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2012 DIGILAW 341 (MAD)

N. Namasivayam v. The Inquiring Authority, Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority

2012-01-24

M.DURAISWAMY, P.JYOTHIMANI

body2012
Judgment :- P.JYOTHIMANI, J 1. These writ appeals are filed against the common order passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court dated 15.03.2010 in a batch of writ petitions filed by the writ petitioner, who is the appellant herein, dismissing all the writ petitions. 2. These two writ appeals are relating to a portion of the order of the learned Single Judge passed in W.P.Nos.35217 of 2005 and W.P.No.25550 of 2008 respectively. It is not in dispute that in respect of the orders relating to other writ petitions, which form part of the common order, the appellant has not filed any appeal. 3. The appellant, who has entered into the Government service as Divisional Fire Officer in the year 1976, recruited through the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission, has worked for 29 years in the department and on his date of superannuation on 31.01.2008, he was not permitted to retire by an order passed by the Government by virtue of the powers under Rule 56(1)(c) of the Fundamental Rules. 4. The appellant states that during his career, he was awarded Presidential Medal for gallentry in the year 1979 and Presidential Medal for his distinguished service in the year 1994. He was deputed to some of the Foreign countries by the Government of India on behalf of the Government. While he was working as Deputy Director of Fire and Rescue Service in Western Region with Headquarters at Coimbatore, there was a serious fire which has broken out in a Cotton Mill belonging to M/s Best Cotton Spinning Mills, Dharapuram in 1993, for which, he has made arrangements through the Divisional Fire Officer, Coimbatore, since he was stationed to make bandobust arrangements from fire service point of view to the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu. It appears that in respect of the fire accident, the owner of the Mill was g?anted a compensation of Rs.32,29,557/-alleged to be due to the negligence on the part of the Divisional Fire Officer in not inspecting and giving proper report. After receiving the said compensation amount from the Insurance Company, the Managing Director of the Mill has given a complaint to the Government on 28.06.1993 alleging that the appellant has demanded Rs.30,000/-through the Fire Officer, Tiruppur for issuing necessary certificate for claiming insurance amount and according to the appellant, no further proceedings have been initiated based on the said allegation. After receiving the said compensation amount from the Insurance Company, the Managing Director of the Mill has given a complaint to the Government on 28.06.1993 alleging that the appellant has demanded Rs.30,000/-through the Fire Officer, Tiruppur for issuing necessary certificate for claiming insurance amount and according to the appellant, no further proceedings have been initiated based on the said allegation. However, a notice was issued to the appellant by the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings on 15.10.1997 containing the charges in the charge memo dated 24.09.1997 to the effect that in respect of the fire accident, which took place in M/s Best Cotton Mills, Dharapuram on 10.06.1993, the appellant has enabled the owner to obtain exaggerated amount of compensation from the insurance company and the appellant accepted illegal gratification of Rs.12,000/- from the Officer in charge of M/s Best Cotton Mills, Dharapuram. However, it is stated that thereafter, the Tribunal has not proceeded further on the said charge. In the meantime, a show cause notice was issued on 18.02.2000 along with a charge memo framing three charges against the petitioner, which are as follows: CHARGE No.I That, the said Thiru N.Namasivayam, while functioning as Deputy Director of Fire Service, Chennai, during the year 1989, as a member of the Technical Committee, constituted by the then Director of Fire Service, Chennai, for conducting the endurance test and selection of portable fire pumps for which tender had been called for during August 1989, submitted a joint report on 21.09.1989 along with Thiru V.Ananthasekar, Deputy Director of Fire Service, Northern Region, recommending the purchase of the German-made Bachert Portable pumps offered by Tvl.Nisarzs & Co. Chennai stating that the pumps were as per specifications. He had failed to point out that (i) the supplier viz., Tvl.Nisarzs & Co. was not a reputed dealer for the supply of fire fighting equipments (ii) they have no infrastructural facilities for repairs and maintenance of the pumps; (iii) the BACHERT portable fire pumps being import items, it would be very difficult to procure and provide spares and to attend to their repairs in future. By his failure to point out such vital aspects, he failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and conducted himself in an unbecoming manner and thereby contravened Rule 20(1) of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1973. By his failure to point out such vital aspects, he failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and conducted himself in an unbecoming manner and thereby contravened Rule 20(1) of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1973. CHARGE No.II That, during the aforesaid period and while functioning as Deputy Director of Fire Service, Chennai, the said Thiru N.Namasivayam, was a Member of the Technical Committee constituted in the year 1991 by the then Director of Fire Service, Chennai, for inspection of the High Capacity Portable Pumps for which tenders had been invited during August 1991. After inspecting the pumps produced by five of the tenderers, he along with the other members of the Committee, had submitted a report recommending the Wadia-make pump driven by diesel engine offered by Tvl. Nisarzs & Co., Chennai. It was inter-alia recommended that the weight of the pump may be reduced to the extent possible. He as the member of Technical Committee, failed to point out and bring on record the facts that a diesel-driven pump is not in accordance with IS:12717/89, which read along with IS 10004/81 stipulated portable fire pumps with petrol-driven engines only. The weight of the diesel pump supplied was also found to be over 300 kgs and hence they could not be described as portable. The entire amount of Rs.1,77,22,320/-paid to Tvl.Nisarzs & Co. is therefore to be construed as loss to Government and undue pecuniary advantage to the firm. He, by being a member of the Committee for recommendation for the purchase of the above pump failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and acted in an unbecoming manner, and thereby contravened Rule 20(1) of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1973. CHARGE No.III That, during the aforesaid period and while functioning as Deputy Director of Fire Service, Chennai, the said Thiru N.Namasivayam, had, in course of the investigation of the case in Cr.No.34/96 of CBCID Hars, Chennai were examined and had also given a statement before the XV Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, under Section 164 Cr.P.C. In the course of the statement, he had also stated that he committed various delinquencies under pressure and coercion and threat of punishment from his superiors. By his own admission, he had conducted himself in a way inconsistent with the faithful discharge of his duty in the service and failed to act in the best interests of the Government. He had, thereby, misconducted himself and contravened Rule 20(1) of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1973. 5. The above said charges were denied by the petitioner in his explanation dated 19.08.2005 and not being satisfied with the explanation, the respondents have proceeded with the enquiry by appointing an Enquiry Officer. While the said enquiry was pending in respect of another charge memo dated 24.09.1997, which was pending before the Tribunal for disciplinary proceedings, which was concluded after enquiry, the second respondent passed an order on 16.02.2005 imposing punishment of compulsory retirement together with cut of pension amount by granting only 2/3rd of eligible pension. It was against that said order, the appellant has approached this Court by filing a writ petition in W.P.No.13310 of 2005. This Court in the order dated 29.08.2007 has set aside the said order of compulsory retirement on the ground that the charges and explanation are belated and the delay was prejudicial to the interest of the delinquent, by following the judgment of the Supreme Court in P.V.MahadevanVs. Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board reported in2005 SCC (L & S) 861 and other series of judgments. 6. After the order passed by this Court setting aside the order of compulsory retirement, the Government, in obedience of the said order, has directed that the appellant be reinstated as Deputy Director, Fire and Rescue Services, Northern Region, Chennai by an order dated 08.01.2008. Thereafter, the appellant made a representation on 08.01.2008 requesting the Government that since his date of retirement was to fall on 31.01.2008, he may be permitted to work for a period of two years, for which he was not allowed to work, after the order of compulsory retirement was passed. It was on receipt of the said representation, the Government in the order dated 22.01.2008 has placed the petitioner under suspension, pending contemplation of charges. 7. The appellant has challenged the order of suspension by filing W.P.No.2252 of 2008 and an order of interim stay was granted by this Court on 29.01.2008. It was on receipt of the said representation, the Government in the order dated 22.01.2008 has placed the petitioner under suspension, pending contemplation of charges. 7. The appellant has challenged the order of suspension by filing W.P.No.2252 of 2008 and an order of interim stay was granted by this Court on 29.01.2008. However, when the matter was taken up on 31.01.2008, the learned Single Judge was informed by the Government that the petitioner was to reach the age of superannuation on 31.01.2008 and therefore the Government must be directed to invoke its powers under Section 56 (1)(c) of the Fundamental Rules retaining him in service so as to enable the Government to complete the disciplinary proceedings. It was in those circumstances, by an order dated 31.01.2008 in W.P.No.2252 of 2008, this Court has vacated the order of interim stay of suspension, however directed the respondent Government to complete all the disciplinary proceedings pending against the appellant within a period of three months, specifically stating that if there is any difficulty in concluding the said proceedings, it is open to the Government to approach the Court for the purpose of extension of period. The operative portion of the order of the learned Single Judge is as follows: "(4.) Today, the petitioner will retire, but for the order produced by the learned Special Government Pleader invoking Rule 56(1)(c) of the Fundamental Rules and once he retires, it will not be possible for the respondent to initiate action against him or proceed against him. May be the petitioner is innocent. If he is innocent and he succeeds in the writ petition, he will get back all the monetary benefits without any loss. Since, he is retiring today, continuation of stay of suspension is also meaningless, since suspension would only affect a person, who is in service and not a person, who ceases to be in service. Therefore, the suspension will have no effect on him from today. On the other hand if the petitioner is guilty of misconduct which has to be proved, and he is permitted to retire, public interest will suffer. In these circumstances, interim stay granted on 29.01.2008 is vacated. Therefore, the suspension will have no effect on him from today. On the other hand if the petitioner is guilty of misconduct which has to be proved, and he is permitted to retire, public interest will suffer. In these circumstances, interim stay granted on 29.01.2008 is vacated. But, the petitioner claims in his affidavit that he had rendered distinguished service and he had been awarded by the U.K. Government and he is the only officer in the country, who has achieved such laurels and that his entire service has been unblemished. If that is so, it is unfortunate that he should be faced with disciplinary proceedings at the fag end of his career. In these circumstances, the respondent is directed to conclude all the disciplinary proceedings within 3 months and if there is any difficulty in concluding the said proceedings, they can move this Court." Similarly on the same day, viz., 31.01.2008, the Government passed G.O.(D).No.91 Home (SC) Department dated 31.01.2008 by invoking its power under Rule 56(1)(c) of the Fundamental Rules by not permitting the petitioner to retire from service and retaining the petitioner in service for the purpose of completion of the enquiry . 8. WP.No.35217 of 2005 was filed by the petitioner/appellant against the charges dated 18.02.2000, as enumerated above, which were laid on the ground that the said charges relate to certain facts stated to have happened in the year 1989 and therefore there has been long delay of nearly 16 years in framing charges and such a long delay, especially, when the petitioner has attained the age of superannuation, is prejudicial to the interest of the petitioner, since it is practically not possible to effectively defend himself in respect of the charges, which relates to various factual aspects regarding the specifications in respect of some of the materials including the BACHERT portable fire pumps and the technical committees views etc., especially when it has been the defence of the petitioner as it is stated in his explanation that he was not involved and not competent to make such decisions regarding technical committee. 9. In the meantime, the Government has issued another charge memo under Rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1955 dated 29.01.2008. 9. In the meantime, the Government has issued another charge memo under Rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1955 dated 29.01.2008. The charge relates to disproportionate income to the extent of Rs.3,02,557.30 for the period between 01.04.1995 and 31.03.2001 and the said charge is as follows: That, you while serving as Deputy Director, Fire and Rescue Service, Southern Range, Madurai from 24.09.1999 to 29.12.2001 as a Public Servant were found in possession of pecuniary resources and properties in your name and in the name of your family members disproportionate to your known sources of income to the extent ofRs.3,02,557.30 during the period between 01.04.1995 and 31.03.2001 and for which you could not satisfactorily account for and thereby you have committed misconduct and failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and acted in a manner unbecoming of a member of the Tamil Nadu Government Services and thus you have violated Rule 20 of the Tamil Nadu Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1973." 10. The petitioner has also submitted his explanation for the said charge memo and in the meantime, he has reached the age of superannuation. Challenging the said charge memo, he has filed a writ petition in W.P.No.25550 of 2008 mainly on the ground that there has been a long delay, since the charges are framed in 2001 in respect of the incident stated to have happened from 01.04.1995. In fact, it has been the case of the appellant in the writ petition that the statement annexed to the charges runs to many pages wherein minute details have been given in respect of the alleged disproportionate assets, and at this later point of time, it is impossible for the appellant to effectively defend himself. 11. Learned single Judge by taking up the above said writ petitions along with other writ petitions filed by the petitioner for various reliefs has dismissed all the writ petitions on the basis of the fact that mere delay in framing charges cannot be a ground for the Court to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to arrive at such a conclusion. Learned Judge has relied upon various judgments, most of which are in relation to the challenge against the show cause notice, as it is seen in the Judgments relied upon by the learned Judge in State of U.P. Vs. Learned Judge has relied upon various judgments, most of which are in relation to the challenge against the show cause notice, as it is seen in the Judgments relied upon by the learned Judge in State of U.P. Vs. Brah Datt Sharma reported in (1987) 2 SCC 179 andSpecial Director Vs. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse reported in (2004) 3 SCC 440 , which are all cases where show cause notice issued by the employer was challenged on the ground of delay. It was in those circumstances, it was held that the interference by the High Court by exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India at the show cause notice stage is improper and the employer must be given an opportunity to proceed with further proceedings. 12. Learned Judge has also relied upon a later judgment of the Supreme Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh Vs. V.Appala Swamy reported in (2007) 14 SCC 49 wherein the Apex Court has laid down the parameters for interference at the stage of charge memo. In fact, the Supreme Court has held that if the reason for delay is due to the lapse committed by the employee, there is no question of interference by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is also made clear in the said judgment by the Supreme Court that if an employee has challenged the charge memo on the ground of delay, he must prove that such a delay has caused prejudice to him. On a reference to the impugned judgment of the learned Judge, while quoting the above said judgment in AppalaSwamys case (cited supra), the learned Judge has chosen to quote a paragraph relating to the decision of the Supreme Court in BijlaniVs. Union of India ( 2006 (5) SCC 88 ) wherein the Supreme Court has specifically stated that decision was taken in that cases in a peculiar circumstance in which there was a finding that even the basic material on which the departmental proceedings can be initiated was absent and it was initiated after six years and continued for a period of 7 years. Having referred to the said judgment of the Supreme Court, the learned Judge, however, dismissed the writ petitions stating that there is no prejudice on the part of the appellant against the charges. 13. Having referred to the said judgment of the Supreme Court, the learned Judge, however, dismissed the writ petitions stating that there is no prejudice on the part of the appellant against the charges. 13. It is the contention of Mr.P.Jayaraman, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants that it is not only in respect of the said two charges which are the subject matters of challenge in the writ petitions, there has been undue delay of more than 16 years and hence the prejudice is apparent on record. He has also referred to the charges relating to the year 1989, especially in respect of disproportionate income which runs to various pages of the minute details and after the lapse of more than 10 years it is difficult for the delinquent to effectively defend himself. As per the service jurisprudence, the effective defence is a vital aspect and it has to be read with principles of natural justice. It is also his contention that even on the specification of the charge, he being one of the members of the technical committee, cannot be imposed with such obligation which has been stated in the charges at all. 14. We are aware that in respect of the factual assertion, the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be stretched for the purpose of finding out the facts. But the fact remains that after a lapse of undue period of more than 10 years, it is certainly not possible for any delinquent to make effective defence. By the narration of facts, which we have made out for the purpose of finding out as to whether there can be any prejudice on the part of the appellant, it is seen that the respondents have been taking various steps at various stages by making various allegations but not proceeded further and suddenly making some other allegations which were pending in the previous proceedings, which only shows that the respondent is not serious about the charges and delay in framing charges has not been properly explained. This aspect has not been considered by the learned Judge. 15. This aspect has not been considered by the learned Judge. 15. It is true that when a charge memo is issued by the employer, it is not open to the High Court by exercising its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere at that stage, for, it is the right of the employer to proceed with the charge memo and the employee can only question about the propriety of the final order which may be ultimately passed. But, on the facts of the present case, it is not as if the delay has been caused due to the conduct of the employee. That is not the stand of the Government. The appellant being the delinquent, is not responsible for the undue delay, and this aspect has been lost sight of by the learned Judge. There is one other vital aspect, which of course could not be considered by the learned Singe Judge, since the judgment rendered was subsequent. 16. Under similar circumstances, when the competent court fixes an outer period of limitation for completing disciplinary proceedings, the employer has to necessarily approach the Court on the expiry of the period of extension of enquiry and normally on such approach, the Courts/Tribunals are liberal for extending the period. But the failure on the part of the employer in approaching the Court for the purpose of extension would make entire charges invalid. That was the view of the Division Bench of this Court presided over by Elipe Dharma Rao,J in the case of State of Tamil Nadu rep. By Secretary to Government, Personnel and Administrative Reforms(Q) Department, Chennai and another Vs T.Ranganathan reported in (2010) 3 MLJ 625 . The Division Bench by referring to catena of judgments on this issue has held as follows: "(21.) It is well settled in law that once a competent Court fixes an outer time limit to complete the enquiry and pass final orders, the parties to the proceedings are found to strictly adhere to the time granted to comply with the said order. If on any reason the time fixed by the competent Court is unable to be adhered to and the proceedings are unable to be finalised, the party to the proceedings can approach the very same Court seeking extension of time stating sufficient reasons and once valid reasons are given, normally the Court/Tribunal would extend the time, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. Admittedly, the said procedure has not been followed in this case and the department has chosen to ignore the direction given by the Tribunal which is binding on them. 17. On the basis of the above said finding, the Bench taking note of the fact that the said observation is subject to the co-operation of the delinquent in the disciplinary proceedings, has held that the employer, herein, the Government is bound to follow the direction given by this Court in the operative portion, which is as follows: "(23.) We are conscious of the fact that if there is non-cooperation of the delinquent officer to comply with the time limit fixed by the Court/Tribunal to complete the enquiry and pass final orders in disciplinary proceedings, the Department cannot be blamed. In such contingency, it is for the Department to point out the non-cooperation on the part of the delinquent officer in finalising the proceeding and the hardships faced by the Department in not strictly adhering to the time schedule due to the fault of the delinquent officer or for any valid reason and get appropriate orders seeking extension of time. At this juncture, it is relevant to point out that even if the time granted originally to complete the enquiry is over, nothing prevented the Department from filing appropriate application after expiry of the time. It is now well settled in law that application seeking extension of time can be filed and the Court are having inherent powers to grant further time, even thought the original time granted got expired, based on the principles of invoking inherent powers to meet the ends of justice. In this case, there is no whisper about the non-cooperation of the petitioner in conducting the enquiry and completing the enquiry within the time. Hence, the Department is bound to comply with the directions issued by the Tribunal in O.A.No.1535 of 2003". 18. Ultimately, the Bench quashed the charge memo and directed for promotion due to the delinquent therein. In this case, there is no whisper about the non-cooperation of the petitioner in conducting the enquiry and completing the enquiry within the time. Hence, the Department is bound to comply with the directions issued by the Tribunal in O.A.No.1535 of 2003". 18. Ultimately, the Bench quashed the charge memo and directed for promotion due to the delinquent therein. As against the said Judgment, the Government has filed an appeal before the Supreme Court in a petition for Special Leave Appeal (Civil) Nos.11346-11347/2010 and the Honble Apex Court in the order dated 23.04.2010 has dismissed the SLP by the Government even though the question of law relating to delay was kept open. The operative portion is as follows: "No ground is made out for our interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. The special leave petitions are dismissed. However, the question of law raised by the petitioners is kept open." 19. It is true that the Division Bench judgment is dated 5.3.2010 and the common order passed by the learned Judge is dated 15.03.2010. 20. The issue relating to the delay in disciplinary proceedings, which has been covered in the Judgment of the Supreme Court from P.V.Mahadevans case as stated above and continues as on date. There is no contrary judgment and the learned Government pleader is not able to show except the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in P.D.AgarwalVs. State Bank of India and others reported in (2006) 8 SCC 776 . 21. First of all, the judgment was delivered before the confirmation of the order of the Division Bench of this Court by the Honble Apex Court as stated above and even an analysis of the said judgment of the Supreme Court inP.D.Agarwalshows that the focus is on the prejudice to the delinquent officer as it was held in the earlier judgment in Additional Superintendent of Police Vs. T.Natarajan reported in 1999 SCC(L & S) 646. Apart from the said Judgment, in State of Punjab Vs. Chaman Lal Goyal reported in (1995) 2 SCC 570 , the Supreme Court has held that the issue of delay is a question of fact and the same has to be considered by weighing factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of the circumstances. There is no dispute about the said settled legal principle. There is no dispute about the said settled legal principle. Certainly it is the duty of the Court to find out the prejudice to be caused to the delinquent. It is not the length of time that is material for deciding about the validity of the charge memo on the basis of the delay, but it is the prejudice which would be caused to the delinquent. If the prejudice that would be caused to the delinquent is made even if the number of delay is less, certainly the Court is entitled to interfere. But, on the factual matrix which we have chosen to explain in detail as stated above, we have no hesitation to hold that the delay of more than 10 years on the facts of the present case taking note of the minute incidents, which are put to proof of defence by the delinquent, we have no hesitation to hold that certainly prejudice has been caused to the appellant. 22. Inasmuch as the said vital aspect has not been taken note of by the learned Judge, we do not agree with the finding of the learned Judge and accordingly the judgment of the learned Single Judge stands set aside and the writ appeals filed by the appellant stand allowed. No costs.