JUDGMENT Pankaj Mithal, J.: - Petitioners, four in number and all sons of late Indra Pal alias Deshraj have filed this writ petition praying for the quashing of the judgment and order dated 3.7.2008 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, respondent No.1. The Deputy Director of Consolidation by the said order has allowed revision of the private respondents and the order dated 7.11.2007 passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation in appeal has been set aside and that passed by the Consolidation Officer has been maintained and confirmed. The dispute relates to agricultural land of Khata Nos.126, 127-Ba and 21-Aa. Petitioners claim that in the aforesaid land their father and now they themselves have 1/3rd share. During the consolidation proceedings objections under Section 9-A of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (for short the 'Consolidation Act') filed by Indra Pal, predecessor in interest of the petitioners came up for consideration before the Consolidation Officer and were decided vide order 26.12.1985. Aggrieved, Indra Pal, preferred an appeal before the Settlement Officer Consolidation which was dismissed on 10.4.1986. The said order was taken up in revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation by the aforesaid Indra Pal. The revision was allowed on 25.2.1987. The orders of the Settlement Officer Consolidation and Consolidation Officer were set aside, the matter was remanded to the Consolidation Officer with the direction to frame a specific issue, whether Indra Pal alias Deshraj son of Makhan Singh is a co-tenure holder in Khata No.127-B and to decide the matter thereafter in accordance with law. In pursuance of the above remand order, Consolidation Officer rejected the claim of Indra Pal vide order dated 11.6.2007. However, in appeal No.268 of 2007-08 preferred by petitioners, the order of the Consolidation Officer was set-aside and in all the three Khata Nos. 126, 127-Ba and 21-Aa petitioners were held to be co-owners to the extent of 1/3rd share. This order was assailed by the contesting respondents in revision which has been decided by the impugned order. I have heard Sri Pramod Kumar Jain, learned counsel for petitioners, Sri R.N.Singh, Senior Advocate assisted by Sri A.K.Rai, learned counsel for the respondents and Sri Ayub Khan, learned counsel for the impleaded respondents. This order was assailed by the contesting respondents in revision which has been decided by the impugned order. I have heard Sri Pramod Kumar Jain, learned counsel for petitioners, Sri R.N.Singh, Senior Advocate assisted by Sri A.K.Rai, learned counsel for the respondents and Sri Ayub Khan, learned counsel for the impleaded respondents. Sri Jain has argued that on the day the impugned order was passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, i.e. 3.7.2008 there was strike of lawyers and no lawyer had appeared before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The statement in the impugned order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation that he had heard both the lawyers is incorrect. The lawyer of the petitioners on knowing that the impugned judgment and order had been passed on the same very day filed an application for recalling the said order which was rejected on 7.8.2008. The order dated 3.7.2008 has actually been antedated. In such a situation, when the order has been passed without hearing the petitioners or their counsel, it ought to have been recalled, or at least the matter deserves to be remanded. He has also submitted that the revision has been allowed only on the ground that the proceedings before the Consolidation Officer were barred by Section 49 of the Consolidation Act though the matter was required to be decided on merits as previously there was no issue regarding the proceedings being barred by Section 49 of the Consolidation Act. Sri R.N.Singh in reply to the above arguments has submitted that the petitioners were given ample opportunity to appear and it is incorrect to state that counsel for the petitioners was not heard before passing the impugned order dated 3.7.2008. The story regarding strike of lawyers on the said date is being pleaded for the first time in the writ petition. No purpose would be served in remanding the matter as even on remand the result would remain the same, inasmuch as the present proceedings stand barred by Section 49 of the Consolidation Act. It is well settled that there is no purpose in issuing futile writs. In the writ petition, though no specific ground has been taken so as to assail the order dated 3.7.2008 on merits, counsel for the petitioner submitted that the revisional court erred in allowing the revision on the ground that the proceedings were barred by Section 49 of the Consolidation Act. In the writ petition, though no specific ground has been taken so as to assail the order dated 3.7.2008 on merits, counsel for the petitioner submitted that the revisional court erred in allowing the revision on the ground that the proceedings were barred by Section 49 of the Consolidation Act. The revision of the contesting respondents has been allowed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on the sole ground that the proceedings are barred by Section 49 of the Consolidation Act and, as such, the appellate order declaring 1/3 share of the petitioners in the disputed land is illegal. Section 49 of the Consolidation Act bars the jurisdiction of the civil and revenue courts in respect of the "consolidated area" i.e. land covered by the notification issued under Section 4(2) of the Consolidation Act or matters arising out of the consolidation proceedings. The above Section 49 of the Consolidation Act is quoted below: "49. Bar to Civil Jurisdiction.-- Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time time being in force, the declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure holders in respect of land lying in an area for which a [Notification] has been issued under Sub-section (2) of Section 4, or adjudication of any other rights arising out of consolidation proceedings and in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act, shall be done in accordance with the provisions of this Act and no civil or revenue court shall entertain any suit or proceeding with respect to rights in such land or with respect to any other matters for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act. Provided that nothing in this section shall preclude that Assistant Collector from initiating proceedings under Section 122-B of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 in respect of any land, possession over which has been delivered or deemed to be delivered to a Gaon Sabha under or in accordance with the provisions of this Act." A perusal of the above provision reveals that it only bars the jurisdiction of civil and revenue court and all matters in respect of the land within the consolidation area are to be decided by consolidation court. In Gorakh Nath Dube Vs. In Gorakh Nath Dube Vs. Hari Narain Singh and Others 1973 RD 423 (S.C.) the Apex Court observed as under: - "The whole object of this provision of the Act was to remove from the jurisdiction of ordinary civil and revenue courts, for the duration of consolidation operations, all disputes which could be decided in the course of consolidation proceedings before special courts governed by special procedure, such adjudications by consolidation authorities were considered more suitable, just and efficacious for speedy decisions which had to be taken in order to enable consolidation operations to be finalised within a reasonable time." The Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 in Chapter II provides for the constitution of Civil Courts. Section 3 of the aforesaid Act provides that the court of District Judge; court of Additional District Judge; court of Sub-ordinate Judge (Civil Judge); and the court of Munsif now Civil Judge (Junior Division) shall be classes of civil courts. In view of the above, the Consolidation Authorities/Courts under the Consolidation Act are not the civil courts. Section 4(8) of the United Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1901 (hereinafter referred to as the "Revenue Act') provides that "Revenue Court" means all or any of the following authorities, i.e. the Board of Revenue, Commissioners, Additional Commissioners, Collectors, Additional Collectors, Assistant Collectors, Settlement Officers, Assistant Settlement Officers, Record Officers, Assistant Record Officers and Tehsildars. Thus, it confers powers of the Revenue Court upon the various authorities enumerated above under the said Act. In the State of U.P., Board of Revenue has been vested with the power of the Chief Controlling Authority in all revenue matters subject to the superintendence, direction and control of the State Government. The Board of Revenue has both administrative and judicial powers. Administrative work is looked-after by administrative members and the judicial by the judicial members. It acts as a revenue court while exercising the judicial function. Simultaneously, Commissioners at the divisional level including Additional Commissioners, Collectors at the district level including Additional Collectors and Assistant Collectors and Tehsildar (Assistant Collector-I Class) and Naib Tehsildar (Assistant Collector-II Class) at the sub-divisional level (Tehsil) or the sub-divisional or additional sub-divisional officers are all revenue authorities under the Revenue Act. The revenue courts discharge duties conferred or imposed upon them under the Revenue Act or any other law for time being enforce. The revenue courts discharge duties conferred or imposed upon them under the Revenue Act or any other law for time being enforce. The said Act does not provide for including the consolidation authorities or the consolidation courts within the ambit of revenue courts. The consolidations authorities, namely, Consolidation Officer, Settlement Officer, Deputy Direction of Consolidation and Director of Consolidation act as adjudicators of disputes under the Consolidation Act and are commonly referred to consolidation courts. The consolidation courts as such are distinct and special courts under a special enactment. They are neither the civil courts nor the revenue courts though they adjudicate disputes both of civil and revenue nature in respect of land within consolidated area. Section 49 of the Consolidation Act only bars the jurisdiction of the civil and revenue courts. It does not provide for excluding the jurisdiction of consolidation court. It is settled that exclusion of jurisdiction of any court can not be easily inferred and the provision which takes it away must be construed strictly vide Suba Singh Vs. Mahendra Singh 1974 (1) SCC 418 . There is no specific provision in the Consolidation Act ousting the jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities or court. In view of the above, the proceedings before the consolidation court can not be said to be barred by Section 49 of the Consolidation Act as the aforesaid provision only bars proceedings before the civil and revenue courts in matters connecting to consolidation area or rights in respect of of such land and not the proceedings before the consolidation courts itself. It appears that what the revisional court wants to say in holding the proceedings to be barred by Section 49 of the Consolidation Act is that the present proceedings before the Consolidation Courts are not maintainable as the dispute in question had previously been adjudicated between the predecessors in interest of the parties during the earlier consolidation operation. In other words, what was meant to be conveyed was that the proceedings are barred by principle of res-judicata or estoppal. However, for establishing that the matter had already been adjudicated earlier or during the previous consolidation operation their appears to be no material on record to indicate as to when the previous consolidation proceedings, if any, were commenced and were closed under Section 52 of the Consolidation Act. However, for establishing that the matter had already been adjudicated earlier or during the previous consolidation operation their appears to be no material on record to indicate as to when the previous consolidation proceedings, if any, were commenced and were closed under Section 52 of the Consolidation Act. There is even no material to establish the time and date when fresh proceedings for consolidation in the area, as contemplated under Section 4-A of the Consolidation Act, if any, have started. The perusal of the record reveals that the courts have treated the earlier round of litigation arising from the same very objections filed by Indra Pal Singh under Section 9-A of the Consolidation Act wherein the matter was remanded to the Consolidation Officer vide revisional court's order dated 25.2.1987 to be the orders passed in previous consolidation operations. This is not the correct position. The present order of Consolidation Officer dated 11.6.2007, Settlement Officer Consolidation dated 7.11.2007 and the impugned order of Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 3.2.2008 are all orders pursuant to the remand made by the Deputy Director of Consolidation earlier vide order dated 25.2.1987. There appears to be no fresh consolidation operation. The position in this regard is not at all clear and, as such, the issue as to whether the instant proceedings are barred by Section 49 of the Consolidation Act or are actually barred by principle of res-judicata or estoppal deserves to be reconsidered. In view of the above unclear factual position, the decision of Birbal and others Vs. D.D.C., Bulandshahr and others 1989 RD 219 holding that the orders passed in earlier consolidation proceedings will have binding effect on the parties in view of Section 11 C.P.C. can not be applied. A learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of (Smt.) Vishnu Devi Vs. K.K.Singh 1988 RD 283 held that where the names of certain co-sharers are omitted they are not precluded from asserting their rights in future, even after the close of consolidation operations and that their claim would not be barred by Section 49 of the Consolidation Act. The ratio is that if the non-recorded co-sharer had otherwise no cause or complain and is allowed to enjoy property peacefully, omission on his part to file objections would not be material or decisive. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sita Ram Vs. The ratio is that if the non-recorded co-sharer had otherwise no cause or complain and is allowed to enjoy property peacefully, omission on his part to file objections would not be material or decisive. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sita Ram Vs. Chhota Bhondey and others 1990 RD 439 (SC) is of no assistance to the respondents as therein the only proposition laid down is to the effect that the jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of matter covered by Section 5(2) of the Consolidation Act stand expressly excluded by Section 49 of the Consolidation Act. It is no authority barring the proceedings before the consolidation court itself. Apart from the above, the impugned order dated 3.7.2008 is said to be an ex-parte order which has been passed without hearing the counsel for the petitioners. The petitioners' counsel on the same day had filed an application for its recall which has been rejected. Thus, this Court, while entertaining the writ petition, was prima facie satisfied that the matter requires consideration, as when the petitioners have appeared on the same day the Deputy Director of Consolidation ought to have recalled the order and given opportunity. The impugned order records that the counsel for the parties were heard, but the order sheet of the said date records as under: 3@7@08 & i=koyh is'k gqbZA dbZ ckj iqdkj djkbZ x;hA mRrjoknh dks esjs iwokZf/kdkjh }kjk 27@3@07 dks vafre ekSdk fn;k FkkA esjs }kjk Hkh dbZ volj fn;s o 26@6@08 dks vafre volj fn;k x;k fdUrq vkt Hkh gk ugh gS u gh dksbZ cgl gh dh gS tcfd fuxjkuh drkZ dh cgl iwoZ esa dh tk pqdh gSA ,slk izrhr gksrk gS fd fuxjkuhdrkZ dks mRrjoknh ijs'kku djuk pkgrs gSaA ;g fd vkt vkns'k [kqyh vnkyr esa lquk;k x;kA okn vuqokn gksA g0 viBuh; 03@7@08 The aforesaid order establishes that in fact no one had turned up on behalf of the petitioner to argue on the said date despite opportunity being given earlier. Thus, the absence of the petitioners and their counsel is clearly established by the order sheet dated 3.7.2008 and the impugned order was pronounced without actually hearing the petitioners or their counsel. Thus, the absence of the petitioners and their counsel is clearly established by the order sheet dated 3.7.2008 and the impugned order was pronounced without actually hearing the petitioners or their counsel. It is an admitted fact that the counsel for the petitioners had filed application on 3.7.2008 itself supported by affidavit of petitioner No.1 to recall the aforesaid order terming it as ex-parte on the ground that the revision was fixed for hearing and no one from the side of the respondents/revisionist was present in the court. The counsel for the petitioner reached court at 12.00 noon and found that the court had already pronounced the judgment. The said application was rejected holding that the petitioners have not cared to advance arguments despite sufficient opportunity. The record, however, does not reveal that the petitioners or their counsel had deliberately or wilfully avoided appearance before the court on 3.7.2008 or that there was no sufficient cause for their absence. The plea that on the said date there was strike of the lawyers may not be gone into as this was not the ground taken by the petitioners in the application and has been taken for the first time through supplementary affidavit supported by resolution of the Bar Association for abstaining from work on the said date. It is common knowledge that the court are always in favour of hearing the matter on merits instead of shutting out the litigants on technicalities. In Ramji Dass and others Vs. Mohan Singh 1978 ARC 496 (SC) the Apex Court observed that the courts' discretion should always be exercised in favour of hearing and not to shut out hearing. The argument that the court is not enjoined upon to issue a futile writ when on remand the result is certain and the proceedings are to be dismissed as barred by Section 49 of the Consolidation Act is of no substance. There is no quarrel to the proposition that the court is not supposed to enter into any useless formality of issuing a writ when it is certain that the result would remain the same. But this is not the situation in the present case. In the case at hand the issue as to whether the proceedings are actually barred by the principle of res-judicata or estoppal is different than actually decided and, as such, is to be reconsidered, as already pointed out above. But this is not the situation in the present case. In the case at hand the issue as to whether the proceedings are actually barred by the principle of res-judicata or estoppal is different than actually decided and, as such, is to be reconsidered, as already pointed out above. The instant proceedings are not barred by Section 49 of the Consolidation Act as held by the revisional court. Thus, the precedent laid down in the case of Ashok Kumar Sonkar Vs. Union of India and others JT 2007 (6) SC 127 that the court should not issue writ for the sake of formality is of no help to the contesting respondents. Thus, in view of the above narrated facts and circumstances of the case I am of the opinion that on both the counts the matter requires reconsideration by the revisional court. In view of the aforesaid, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 3.7.2008 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation Gautam Budh Nagar in Revision No.128 Gyanendra alias Gajendra and others Vs. Ramesh and others is quashed with the direction to the Deputy Director of Consolidation to re-decide the matter in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of six months from today, keeping in mind the observations made above.