Judgment :- 1. This writ petition is filed by the petitioner seeking for a direction to the respondents to value the plot No.R-32, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Kakkalur Bypass Road, Kakkalur, Tiruvallur, which was specifically allotted for construction of a Mosque and as a public purpose site. 2. When the writ petition came up on 23.07.2012, this court directed notice to be given to the Standing counsel for TNHB Mr.R.Jayaseelan. On notice from this court, the learned Standing Counsel produced a written instruction received from the Executive Engineer-cum-Administrative Officer, K.K.Nagar Division. 3. The case of the petitioner was that he is staunch Muslim. He and his brother Muslims used to worship under the temporary mosque situated in plot No.R-32, TNHB, Kakkalur Bypass Road, Kakkalur for many years. The Board had proposed K.K.Nagar Division in Kakkalur village. Under the said scheme, Plot No.R-32 was allotted for construction of mosque. One Firdouse Development Society was registered under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act and was formed to construct a Mosque at Plot No.R-32 in K.K.Nagar division, Kakkalur. As there is no Mosque for the Muslim community in the nearby areas, such as Poonga Nagar, VM Nagar, Kakkalur, his community had put up a thatched roof in the site. The petitioner was a member of the society. Through the Right to Information Act, they have also found that the site was allotted for a religious purpose. 4. The TNHB in its auction notice issued during December, 2010, had proposed to auction commercial / school / public utility plots in the village. The second respondent had advertised for auction of the plot R-32 which was specifically allotted for construction of mosque, though auction notice dated 05.01.2011. On 05.01.2011, there was no bidder for the said site. As it was valued at the commercial rate, the people in that area cannot afford the said amount. The said property was not for business or for commercial purpose and it was earmarked for a religious purpose. The petitioner sent a legal notice through his counsel on 02.02.2012 to the second respondent. The second respondent had sent a reply dated 23.2.2012 stating that public auction would be advertised in the newspaper for the above said site and that interested persons can participate in the auction and bid for the site. The petitioner sent a legal notice through his counsel on 02.02.2012 to the second respondent. The second respondent had sent a reply dated 23.2.2012 stating that public auction would be advertised in the newspaper for the above said site and that interested persons can participate in the auction and bid for the site. The petitioner had sent a representation to fix the price of the site at the rate fixed for public purpose site. But there was no fruitful reply from the respondents. It was stated that the Muslim community had decided to purchase the property to construct a pucca mosque. It was also decided by everyone to contribute for the construction of the mosque. The Muslim people in and around the area are performing their prayers in the said property. But, the second respondent had valued the property which was allotted for religious purpose at commercial rates. Therefore, the respondents should be directed to value the property not at commercial rate. It was also stated that valuing the site at commercial price would amount to violation of Articles 25(1) and 26 of the Constitution. 5. In the written instructions obtained by the respondents, it was stated that the Housing Board had proposed S&S Scheme at Kakkalur to an extent of 117.13 acres of land. It was taken over from the Government after paying the land costs for the entire land. The layout was also approved by the CMDA. The residential plots were allotted to public by drawing lots and . The commercial, public purpose site, religious purpose site, school site will be allotted through sealed offer or by public auction. The commercial, public purpose site and school sites are allotted by open auction and sealed offer only. Plot No.R-32 was encroached by the petitioner and they had erected thatched shed. The Housing Board took steps to vacate the encroachers from the site with the help of the police on 26.08.2011, 13.09.2011, 22.09.2011, 23.11.2011 and 07.02.2012. Due to non availability of the police bundobust and local problem, the eviction was postponed. Action was being taken to evict the encroachers in the site by the Board. The petitioner when applied for allotment of site, he was informed by a letter dated 23.2.2012 that a public auction would be advertised in the newspaper for the above site and interested persons can participate in the auction and bid for the said site. 6. Action was being taken to evict the encroachers in the site by the Board. The petitioner when applied for allotment of site, he was informed by a letter dated 23.2.2012 that a public auction would be advertised in the newspaper for the above site and interested persons can participate in the auction and bid for the said site. 6. In view of the stand taken by the TNHB, the petitioner has no locus standi to approach this court. The petitioner even as per his own admission is a rank encroacher of Plot No.R-32. Without any authority of law, his group have entered the site and put up a thatched shed by claiming that they are offering prayers at the site. Without an allotment by the board, if the petitioner is allowed to encroach, it will only lead to total chaos and disorder. The petitioner before seeking any relief, must come with clean hands before the court. The averment that Articles 25(1) and 26 of the Constitution were violated is only stated to be rejected. It is not as if they can hold prayer wherever they want and claim the place as theirs. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner claims that the petitioner and his group are offering worship in the same area and therefore, it has to be allotted to them for building a Mosque. It is not clear as to how such right vests on the petitioner and his group, especially when there was no allotment order given to them by the TNHB. Further, the right claimed by the petitioner, i.e., Articles 25(1) and 26 of the Constitution also does not stand to reason as the Supreme Court had held that there is no right to worship in a particular place. 8. It is necessary to refer to a judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Dr.M.Ismail Faruqui and others Vs. Union of india and others reported in (1994) 6 SCC 360 , wherein in paragraphs 37 and 38, it was observed as follows : "77.) It may be noticed that Article 25 does not contain any reference to property unlike Article 26 of the Constitution. The right to practise, profess and propagate religion guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution does not necessarily include the right to acquire or own or possess property. The right to practise, profess and propagate religion guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution does not necessarily include the right to acquire or own or possess property. Similarly this right does not extend to the right of worship at any and every place of worship so that any hindrance to worship at a particular place per se may infringe the religious freedom guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. The protection under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution is to religious practice which forms an essential and integral part of the religion. A practice may be a religious practice but not an essential and integral part of practice of that religion. 78.) While offer of prayer or worship is a religious practice, its offering at every location where such prayers can be offered would not be an essential or integral part of such religious practice unless the place has a particular significance for that religion so as to form an essential or integral part thereof......" 9. Further, the right to grant the relief through a writ remedy is discretionary. The petitioner had admittedly encroached the land and had put up a thatched shed. They are also offering worship even though the plot does not belong to them. They had also forced the TNHB to take steps to evict them from the place and successive attempts could not succeed for want of sufficient police force. It only shows the Board is facing resistance in getting back their own land. The Supreme Court in Mohd. Hamid and another Vs. Badi Masjid Trust and others reported in (2011) 13 SCC 61 held that without permission or consent of the owner, the persons cannot even use the property and it would amount to usurping the property of another. In that case, a corpse was buried in a school premises without the consent of its owner and it was directed to be shifted. In that context, in paragraph 15, the Supreme Court had observed as follows : "15....Besides, interring a corpse in an unauthorised place without permission or consent of the owner and lessee of the property amounts to usurping somebody else's property." 10. In that context, in paragraph 15, the Supreme Court had observed as follows : "15....Besides, interring a corpse in an unauthorised place without permission or consent of the owner and lessee of the property amounts to usurping somebody else's property." 10. Further merely because the site has been earmarked for a religious purpose, that does not mean that the particular religious community automatically gets right over the said site and can enter the site without becoming lawful owner of the site. The attempt by the petitioner to encroach the land and further putting up a thatched shed and seeking for subsidized rate for the said place is totally repugnant to the scheme of the housing board in allotting the site through public tender. The Housing board cannot give away the site at their whims and fancies without fetching appropriate income for the site. If the petitioner is so interested, they are at liberty to participate in the said auction, bid for the site and get the plot allotted to their favour. But the highhandedness on the part of the petitioner cannot be appreciated. But before they bid for the property, the petitioner and his group must vacate the encroachment and hand over the property to the TNHB. Then only the property can fetch a real return and not when some one is squatting over it. 11. As to whether the public body can give away the largesse on its own came to be considered by the Supreme Court in Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651 and in paragraph 70, the Supreme Court had observed as follows : “70.) It cannot be denied that the principles of judicial review would apply to the exercise of contractual powers by government bodies in order to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism. However, it must be clearly stated that there are inherent limitations in exercise of that power of judicial review. Government is the guardian of the finances of the State. It is expected to protect the financial interest of the State. (emphasis in original) The right to refuse the lowest or any other tender is always available to the Government. But, the principles laid down in Article 14 of the Constitution have to be kept in view while accepting or refusing a tender. It is expected to protect the financial interest of the State. (emphasis in original) The right to refuse the lowest or any other tender is always available to the Government. But, the principles laid down in Article 14 of the Constitution have to be kept in view while accepting or refusing a tender. There can be no question of infringement of Article 14 if the Government tries to get the best person or the best quotation. The right to choose cannot be considered to be an arbitrary power. Of course, if the said power is exercised for any collateral purpose the exercise of that power will be struck down.”(emphasis added) 12. The argument that they are entitled to get the plot allotted at a subsidized rate and not for a competitive price, has to be rejected. Very recently, the Supreme Court though upheld the formation of the Haj Committee, had stated that this practice of State subsidy should come to an end within a period of 10 years vide its judgment in Union of India v. Rafique Shaikh Bhikan reported in (2012) 6 SCC 265. 13. Under these circumstances, this court do not think that any case is made out to entertain the writ petition filed by the petitioner. Hence the writ petition will stand dismissed. No costs. Consequently connected miscellaneous petition stands closed.