JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sunil Hali, J.—The petitioner was working as Constable in the Central Industrial Security Force. He was granted leave w.e.f. 30.3.2005 to 22.4.2005 and was to report on duty on 23.4.2005. Instead of joining his duties, the petitioner extended his leave on account of his sickness up to 26.5.2005. For having remained on unauthorised leave, an enquiry was initiated against the petitioner. 2. Three charges were framed against the petitioner by the respondents. First charge relates to his unauthorised absence from duty from 23.4.2005 to 23.6.2005. The second charge was that he had refused to get himself medically examined by the Unit Hospital, Kanpur as an Outdoor patient. The intended purpose of the petitioner was to stay away from duty on the pretext of being ill. The third charge against the petitioner was that he has already been punished 8 times, out of which one major punishment and 7 minor punishments have been awarded to him. 3. In pursuance to the charge-sheet submitted against the petitioner, he filed his reply to the effect that he was hospitalised up to 26.5.2005 at Shyama Prasad Mukherjee Civil Hospital, Lucknow and after he was discharged from the said hospital, he went to a nursing home where he was initially admitted for three days, thereafter, he was discharged on 28.5.2005. 4. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that it is not the case of the respondents that the petitioner was not ill but what has been stated is that he should have got his treatment done by the Unit Hospital located at Kanpur. The explanation submitted by the petitioner did not find favour with the respondents for the following reasons : (i) The conclusion of the enquiry report indicates that the illness from which the petitioner was suffering was not of a serious nature could have been treated in the Unit Hospital also. (ii) If his illness was of a serious nature, he should have been hospitalised after 28.5.2005, which is not the case in hand. 5. The failure on the part of the petitioner to get himself examined as Outdoor patient in the Unit Hospital is an effort on his part to remain away from the duty. The petitioner was found guilty for remaining absent from the duty which is an act of indiscipline by a member belonging to a disciplined force. 6. 5. The failure on the part of the petitioner to get himself examined as Outdoor patient in the Unit Hospital is an effort on his part to remain away from the duty. The petitioner was found guilty for remaining absent from the duty which is an act of indiscipline by a member belonging to a disciplined force. 6. After having found him guilty of the charges, the petitioner was punished by lowering down his pay scale from Rs. 3965 to 3710/- per month for a period of two years. He was also not to be given periodical increment for the period his pay has been lowered. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Rajiv Singh, learned counsel for the respondents. 8. The case set up by the petitioner is that for having remained absent on duty on account of his illness cannot tantamount to misconduct. According to the petitioner his absence from duty was not intentional and he had not intended to remain away from duty. The stand of the petitioner is that he was sick and under treatment which fact has not been denied by the respondents and merely because he refused to be treated in the Unit Hospital, could not be a ground for holding him guilty of misconduct. In support of his contention learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Noratanmal Chouraria v. M.R. Murli and another, (2004) 5 SCC 689 , in which misconduct has been defined as : “Any unlawful behaviour by a public officer in relation to the duties of his office is, wilful in character. Term embraces acts which the office holder had no right to perform, acts performed improperly and failure to act in the face of an affirmative duty to act”. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on a decision of this Court, Ram Sharan Lal Son of Sri Prahlad v. State of U.P., 2008 (1) ADJ 453 , in which it is held that : “Code of conduct as set out in the Conduct Rules clearly indicates the conduct expected of a member of the service. It would follow that that conduct which is blameworthy for the Government servant in the context of Conduct Rules would be misconduct. It would follow that that conduct which is blameworthy for the Government servant in the context of Conduct Rules would be misconduct. If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with due and faithful discharge of his duty in service, it is misconduct (see Pearce v. Foster) (1988) 17 QBD 536 (at p. 542). A disregard of an essential condition of the contract of service may constitute misconduct [see Laws v. London Chronicle (Indicator Newspaper)]. (1959) 1 WLR 698. This view was adopted in Shardaprasad Onkarprasad Tiwari v. Divisional Supdt., Central Railway, Nagpur Divn., Nagpur and Satubha K. Vaghela v. Moosa RazaF, (1969) 10 Guj LR 23. The High Court has noted the definition of misconduct in Stroud’s Judicial. Dictionary which runs as under: Misconduct means, misconduct arising from ill motive; act of negligence, errors of judgment, or innocent mistake, do not constitute such misconduct.” 9. In order to appreciate the issue raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is important to note that under Central Industrial Security Force Act, 1968 (in short as the ‘Act’) and the Rules framed thereunder, it is necessary to indicate that penalty can be imposed against a member of the force if he is found guilty of any violation of duty or wilful breach or neglect of any Rule or regulations or lawful orders made by a Supervisory officer, or who shall withdraw from the duties of his office without permission, or who, being absent on leave, fails without reasonable cause, to report himself for duty on the expiration of the leave, can be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year. 10. In terms of Section 22 of the aforesaid Act, the Central Government may by notification in the official Gazette make rules for carrying out the purpose of the Act. In addition to it, Rule-34 of the Central Security Force Rules, 2001 (in short as the ‘Rules”) provides nature of penalties and Rule 36 provides procedure for imposing major penalties. For the purpose of imposing penalty under the aforesaid Rules, whenever the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour against an enrolled member of the Force, it may itself inquire into, or appoint an authority to inquire into the truth thereof. For the purpose of imposing penalty under the aforesaid Rules, whenever the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour against an enrolled member of the Force, it may itself inquire into, or appoint an authority to inquire into the truth thereof. The definition of misconduct also includes absence from duty without reasonable explanation. In the present context, it is not in dispute that the petitioner remained on unauthorised absence w.e.f. 23.4.2005 to 23.6.2005. The only question which is required to be examined is as to whether he had sufficient explanation for his unauthorised absence for such a long period and whether there was reasonable cause for him to remain absent from the duty. This is the limited question, which is required to be determined in the present case. 11. No dispute has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that irregularities have been committed by the respondents while conducting enquiry. While examining the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent, it clearly emerges: (a) that the petitioner was absent from duty w.e.f. 23.4.2005 to 23.6.2005; and (b) that he has failed to get himself treated from the Unit hospital. 12. There is no dispute that the petitioner was sanctioned leave up to 22.4.2005 and was required to report for duty on 23.4.2005, but he remained absent from duty up to 23.6.2005. Whether the petitioner had reasonable cause to remain absent for such a long period would determine the fate of allegations levelled. Admittedly, the sickness of the petitioner has not been denied by the respondents. 13. With respect to the second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is to be seen that the petitioner was admitted in Shyama Prasad Mukherjee Civil Hospital, Lucknow w.e.f. 18.4.2005 to 26.5.2005 and thereafter he was treated in a local nursing home w.e.f. 26.5.2005 to 28.5.2005. The cause for his absence is that he was ill during the aforesaid period. It can be said that the petitioner had a reasonable cause for him to remain absent from duty. What is being contended is that on his failure to report for medical check-up in the Unit hospital, the intended purpose of the petitioner was to remain away from duty. It can be said that the petitioner had a reasonable cause for him to remain absent from duty. What is being contended is that on his failure to report for medical check-up in the Unit hospital, the intended purpose of the petitioner was to remain away from duty. It is this area where there is no specific finding recorded by the disciplinary authority that the petitioner was not ill during the aforesaid period. If there was sufficient material to indicate that the petitioner was not ill during the aforesaid period, then there is no sufficient cause for his absence from duty which is not the case in hand. Merely because the petitioner has failed to report for treatment at the Unit Hospital is the only basis to conclude that the petitioner was avoiding to resume his duty. 14. The explanation submitted by the petitioner for not getting treated in the Unit Hospital is that there was not sufficient medical facilities available in the Unit Hospital, as a result of which, he did not get himself examined there. This aspect of the matter has not been considered by the respondents while rejecting his plea. There was no requirement under the Rules that the person has to be treated in the Unit hospital or a certificate is to be issued by the Unit hospital that nature of illness cannot be treated in the said hospital. Nothing has been shown by the learned counsel for the respondent in this behalf. 15. Now coming to the question of misconduct. It is to be seen as to what is the nature of misconduct levelled against the petitioner. It is stated that the petitioner was unauthorisedly absent or having overstayed after the leave was over. Undoubtedly, the petitioner did not have authorisation to remain on leave for the said period. But merely because he remained on unauthorised leave cannot tantamount misconduct if there is sufficient cause to remain absent. The petitioner in his explanation has submitted that he was under treatment, which fact has not been denied by the respondents. Undoubtedly, the petitioner did not have authorisation to remain on leave for the said period. But merely because he remained on unauthorised leave cannot tantamount misconduct if there is sufficient cause to remain absent. The petitioner in his explanation has submitted that he was under treatment, which fact has not been denied by the respondents. The word misconduct has been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, sixth Edition at Page 999 thus : “A Transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behaviour, wilful in character, improper or wrong behaviour, it synonyms are misdemeanor, misdeed, misbehaviour, delinquency, impropriety, mismanagement, offence, but not negligence or carelessness”. Misconduct in offence has been defined as : “Any unlawful behaviour by a public officer in relation to the duties of his office, wilful in character. Term embraces acts which the office holder had no right to perform, acts performed improperly and failure to act in the face of an affirmative duty to act”. P. Ramanath Aiyar’s Law Lexicon, Reprint Edition 1987 at Page 821 defines ‘misconduct thus : “The term misconduct implies a wrongful intention, and not a mere error of judgment, Misconduct is not necessarily the same thing as conduct involving moral turpitude. The word misconduct is a relative term, and has to be construed with reference to the subject-matter and the context wherein the term occurs, having regard to the scope of the Act or statute which is being construed. Misconduct literally means wrong conduct or improper conduct. In usual parlance, misconduct means a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, where no discretion is left, except what necessity may demand and carelessness, negligence and unskillfulness are transgressions of some established, but indefinite, rule of action, where some discretion is necessarily left to the actor. Misconduct is a violation of definite law; carelessness or abuse of discretion under an indefinite law. Misconduct is a forbidden act; carelessness, a forbidden quality of an act and is necessarily indefinite. Misconduct in office may be defined as unlawful behaviour or neglect by a public official, by which the right of party have been affected. Thus, it could be seen that the word ‘misconduct’ though not capable of precise definition, on reflection receives its conotation from the context, the delinquency in its performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature of the duty. Thus, it could be seen that the word ‘misconduct’ though not capable of precise definition, on reflection receives its conotation from the context, the delinquency in its performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature of the duty. It may involve moral turpitude, it must be improper or wrong behaviour; unlawful behaviour, wilful in character; forbidden act a transgression of established and definite rule of action or code of conduct but not mere error of judgment, carelessness or negligence in performance of the duty; the act complained of bears forbidden quality or character. Its ambit has to be construed with reference to the subject-manner and the context wherein the term occurs, regard being had to the scope of the statute and the public purpose it seeks to serve. The police service is a disciplined service and it requires to maintain strict discipline. Laxity in this behalf erodes discipline in the service causing serious effect in the maintenance of law and order.” 16. Even there is no specific definition of the misconduct but in the normal course a misconduct cannot amount an act of negligence, errors of judgments or innocent mistake. The initial feature of the misconduct is that it arrives on account of ill-motive. Applying this principle in the present case, it clearly emerges that the petitioner had submitted his explanation regarding his absence from duty. There is no finding recorded by the disciplinary authority that he was not ill but merely because he refused to get himself examined in the Unit Hospital, he has been treated as on unauthorised absence from duty. 17. In my view this could not tantamount to misconduct on the part of the petitioner. It is also important to note that for remaining absent from duty without sufficient cause tantamounts to misconduct provided the enrolled member of the force is unable to show sufficient cause for his absence from duty. The Act itself provides a mechanism by which a person can justify himself by showing reasonable cause. Once the sufficient cause is shown by the petitioner and accepted by the authority concerned, then absence from duty cannot be treated to be intentional and would not amount to misconduct. No finding in this behalf has been recorded that the explanation submitted by the petitioner for his sickness is not correct. Once the sufficient cause is shown by the petitioner and accepted by the authority concerned, then absence from duty cannot be treated to be intentional and would not amount to misconduct. No finding in this behalf has been recorded that the explanation submitted by the petitioner for his sickness is not correct. Therefore, I am of the view that the punishment imposed by the respondents cannot sustain. 18. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the order impugned dated 13.1.2006 and 25.5.2006 passed by the respondents (Annexures 2 and 4 to the writ petition respectively) are quashed. ——————