Judgment :- 1. The writ petition came to be posted on being specially ordered by the Hon'ble Chief Justice vide order dated 19.04.2012. 2. The petitioner, who is a minor represented by his father and natural guardian, has filed the present writ petition challenging an order dated 25.11.2011 issued by the second respondent Rowing Federation of India represented by its Secretary General at Chennai, wherein and by which a sanction was imposed on her for a period of six months with immediate effect and that she was prohibited from participating in the events conducted under the aegis of the second respondent or its affiliates. 3. The said order came to be issued after a show cause notice was issued to her on 21.11.2011, to which the petitioner had sent a reply on 22.11.2011. The second respondent was not satisfied with the reply. Anticipating that the petitioner may move the court against the said order, the second respondent had filed a caveat before the original side of this court under Section 148-A and Order 52 of CPC. But, however, the petitioner chose to move the writ petition against the order of the second respondent. 4. When the writ petition came up on 01.12.2011, notice of motion was ordered. Pending notice of motion, an interim stay was granted for a period of four weeks. The stay order came to be extended from time to time, i.e., on 23.12.2011, 12.01.2012, 30.01.2012, 08.02.2012, 22.02.2012, 08.03.2012, 22.03.2012, 09.04.2012 and 26.04.2012. 5. On notice from this court, the second respondent has filed a counter affidavit, dated 11.01.2012. It was contended that the writ petition is not maintainable and for any dispute between the members of the Association who are affiliated to India Olympic Association, there is a court of Arbitration of Sports has been constituted. The Arbitral Tribunal being the Indian Court of Arbitration for Sports is consisting of Chairman and members who are retired judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts. The disputes will have to be resolved only by way of an arbitration. A memorandum of association of the society also provides for arbitration. The petitioner had also signed the letter of commitment on 14.2.2011 and 20.11.2011, under which it was specifically informed about the arbitration clause of Rowing Federation of India. Hence the petitioner is precluded and prohibited from raising any dispute about her non selection before this court. A memorandum of association of the society also provides for arbitration. The petitioner had also signed the letter of commitment on 14.2.2011 and 20.11.2011, under which it was specifically informed about the arbitration clause of Rowing Federation of India. Hence the petitioner is precluded and prohibited from raising any dispute about her non selection before this court. With reference to the disciplinary proceedings under which six months sanction has been imposed on her, the petitioner had already appealed to the Executive Counsel of the second respondent through her State Association and that the appeal was rejected. The Executive Council of the second respondent had ratified the suspension of six months imposed on her. Further it was also stated that the writ petition is not maintainable against the second and third respondents as they are not coming within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution as well as they are not entrusted with any statutory duty by any enactment. Hence the writ petition is not maintainable. 6. The petitioner filed a reply affidavit, dated 30.01.2012. Further rejoinder was filed by the second respondent, dated Nil (March, 2012). An additional counter affidavit was also filed by the second respondent, stating that there is no infraction of any statutory provisions of law. The issue is purely an internal matter regarding administration of the association and the enforcement of discipline. 7. The petitioner filed a rejoinder additional affidavit, dated 18.01.2012. It was stated by the petitioner that the Rowing Federation of India is a national sports federation. Therefore, subject to the provisions of the National Sports Development Code of India, 2011, the National development code of India has been issued in furtherance of various steps and initiatives taken by the Government of India. It was also claimed that even though the national sports body is autonomous in nature and they are not "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, they come within the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. The second respondent is regulated and financed by the Government of India with very little other income accounting for its resources. They also received substantial aid from the Government. There is pervasive State control and that almost the entire corpus is from the first respondent. In view of the denial of principle of natural justice, the writ petition is maintainable. She need not be relegated to any alternative forum. 8. They also received substantial aid from the Government. There is pervasive State control and that almost the entire corpus is from the first respondent. In view of the denial of principle of natural justice, the writ petition is maintainable. She need not be relegated to any alternative forum. 8. However this court is not inclined to accept the submissions made by the petitioner that the writ petition is maintainable. The learned counsel for the petitioner made an elaborate submission by relying upon the following judgments to contend that the writ petition is maintainable, which are as follows : (i)Devi Chand Vs. Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad, A.P., [ AIR 1965 AP 415 (Vol.52, C.100)]; (ii)Harbanslal Sahnia and another Vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and others [ (2003) 2 SCC 107 ]; (iii)Kirandeep and another Vs. Chandigarh Rowing Association and others [MANU/PH/0193/2004 = AIR 2004 P&H 278 ] (iv)G.Ramesh and others Vs. Registrar of Companies [MANU/TN/1003/2006] (v)N.Chandrasekar and others Vs. Tamil Nadu Cricket Association [ 2006 (3) MLJ 846 ]. 9. He also contended that the society's activities can be brought within the norms laid by the Supreme Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas Vs. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology reported in (2002) 5 SCC 111 . But however, in a decision in General Manger, Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd., Sultanpur, U.P. Vs. Satrughan Nishad reported in (2003) 8 SCC 639 , the Supreme Court in paragraph 8 had observed as follows : “8.) From the decisions referred to above, it would be clear that the form in which the body is constituted, namely, whether it is a society or a cooperative society or a company, is not decisive. The real status of the body with respect to the control of Government would have to be looked into. The various tests, as indicated above, would have to be applied and considered cumulatively. There can be no hard-and-fast formula and in different facts/situations, different factors may be found to be overwhelming and indicating that the body is an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution........” 10. Subsequently, the Supreme Court in S.S.Rana Vs. Registrar, Cooperative Societies reported in (2006) 11 SCC 634 , in paragraphs 10,12 and 13 had observed as follows : “10.) It has not been shown before us that the State exercises any direct or indirect control over the affairs of the Society for deep and pervasive control. Subsequently, the Supreme Court in S.S.Rana Vs. Registrar, Cooperative Societies reported in (2006) 11 SCC 634 , in paragraphs 10,12 and 13 had observed as follows : “10.) It has not been shown before us that the State exercises any direct or indirect control over the affairs of the Society for deep and pervasive control. The State furthermore is not the majority shareholder. The State has the power only to nominate one Director. It cannot, thus, be said that the State exercises any functional control over the affairs of the Society in the sense that the majority Directors are nominated by the State. For arriving at the conclusion that the State has a deep and pervasive control over the Society, several other relevant questions are required to be considered, namely, (1) How was the Society created? (2) Whether it enjoys any monopoly character? (3) Do the functions of the Society partake to statutory functions or public functions? and (4) Can it be characterised as public authority? 12.) It is well settled that general regulations under an Act, like the Companies Act or the Cooperative Societies Act, would not render the activities of a company or a society as subject to control of the State. Such control in terms of the provisions of the Act are meant to ensure proper functioning of the society and the State or statutory authorities would have nothing to do with its day-to-day functions. 13.) The decision of the seven-Judge Bench of this Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas whereupon strong reliance has been placed, has no application in the instant case. In that case, the Bench was deciding a question as to whether in view of the subsequent decisions of this Court, the law was correctly laid down in Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India4 and if not whether the same deserved to be overruled. The majority opined that the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) was ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. This Court noticed the history of the formation thereof, its objects and functions, its management and control as also the extent of financial aid received by it. The majority opined that the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) was ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. This Court noticed the history of the formation thereof, its objects and functions, its management and control as also the extent of financial aid received by it. Apart from the said fact it was noticed by reason of an appropriate notification issued by the Central Government that CSIR was amenable to the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal in terms of Section 14(2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. It was on the aforementioned premises, this Court opined that Sabhajit Tewary4 did not lay down the correct law. This Court reiterated the following six tests laid down in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi: (Pradeep Kumar Biswas case1, SCC pp. 149-50, para 85) “(1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government. (2) Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost the entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character. (3) It may also be a relevant factor - whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State-conferred or State-protected. (4) Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the corporation is a State agency or instrumentality. (5) If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government. (6) ‘Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference’ of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government.’ This Court further held: (Pradeep Kumar Biswas case1, SCC p. 134, para 40) “40.) The picture that ultimately emerges is that the tests formulated in Ajay Hasia2 are not a rigid set of principles so that if a body falls within any one of them it must, ex hypothesi, be considered to be a State within the meaning of Article 12. The question in each case would be - whether in the light of the cumulative facts as established, the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government. Such control must be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive. If this is found then the body is a State within Article 12. On the other hand, when the control is merely regulatory, whether under statute or otherwise, it would not serve to make the body a State.”(emphasis supplied) In that case, the dictum of Pradeep Kumar Biswas's case (cited supra) was also referred to. 11. Thereafter, the Supreme Court in Sindhi Education Society Vs. Chief Secretary, Government of NCT of Delhi reported in (2010) 8 SCC 49, had elaborately dealt with the application of Pradeep Kumar Biswas case and held that it has to be considered with reference to the facts available in respect of each case. As to the body is concerned, whether it is State or other authority within the meaning of Article 12, it is necessary to refer to the following passages found in paragraphs 86 and 87 and it reads as follows : "86.) The interpretation of the word ‘State’ really does not require any deliberation as this aspect is no more res integra and has been settled by the law stated in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi28, where this Court spelt out the test that would be applicable in determining whether a corporation or a government company or a private body is an instrumentality or agency of the State. Primarily, there are different types of controls, which can be exercised by the State over any other authority, society, organisation or private body to bring it within the ambit of the expression ‘State’ or ‘other authority’ appearing in Article 12 of the Constitution. These are financial control, managerial and administrative control and functional control. To put it differently, what is the administrative control that the Government exercises upon such a body, whether functions of that body are governmental functions or closely related thereto, quantum of State control, volume of financial assistances, character and structure of the body and cumulative effect of these factors, etc. This has been followed consistently in Zoroastrian Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. District Registrar, Coop. This has been followed consistently in Zoroastrian Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. District Registrar, Coop. Societies (Urban)29 and in a very recent judgment in State of U.P. v. Radhey Shyam Rai30, wherein this Court held that Uttar Pradesh Ganna Kishan Sansthan (Sansthan) is State because these criteria were satisfied and even the State could take over the functions of the Sansthan. Unless all these three aspects are established or they are stated to be satisfied, it will not be permissible to term that society, organisation or body as ‘State’. 87.) There is no doubt, that there may be minority institutions which are receiving grant-in-aid from the Government. But, merely receiving grant-in-aid per se would not make such school or institution ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Even this aspect we need not discuss in any great detail as the question stands settled by the judgment of this Court in V.K. Sodhi15, wherein this Court has dealt with the question whether the State Council of Education, Research and Training is not State or other authority within the meaning of Article 12. The Court returned the finding that though the finances were being provided by the State, the State Government does not have deep and pervasive control over the working of the Council and it was an independent society and thus, is not State. The Court held as under: (SCC pp. 143-46, paras 16-21) “16.) The two elements, one, of a function of the State, namely, the coordinating of education and the other, of the Council being dependent on the funding by the State, satisfied two of the tests indicated by the decisions of this Court. But, at the same time, from that alone it could not be assumed that SCERT is State. It has to be noted that though finance is made available by the State, in the matter of administration of that finance, the Council is supreme. The administration is also completely with the Council. There is no governmental interference or control either financially, functionally or administratively, in the working of the Council. These were the aspects taken note of in Chander Mohan Khanna31 to come to the conclusion that NCERT is not State or other authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. There is no governmental interference or control either financially, functionally or administratively, in the working of the Council. These were the aspects taken note of in Chander Mohan Khanna31 to come to the conclusion that NCERT is not State or other authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. No doubt, in Chander Mohan Khanna31 the Bench noted that the fact that education was a State function could not make any difference. This part of the reasoning in Chander Mohan Khanna case31 has been specifically disapproved by the majority in Pradeep Kumar Biswas32. The majority noted that the objects of forming Indian Institute of Chemical Biology was with the view of entrusting it with a function that is fundamental to the governance of the country and quoted with approval (Pradeep Kumar Biswas case32, SCC p. 135, para 45) the following passage in Rajasthan SEB v. Mohan Lal33: (AIR p. 1863, para 6) “6. ‘The State, as defined in Article 12, is thus comprehended to include bodies created for the purpose of promoting the educational and economic interests of the people.” The majority then stated: (Pradeep Kumar Biswas case32, SCC p. 136, para 46) “46. We are in respectful agreement with this statement of the law. The observations to the contrary in Chander Mohan Khanna v. NCERT31 relied on by the learned Attorney General in this context, do not represent the correct legal position.” *** 17.) We also find substantial differences in the two set-ups. Sabhajit Tewary34, after referring to the rules of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research which was registered under the Societies Registration Act, concluded that it was not State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Sabhajit Tewary34, after referring to the rules of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research which was registered under the Societies Registration Act, concluded that it was not State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. While overruling the said decision, the majority in Pradeep Kumar Biswas32 took the view that the dominant role played by the Government of India in the governing body and the ubiquitous control of the Government in the Council and the complete subjugation of the Governing Body to the will of the Central Government, the inability of the Council to lay down or change the terms and conditions of service of its employees and the inability to alter any bye-law without the approval of the Government of India and the owning by the Central Government of the assets and funds of the Council though normally owned by the Society, all indicated that there was effective and pervasive control over the functioning of the Council and since it was also entrusted with a governmental function, the justifiable conclusion was that it was State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. 18.) The majority in Pradeep Kumar Biswas32 also noticed that on a winding up of that Council, the entire assets were to vest in the Central Government and that was also a relevant indication. Their Lordships in the majority also specifically overruled as a legal principle that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act or a company incorporated under the Companies Act, is by that reason alone excluded from the concept of State under Article 12 of the Constitution. 19.) In the case of SCERT, in addition to the operational autonomy of the Executive Committee, it could also amend its bye-laws subject to the provisions of the Delhi (sic) Societies Registration Act though with the previous concurrence of the Government of Delhi and that the proceedings of the Council are to be made available by the Secretary for inspection of the Registrar of Societies as per the provisions of the Societies Registration Act. The records and proceedings of the Council have also to be made available for inspection by the Registrar of Societies. In the case of dissolution of SCERT, the liabilities and assets are to be taken over at book value by the Government of Delhi which had to appoint a liquidator for completing the dissolution of the body. The records and proceedings of the Council have also to be made available for inspection by the Registrar of Societies. In the case of dissolution of SCERT, the liabilities and assets are to be taken over at book value by the Government of Delhi which had to appoint a liquidator for completing the dissolution of the body. The creditors' loans and other liabilities of SCERT shall have preference and bear a first charge on the assets of the Council at the time of dissolution. This is not an unconditional vesting of the assets on dissolution with the Government. 20.) It is also provided that the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 had to be complied with in the matter of filing list of office-bearers every year with the Registrar and the carrying out of the amendments in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Act of 1860 and the dissolution being in terms of Sections 13 and 14 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and making all the provisions of the Societies Registration Act applicable to the Society. These provisions, in our view, indicate that SCERT is subservient to the provisions of the Societies Registration Act rather than to the State Government and that the intention was to keep SCERT as an independent body and the role of the State Government cannot be compared to that of the Central Government in the case of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research. 21.) As we understand it, even going by para 40 of the judgment in Pradeep Kumar Biswas32, which we have quoted above, we have to consider the cumulative effect of all the facts available in the case. So considered, we are inclined to hold that SCERT is not State or other authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. As we see it, the High Court has not independently discussed the relevant rules governing the functioning and administration of SCERT. It has proceeded on the basis that in the face of Pradeep Kumar Biswas32 decision, the decision in Chander Mohan Khanna31 must be taken to be overruled and no further discussion of the question is necessary. As we see it, the High Court has not independently discussed the relevant rules governing the functioning and administration of SCERT. It has proceeded on the basis that in the face of Pradeep Kumar Biswas32 decision, the decision in Chander Mohan Khanna31 must be taken to be overruled and no further discussion of the question is necessary. But, in our view, even going by Pradeep Kumar Biswas32 each case has to be considered with reference to the facts available for determining whether the body concerned is State or other authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. So considered, we find that the Government does not have deep and pervasive control over the working of SCERT. It does not have financial control in the sense that once the finances are made available to it, the administration of those finances is left to SCERT and there is no further governmental control. In this situation, we accept the submission on behalf of the appellants and hold that SCERT is not State or other authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. After all, the very formation of an independent society under the Societies Registration Act would also suggest that the intention was not to make the body a mere appendage of the State. We reverse the finding of the High Court on this aspect.” 12. If it is seen in the light of the above, it can certainly be held that merely because the second respondent receiving grant from the Central Government, by itself will not bring it within the term "other authority" so as to enable the court to issue the writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. Hence the writ petition is liable to be rejected solely on the ground of not maintainable. Even assuming that such a writ is maintainable by holding that the second and third respondents are other authorities, certainly as the petitioner had agreed to abide by the arbitration clause as contended by the respondents, even on that ground, the writ petition will have to fail. Accordingly, the writ petition will stand dismissed. No costs. Consequently connected miscellaneous petition stands closed.