JUDGMENT S.C. Das, J. 1. The petitioners, named above, filed the present application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging order dated 19.05.2011 passed by learned Civil Judge, or Division, Kailashahar, North Tripura District in Civil Misc Case No. 03/2011 arising out of Title Suit No. 5/ 2011 and the passed by learned Additional District Judge, North Tripura, Kailashahar in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 5/2011, alleging that the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division (trial Court) and the learned Additional District Judge (appellate Court) have utterly failed to exercise lawful jurisdiction vested/ conferred in them and thereby caused gross miscarriage of justice. Heard Learned Counsel, Mr. D.K. Biswas for petitioners and Learned Counsel, Mr. P. Rathor for the respondents. 2. The petitioners, as plaintiffs, instituted Title Suit No. 5/2011 for declaration and injunction in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Kailashahar; seeking following reliefs : (A) Granting declaration that above said questioned proceeding (of arbitration) and questioned award (of arbitration) are illegal, ultravires, none-est and not binding upon the plaintiffs, having been vitiated by fraud and collusion and that defendants have no right to execute the same as against this plaintiffs; (B) Granting and issuing perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from further continuing/prosecuting aforesaid civil Misc. (execution) 39 of 2010 and from executing the question award; (C) Granting all other reliefs deemed fit and proper; and (D) Granting full cost of litigation. Along with the plaint the plaintiff-petitioners filed a separate petition under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of CPC praying for temporary injunction restraining the defendants/respondents from executing the arbitral award, dated 26.03.2011, passed by sole Arbitrator in SGRCV No. 178/2009 and also prayed for an injunction in further proceeding of Civil Misc (Execution) No. 39/2010 in the Court of District Judge, North Tripura. The special petition, seeking temporary injunction, was registered as Civil Misc Case No. 3/2011 and by impugned judgment, dated 19.05.2011, the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, rejected the prayer of temporary injunction pending disposal of the suit and challenging that order the plaintiff-petitioners filed Civil Misc Appeal No. 5/2011 in the Court of District Judge and learned Additional District Judge vide impugned order, dated 15.07.2011, dismissed the appeal and hence the plaintiff- petitioners filed the present application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India praying for setting aside the impugned orders, dated 19.05.2011 and 15.07.2011 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division and Additional District Judge, North Tripura, Kailashahar respectively on the ground that the Courts below failed to exercise their jurisdiction, according to law and the judgments/orders passed by the Courts below suffers from perversity. 3. The High Court's power of revision under Article 227 of the Constitution would be restricted to interference in cases of grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of law, and would be exercised most sparingly, in cases where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interfere. It cannot be used as appellate or revisional power. The power would not be exercised to correct an error of fact or of law, not being an error of law apparent on the face of the record, of an irregularity or illegality of procedure, unless such error affects the jurisdiction or involves a breach of principles of natural justice; or to re-apprise the evidence. 4. Keeping in mind the principles in respect of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, let us first briefly narrate the facts of the case for fair appreciation and decision on the point posed by the petitioners. The petitioners with a view to purchase a Bus vehicle took a loan of Rs. 5,10,000/- (Rupees five lakhs ten thousands) and the loan agreement No. WG001241 H, dated 15.02.2005, was executed with specific terms and conditions that the loan will be repaid with interest @ 6% per annum by 36 monthly installments commencing from the date of disbursement of loan and that the loan agreement shall expire on 15.01.2008. In terms of the agreement, dated 15.02.2005, the petitioners could not pay the monthly installments and to regularize the outstanding dues of Rs. In terms of the agreement, dated 15.02.2005, the petitioners could not pay the monthly installments and to regularize the outstanding dues of Rs. 3,15,000/- a fresh loan agreement, bearing No. WG00323H dated 21.03.2007, was executed with specific terms of repayment by 35 monthly installments of the amount with interest thereon. The petitioner could not make payment of the installments, as per the agreement and therefore, the vehicle was seized by the respondents and it was sold and as per the terms of the agreement, an arbitration proceeding was initiated before the sole Arbitrator at Chennai and the Arbitrator in due course made award dated 26.03.2010 which has been put to execution in due course before the District Judge, North Tripura, Kailashahar in Civil Misc (Execution) Case No. 39/2010. While the execution case was pending the Title suit seeking declaration and injunction was filed along with the petition for temporary injunction. 5. The petitioners inter alia stated in their petition before this Court that on the approach of the respondents the petitioners purchased vehicle on higher purchase agreement with a loan of Rs. 5,10,000/- and that they are half-literate and without knowing the details of the terms and conditions incorporated in the lengthy agreement, the petitioners put their signatures in the loan agreements, executed in the year 2005 and fresh agreement in the year 2007 and' that for various reasons they could not liquidate the loan amount according to the terms. It has also been stated that the arbitration clause in the loan agreement was not at all understood by the petitioners since the place of arbitration was wrongly and illegally mentioned as at Chennai which was not explained to the petitioners and who shall be the arbitrator that was also not mentioned in the arbitration clause. The Arbitrator was appointed at the whims of the respondents without taking any consent from the petitioners and, therefore, the arbitral proceeding vitiated. The incorporation of the Arbitration Clause itself was a fraud since it was not explained to the petitioners. The vehicle was withdrawn and seized by the respondents and it was not disclosed to the petitioner as to how the vehicle was disposed of and subsequently they could learn that the vehicle had been sold at a price of Rs. The incorporation of the Arbitration Clause itself was a fraud since it was not explained to the petitioners. The vehicle was withdrawn and seized by the respondents and it was not disclosed to the petitioner as to how the vehicle was disposed of and subsequently they could learn that the vehicle had been sold at a price of Rs. 97,500/- which was much less than the market price of the vehicle and it was not put to auction as contemplated in the loan agreement. It has also been alleged that the loan account was never supplied to the petitioners and the repayments made by the petitioners time to time were not entered in the loan account of the petitioners. The respondents with a fraudulent intention incorporated unacceptable terms in the agreement and the Arbitrator was nominated unilaterally by the respondents with a view to get an order in their favour according to their desire and the Arbitrator did not formulate any issue and did not sent any notice of the dispute to the petitioners to aware them about the reference and so the arbitral proceeding was a fraud and therefore, liable to be adjudicated in the civil suit which cannot be challenged under the special powers, as prescribed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereunder mentioned as Act of 1996). 6. The case of the respondents, on the contrary, as stated in their counter-affidavit, is that the petitioners approached the Bank to have a loan to purchase Bus vehicle under a higher purchase agreement and a booklet was supplied to them in respect of such loan by the respondent Bank and the petitioners being satisfied after consultation with their learned Advocate entered into agreement, on 15.02.2005, under specific terms and conditions but they failed to liquidate the loan as per the terms and therefore, for the residue amount of Rs. 3,15,000/- a fresh agreement was executed, on 15.03.2007 but they could not liquidate the loan in terms of that agreement too and, therefore, according to the agreed terms and conditions, the dispute was referred to the Arbitrator with notice to the petitioners but the petitioners did not participate and co-operate while the arbitration proceeding was taken up by the sole Arbitrator. The arbitrator was appointed as per the terms of agreement and the place of arbitration also was according to the agreement and the allegation of fraud has been made in the air without any basis. The petitioners deliberately did not participate in the arbitral proceeding on receipt of first notice and the 2nd and 3rd notice were refused by them and while the arbitral award was put in execution in due course and pending before the District Judge, North Tripura, Kailashahar, the present suit has been filed by the petitioners with a view to reassess the recovery of due amount. There is no jurisdictional or other error and no injustice caused to the petitioners and therefore, petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed. 7. Learned Counsel, Mr. Biswas for the petitioners, has submitted that the respondents from the very inception of the loan agreement acted with a fraudulent intention and while it is a case of fraudulent intention it is not necessary for the plaintiff-petitioners to give details/particulars of alleged fraud, as required under Order VI, Rule 4 of CPC and that the case of the plaintiff-petitioners is covered by Order VI Rule 10 of CPC. 8. In support of his contention referring to the loan agreement and arbitral proceeding, Learned Counsel has submitted that the agreement was having with innumerable terms, difficult to read with very small font of letters that are used in drafting of the loan agreement and the petitioners were asked only to put their signatures in the dotted place of the agreement and that the semi-literate petitioners mechanically put their signatures without going through the loan agreement in details and thereby the respondents from the very inception acted with a fraudulent intention. He has also submitted that the terms' and conditions of the agreement were not read over and not explained to them and the petitioners could not understand the meaning of the terms and conditions of the loan agreement specially in respect of the arbitration clause and consequence of incorporation of such clause fixing the place of arbitration at Chennai and the appointment of Arbitrator at the whims of the respondents In addition to that Learned Counsel further submitted that the vehicle was seized and sold surreptitiously at a much less price of Rs. 97,500/-and the plaintiff-petitioners were not at all informed about date, time, place and mode of the disposal of the vehicle and the plaintiff petitioners could assume that the vehicle after being seized had been disposed of when they found that Rs. 97,500/-was credited in the loan account. It has also been submitted by the Learned Counsel that the Statements of account were never furnished to the petitioners and the payment made by the petitioners time to time were not shown in the loan account of the petitioners. It has further been contended by Learned Counsel that the Arbitrator was appointed in collusion without disclosing his name in the arbitration clause of the agreement and no consent was taken from the petitioners and, therefore, the appointment of Arbitrator since was illegal the arbitral award is liable to be termed as fraud. 9. Learned Counsel, Mr. Rathor for the respondents, refuted the arguments advanced by Learned Counsel, Mr. Biswas, referring to the specific Clauses of the loan agreement i.e. Clause 15.3 and 23 of the agreement and has submitted that the loan agreement was signed by the petitioners, once in 2005 and again in 2007 and the petitioners should be deemed to have aware of the terms and conditions of the loan and if they had any confusion in respect of any clause of argument. They would file the suit while the agreement was in force and they have come up with the suit only when the award made by the Arbitrator is put in execution which shows that the petitioners have come before the Court with a colourable allegation only to frustrate the recovery of the due amount from them. 10. It is an undisputed fact that a loan agreement was signed between the parties. In the petition before this Court it has been stated that from the very inception respondents were with fraudulent intention and the loan agreement was executed fraudulently. This contention of the petitioners and the argument on that point made by Learned Counsel, Mr. Biswas, has got no merit at all in view of the fact that in the title suit, instituted by the petitioners, they have only sought declaration about the arbitral proceeding and the award made by the Arbitrator. This contention of the petitioners and the argument on that point made by Learned Counsel, Mr. Biswas, has got no merit at all in view of the fact that in the title suit, instituted by the petitioners, they have only sought declaration about the arbitral proceeding and the award made by the Arbitrator. The reliefs prayed by the plaintiff-petitioners has already reproduced at the inception of this judgment, which shows that the loan agreement has never been challenged in the Title Suit. So the argument that the respondents were with a fraudulent intention from the very beginning of the loan agreement is unfounded and made only for the purpose of the petition made before this Court without having any basis. 11. In a suit based on the allegation of fraud, as required under Order VI, Rule 4 of CPC the particulars of fraud should be stated in the pleading. A copy of the plaint has been annexed with the petition before this Court which shows that specific particulars of fraud has no where been stated in the plaint. The Apex Court in the case of Virendra Kashinath Ravat and another v. Vinayak N. Joshi and others, reported in AIR 1999 SC 162 has outlined the object of Rule 4 thus : Object: The object of the rule is two-fold. First is to afford the other side intimation regarding the particular facts of his case so that they may be met by the other side. Second is to enable the Court to determine what is really the issue between the parties. The words in the Sub-rule "a statement in a concise form" are definitely suggestive that brevity should be adhered to while drafting pleadings. Of course brevity should not be at the cost of setting out necessary facts, but it does not mean niggling in the pleadings. If care is taken in the syntactic process, pleadings can be saved from tautology. Elaboration of facts in pleadings is not the ideal measure and that is why the sub-rule embodied the words "and contain only" just before the succeeding words "a statement in a concise form of the material facts. In the absence of particulars of fraud in respect of the arbitral proceeding and award thereof a suit for declaration and for injunction on the award made by the Arbitrator cannot stand in law. In the absence of particulars of fraud in respect of the arbitral proceeding and award thereof a suit for declaration and for injunction on the award made by the Arbitrator cannot stand in law. As already stated above, the argument of Learned Counsel that the plaintiff's case shall come under the purview of Order VI Rule 10 cannot stand in law in view of the fact the plaintiffs have not challenged the loan agreement in their suit. 12. The Act of 1996 is a special law, prescribing alternative dispute resolution mechanism and the main object of the law as incorporated in the statement of objects and reasons of the bill are as under : (i) to comprehensibly cover international and commercial arbitration and conciliation as also domestic arbitration and conciliation; (ii) to make provision for an arbitral procedure which is fair, efficient and capable of meeting the needs of the specific arbitration; (iii) to provide that the arbitral tribunal gives reasons for its arbitral award; (iv) "to ensure that the arbitral tribunal remains within the limits of its jurisdiction; (v) to minimise the supervisory role of Courts in the arbitral process; (vi) to permit an arbitral tribunal to use mediation, conciliation or other procedures during the arbitral proceedings to encourage settlement of disputes; (v) to minimize the supervisory role of Courts in the arbitral process; (vi) to permit an arbitral tribunal to use mediation, conciliation or other procedures during the arbitral proceedings to encourage settlement of disputes; (vii) to provide that every final arbitral award is enforced in the same manner as if it were a decree of the Court; (viii) to provide that a settlement agreement reached by the parties as a result of conciliation proceedings will have the same status and effect as an arbitral award on agreed terms on the substance of the dispute rendered by an arbitral tribunal; and (ix) to provide that, for purposes of enforcement of foreign awards, every arbitral award made in a country to which one of the two international Conventions relating to foreign arbitral awards to which India is a party applies, will be treated as a foreign award. 13. The Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Sewa Sansthan v. U.P. Electronic Corpn. Ltd., reported in AIR 2007 SC 2961 has categorically explained the object and purpose of the Act in settling the disputes. 14. 13. The Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Sewa Sansthan v. U.P. Electronic Corpn. Ltd., reported in AIR 2007 SC 2961 has categorically explained the object and purpose of the Act in settling the disputes. 14. Section 5 of the Act of 1996 prescribes that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any matter governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in the Act. This provision has excluded the jurisdiction of ordinary Civil Courts in the matter of arbitration. 15. Learned Counsel, Mr. Biswas, has contended that where fraud is alleged and prima facie it is brought on record, the Civil Court has got the jurisdiction to decide as to whether an arbitral award was vitiated by fraud or not. In support of his contention Learned Counsel referred the decision of the Apex Court, reported in (1996) 5 SCC 550 , Indian Bank v. Satyam fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd. and the case law, reported in (2007) 5 SCC 510 , India Household and Healthcare Ltd. v. L.G. Household and Healthcare Ltd. and the full Bench decision of this Court, reported in AIR 1978 Gau 56 , Tazmul ali and others v. Md. Ulairaja. 16. There is no doubt that fraud and justice never dwell together (Fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant). It is a settled principle that fraud and deceit defend or excuse no man (Fraus et dolus nemini patrocinari debent). It is also a settled law that the Civil Court has inherent jurisdiction to decide any dispute of civil nature concerning parties in particular facts and circumstances of the case though it would apparently appear that such Civil Court is expressly or implicitly barred to entertain such suit. The decision by the Civil Court has to be taken on particular facts and circumstances of the case where it would amount gross miscarriage of justice unless a civil suit is entertained. In all the above reported cases, specific particulars of forgery and fraud were brought on record but in the case in hand no such particulars of forgery or fraud prima facie brought on record. In all the above reported cases, specific particulars of forgery and fraud were brought on record but in the case in hand no such particulars of forgery or fraud prima facie brought on record. Whatever has been alleged in the Title Suit or in the petition before this Court are of facts which ought to be stated before the Arbitrator while the arbitration proceeding was entertained but the petitioners waived their right as they did not participate in the arbitral proceeding. 17. Let us now critically examine the relevant Clause of agreement to see whether the arbitration proceeding and the award made by the sole Arbitrator suffers from forgery/fraud or fraudulent exercise of power by the sole Arbitrator. Clause 23 of the loan agreement (Annexure-P/1 to the writ petition) reads thus : 23.0 LAW, JURISDICTION, ARBITRATION (a) All disputes, differences and/or claim arising out of or touching upon this Agreement whether during its subsistence or thereafter shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, or any statutory amendments thereof and shall be referred to the sole Arbitration of an Arbitrator nominated the Lender. The award given by such an Arbitrator shall be final and binding on the Borrower and Co-borrower to this agreement. (b) Dispute for the purpose of Arbitration includes default committed by the Borrower as per clause 14 of this Agreement. It is a term of this agreement that in the event of such an Arbitrator to whom the matter has been originally referred to dying or being unable to act for any reason, the Lender, at the time of such death of the arbitrator or of his inability to act as arbitrator, shall appoint another person to act as arbitrator. Such a person shall be entitled to proceed with the reference from the stage at which it was left by his predecessor. (c) The venue of Arbitration proceedings shall be at Chennai. (d) The arbitrator so appointed herein above, shall also be entitled to pass an Award on the hypothecated asset and also on any other securities furnished by or on behalf of the Borrower/Co-Borrower. (e) All notices and other communications on the Lender and the Borrowers shall be to the following address : For Lender : Corporation Off. (d) The arbitrator so appointed herein above, shall also be entitled to pass an Award on the hypothecated asset and also on any other securities furnished by or on behalf of the Borrower/Co-Borrower. (e) All notices and other communications on the Lender and the Borrowers shall be to the following address : For Lender : Corporation Off. Retail : Indusind Bank Ltd. 86 Sudarsan Building, Chamiers Road, Chennai 600 018 For Borrower : The residential address stated in the schedule or the property address described in the schedule. 18. A bare perusal of the above clause makes it clear that it is exhaustive in respect of appointment of sole Arbitrator, manner of appointment, place of arbitration, nature of dispute, addresses of the parties to which notice has to be sent in course of an arbitration proceeding. Undoubtedly, the above clause is an exhaustive arbitration agreement as defined in Section of 7 of the Act of 1996. The petitioners while did not challenge the loan agreement cannot say now that the meaning of the arbitration agreement was not clear to them. The arbitration clause prescribes appointment of a sole Arbitrator to be nominated by the respondents and such clause is not contrary to the provisions of Section 10 of the Act of 1996 which prescribes that the parties are free to determine the number of Arbitrator, provided that, such number shall not be even number. The petitioners, being the parties to the agreement assigned the responsibility on the respondents to appoint Arbitrator and now cannot dispute it while the agreement is/was in force. Regarding appointment of Arbitrator, Section 11 prescribes that subject to Sub-Section 6 of that Section, the parties are free to agree on a procedure for appointment of Arbitrator or Arbitrators. In the case in hand, while the petitioners through a written agreement agreed the appointment of Arbitrator to be made by the respondents, they cannot challenge it now stating that their consent was not taken at the time of appointment of the Arbitrator. 19. Learned Counsel, Mr. Biswas, has further submitted that the agreement stipulates that the Arbitrator shall be nominated by the respondents and that such nomination does not necessarily mean appointment of the Arbitrator. While appointment, consent of the other side was necessary which has not been taken. 19. Learned Counsel, Mr. Biswas, has further submitted that the agreement stipulates that the Arbitrator shall be nominated by the respondents and that such nomination does not necessarily mean appointment of the Arbitrator. While appointment, consent of the other side was necessary which has not been taken. There is nothing in the agreement that the name of the arbitrator will be proposed by the respondents and that shall be followed by the appointment with the consent of the petitioners. In the absence of any such stipulation in the agreement, I find no reason to accept the argument of Learned Counsel, Mr. Biswas. Furthermore, the words "nominate" and "appoint" are closely allied and a bare reading of the arbitration clause makes it clear that the word nominated indicates appointment of the arbitrator to be made by the respondents. 20. The next argument advanced by Learned Counsel is that the place of arbitration was fixed at Chennai where as all transactions were held at Dharmanagar in North Tripura District and such clause was illegal, unilateral, arbitrary and beyond the grasps of the petitioners. Section 20 of the Act of 1996 prescribes that the parties are free to agree on the place of arbitration. In case there is nothing in the agreement regarding the place of arbitration, the arbitral tribunal shall determine the place of such arbitration proceeding. In the present case, it has been clearly stipulated in Clause 23.0 (Zero)(C), as reproduced above, that the venue of arbitration proceeding shall be at Chennai which is the headquarter of the respondents So while there is written agreement regarding the place of arbitration the petitioners cannot dispute it now after the proceeding was over and the arbitral award has been made. 21. It has also been argued that respondents seized the vehicle and disposed it surreptitiously even without informing the petitioners and that the vehicle was sold at Rs. 97,500/- where as it was valued much more than that. In this respect, Learned Counsel, Mr. 21. It has also been argued that respondents seized the vehicle and disposed it surreptitiously even without informing the petitioners and that the vehicle was sold at Rs. 97,500/- where as it was valued much more than that. In this respect, Learned Counsel, Mr. Rathor, referred Clause 15.3 of the loan agreement which reads thus : 15.3 The lender shall, in any/all the aforesaid Events of Default, be entitled to and the Borrower hereby irrevocably authorizes the Lender to sell/transfer/assign the Asset either by public auction or by private treaty or otherwise howsoever, and appropriate the proceeds thereof towards repayment of all the outstanding amounts from the Borrower to the Lender under this Agreement. If the sale proceeds are not sufficient to meet all the dues of the Lender, the Borrower shall be liable to pay for any deficiencies after the said appropriation. In case there is any surplus after adjusting the dues of the Lender, the same shall, be paid to the Borrower. Nothing contained in this Clause shall prevent the lender to sell the Asset and the Lender shall be entitled to proceed against the Borrower(s) or Co-borrower(s), independently or such security. It is contended by the Learned Counsel, Mr. Rathor that the agreement vested all authority with the respondents to dispose the vehicle either by sale or transfer or by public auction or otherwise, as may be determined by the respondents and while such a written agreement was in force it was contractual authority of the respondents to dispose the same in their own way and the respondents after sale of the vehicle have credited the amount to the loan account of the petitioners. The vehicle was purchased in the year 2005. It was seized in the year 2008 and was sold and the sale price credited to the account of the petitioners. So there was no ingredient of fraud in the action taken by the respondents It is, however, submitted by Learned Counsel Mr. Rathor that the sale of the vehicle was within the knowledge of the petitioners but no such document is placed on record. Though there is no such document placed on record regarding sale of the vehicle after it was seized, I find no element of fraud in such disposal of the vehicle while the written agreement was in force that respondents had the authority to cease and dispose the vehicle. 22. Though there is no such document placed on record regarding sale of the vehicle after it was seized, I find no element of fraud in such disposal of the vehicle while the written agreement was in force that respondents had the authority to cease and dispose the vehicle. 22. Learned Counsel Mr. Biswas, has further argued that the petitioners were not given any notice regarding the reference made to the arbitrator and that simply a notice of proceeding was sent and that statements of account were also not sent to the petitioners and all those facts collectively established the fraudulent intention of the respondents. Learned Counsel, Mr. Rathor, refuted the argument referring to Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the arbitration award and submitted that the arbitrator issued first notice on 18.12.2009 which was dully served and acknowledged by the respondents and thereafter, notices of hearing dated 20.11.2009 and 22.01.2010 were also sent but the petitioners refused to receive the notices and those were returned with the postal endorsement "refused". Since the petitioners did not bother to submit their case before the Arbitrator, the sole Arbitrator proceeded to decide the dispute as per Section 25(C) of the Act. 23. I have meticulously gone through the record placed before this Court. Annexure P/2 is a copy of the plaint of the title suit instituted by the plaintiffs. Para-8 of the plaint clearly stipulates that the notices served by the respondents on the plaintiffs time to time. It shows that notice, dated 22.10.2008, was served on the petitioners by an advocate of the respondents asking them to make payment of the due amount and otherwise the matter will be sent to the sole Arbitrator, Further Ext. R/6(series) filed by the respondents shows that the notice of the arbitration proceeding and the notices of hearing were sent to the respondents and respondents received the first notice of arbitration proceeding issued by the sole Arbitrator and the subsequent notices were refused by them and the postal authority return the same with the endorsement "refused". Under such circumstances, the allegation that notices were not served on the petitioners and that the Arbitrator in collusion with the respondents made the award prima facie cannot be accepted. Under such circumstances, the allegation that notices were not served on the petitioners and that the Arbitrator in collusion with the respondents made the award prima facie cannot be accepted. The burden heavily lies on the petitioners to make out a prima facie case that there was collusion between the respondents and the sole Arbitrator and that reasonable opportunity was not given to the petitioners to present their case before the sole Arbitrator. It is true that the name of the sole Arbitrator was not mentioned in the agreement but the agreement was clear that the sole Arbitrator should be named and nominated by the respondents later on. 24. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act is a self-contained law. It has prescribed the provisions as to on what ground an arbitral award can be challenged, in Section 34 of the Act. The Civil Court jurisdiction, otherwise, is barred under Section 5 of the Act. If a party feel aggrieved with an arbitral award only recourse open to the party is to apply for setting aside the arbitral award on specific ground as prescribed in Section 34 of the Act and that is also within the prescribed period of imitation. 25. The Apex Court in the case of N. Radhakrishnan v. Maestoro Engineers and others, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 72 held that in case of complicated matter involving various questions and issues, if beyond purview of arbitration, a civil suit is the appropriate measure despite existence of arbitration agreement and the dispute in question falling within the purview thereof. If dispute requires detailed investigations and production of elaborate evidence, the Apex Court has held that such dispute must be tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction. In that reported case there were serious allegation of allegations fraud and malpractices committed on account books and manipulation of finances of the partnership form were made and, therefore, in peculiar facts of that case the Apex Court held it justified to try the matter in a competent Court of civil jurisdiction. The ratio of that decision in the facts and circumstances of this case is not applicable at all. Here, in this case, the petitioner made stray allegation that books of account was not supplied and that certain repayments were not entered. The ratio of that decision in the facts and circumstances of this case is not applicable at all. Here, in this case, the petitioner made stray allegation that books of account was not supplied and that certain repayments were not entered. The petitioners, according to them, at first taken loan in the year 2005 but failed to make repayment of installments and therefore, a fresh agreement was signed in the year 2007 for the amount remained due and unpaid. They failed to make payment. The respondents filed copies of the statement of accounts along with their counter-affidavit and the petitioners could not notice any infirmity in the said statement of accounts rather the respondents pointed out that on several occasions cheques issued by the petitioners were disownered but the respondents did not initiate any criminal proceeding against petitioners for the sake of goodwill of their business. Anyway, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the ratio of the decision of the case of N. Radhakrishnan (supra) cannot be applied. 26. In the case of Indian Bank v. Sat yam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd., reported in (1996) 5 SCC 550 the Apex Court has held "Forgery and fraud are essentially matters of evidence which could be proved as a fact by direct evidence or by inferences, drawn from proved facts. The Privy Council in Satish Chandra Chatterji laid down thus : Suspicions and surmises and conjecture are not permissible substitutes for those facts or those inferences, but that by no means requires that every puzzling artifice or contrivance resorted to by one accused of fraud must necessarily be completely unraveled and cleared up and made plain before a verdict can be properly found against him. If this were not so, many a clever and dexterous knave would escape.' This principle will apply not only to Courts of law but also to statutory tribunals which, like the Commission, are conferred power to record evidence by applying certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure including the power to enforce attendance of the witnesses and are also given the power to receive evidence on affidavits. 27. In the case of Ramchandra Singh v. Savitri Devi and others, reported in (2003) 8 SCC 319 the Apex Court has held Fraud as is well known vitiates every solemn act. Fraud and justice never dwell together. 27. In the case of Ramchandra Singh v. Savitri Devi and others, reported in (2003) 8 SCC 319 the Apex Court has held Fraud as is well known vitiates every solemn act. Fraud and justice never dwell together. Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which induces the other person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former either by word or letter. It is also well settled that misrepresentation itself amounts to fraud. Indeed, innocent misrepresentation may also give reason to claim relief against fraud. A fraudulent misrepresentation is called deceit and consists in leading a man into damage by willfully or recklessly causing him to believe and act on falsehood. It is a fraud in law if a party makes representations which he knows to be false, and injury ensues therefrom although the motive from which the representations proceeded may not have been bad. An act of fraud on Court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous. Although in a given case a deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res judicata. The same principle has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bhaurao Dagdu Paralkar v. State of Maharashtra and others, reported in (2005) 7 SCC 605 . 28. It is well settled that temporary injunction can be granted injuncting execution of a decree obtained by fraud. Full Bench of this Court in the Case, reported in AIR 1978 Gau 58, Tazmul ali and others v. Md. Ulairaja, has laid down the law that when fraud is pleaded in a given facts and circumstances of the case temporary injunction can be granted. 29. In the present case, the particulars of fraud has not been brought clearly in the plaint of the title suit. There was a written agreement between the parties about the dispute resolution through arbitration. The arbitration clause was specific in respect of appointment of an Arbitrator, number of Arbitrator and place of arbitration etc. in details. 29. In the present case, the particulars of fraud has not been brought clearly in the plaint of the title suit. There was a written agreement between the parties about the dispute resolution through arbitration. The arbitration clause was specific in respect of appointment of an Arbitrator, number of Arbitrator and place of arbitration etc. in details. There is no allegation of fraud alleged in the title suit about the agreement. The simple allegation of fraud is in respect of arbitration proceeding and award made by the Arbitrator. The dispute was referred to the Arbitrator after issuing notice to the petitioners. The Arbitrator while taken up the arbitration proceeding noticed the petitioners which the petitioners received but they have chosen to remain absent. Notices of hearing were also sent but they refused to receive the same. The Arbitrator heard the dispute ex-parte against the petitioners and made the arbitral award on the basis of the materials placed by the respondents The arbitral award has been put in execution before the District Judge. When the petitioners received notice of the execution, they have come up with the suit alleging fraud and forgery etc. having no specific material placed in support of the pleadings thereof. Under such circumstances, the trial Court and the first appellate Court refused to grant injunction. Article 227 of the Constitution has vested very limited jurisdiction on this Court to entertain a revisional application against such order passed by the inferior Court. However, on the basis of the discussions, made above, I find nothing to hold that the Courts below failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in them and, therefore, the petition is found to be devoid of merit and accordingly, stands disposed of but in the circumstances without cost. It is, however, made clear that the trial Court should decide the suit on its own merit and should not be influenced with the observations made in the judgment of this petition.