Judgment :- 1. The petitioner, has sought for a mandamus, directing respondents 1 to 3, jointly and severally to pay a sum of Rs.4,00,000/-as compensation for the negligence in conducting tubectomy operation on his wife. 2. According to him, two children, were born out of the wedlock. Family planning operation was done on 09.01.1985 in Government Hospital, Vellore. Even after the surgery, the petitioner's wife conceived and delivered a female child on 24.11.1987. Another child was born on 31.07.1989. It is the case of the petitioner that due to the faulty operation, the petitioner's wife gave birth to two children. She became weak and could not do any household work as done earlier. 3. It is the further case of the petitioner that she had to undergo one more operation on 16.01.1990 in the same hospital. According to the petitioner, negligence in performing tubectomy operation on 09.01.1985, requires no proof, that even after the surgery, his wife gave birth to two children. Hence, he submitted that for the negligence and faulty operation performed by the hospital authorities, the Government is vicariously liable to pay compensation and in this regard, he has made representations on 27.03.1996, 05.02.2002, 14.02.2002, 25.02.2002, 24.05.2002 and 24.06.2002, respectively. Finally referring to G.O.No.415, Social Welfare and Family Planning Department, dated 24.07.1998, the Joint Director, Health Services, Vellore, has rejected the request of the petitioner, on the ground that compensation would be paid only to the eligible members, who had underwent the operation after 24.07.1998. 4. According to the petitioner, the approach of the said authority, is not correct, for the reason that there cannot be any restriction with reference to the date of operation in the matter of claiming compensation against the Doctor, who had performed a faulty surgery resulting in damages. 5. Though the writ petition is pending for quite some time, no counter affidavit has been filed. Nevertheless, on the basis of the material on record, Mr.K.V.Dhanapalan, learned Additional Government Pleader submitted that the writ petition has to be dismissed on the sole ground of delay and laches. He further submitted that though, the petitioner's wife underwent a surgery on 09.01.1985 immediately thereafter, there was no complaint of negligence in performing tubectomy surgery and it cannot be said that there would be 100% success, in every surgery. He further submitted that though, the petitioner's wife underwent a surgery on 09.01.1985 immediately thereafter, there was no complaint of negligence in performing tubectomy surgery and it cannot be said that there would be 100% success, in every surgery. It is his further contention that when the request of the petitioner's wife had already been rejected by the Joint Director, Health Services, Vellore, by a valid order dated 24.06.2002, in the absence of any challenge to the same, it is not open to the petitioner to seek for a mandamus, which have the effect of setting at naught, a valid order. 6. Learned State Counsel further submitted that the relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is purely based on equitable consideration. According to him, even after the surgery in the year 1985, the spouses in most probability desired to have children and that two children were born on 24.11.1987 and 31.07.1989 respectively and therefore, if at all there was any case for negligence, her right to claim compensation has been waived, by her conduct and hence, the present writ petition is no maintainable. Though the second operation was performed on 16.01.1990, in Government Hospital, there was absolutely no complaint. All the representations are stated to have been sent, only after 1996 and in 2002. 7. Learned Additional Government Pleader also submitted that sending successive representations, would not be reasonable cause for condonation of an inordinate and unexplained delay of nearly 17 years in filing the present writ petition. For the above said reasons, he prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 8. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 9. Indisputably, the first surgery has been performed on 09.01.1985. Thereafter, the petitioner's wife conceived and on 24.11.1987 gave birth to a female child. She delivered another child on 31.07.1989. 10. For the above said reasons, he prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 8. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 9. Indisputably, the first surgery has been performed on 09.01.1985. Thereafter, the petitioner's wife conceived and on 24.11.1987 gave birth to a female child. She delivered another child on 31.07.1989. 10. In State of Punjab v. Shiv Ram reported in 2005(4) CTC 627, while considering the case of a woman, giving birth to a child, after undergoing a tubectomy operation and reiterating the principles of law that the proof of negligence will have to be established by showing that surgeon did not possess requisite skill which he professed to possess or he did not exercise with reasonable competent skill, which he did possess and also holding that the proof of negligence should satisfy Bolam test, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment and decree of the lower Court, holding that the Government was not liable to pay damages either in contract or in tort. The decision in Jacob Mathew's case (cited supra), has been referred. 11. The same view has been reiterated inState of Haryana v. Raj Rani reported in 2005(4) CTC 703, wherein the Supreme Court held that in the absence of proof of negligence, the surgeon cannot be held liable to pay compensation as pregnancy is possible for reasons, de hors negligence of the surgeon also. 12. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the State, there was absolutely no complaint of negligence between 1985 and 1990, when the 2nd surgery was performed and as stated supra, during the interregnum period, two children were born on 24.11.1987 and 31.07.1989, respectively. Though, the petitioner has contended that he had sent several representations, claiming compensation from the respondents, there is no proof of acknowledgement. 13. Material on record shows that when the wife of the petitioner made a request for damages, by proceedings dated 14.02.2002, the Joint Director, Social Welfare, Health Services Department, has sought for certain particulars. Finally, placing reliance on G.O.No.415, Social Welfare and Family Planning Department, dated 24.07.1998, the request of the petitioner's wife for compensation as well as for employment, have been rejected. As rightly contended by the learned State counsel, the said order remains unchallenged. 14. As observed by the Supreme Court in Dr.Alice George Vs. Finally, placing reliance on G.O.No.415, Social Welfare and Family Planning Department, dated 24.07.1998, the request of the petitioner's wife for compensation as well as for employment, have been rejected. As rightly contended by the learned State counsel, the said order remains unchallenged. 14. As observed by the Supreme Court in Dr.Alice George Vs. Lakshmi, reported in 2007(1) CTC 496 , there could be a possibility of failure in tubectomy operations. Even taking it for granted that there was any negligence, the right to claim compensation, under the private law remedy is subject to law of limitation. Though, there is no specific time limit for invoking public law remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for claiming compensation, still it is not open to the petitioner to knock at the doors of this Court after a deep slumber. The first surgery was performed on 09.01.1985. Thereafter, the spouses most probably have decided to have children and that, two children were born on 24.11.1987 and 31.07.1989, respectively. 15. In the above said background, it cannot be said that the spouses did not desire to have any child and that the subsequent delivery, put them in financial constraint or agony. A person, who claims damages has to prove that due to the negligence or omission to perform the surgery properly, she had to suffer, and put to financial constraint. 16. In the case on hand, as stated supra, between 1985 & 1990, there was absolutely no grievance over the alleged faulty surgery performed in Government Hospital, Vellore. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to subscribe to the contentions of the petitioner regarding hardship. 17. As rightly pointed out by the State Counsel that though, the petitioner has contended that there was a faulty surgery in 1985, he has chosen to file the writ petition only in the year 2004, after nearly 17 years, from the date of birth of the third child after surgery. No sufficient cause is shown in the supporting affidavit explaining the reasons, as to why, he had approached this Court, with an unreasonable delay, excepting to state that representations were sent periodically. Sending periodical representation is not a valid ground, for condoning such an inordinate delay. 18. Laches or reasonable time are not defined under any Statute or Rules. "Latches" or "Lashes" is an old french word for slackness or negligence or not doing. Sending periodical representation is not a valid ground, for condoning such an inordinate delay. 18. Laches or reasonable time are not defined under any Statute or Rules. "Latches" or "Lashes" is an old french word for slackness or negligence or not doing. In general sense, it means neglect to do what in the law should have been done for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time. What could be the latches in one case might not constitute in another. What is reasonable time has not been explained in any of the enactment. Reasonable time depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 19. The words "reasonable time", as explained in Veerayeeammal v. Seeniammal reported in 2002 (1) SCC 134 , at Paragraph 13, is as follows: "13. The word “reasonable” has in law prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the person concerned is called upon to act reasonably knows or ought to know as to what was reasonable. It may be unreasonable to give an exact definition of the word “reasonable”. The reason varies in its conclusion according to idiosyncrasy of the individual and the time and circumstances in which he thinks. The dictionary meaning of the “reasonable time” is to be so much time as is necessary, under the circumstances, to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular case. In other words it means, as soon as circumstances permit. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s The Law Lexicon it is defined to mean: “A reasonable time, looking at all the circumstances of the case; a reasonable time under ordinary circumstances; as soon as circumstances will permit; so much time as is necessary under the circumstances, conveniently to do what the contract requires should be done; some more protracted space than ‘directly’; such length of time as may fairly, and properly, and reasonably be allowed or required, having regard to the nature of the act or duty and to the attending circumstances; all these convey more or less the same idea.” 20. The statement of law has also been summarized in Halsbury's Laws of England, Para 911 , pg. The statement of law has also been summarized in Halsbury's Laws of England, Para 911 , pg. 395 as follows: "In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are: (i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part. Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches." 21. In State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai reported in AIR 1964 SC 1006 , the Supreme Court held that it is not either unreasonable delay denies to the petitioner the discretionary extraordinary remedy of mandamus, certiorari or any other relief. 22. In State of M.P., v. Nandlal Jaismal reported in 1986 (4) SCC 566 , the Supreme Court, at Paragraph 24, held as follows: "24.Now, it is well settled that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of laches or delay is premised upon a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices. The evolution of this rule of laches or delay is premised upon a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices. The rights of third parties may intervene and if the writ jurisdiction is exercised on a writ petition filed after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. When the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meanwhile is an important factor which always weighs the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. We do not think it necessary to burden this judgment with reference to various decisions of this Court where it has been emphasised time and again that where there is inordinate and unexplained delay and third party rights are created in the intervening period, the High Court would decline to interfere, even if the State action complained of is unconstitutional or illegal. .........Of course, this rule of laches or delay is not a rigid rule which can be cast in a strait jacket formula, for there may be cases where despite delay and creation of third party rights the High Court may still in the exercise of its discretion interfere and grant relief to the petitioner. But, such cases where the demand of justice is so compelling that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay or creation of third party rights would by their very nature be few and far between. Ultimately it would be a matter within the discretion of the court; ex hypothesi every discretion must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it." (emphasis supplied) 23. In State of Maharastra v. Digambar reported in AIR 1995 SC 1991 , the Supreme Court, considered a case, where compensation for the acquired land was claimed belatedly and at Paragraphs 12 and 21, held as follows: "12. In State of Maharastra v. Digambar reported in AIR 1995 SC 1991 , the Supreme Court, considered a case, where compensation for the acquired land was claimed belatedly and at Paragraphs 12 and 21, held as follows: "12. How a person who alleges against the State of deprivation of his legal right, can get relief of compensation from the State invoking writ jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution even though, he is guilty of laches or undue delay is difficult to comprehend, when it is well settled by decision of this Court that no person, be he a citizen or otherwise, is entitled to obtain the equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution if his conduct is blame-worthy because of laches, undue delay, acquiescence, waiver and the like. Moreover, how a citizen claiming discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution against a State, could be relieved of his obligation to establish his unblameworthy conduct for getting such relief, where the State against which relief is sought is a welfare State, is also difficult to comprehend. Where the relief sought under Article 226 of the Constitution by a person against the welfare State is founded on its alleged illegal or wrongful executive action, the need to explain laches or undue delay on his part to obtain such relief, should, if anything, be more stringent than in other cases, for the reason that the State due to laches or undue delay on the part of the person seeking relief, may not be able to show that the executive action complained of was legal or correct for want of records pertaining to the action or for the officers who were responsible for such action not being available later on. Further, where granting of relief is claimed against the State on alleged unwarranted executive action, is bound to result in loss to the public exchequer of the State or in damage to other public interest, the High Court before granting such relief is required to satisfy itself that the delay or laches on the part of a citizen or any other person in approaching for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution on the alleged violation of his legal right, was wholly justified in the facts and circumstances, instead of ignoring the same or leniently considering it. Thus, in our view, persons seeking relief against the State under Article 226 of the Constitution, be they citizens or otherwise, cannot get discretionary relief obtainable thereunder unless they fully satisfy the High Court that the facts and circumstances of the case clearly justified the laches or undue delay on their part in approaching the Court for grant of such discretionary relief. Therefore, where a High Court grants relief to a citizen or any other person under Article 226 of the Constitution against any person including the State without considering his blame-worthy conduct, such as laches or undue delay, acquiescence or waiver, the relief so granted becomes unsustainable even if the relief was granted in respect of alleged deprivation of his legal right by the State. 21. Therefore, where a High Court in exercise of its power vested under Article 226 of the Constitution issues a direction, order or writ for granting relief to a person including a citizen without considering his disentitlement of such relief due to his blameworthy conduct of undue delay or laches in claiming the same, such a direction, order or writ becomes unsustainable as that not made judiciously and reasonably in exercise of its sound judicial discretion, but as that made arbitrarily." 24. In State of Rajasthan v. D.R.Laxmi reported in 1996 (6) SCC 445 , the Supreme Court observed that though the order may be void, if the party does not approach the Court within a reasonable time, which is always a question of fact and have the order invalidated or acquiesced or waived, the discretion of the Court has to be exercised in a reasonable manner. 25. In Larsen and Toubro Ltd., v. State of Gujarat reported in 1998 (4) SCC 387 , the Supreme Court held that a writ petition challenging the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Central Act is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, if the challenge is not made within a reasonable time. 26. In Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam and another v. Jaswant Singh reported in AIR 2007 SC 924, the Supreme Court, after considering a catena of decisions on the aspect of delay, at Paragraph 13, held as follows: "13. 26. In Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam and another v. Jaswant Singh reported in AIR 2007 SC 924, the Supreme Court, after considering a catena of decisions on the aspect of delay, at Paragraph 13, held as follows: "13. .......Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or while away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the Court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted." 27. In view of the above discussion and the legal pronouncements of the Supreme Court on the aspect relating to claim for damages, in tubectomy surgery, this Court is of the view that the petitioner has not made out a case for mandamus. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.