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2012 DIGILAW 34 (PNJ)

Hindu College of Pharmacy, Sonipat v. Haryana State Board for Prevention & Control of Water Pollution

2012-01-05

AJAY K.MITTAL, M.M.KUMAR

body2012
JUDGMENT Mr. M.M. Kumar, J.: - The instant petition under Article 226 of the Constitution raises a significant issue as to ‘whether the Hindu College of Pharmacy, Sonipat is exigible to payment of water cess and whether it would be covered by the expression ‘local authority’ and ‘specified industry’ used in Section 2(a) and 2(c) read with Schedule 1 of Section 3 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977 (for brevity ‘the Act’). As per the charging Section 3 of the Act, water cess could be levied on the ‘specified industry’ or ‘local authority’. It is payable by every person carrying on any ‘specified industry’ or by any ‘local authority’. The case of the petitioner is that it is neither covered by the definition of expression ‘local authority’ or ‘specified industry’ as envisaged under Section 2(a) and 2 ( c) read with Schedule 1 of the Act. It is claimed that they are neither ‘local authority’ nor covered by any ‘specified industry being’ an educational institution. 2. In response to notice of motion having been issued, the respondent- Board has filed the written statement. It is claimed that the Board has rightly issued letter dated 27.3.1986 to the petitioner requiring it to submit monthly water consumption return as per condition no.5 of the Act. According to the respondents , the petitioner is covered under Section 2(a) of the Act being ‘local authority’ and are liable to pay water cess. 3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at a considerable length and are of the view that this petition deserves to succeed. It would first be appropriate to read the charging Section 3 of the Act which is set out below: “3. Levy and Collection of cess.- (1) There shall be levied and collected cess for the purposes of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution )Act,1974 and utilization thereunder. It would first be appropriate to read the charging Section 3 of the Act which is set out below: “3. Levy and Collection of cess.- (1) There shall be levied and collected cess for the purposes of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution )Act,1974 and utilization thereunder. (2) The cess under sub section (1) shall be payable by- (a) every person carrying on any specified industry and (b) every local authority, and shall be calculated on the basis of the water consumed by such person or local authority, as the case may be, for any of the purposes specified in column (1) of schedule II, at such rate, not exceeding the rate specified in the corresponding entry in column (2) thereof as the Central Government may, by notification in the official gazette, from time to time specify (3) Where any local authority supplies water to any person carrying on any specified industry or to any other local authority and such person or other local authority is liable to pay cess under sub section (2) in respect of the water so supplied, then, notwithstanding anything contained in that sub section, the local authority first mentioned shall not be liable to pay such cess in respect of such water.” 4. A perusal of the aforesaid provision would make it clear that cess has been levied and is to be collected for the purposes of Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution ) Act, 1974 and utilization thereunder. Such water cess is payable by a ‘local authority’ or any person carrying on any ‘specified industry’. The expression ‘ local authority’ and ‘specified industry’ as used in Section 3 of the Act are defined by sections 2 (a) and 2( c) of the Act respectively and the definitions are set out below: “ 2. Definition.- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,- (a) “ local authority’ means a municipal corporation or a municipal council ( by whatever name called) or a cantonment Board or any other body entrusted with the duty of supplying water under the law by or under which it is constituted. (b) .. .. .. .. (c) ‘specified industry’ means any industry specified in schedule 1.” 5. (b) .. .. .. .. (c) ‘specified industry’ means any industry specified in schedule 1.” 5. Under Section 2(a) of the Act ‘ local authority’ has been defined to mean a municipal corporation, municipal council, cantonment Board or any other body entrusted with the duty of supplying water under the law by or under which it is constituted. The ‘local authority’ necessarily has to be entrusted with the duty of supplying water under the law. An educational institution like the petitioner has no obligation to supply water by virtue of provision of any law. When we read the expression like municipal council, municipal corporation which are obliged by the municipal laws to supply water to residents of local area then any other such institution could be brought under the definition by the principle of ejusdem generis if it under obligation by law to supply water. It is neither the case pleaded nor even argued. The bald statement that the petitioner is covered by expression ‘local authority’ is without substance and has not been substantiated at all. Likewise under Section 2(c) of the Act ‘specified industry’ is the one, which is detailed in schedule 1. According to the Schedule 15 industries have been listed which reads as under: “Schedule 1” [See Section 2(c) ] 1. Ferrous metallurgical industry 2. Non-ferrous metallurgical industry 3. Mining industry 4. Ore processing industry 5. Petroleum industry 6. Petro-chemical industry 7. Chemical industry. 8. Ceramic industry 9. Cement industry 10. Textile industry. 11. Paper industry. 12. Fertilizer industry. 13. Coal (including Coke) industry. 14. Power (thermal and diesel) generating industry. 15. Processing of animal or vegetable products industry.” 6. The educational institution run by the petitioner have not been included in the definition of ‘specified industry’ nor any mention thereof has been made in the schedule. By no stretch of reasoning the petitioner school it could be called an ‘industry’ for the purposes of charging water cess. There is no mention in Schedule 1 of the institution like the petitioner. It is only those industries which cause water pollution or discharge trade effluents that have been made liable to pay water cess. For example, the Petroleum industry, Ferrous metallurgical industry, Chemical industry etc. etc. Therefore, it is evident that respondent did not have any jurisdiction to demand levy or cess from the petitioner. It is only those industries which cause water pollution or discharge trade effluents that have been made liable to pay water cess. For example, the Petroleum industry, Ferrous metallurgical industry, Chemical industry etc. etc. Therefore, it is evident that respondent did not have any jurisdiction to demand levy or cess from the petitioner. Any amount of water cess, under the Act, which is to be recovered from the local authority or specified industry did not cover the same. It was under some mis-conceived notion that the petitioner college was sought to be brought within the mis-chief of Section 3 of the Act and was assessed by passing assessment order dated 26.9.1986 (P.1). Consequential order of penalty dated 26.2.1990 (P.2) for non payment would also not be sustainable. Likewise the order dated 19.4.1991 for recovery of cess, penalty and interest as arrears of land revenue would also be illegal. It is further appropriate to mention that when the petition came up for motion hearing, the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 21.5.1991 had stayed the operation of recovery order dated 19.4.1991. 7. The matter in respect of Tourism Corporation has been considered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Haryana Tourism Corporation Ltd v. Haryana State Board for the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution and another AIR 1993 P & H 272. The Bench held that Haryana Tourism Corporation would not fall in any of the industries nor it would be covered by the expression ‘local authority.The Bench rejected similar argument of the respondent and the view of the Division Bench is discernible from the perusal of paras 5 and 6 of the judgement which reads thus: “ 5. “................... Under no circumstance, the petitioner- Corporation can be said to be carrying on an industry engaged in processing of animal or vegetable products. Faced with this situation, emphasis was laid by the learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner-Corporation fell within the ambit of ‘local authority’ being ‘any other body’ and, therefore, is liable to pay cess as it is supplying water to various visitors visiting or staying in the complexes. 6. The stand of the respondents cannot be accepted. As already noticed, the local authority means a municipal corporation or any other body entrusted with the duty of supplying water under the law by or under which it is constituted. 6. The stand of the respondents cannot be accepted. As already noticed, the local authority means a municipal corporation or any other body entrusted with the duty of supplying water under the law by or under which it is constituted. In the present case, the respondents have completely failed to show that the petitioner-Corporation is entrusted with the duty of supplying water under the law...................... It does not apply to such persons who draw their own water, say, by installing tubewell and then supply in the houses or the complexes where some visitors also happen to come and stay. It is not the duty of such authority or a body to supply water under any provisions of law. The petitioner-Corporation is drawing water for its own consumption and is not entrusted with the duty of supplying water to others. Merely providing the amenity of water to the visitors coming or staying in the complexes, by the petitioner-Corporation cannot mean to hold that it is entrusted with the duty of supplying water to them under the law.........‘“ 8. In view of the above, this petition succeeds. It is declared that the petitioner is not liable to pay water cess under Section 3 of the Act as it is neither ‘local authority’ or ‘specified industry’ within the meanings of Section 2(a) and 2 ( c) of the Act. Consequently, orders dated 26.9.1986 (P.1), 26.2.1990 (P.2) and 19.4.1991 (P.4) are hereby quashed.