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2012 DIGILAW 347 (PNJ)

Sunil Mahajan v. State of Punjab

2012-02-27

MEHINDER SINGH SULLAR

body2012
JUDGMENT Mehinder Singh Sullar, J 1. Tersenessly, the facts and material, which need a necessary mention, relevant for the limited purpose of deciding the core controversy, involved in the instant petition and emanating from the record, are that, initially, Ashwani Sarpal son of Darbari Lal Sarpal, brother of complainant Jaswant Singh respondent No.2 (for brevity “the complainant”) filed a civil suit for a decree of permanent injunction, restraining petitioners Sunil Mahajan and others (defendants therein) from raising any type of construction on the 1st floor of disputed building, situated at Mahan Singh Gate, Amritsar. The defendants (therein) filed their respective written statements, wherein, the petitioners have pleaded that in fact, the plaintiff and his brother Jaswant Singh Sarpal are in the habit of grabbing the land and property of others. According to the complainant that this averment is false, defamatory and was made by the accused in their written statements to cause injury to his reputation in the eyes of officials of the department, Courts and general public. In the background of these allegations, the complainant filed the impugned complaint (Annexure P1) against the petitioners and their other co-accused. 2. Sequelly, the trial Magistrate dismissed the complaint being premature, by virtue of order dated 27.10.2004 (Annexure P3). However, the revision petition filed by the complainant was accepted by the revisional Court and a direction was issued to the trial Magistrate to pass a fresh summoning order, by way of order dated 12.12.2005 (Annexure P4). Consequently, the Magistrate summoned the petitioners to face the trial under Sections 499, 500 and 501 IPC, by means of impugned summoning order dated 9.1.2006 (Annexure P5). 3. Faced with the situation, the petitioners-accused did not feel satisfied and preferred the present petition for quashing the impugned complaint (Annexure P1) and summoning order (Annexure P5), invoking the provisions of Section 482 Cr.PC. 4. The case set up by the petitioners, in brief in so far as relevant, was that all the essential ingredients of the indicated offences are not at all complete and no offence whatsoever is made out against them. It was claimed that brother of the complainant filed a civil suit, inviting the petitioners to file their written statement in their defence, as per their legal right. It was claimed that brother of the complainant filed a civil suit, inviting the petitioners to file their written statement in their defence, as per their legal right. It is for the Court to decide as to whether the averments were true or false and it cannot be said that the allegations were false as the civil suit is yet to be decided. The petitioners pleaded that even such plea raised by them in their written statement does not constitute any offence. On the strength of the aforesaid grounds, the petitioners sought to quash the impugned complaint (Annexure P1) and summoning order (Annexure P5) in the manner described hereinabove. 5. The respondents refuted the prayer of petitioners and filed their respective replies, inter-alia pleading certain preliminary objections of, maintainability of the petition, cause of action and locus standi of the petitioners. The State of Punjab (respondent No.1) filed a vague reply stating therein that the contents of the main petition are a matter of record. However, the complainant, in his separate reply, has claimed that the averments pleaded by the petitioners in their written statement amount to the commission of offences punishable under Sections 499, 500 and 501 IPC. The factum of civil suit in question filed by his brother is not denied. Instead of reproducing the entire contents of the reply of complainant-respondent No.2 and in order to avoid the repetition of facts, suffice it to say that he has reiterated the allegations contained in his complaint (Annexure P1) and prayed for dismissal of the main petition. 6. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, going through the record with their valuable help and after considering the entire matter deeply, to my mind, the instant petition deserves to be accepted in this context. 7. As is evident from the record, that initially, Ashwani Sarpal, brother of the complainant, filed a civil suit seeking a decree for permanent injunction, restraining petitioners Sunil Mahajan and others (defendants therein) from raising any type of construction on the 1st floor of indicated disputed building. The defendants (therein) filed their respective written statements, wherein the petitioners have pleaded that in fact, the plaintiff and his brother Jaswant Singh Sarpal are in the habit of grabbing the land and property of others. The defendants (therein) filed their respective written statements, wherein the petitioners have pleaded that in fact, the plaintiff and his brother Jaswant Singh Sarpal are in the habit of grabbing the land and property of others. The complainant alleged that this averment is false, defamatory and was made by the accused in their written statements to cause injury to his reputation in the eyes of officials of the department, Courts and general public in this connection. 8. Above being the position on record, now the short and significant question, though important that, arises for determination in this petition is, as to whether the above depicted allegations contained in the written statement filed by the petitioners would constitute the indicated offences or not? 9. Having regard to the rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties, to me, the answer must obviously be in the negative. 10. As is clear, Section 499 IPC postulates that “whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter expected, to defame that person.” However, the imputation of truth which public good requires to be made or published, conduct of any person touching any public question and publication of reports of proceedings of Courts would not constitute any offence. 11. Not only that, Fifth Exception further posits that “it is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the merits of any case, civil or criminal, which has been decided by a Court of Justice, or respecting the conduct of any person as a party, witness or agent, in any such case, or respecting the character of such person, as far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further.” Ninth Exception envisages that “it is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another provided that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of the interests of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good.” Sequelly, the other situations, where no offence under section 499 IPC is made out, are listed in other Exceptions contained therein. 12. 12. A conjoint and meaningful reading of these provisions would reveal that the averment in question made by the petitioners in their written statement would not constitute and no offence whatsoever under the indicated provisions is made out against them. 13. This is not the end of the matter. Moreover, it is no where mentioned in the complaint (Annexure P1) that such pleadings in the written statement were ever published, intending to harm the reputation of the complainant. As per his own showing, the petitioners have just filed their written statement in the Court and such averments were under the scrutiny of the Court in the civil suit at the time of filing the complaint. It is not a matter of dispute that the civil suit in question, bearing No.303 of 1998 filed by the brother of the complainant, in which, the petitioners were stated to have filed the written statement, has already been dismissed by the Civil Judge, Amritsar, through the medium of judgment and decree dated 12.6.2006 (Annexure P6). The question whether such averments contained in the written statement would constitute an offence or not, is no more res integra and is now well settled. 14. An identical question came to be decided by this Court in case Jogesh Kumar Khaitan and others v. Balbir Singh Cheema 2000(2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 224. Having considered the provisions of Sections 499 and 500 IPC, it was ruled as under (paras 5 & 6):- “5. On a consideration of the material on record, I am of the opinion that the complaint filed by the respondent is liable to be quashed. It is the respondent, who filed the suit and invited the petitioners to file the written statement in their defence. The respondent filed the suit for permanent injunction restraining the petitioners and others from terminating his services and also for a direction to pay him the salary. In reply to that suit, the petitioners have to necessarily defend themselves. According to the defendants (who are petitioners herein), the respondent-complainant submitted his resignation and he also applied for leave in lieu of the notice and also one month's pay and wanted to be relieved forthwith. In the written statement, the defendants (petitioners herein) alleged that the respondent had removed some of the papers from the file. According to the defendants (who are petitioners herein), the respondent-complainant submitted his resignation and he also applied for leave in lieu of the notice and also one month's pay and wanted to be relieved forthwith. In the written statement, the defendants (petitioners herein) alleged that the respondent had removed some of the papers from the file. The Civil Court while dismissing the application for grant of an interim injunction pending disposal of the suit, after considering the averments made in the reply to application for temporary injunction and also in the written statement, came to the conclusion that the respondent suppressed the material facts and obtained an ex parte ad-interim injunction and vacated the same on the ground of nondisclosure of material facts and suppression thereof. 6. Admittedly, the suit is still pending. When the Civil Court found on the interlocutory application for grant of injunction that the respondent-complainant suppressed certain facts in his complaint, it cannot be said that the contentions raised by the defendants (petitioners herein) are prima facie false. It is open to a party to the civil litigation to raise all the pleas that are available to it. It is for the Civil Court to decide on the basis of the evidence whether the averments made in the written statement are true or not. But prima facie the Civil Court found that the allegations are correct and rejected the grant of injunction pending disposal of the suit believing the averments made in the written statement and the counter filed to the application for temporary injunction for vacating the ad-interim injunction. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the simultaneous criminal proceedings cannot be allowed to be proceeded with.” 15. As indicated earlier, even in the instant case, the civil suit in question has already been dismissed and decided in favour of the petitioners (defendants therein), vide judgment and decree (Annexure P6). In this manner, the contrary arguments of learned counsel for the respondents “stricto sensu” deserve to be and are hereby repelled under the present set of circumstances as the ratio of law laid down in the aforesaid judgment “mutatis mutandis” is applicable to the facts of this case and is the complete answer to the problem in hand. Therefore, the criminal complaint (Annexure P1) and summoning order (Annexure P5) qua the petitioners only deserve to be quashed. Therefore, the criminal complaint (Annexure P1) and summoning order (Annexure P5) qua the petitioners only deserve to be quashed. If the complaint is allowed to continue, then it will inculcate and perpetuate injustice to the petitioners, which is not legally permissible. 16. No other legal point, worth consideration, has either been urged or pressed by the counsel for the parties. 17. In the light of aforesaid reasons and without commenting further anything on merits, lest it may prejudice the case of either side during the course of trial of main complaint case, the present petition is accepted. Consequently, the impugned complaint (Annexure P1), summoning order (Annexure P5) and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom in regard and relatable to petitioners only are hereby quashed and they are discharged from the indicated criminal complaint, in the obtaining circumstances of the case. 18. Needless to mention that nothing observed, here-in-above, would reflect, in any manner, on merits during the course of trial of the main complaint against the other co-accused, as the same has been so recorded for a limited purpose of deciding the instant petition in this relevant direction.