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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 329 (MP)

Parvez Khan v. State of M. P.

2012-03-20

AJIT SINGH, R.S.JHA

body2012
JUDGMENT : Asper Ajit Singh, J.:- Thiswrit petition is directed against the order dated 3-3-2010 passed by the learned Single Judge of this HighCourt whereby he has dismissed the appellant's Writ Petition No. 15052/2008. 2.The facts in short are these. The appellant's father Sultan Khan died on 21-6-2005 while serving in the PoliceDepartment of the State Government. Immediately thereafter the appellantapplied for his compassionate appointment. The respondents processed hisapplication and found him eligible for appointment. They, therefore, referredthe matter to the Competent Authority. The Competent Authority also found theappellant eligible for appointment and sent his record for police verification.It is stated that according to the police verification report the appellant wasfound involved in two criminal cases. In the first case he was prosecuted foroffences under Sections 323, 324, 325, 294 and 506-B/34 of the Indian PenalCode and in the second case he was prosecuted for offences under Sections 452,394 and 365 of the Indian Penal Code. The Superintendent of Police (respondentNo. 4) by order dated 26-9-2007 held that on character verification of the appellant he is not found suitablefor Government service and closed his case. Aggrieved, the appellant filed WritPetition No. 15052/2008 and submitted that in the first case he was acquittedof all the charges vide judgment dated 31-1-2007 passed in Criminal Case No. 3014/2007 by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Damoh , and in the second case also he was acquitted becausethe offences were compounded before the Competent Court . But the learned Single Judge dismissed thepetition on the ground that as in the second case the matter was compromised,the acquittal of appellant was not clear. The learned Judge also held thatbecause of the involvement of appellant in criminal offences, the decision ofrespondents in closing his case for compassionate appointment cannot be said asarbitrary. 3.It is argued on behalf of the appellant that the order dated 26-9-2007 dismissing the claim ofpetitioner for compassionate appointment does not contain any reasons and,therefore, it deserves to be quashed on this ground alone. It has also beenargued that the learned Judge committed an illegality in holding that as theappellant was discharged of the offences on the basis of compromise, hisacquittal was not clear. The learned Deputy Advocate General, on the otherhand, justified the action of respondents as well as the order passed in thewrit petition. 4.The Supreme Court in Ram Kumar Vs. It has also beenargued that the learned Judge committed an illegality in holding that as theappellant was discharged of the offences on the basis of compromise, hisacquittal was not clear. The learned Deputy Advocate General, on the otherhand, justified the action of respondents as well as the order passed in thewrit petition. 4.The Supreme Court in Ram Kumar Vs. State of U.P., AIR 2011 SC 2903 , has heldthat the object of the verification of the character and antecedents ofGovernment servants before their first appointment is to ensure that thecharacter of a Government servant for a direct recruitment is such as to renderhim suitable in all respects for employment in the service or post to which heis to be appointed and it would be a duty of the Appointing Authority tosatisfy itself on this point. 5.In the case at hand, the appellant was admitted acquitted in both the aforesaidcriminal cases much prior to the passing of the order dated 26-9-2007 by the Superintendent ofPolice, Sagar . On perusal of the order dated 26-9-2007 , we find that theSuperintendent of Police, without giving any reference to the judgments ofacquittal of the appellant in criminal cases, has disqualified him not only forthe appointment in the Police Department but also for any Government service.The Superintendent of Police has not given any finding as to why merely on thereport of character verification of the appellant he has disqualified him forappointment in the Government service even for future. Apparently, we are ofthe view that the Superintendent of Police has not only acted arbitrarily butexceeded his brief. 6.It is now well settled that the conferment of quasi-judicial power implies thatthe person concerned must follow the rules of natural justice and must givereasons for making the order which he is empowered to make. Purelyadministrative bodies are also bound to act justly and fairly which may bringin the requirement of natural justice as also the duty to give reasons. Even anon-statutory private body, which is not a state under Article 12 of the Constitution,but which exercises public functions is bound to follow the principles of'fairness' and "good faith' and to act reasonably and its orders areamendable to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. Section 4(1) (d) of the recently enacted statute, the Right to Information Act, 2005,also requires every Public Authority of India to 'provide reasons for itsadministrative or quasi-judicial decisions to affected persons'. Section 4(1) (d) of the recently enacted statute, the Right to Information Act, 2005,also requires every Public Authority of India to 'provide reasons for itsadministrative or quasi-judicial decisions to affected persons'. ( See : Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P.Singh, XIIIth Edition, 2012, pp. 453, 456 and 457). 7.Further under English Law a quasi-judicial authority need not give reasonsunless required to do so by statute but now there is also a definite shift in favour of the view that reasons should be given. InFlannery Vs. Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd., (2000) 1 All ER 373, at Pages 377and 378 (CA) comments have been made that the duty to give reasons "isfunction of due-process and, therefore, of justice. Its rationale has twoprinciple aspects. The first is that fairness surely requires that the partiesespecially the losing party should be left in no doubt why they have w6n orlost. The second is that a requirement to give reasons concentrates the mindand if it is fulfilled the resulting decision is much more likely to be soundlybased". Also in Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union ofIndia, AIR 1978 SC 597 , p. 619, the Supreme Court has held that necessity ofgiving reasons is a healthy check against abuse or misuse of power for if thereasons recorded are extraneous or irrelevant the order would be struck down. 8.In view of the aforesaid principle of law the order dated 29-6-2007 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Sagar , cannot be sustained and we accordingly quashthe same. 9.We are also unable to agree with the learned Single Judge that since in thesecond case the offences were compromised, the acquittal of appellant is notclear. It is not in dispute that the offences were lawfully compounded underSection 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and sub-section (8) ofthis Section clearly provides that the composition of an offence shall have theeffect of an acquittal of the accused with whom the offence has beencompounded. The section does not mention anywhere that the composition of anoffence will not have the effect of clear acquittal. We accordingly, quash theorder dated 3-3-2010 of thelearned Single Judge. 10.For these reasons, we allow the appeal and direct the respondents to considerthe case of appellant for compassionate appointment afresh in the light ofabove discussion. The section does not mention anywhere that the composition of anoffence will not have the effect of clear acquittal. We accordingly, quash theorder dated 3-3-2010 of thelearned Single Judge. 10.For these reasons, we allow the appeal and direct the respondents to considerthe case of appellant for compassionate appointment afresh in the light ofabove discussion. The respondents are also directed to do so within threemonths from the date of receiving the copy of this order and communicate thedecision to the appellant.