Judgment : 1. Animadverting upon the dated 28.3.2012 passed by the District Judge, Tiruvallur, in I.A.No.80 of 2011 in A.S.No.3 of 2011, this civil revision petition is filed. 2. Broadly but briefly, narratively but precisely, the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this civil revision petition would run thus: (i) The respondents herein/plaintiffs filed the suit O.S.No.203 of 1996 as against two persons, namely, 1.Jayalakshmi and 2.V.K.Ramamurthy, seeking the following reliefs: 'to pass a judgement and decree against the defendants: a) for a declaration that the plaintiffs 1 to 7 are the owners of the suit property situate at 82, Maduraivoil Village, Chengai MGR District comprised in S.No.13/1A1, 13/1A2, 13/1B, 13/2 and 13/3 measuring an extent of 26.50 acres or thereabout more fully described in the schedule hereunder and consequentially b) for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their men, agents, servants or any person or persons from interfering with the plaintiffs peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property perpetually more fully described in the schedule hereunder." (extracted as such) (ii) The suit was contested and ultimately, it was decreed. (iii) Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the same, D2-V.K.Ramamurthy, presented the appeal memorandum without any application for getting the delay condoned in filing the appeal, as according to him, there was no delay at all. (iv) However, the appeal memorandum was returned for certain clarifications. (v) Whereupon it was represented and arguements were submitted before the Judge; thereafter the Judge ordered the appeal memorandum to be numbered. (vi) The 6th plaintiff in the suit, namely, Sri Jaya Educational Trust, rep.by its Chairman, after entering appearance as respondent in the appeal, filed the petition C.M.P.No.80 of 2011 with the following prayer: "I therefore pray that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to deface the appeal filed by the 1st respondent under SR.No.970 of 2010 and registered as A.S.No.3 of 2011 on the file of this Hon'ble Court by striking out the same as time barred." (vii) After hearing both sides, the said C.M.P.No.80 of 2011 was allowed and A.S.No.3 of 2011 was dismissed as one barred by limitation. 3. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order in C.M.P.No.80 of 2011, this civil revision petition has been filed by the 2nd defendant in the suit on various grounds. 4. 3. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order in C.M.P.No.80 of 2011, this civil revision petition has been filed by the 2nd defendant in the suit on various grounds. 4. When the matter came up before me for hearing, a point was raised by the learned counsel for the first respondent herein/6th plaintiff in the suit to the effect that only second appeal would lie as against such dismissal of A.S.No.3 of 2011 and not a civil revision petition as against the order passed in C.M.P.No.80 of 2011. 5. The point for consideration is as to whether the present civil revision petition, in the factual matrix of this case is maintainable or not? 6. A plain running of the eye over the records would exemplify and demonstrate that the appellate Court held in C.M.P.No.80 of 2011 that the appeal memorandum was presented beyond limitation period; Whereupon, A.S.No.3 of 2011 was dismissed as the one barred by limitation. 7. The core question arises as to whether as against the order passed in C.M.P.No.80 of 2011 alone this civil revision petition can be filed, when the admitted factual position is that A.S.No.3 of 2011 itself was dismissed as a sequela to the findings and the order passed in C.M.P.No.80 of 2011. 8. The learned counsel for R2 to R6 would cite the following decision of the Honourable Apex Court: (2005) 1 SUPREME COURT CASES 436 – SHYAM SUNDAR SARMA V. PANNALAL JAISWAL AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus: "8.The first question to be considered is whether an appeal accompanied by an application for condoning the delay in filing the appeal is an appeal in the eye of the law, when the application for condoning the delay in filing the appeal is dismissed and consequently the appeal is dismissed as being time-barred by limitation, in view of Section 3 of the Limitation Act. There was conflict of views on this question before the High Courts. There was conflict of views on this question before the High Courts. But the Privy Council in Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey1 held: (AIR p. 167) “There is no definition of appeal in the Civil Procedure Code, but Their Lordships have no doubt that any application by a party to an appellate court, asking it to set aside or revise a decision of a subordinate court, is an appeal within the ordinary acceptation of the term, and that it is no less an appeal because it is irregular or incompetent.” 8.1.These observations were referred to with approval by this Court in Raja Kulkarni v. State of Bombay2. 9. The specific question involved came to be considered by this Court in Mela Ram and Sons v. CIT3. This Court held that an appeal presented out of time is an appeal and an order dismissing it as time-barred is one passed in an appeal. This Court referred to and followed the view taken by the Privy Council and by this Court in the two respective decisions above-referred to. This Court quoted with approval the observations of Chagla, C.J. in K.K. Porbunderwalla v. CIT4 (ITR p. 66) to the following effect: (SCR p. 176) “[Although the Appellate Assistant Commissioner did not hear the appeal on merits and held that the appeal was barred by limitation his order was under Section 31 and the effect of that order was to confirm the assessment which had been made by the Income Tax Officer.” 9.1.In Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar5 rendered by four learned Judges of this Court, one of the questions that arose was whether the dismissal of an appeal from a decree on the ground that the appeal was barred by limitation was a decision in the appeal. This Court held: (SCR pp. 308 H-309 B) “We are therefore of opinion that where a decision is given on the merits by the trial court and the matter is taken in appeal and the appeal is dismissed on some preliminary ground, like limitation or default in printing, it must be held that such dismissal when it confirms the decision of the trial court on the merits itself amounts to the appeal being heard and finally decided on the merits whatever may be the ground for dismissal of the appeal.” 9.2.In Board of Revenue v. Raj Bros. Agencies6 this Court approved the decision of the Madras High Court which had applied the principle stated in Mela Ram and Sons3. 10. The question was considered in extenso by a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Thambi v. Mathew7. Therein, after referring to the relevant decisions on the question it was held that an appeal presented out of time was nevertheless an appeal in the eye of the law for all purposes and an order dismissing the appeal was a decree that could be the subject of a second appeal. It was also held that Rule 3-A of Order 41 introduced by Amendment Act 104 of 1976 to the Code, did not in any way affect that principle. An appeal registered under Rule 9 of Order 41 of the Code had to be disposed of according to law and a dismissal of an appeal for the reason of delay in its presentation, after the dismissal of an application for condoning the delay, is in substance and effect a confirmation of the decree appealed against. Thus, the position that emerges on a survey of the authorities is that an appeal filed along with an application for condoning the delay in filing that appeal when dismissed on the refusal to condone the delay is nevertheless a decision in the appeal." (extracted as such) 9. A mere poring over and perusal of the above decision would reveal that under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, even after numbering the appeal either wittingly or unwittingly, the Court can very well consider as to whether the appeal was in time or not. 10. Trite the proposition of law is that as per Section 3 of the Limitation Act, which is extracted hereunder: "Sec.3.Bar of limitation– (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. 10. Trite the proposition of law is that as per Section 3 of the Limitation Act, which is extracted hereunder: "Sec.3.Bar of limitation– (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. (2) For the purposes of this Act- (a) A suit is instituted- (i) in an ordinary case, when the plaint is presented to the proper officer; (ii) in the case of a pauper, when his application for leave to sue as a pauper is made; and (iii) in the case of a claim against a company which is being wound up by the Court, when the claimant first sends in his claim to the official liquidator; (b) any claim by way of a set off, or a counter claim, shall be treated as a separate suit and shall be deemed to have been instituted- (i) in the case of a set off, on the same date as the suit in which the set off is pleaded; (ii) in the case of a counter claim, on the date on which the counter claim is made in Court; (c) an application by notice of motion in a High Court is made when the application is presented to the proper officer of that Court."the law enjoins the Court even suo moto to consider the limitation point at any stage. 11. No doubt, in this case, after hearing on the initial return endorsements made, the appellate Court ordered the registry concerned to number the appeal and that it did not mean that the first respondent herein/6th plaintiff, who entered appearance subsequently had no locus standi to raise the limitation point. Accordingly C.M.P.No.80 of 2011 was filed and in that order was passed. 12. As of now I am not concerned with the merit concerning the limitation point, but about the legality and propriety on the part of the revision petitioner herein/D2 in filing this revision. 13. In view of the ratiocination adhered to in passing the order in C.M.P.No.80 of 2011 in allowing it, as a sequela A.S.No.3 of 2011 was dismissed. As such, the order passed in C.M.P.No.80 of 2011 and the ultimate dismissal of the A.S.No.3 of 2011 are two sides of a coin, which are inseparable. 14. 13. In view of the ratiocination adhered to in passing the order in C.M.P.No.80 of 2011 in allowing it, as a sequela A.S.No.3 of 2011 was dismissed. As such, the order passed in C.M.P.No.80 of 2011 and the ultimate dismissal of the A.S.No.3 of 2011 are two sides of a coin, which are inseparable. 14. The contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner that the revision petitioner has got the right to agitate as against the order passed in C.M.P.No.80 of 2011 is independent and he could canvass in the revision; once this revision is allowed and the order passed by the lower Court in the C.M.P.No.80 of 2011 is set aside, naturally as a corollary A.S.No.3 of 2011 would get revived. 15. However, the learned counsel for the first respondent/plaintiff would argue that once there is an order of dismissal of A.S.No.3 of 2011 based on limitation point, it should be taken as a decree for all practical purposes and as against which only second appeal would like. 16. The core question arises as to whether the limitation point involved in the appeal can be taken as a substantial question of law. 17. Obviously and axiomatically, the issue relating to limitation and that too, based on complicate facts can rightly be taken as a substantive question of law, relating to which second appeal would normally lie. It is not as though the order in C.M.P.No.80 of 2011 was passed on one set of facts, whereas, A.S.No.3 of 2011 was dismissed ultimately on a different set of facts. 18. The very purpose of having filed C.M.P.No.80 of 20111 itself is to get A.S.No.3 of 2011 dismissed and in such a case, viewing the order passed in C.M.P.No.80 of 2011 separately from that of the sequela order passed in A.S.No.3 of 2011 does not arise and hence, in my considered opinion only second appeal would lie, as suggested by the learned counsel for the first respondent/6th plaintiff. 19. At this juncture, I would like to fumigate my mind with the unreported decision of this Court dated 3.7.2012 passed in C.R.P.NPD.No.4888 of 2011. 20. As such, when there is an effective alternate remedy in the form of second appeal is available, the question of invoking Article 227 of the Constitution of India does not arise. 21. 19. At this juncture, I would like to fumigate my mind with the unreported decision of this Court dated 3.7.2012 passed in C.R.P.NPD.No.4888 of 2011. 20. As such, when there is an effective alternate remedy in the form of second appeal is available, the question of invoking Article 227 of the Constitution of India does not arise. 21. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed and the original certified copies are directed to be returned to the petitioner immediately for filing second appeal. However, there is no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are dismissed. 22. In order to disambiguate the ambiguity if any, I would like to point out that in view of the complications as highlighted supra was involved in the matter, the period between the date of filing of this civil revision petition, i.e. 20.6.2012 and the date of dismissal of this revision, including the time that would be taken to obtain a certified copy of this order, shall stand excluded for computing the period of limitation for filing second appeal.