JUDGMENT : V.K. Sharma, J.—The challenge herein in this regular second appeal is against the judgment and decree dated 5.5.2003, passed by the learned District Judge, Kangra at Dharamsala (H.P.) in Civil Appeal No. 129-N/XIII/2001, titled Thunia and Others Versus Ran Singh and Others, whereby the judgment and decree dated 1.1.2001, passed by the learned Sub Judge Ist Class (I), Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P., in Civil Suit No. 111 of 1995, Ran Singh and Others Versus Thunia and Others, has been reversed and the suit for possession filed by the appellants as plaintiffs against the respondents being defendants, on the basis of title, has been dismissed and the defendants have been held to have acquired title to the land in dispute, by adverse possession. The dispute between the parties concerns the land bearing khata No. 36 min, khatauni No. 48, khasra Nos. 29, 82, 225, plots 3, measuring 0-25-61 hectares, as per jamabandi for the year 1992-93, situate in Tika Gatla, Mauza Kukher Khwara, Tehsil Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P., which shall hereinafter be referred to as 'the suit land'. 2. According to the plaintiffs, the suit land is owned by them and is entered in possession of the defendants as 'Kabiz'. It is averred that prior to settlement, the suit land was entered in khata No. 24 min, khatauni No. 60 min, khasra Nos. 141, 592 and 619/215, plots 3, measuring 6 kanals 11 marlas, vide jamabandi for the year 1977-78 and was in self cultivating possession of the owners, as shown in jamabandi 1977-78. 3. It is further averred that during settlement the defendants, in connivance with the revenue officials, got the suit land entered in their possession as 'Kabiz' illegally, wrongly and against facts. Thereafter, they, without any right and in the absence of the plaintiffs and without their knowledge, took forcible possession of the suit land on 28.7.1984. 4. In the meantime, consolidation of holdings took place in the area, during which khasra numbers of the suit land were changed from 31, 73, 74 and 255 to 29, 82 and 225. 5. It was lastly averred that the possession of the defendants over the suit land, is without any legal right or status and they are mere trespassers. They have no right to remain in possession of the suit land and the plaintiffs are entitled for a decree of possession. 5. It was lastly averred that the possession of the defendants over the suit land, is without any legal right or status and they are mere trespassers. They have no right to remain in possession of the suit land and the plaintiffs are entitled for a decree of possession. The defendants were asked many a times to admit the claim of the plaintiffs, but from 4.2.1005, they totally refused to do so, hence the suit. 6. The suit was contested by the defendants on preliminary objections regarding locus standi, cause of action, estoppel, limitation, besides setting up the plea of adverse possession. Preliminary objections No. 3 and 5, regarding estoppel and adverse possession, which constitute written statement on merits, are to the following effect: 3. That the plaintiffs are estopped by their acts and conduct to file the suit against the defendants. Fact of the matter is that the defendants, who were coming in hostile possession over the suit land from the time of their father without payment of any rent throughout considering themselves as owner of the suit land, filed an application for correction against the plaintiffs and others, who were recorded owners on 14-8-80 with the settlement Tehsildar Nurpur. The plaintiffs were also party in that correction case and after following the proper procedure and affording due opportunity to the plaintiffs the order of correction was passed by the settlement Tehsildar Nurpur in favour of the plaintiffs and the defendants were recorded as 'kabiz' as per order dated 6-11-81 and the defendants are coming continuously in possession over the suit land. The plaintiffs never challenged the order passed in Missal No. 46/81 dated 6-11-81 till date which has become final and binding. The plaintiffs are as such estopped by their acts and conduct from filing the present suit. 5. That the defendants are coming in adverse possession from the time of their father over the suit land. The defendants also declare their hostile possession in the month of August 1980 to the plaintiffs and even thereafter on 6-11-81 also. They declared hostile and adverse possession to the plaintiffs. So much so, the possession of the defendants was throughout from Aug. The defendants also declare their hostile possession in the month of August 1980 to the plaintiffs and even thereafter on 6-11-81 also. They declared hostile and adverse possession to the plaintiffs. So much so, the possession of the defendants was throughout from Aug. 1980 was within the knowledge of the plaintiff, it was un-interrupted, continuous within the knowledge of the plaintiffs and being in adverse possession and hostile possession for more than 12 years before filing the present suit the defendants have become absolute owner of the suit land by way of adverse possession. 7. On merits, it is pleaded that the revenue entries depicting the plaintiffs as owners of the suit land are illegal, null and void and are not binding on the defendants, who are in possession of the suit land as owners. It was denied that the suit land was in self cultivating possession of the plaintiffs, since the year 1977-78. It is stated that the revenue entries to this effect were wrong and as such were corrected by the Tehsildar Settlement. It was also denied that the defendants took possession of the suit land on 28.7.1984. 8. Replication, refuting the above stand on behalf of the defendants and reiterating the averments set up in the plaint, was filed by the plaintiffs. 9. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled by the learned trial Court: (1) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the possession of the suit land? OPP. (2) Whether the plaintiffs are estopped by their act and conduct from filing the present suit, as alleged in preliminary objection No. 3? OPD. (3) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? OPD. (4) Whether the defendants have become the owners of the suit land by way of adverse possession? OPD. (5) Relief. 10. After the parties led evidence and were heard by the learned trial Court, the suit was decreed by holding issue No. 1 in affirmative and the remaining issues in negative. Being aggrieved, the defendants carried the matter in appeal to the Court of learned District Judge, who accepted the appeal and dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs, vide the impugned judgment and decree dated 5.5.2003, as already noticed. It is how the plaintiffs are in regular second appeal before this Court. 11. Being aggrieved, the defendants carried the matter in appeal to the Court of learned District Judge, who accepted the appeal and dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs, vide the impugned judgment and decree dated 5.5.2003, as already noticed. It is how the plaintiffs are in regular second appeal before this Court. 11. The appeal has been admitted for hearing on the following substantial question of law: Whether on the pleadings and the material brought on record by the defendants, the first appellate court was right in holding that the case of adverse possession was made out by defendants and the suit filed by the plaintiffs was liable to be dismissed, moreso, when such finding was arrived at in reversal of the finding of the ld. Trial Court. 12. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records. 13. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that the defendants have not shown as to when their possession became hostile to the true owner, that is, the plaintiffs, the order of correction has also not been brought on record by them and they have also not been able to establish the requirements for acquisition of title by way of adverse possession. In support of these contentions, reliance has been placed on the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court in the following authorities: (i) Chatti Konati Rao and Others Vs. Palle Venkata Subba Rao, AIR 2011 SC 1480 (ii) Hemaji Waghaji Jat Vs. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan and Others, AIR 2009 SC 103 (iii) Rajinder Singh v. DalbirHimachal Pradesh 43; Singh and Others (iv) Tilak Raj v. Bhagat Ram and Another, 1997 (1) Sim. L.C. 281; (v) Ashok Kumar and Others v. Hardyal and Others, 1995 (1) Sim. L.C. 79; and (vi) Gajinder Singh and Others v. Narotam Singh and Others, 1995 (2) Sim. L.C. 314. 14. L.C. 281; (v) Ashok Kumar and Others v. Hardyal and Others, 1995 (1) Sim. L.C. 79; and (vi) Gajinder Singh and Others v. Narotam Singh and Others, 1995 (2) Sim. L.C. 314. 14. Per contra, it is contended on behalf of the defendants that though specific pleadings were set up on their behalf vide preliminary objection No. 3 to the written statement that the plaintiffs were parties to the application for correction, which was decided vide order dated 6.11.1981, yet neither the same were specifically denied in the corresponding para of the replication and instead, it was simply stated that the said order was passed in their absence and without their knowledge, nor that order was challenged by them by way of appropriate proceedings. It was further submitted that as soon as the application for correction was filed by the plaintiffs on 14.8.1980, to which the plaintiffs were parties or in any case, when the same was allowed vide order dated 6.11.1981, both these dates can very well be said to be the starting point of adverse possession of the defendants and the suit having been filed only on 15.2.1995, was hopelessly barred by time. To buttress these submissions, reliance has been placed on Konda Lakshmana Bapuji Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, (2002) 3 SCC 258 , D.N. Venkatarayappa and another Vs. State of Karnataka and others, and Dalip Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1990 (2) Sim. L.C. 221. 15. Since the suit of the plaintiffs is based on title and the defendants have set up plea of adverse possession, it shall be governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act. Thus, before the substantial question of law for determination is taken up for discussion and decision, it shall be appropriate to notice the law on the subject which is by now fairly settled by a catena of decisions, including those mentioned hereinabove, rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as also this Court. 16. The broad parameters required to be established by a person, who claims adverse possession, have been annunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chatti Konati Rao and Others (supra), wherein it has been held as under, vide paras 14 and 15 of the judgment: 14. 16. The broad parameters required to be established by a person, who claims adverse possession, have been annunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chatti Konati Rao and Others (supra), wherein it has been held as under, vide paras 14 and 15 of the judgment: 14. In view of the several authorities of this Court, few whereof have been referred above, what can safely be said is that mere possession however long does not necessarily mean that it is adverse to the true owner. It means hostile possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of the true owner and in order to constitute adverse possession the possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent so as to show that it is adverse to the true owner. The possession must be open and hostile enough so that it is known by the parties interested in the property. The plaintiff is bound to prove his title as also possession within twelve years and once the plaintiff proves his title, the burden shifts on the defendant to establish that he has perfected his title by adverse possession. Claim by adverse possession has two basic elements i.e. the possession of the defendant should be adverse to the plaintiff and the defendant must continue to remain in possession for a period of twelve years thereafter. 15. Animus possidendi as is well known is a requisite ingredient of adverse possession. Mere possession does not ripen into possessory title until the possessor holds the property adverse to the title of the true owner for the said purpose. The person who claims adverse possession is required to establish the date on which he came in possession, nature of possession, the factum of possession, knowledge to the true owner, duration of possession and that possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour as he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner and, hence, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish adverse possession. The courts always take unkind view towards statutes of limitation overriding property rights. The plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. 17. The courts always take unkind view towards statutes of limitation overriding property rights. The plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. 17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while reiterating the above ingredients, has further held in Hemaji Waghaji Jat (supra) as under, vide paras 24 to 29 and 32 to 34 of the report: 24. In a relatively recent case in P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy and Others Vs. Revamma and Others, (2007) 6 SCC 59 this court again had an occasion to deal with the concept of adverse possession in detail. The court also examined the legal position in various countries particularly in English and American system. We deem it appropriate to reproduce relevant passages in extenso. The court dealing with adverse possession in paras 5 and 6 observed as under: (SCC pp. 66-67) 5. Adverse possession in one sense is based on the theory or presumption that the owner has abandoned the property to the adverse possessor on the acquiescence of the owner to the hostile acts and claims of the person in possession. It follows that sound qualities of a typical adverse possession lie in it being open, continuous and hostile. [See Downing v. Bird 100 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1958), Arkansas Commemorative Commission v. City of Little Rock 227 Ark. 1085 : 303 S.W.2d 69 (1957); Monnot v. Murphy 207 N.Y. 240, 100 N.E. 742 (1913); City of Rock Springs v. Sturm 39 Wyo. 494, 273 P. 908, 97 A.L.R. 1 (1929).] 6. Efficacy of adverse possession law in most jurisdictions depend on strong limitation statutes by operation of which right to access the court expires through efflux of time. As against rights of the paper owner, in the context of adverse possession, there evolves a set of competing rights in favour of the adverse possessor who has, for a long period of time, cared for the land, developed it, as against the owner of the property who has ignored the property. Modern statutes of limitation operate, as a rule, not only to cut off one's right to bring an action for the recovery of property that has been in the adverse possession of another for a specified time, but also to vest the possessor with title. Modern statutes of limitation operate, as a rule, not only to cut off one's right to bring an action for the recovery of property that has been in the adverse possession of another for a specified time, but also to vest the possessor with title. The intention of such statutes is not to punish one who neglects to assert rights, but to protect those who have maintained the possession of property for the time specified by the statute under claim of right or color of title. (See American Jurisprudence, Vol. 3, 2d, Page 81). It is important to keep in mind while studying the American notion of Adverse Possession, especially in the backdrop of Limitation Statutes, that the intention to dispossess can not be given a complete go by. Simple application of Limitation shall not be enough by itself for the success of an adverse possession claim. 25. There is another aspect of the matter, which needs to be carefully comprehended. According to Revamma's case, the right of property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right but also a human right. In the said case, this Court observed that: (SCC p. 77, para 43) 43. Human rights have been historically considered in the realm of individual rights such as, right to health, right to livelihood, right to shelter and employment, etc. but now human rights are gaining a multifaceted dimension. Right to property is also considered very much a part of the new dimension. Therefore, even claim of adverse possession has to be read in that context. The activist approach of the English Courts is quite visible from the judgments of Beaulane Properties Ltd. v. Palmer (2005) 3 WLR 554 and JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom (2005) 49 ERG 90. The Court herein tried to read the human rights position in the context of adverse possession. But what is commendable is that the dimensions of human rights have widened so much that now property dispute issues are also being raised within the contours of human rights. 26. With the expanding jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the Court has taken an unkind view to the concept of adverse possession in the recent judgment of JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom (supra) which concerned the loss of ownership of land by virtue of adverse possession. 26. With the expanding jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the Court has taken an unkind view to the concept of adverse possession in the recent judgment of JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom (supra) which concerned the loss of ownership of land by virtue of adverse possession. In the said case, "the applicant company was the registered owner of a plot of 23 hectares of agricultural land. The owners of a property adjacent to the land, Mr. and Mrs. Graham ("the Grahams") occupied the land under a grazing agreement. After a brief exchange of documents in December 1983 a chartered surveyor acting for the applicants wrote to the Grahams noting that the grazing agreement was about to expire and requiring them to vacate the land.". The Grahams continued to use the whole of the disputed land for farming without the permission of the applicants from September 1998 till 1999. In 1997, Mr. Graham moved the Local Land Registry against the applicant on the ground that he had obtained title by adverse possession. The Grahams challenged the applicant company's claims under the Limitation Act, 1980 ("the 1980 Act") which provides that a person cannot bring an action to recover any land after the expiration of 12 years of adverse possession by another. 27. The judgment was pronounced in favour of JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. Graham 2000 Ch. 676 : (2000) 3 WLR 242. The Court held in favour of the Grahams but went on to observe the irony in law of adverse possession. The Court observed that the law which provides to oust an owner on the basis of inaction of 12 years is "illogical and disproportionate". The effect of such law would "seem draconian to the owner" and "a windfall for the squatter". The court expressed its astonishment on the prevalent law that ousting an owner for not taking action within limitation is illogical. The applicant company aggrieved by the said judgment filed an appeal and the Court of Appeal reversed the High Court decision. The Grahams then appealed to the House of Lords, which, allowed their appeal and restored the order of the High Court. 28. The applicant company aggrieved by the said judgment filed an appeal and the Court of Appeal reversed the High Court decision. The Grahams then appealed to the House of Lords, which, allowed their appeal and restored the order of the High Court. 28. The House of Lords in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. Graham (2003) 1 AC 419 observed that the Grahams had possession of the land in the ordinary sense of the word, and, therefore, the applicant company had been dispossessed of it within the meaning of the Limitation Act of 1980. 31. We deem it proper to reproduce the relevant portion of the judgment in Revamma's case (supra): (SCC p. 79, paras 51-52) 51. Thereafter the applicants moved the European Commission of Human Rights (ECHR) alleging that the United Kingdom law on adverse possession, by which they lost land to a neighbour, operated in violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention"). 52. It was contended by the applicants that they had been deprived of their land by the operation of the domestic law on adverse possession which is in contravention with Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention"), which reads as under: Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.' This Court in Revamma's case (supra) also mentioned that the European Council of Human Rights importantly laid down three-pronged test to judge the interference of the Government with the right of "peaceful enjoyment of property": (SCC p.79, para 53) 53. ......(In) Beyeler v. Italy [GC] No.33202 of 1996 ' 108-14 ECHR 2000-I, it was held that the "interference" should comply with the principle of lawfulness and pursue a legitimate aim (public interest) by means reasonably proportionate to the aim sought to be realized. ......(In) Beyeler v. Italy [GC] No.33202 of 1996 ' 108-14 ECHR 2000-I, it was held that the "interference" should comply with the principle of lawfulness and pursue a legitimate aim (public interest) by means reasonably proportionate to the aim sought to be realized. The Court observed: (Revamma case, SCC pp.79-80, paras 54-56) 54. ....'The question nevertheless remains whether, even having regard to the lack of care and inadvertence on the part of the applicants and their advisers, the deprivation of their title to the registered land and the transfer of beneficial ownership to those in unauthorised possession struck a fair balance with any legitimate public interest served. In these circumstances, the Court concludes that the application of the provisions of the 1925 and 1980 Acts to deprive the applicant companies of their title to the registered land imposed on them an individual and excessive burden and upset the fair balance between the demands of the public interest on the one hand and the applicants' right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions on the other. There has therefore been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1." 55. The question of the application of Article 41 was referred for the Grand Chamber Hearing of the ECHR. This case sets the field of adverse possession and its interface with the right to peaceful enjoyment in all its complexity. 56. Therefore it will have to be kept in mind the courts around the world are taking an unkind view towards statutes of limitation overriding property rights. 32. Before parting with this case, we deem it appropriate to observe that the law of adverse possession which ousts an owner on the basis of inaction within limitation is irrational, illogical and wholly disproportionate. The law as it exists is extremely harsh for the true owner and a windfall for a dishonest person who had illegally taken possession of the property of the true owner. The law ought not to benefit a person who in a clandestine manner takes possession of the property of the owner in contravention of law. This in substance would mean that the law gives seal of approval to the illegal action or activities of a rank trespasser or who had wrongfully taken possession of the property of the true owner. 33. This in substance would mean that the law gives seal of approval to the illegal action or activities of a rank trespasser or who had wrongfully taken possession of the property of the true owner. 33. We fail to comprehend why the law should place premium on dishonesty by legitimizing possession of a rank trespasser and compelling the owner to loose its possession only because of his inaction in taking back the possession within limitation. 34. In our considered view, there is an urgent need of fresh look regarding the law on adverse possession. We recommend the Union of India to seriously consider and make suitable changes in the law of adverse possession. A copy of this judgment be sent to the Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, Department of Legal Affairs, Government of India for taking appropriate steps in accordance with law. 18. It has further been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Annakili v. Vedanayagam & Others, AIR 2008 SC 346 , vide para 22 of the report, as under: Claim by adverse possession has two elements: (1) the possession of the defendant should become adverse to the plaintiffs; and (2) the defendant must continue to remain in possession for a period of 12 years thereafter. Animus possidendi as is well known is a requisite ingredient of adverse possession. It is now a well settled principle of law that mere possession of the land would not ripen into possessory title for the said purpose. Possessor must have animus possidendi and hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner. For the said purpose, not only animus possidendi must be shown to exist, but the same must be shown to exist at the commencement of the possession. He must continue in said capacity for the period prescribed under the Limitation Act. Mere long possession, it is trite, for a period of more than 12 years without anything more do not ripen into a title. 19. In P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy and Others Vs. He must continue in said capacity for the period prescribed under the Limitation Act. Mere long possession, it is trite, for a period of more than 12 years without anything more do not ripen into a title. 19. In P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy and Others Vs. Revamma and Others, (2007) 6 SCC 59 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has further emphasized that (1) starting point of adverse possession is of equal importance; (2) even an unduly long and undisturbed possession does not prove the intention of the person claiming title by adverse possession; (3) the initial burden lies on the land owner to prove his title and possession, the onus then shifts to other side to prove title by adverse possession and (4) since right to property is a human right, adverse possession should be considered in that context against the background that Courts around the world are taking an unkind view to the concept of adverse possession, should be kept in mind. (Emphasis supplied). 20. In another authoritative and exhaustive pronouncement of law, reported as Konda Lakshmana Bapuji (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has further emphasized as under, in para 53 of the judgment: The question of a person perfecting title by adverse possession is a mixed question of law and fact. The principle of law in regard to adverse possession is firmly established. It is a well-settled proposition that mere possession of the land, however long it may be, would not ripen into possessory title unless the possessor has 'animus possidendi' to hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner. It is true that assertion of title to the land in dispute by the possessor would, in an appropriate case, be sufficient indication of the animus possidendi to hold adverse to the title of the true owner. But such an assertion of title must be clear and unequivocal though it need not be addressed to the real owner. For reckoning the statutory period to perfect title by prescription both the possession as well as the animus possidendi must be shown to exist. Where, however, at the commencement of the possession there is no animus possidendi, the period for the purpose of reckoning adverse possession will commence from the date when both the actual possession and assertion of title by the possessor are shown to exist. Where, however, at the commencement of the possession there is no animus possidendi, the period for the purpose of reckoning adverse possession will commence from the date when both the actual possession and assertion of title by the possessor are shown to exist. The length of possession to perfect titles by adverse possession as against the Government is 30 years. 21. In D.N.Venkatarayappa and Another (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that "the classical requirement of adverse possession is that it should be nec vi, nec clam, nec precario." 22. The law laid down by this Court in Rajinder Singh v. Dalbir Singh and Others (supra), Tilak Raj v. Bhagat Ram and Another (supra), Ashok Kumar and Others v. Hardyal and Others (supra), Gajinder Singh and Others v. Narotam Singh and Others (supra) and Dalip Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh (supra), is to the similar effect. 23. In order to better understand the controversy between the parties, it shall be beneficial to notice the revenue entries relied upon on their behalf, which are given below in the form of a table: Jamabandi. Exhibits Khasra Number. Area 1977-78 P-2=D-4 Old New 141 1-09 * 592 1-13 619/215 3-09 * 6-11 1982-83 P-4=D-3 619/215 31 13-41 * 141 min 73 1-76 * 141 min 74 3-51 * 592 255 6-99 25-67 1985-86 P-3=D-2 31 min 29 13-35 * 73,74 82 5-27 * 255 225 6-99 25-61 1992-93 P-1 = D-1 29 13-35 * 82 5-27 * 225 6-99 25-61 *Denotes khasra Nos./corresponding khasra Nos., qua which correction in revenue entries in the column of possession, was carried out vide the aforesaid order dated 6.11.1981 in Misal (File) No. 646 of 1981. 24. In jamabandi 1977-78 Ex.P-2, an alternate copy whereof has been brought on record on behalf of the defendants as Ex. D-4, the suit land is recorded in self cultivating possession of the plaintiffs and other co-owners. However, in the remarks column, there is an entry in red ink to the effect that as per order dated 6.11.1981 passed in Misal (file) No. 646 of 1981, a part of the suit land, comprised of old khasra Nos. 141 and 619/215, measuring 4 kanals 18 marlas, corresponding to the latest khasra Nos. 29 and 82, measuring 0-18-62 hectares, has been ordered to be entered in possession of the defendants as 'Kabiz bila sift' in equal shares. 25. 141 and 619/215, measuring 4 kanals 18 marlas, corresponding to the latest khasra Nos. 29 and 82, measuring 0-18-62 hectares, has been ordered to be entered in possession of the defendants as 'Kabiz bila sift' in equal shares. 25. It is, thus, manifest that a part of the suit land, comprised of khasra Nos. 29 and 82, measuring 0-18-62 hectares, was found to be in possession of the defendants and orders to reflect their possession in the revenue record were passed on 6.11.1981. However, in later jamabandis 1982-83 Ex. P-4, 1985-86 Ex.P-3 and 1992-93 Ex. P-1, alternate copies whereof have been brought on record on behalf of the defendants as Ex.D-3, D-2 and D-1, respectively, the entire suit land, including khasra No. 225, measuring 0-06-99 hectares, corresponding to old khasra Nos. 255 (jamabandi 1982-83 Ex. P-4 = Ex.D-3) and 592 (jamabandi 1977-78 Ex.P-2 = Ex. D-4), qua which there was no order of correction, is recorded in possession of the defendants as 'Kabizan'. 26. Thus, whereas revenue entries, depicting possession of the defendants over a part of the suit land comprised of khasra Nos. 29 and 82, measuring 0-18-62 hectares, are based on the aforesaid order of correction dated 6.11.1981, the entries in respect of the remaining suit land comprised of khasra No. 225, measuring 0-06-99 hectares are concerned, there is no basis for the same. 27. It was pleaded on behalf of the plaintiffs in para 3 of the plaint that the defendants had taken forcible possession of the suit land on 28.7.1984. However, plaintiff No. 1 Shri Ran Singh, while appearing as PW-1 on 26.5.1999, has stated in chief-examination that the defendants have taken forcible possession of the suit land about 10-12 years back, that is, somewhere in 1987/1989. Thus, there is a marked variance between the pleadings set up on behalf of the plaintiffs and the evidence led to prove the same. In cross examination, though PW-1 Ran Singh has denied that in 1980, the plaintiffs had asked the defendants to vacate the suit land, yet he has categorically admitted that in 1981, when they had asked the defendants to vacate the suit land, they had assured that they would vacate the same sooner or later. In further cross-examination, he has stated that 'Bandobast' (settlement) had taken place in the area in 1980-81. In further cross-examination, he has stated that 'Bandobast' (settlement) had taken place in the area in 1980-81. It is further admitted by him that the defendants did not vacate the suit land since settlement till the day he was making statement in the Court on 26.5.1999. Thus, it is apparent that the plaintiffs did not take any steps for restoration of possession of the suit land from the defendants, despite the fact that they had been asserting hostile title to the same since 1981, when settlement had taken place in the area and since the suit was filed only on 15.2.1995, that is, after more than 12 years, the same was, on the face of it, barred by time. 28. The above discussion brings me to hold that the findings returned by the learned first appellate Court are partly borne out of the evidence on record and partly otherwise. The substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 29. In view of the above, the appeal succeeds partly and is accordingly allowed in part. Consequently, it is held that whereas the defendants have acquired title to a part of the suit land, comprised of khasra Nos. 29 and 82, measuring 0-18-62 hectares, the suit of the plaintiffs for possession in respect of rest of the suit land, comprised of khasra No. 225, measuring 0-06-99 hectares, is decreed. Consequently, the impugned judgment and decree dated 5.5.2003, passed by the learned first appellate Court, shall stand modified accordingly. The appeal stands disposed of in the above terms.