover procedure was envisaged under the rules to give benefit of any assessment made by the Departmental Promotion Committee in favour of such an officer, if he had been found fit for promotion and if he was later exonerated in the disciplinary inquiry which was pending at the time when DPC met………..’ 4. A perusal of the above judgment would go a long way to show that the right for being considered for promotion, if the employee has come within the zone of consideration is a fundamental right. In the case on hand, there is no dispute that the petitioner became eligible for promotion and also came within the zone of consideration even on 18.05.2000 itself. 5. But, according to the respondents, the petitioner was not considered for promotion because there was a disciplinary proceeding pending against him. In the case on hand, there is no dispute that the petitioner became eligible for promotion and also came within the zone of consideration even on 18.05.2000 itself. 5. But, according to the respondents, the petitioner was not considered for promotion because there was a disciplinary proceeding pending against him. Ofcourse, the first respondent would have been right in not promoting the petitioner, but at the same time, as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment cited supra, the petitioner should have been considered for promotion and if he was found eligible, ‘sealed cover procedure’ should have been adopted by keeping his promotion in abeyance awaiting the result of the disciplinary proceedings. Obviously, the said procedure was not followed in the case of the petitioner by the first respondent. Admittedly, the petitioner was exonerated from the charges on 07.01.2008. Even thereafter, the petitioner was not considered for promotion and instead, the persons from other Departments were appointed in succession as Director by violating the adhoc Rules. 6. According to the adhoc Rules, there are two alternative modes of appointment. The first one is to promote a person from the Department who has been working for more than five years as Woks Manager provided he has got the other required qualifications. The second mode is to appoint an eligible person drawn either from the Tamil Nadu Engineering Service or from the Tamil Nadu Highways Engineering Service. 7. Admittedly, the second respondent was not drawn from any of these two services. Further, the second respondent does not fall within the first category as well. But, he was drawn only from a third unauthorized source namely from the State owned Transport Corporation, which is not in accordance with the Adhoc Rules. In such view of the matter, I have no difficulty in holding that the appointment of the second respondent as Director cannot be sustained. But since, this Court is informed that as of now, the second respondent is no more in service as Director of the Department in question, I do not proceed to quash the said appointment. 8. The learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the first respondent would submit that in future, the adhoc Rules will be scrupulously followed by the Government in making appointment of Director of Motor Vehicles Maintenance Department. 8. The learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the first respondent would submit that in future, the adhoc Rules will be scrupulously followed by the Government in making appointment of Director of Motor Vehicles Maintenance Department. I am hopeful that this undertaking will be adhered scrupulously by the Government in future. In the light of the above conclusion, now it has to be considered as to what is the relief that could be given to the petitioner at this stage. 9. As I have already stated, the petitioner’s promotion was unduly denied without considering his case for promotion though he was well within the zone of consideration. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that atleast from 07.01.2008, (the date on which the petitioner was exonerated from the charges), he should be deemed to have promoted as Director, Motor Vehicles Department until the date of his retirement. This is in tune with the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme court in Delhi Jal Board Y. Mahinder Singh (cited supra). 10. In view of all the above, the writ petition is disposed of on the following terms:- (i) the petitioner shall be deemed to have been promoted as Director of Motor Vehicles Maintenance Department with effect from 07.01.2008 and he shall be entitled for all the consequential monetary benefits including pensionary benefits. (ii) The first respondent shall issue consequential orders in this regard within a period of five months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.