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Allahabad High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 35 (ALL)

SUSHILA DEVI v. SHIV SWAROOP

2012-01-05

S.U.KHAN

body2012
JUDGMENT Hon’ble S.U. Khan, J.—Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This is plaintiff’s second appeal arising out of O.S. No. 416 of 1985, which was filed for specific performance of an agreement for sale dated 5.2.1981 in respect of a house. It was alleged in the plaint that out of agreed sale consideration of Rs. 30,000/- under the agreement plaintiff had paid Rs. 29500/- to the defendant. The suit was decreed on 20.1.1999 by II Additional Civil Judge, Senior Division, Allahabad and defendant was directed to execute the sale-deed after receiving Rs. 500/- from the plaintiff. Against the said judgment and decree, defendant’s legal representatives (as he had died by then) filed Civil Appeal No. 42 of 1999. A.D.J. Court No. 17, Allahabad through judgment and decree dated 27.8.2004 allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court for specific performance of the agreement for sale and decreed the suit in part only for return of Rs. 14,000/-. This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by lower appellate Court dated 27.8.2004. This second appeal was admitted on 15.2.2007 by the following order: Admit. Issue notice on the substantial question of law, besides the other as may be found at the time of the hearing of the appeal : “Whether the Court below was right in setting aside the decree of the trial Court on the ground that the trial Court has failed to frame any issue with regard to the Section 16(c) of the Specifi Relief Act.” 3. Defendant respondent was teacher in an intermediate college. He filed written statement in the suit stating therein that he had purchased the house in dispute in the year 1976 for Rs. 27,000/-, he was a teacher receiving good salary hence he did not have any need to sell the house, that Arun Kumar Tiwari, husband of the plaintiff was his student. It was further pleaded by the defendant that he treated Arun Kumar Tiwari as his son and he borrowed from Arun Kumar Tiwary, Rs. 5000/- in 1978 and a document was executed in respect thereof and he returned the amount in monthly instalments, that in the year 1981 defendant again required some money for the marriage of his daughter hence he again borrowed Rs. 5000/- in 1978 and a document was executed in respect thereof and he returned the amount in monthly instalments, that in the year 1981 defendant again required some money for the marriage of his daughter hence he again borrowed Rs. 9000/- from husband of the plaintiff and some document was executed (kuchh likha-parhi kar) which he also returned in instalments and in this manner against Rs. 14,000/-, he had returned Rs. 22,000/- and Arun Kumar Tiwari husband of the plaintiff was moneylender. 4. The plaint case was that agreement was executed on 5.2.1981 for a sale consideration of Rs. 30,000/- out of which Rs. 24,000/- were paid at the time of agreement and Rs. 5500/- were paid on different dates subsequently from 11.3.1981 to 1.8.1981. Defendant himself stated that husband of the plaintiff was a carpenter earning Rs. 2000/- per month as salary from some government office where he was employed and that with great difficulty he was meeting the expenses of his family consisting of 9 persons. The Court wonders how such a person can be money-lender. The lower appellate Court also noted the argument that allegation of readiness and willingness as required by Section 16-c was not made in the plaint. 5. Lower appellate Court itself held that defendant was not illiterate or fool and he was lecturer in an intermediate college. Thereafter inference was drawn by the lower appellate Court that such a person could not execute the agreement for sale of his house. A literate person who is also a lecturer in an intermediate college can by no stretch of imagination say that he signed a document without knowing its content. 6. In my opinion the following substantial question of law is also involved in this second appeal, which will be hereinafter referred to as second substantial question of law: “Whether the finding of lower appellate Court that agreement for sale was not executed by defendant is legally erroneous in law?” 7. As far as second substantial question of law is concerned the findings of the lower appellate Court are utterly erroneous in law as they are based on untenable grounds. Defendant admitted execution of agreement but termed it a result of fraud etc. As far as second substantial question of law is concerned the findings of the lower appellate Court are utterly erroneous in law as they are based on untenable grounds. Defendant admitted execution of agreement but termed it a result of fraud etc. Why a person wants to sell the property is neither the concern of the purchaser nor of the Court, that may be a supporting evidence to decide the plea of non-execution of the deed but independently it cannot be a ground to hold that the deed was not executed. No independent finding has been recorded by the lower appellate Court regarding non-execution of the agreement by the defendant who was a lecturer in an intermediate college. In such a situation agreement for sale could not be held to have not been executed merely on the ground that there did not appear any need for the defendant to sell the house. Sanctity of contract cannot be violated in this manner. According to the allegations made in the written statement it was defendant who was in a dominant position being literate, lecturer and teacher and not husband of the plaintiff who was only a carpenter and student of defendant. 8. However lower appellate Court categorically recorded a finding that plaintiff had proved that amount of Rs. 14,000/- had been paid to the defendant in two instalments (in fact this assertion was admitted by the defendant) and defendant could not prove return of the said amount. 9. In Para-30 of the written statement defendant categorically admitted execution of the agreement dated 5.2.1981. The precise para translated into English is as follows: “That alleged agreement dated 5.2.1981 has been got executed by the defendant under fraud and deceit (chhal va prapanch) and the same is not binding upon the defendant.” 10. The details of fraud, deceit and misrepresentation have not been given in the written statement as required by Order VI Rule 4, C.P.C. hence no evidence to prove deceit and fraud may be seen. Order VI Rule 4, C.P.C. is quoted below: “4. The details of fraud, deceit and misrepresentation have not been given in the written statement as required by Order VI Rule 4, C.P.C. hence no evidence to prove deceit and fraud may be seen. Order VI Rule 4, C.P.C. is quoted below: “4. Particulars to be given where necessary.—In all cases in which the party pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default, or undue influence, and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary beyond such as are exemplified in the forms aforesaid, particulars (with dates and items if necessary) shall be stated in the pleading.” 11. In this regard reference may be made to the following authorities of the Supreme Court. 1. Afsar Shaikh v. Soleman Bibi, AIR 1976 SC 163 2. Bijendra Nath Srivastava v. Mayank Srivastava, AIR 1994 SC 2562 3. Sangramsinh P. Gaekwad v. Shantadevi P. Gaekwad, AIR 2005 SC 809 Second Substantial Question of Law: 12. Accordingly second substantial question of law is decided in favour of appellant. In Para-14 of the plaint, it was stated as follows: “That the plaintiff is and has always been willing to perform her part of the agreement in getting the sale-deed executed but the defendant always avoided to perform his part.” 13. Accordingly, there were sufficient pleadings. Plaintiff also proved that he had paid Rs. 25900/- and also gave registered notice on 31.7.1985. Earlier also notice had been given on 19.1.1983, stating that plaintiff would be present before the Sub-Registrar on 4.2.1983 and 5.2.1983. Defendant admitted receipt of the said notices (in Para-29 of the written statement), however neither any replies to the notices were given nor defendant reached there. Almost entire sale consideration had already been paid by the plaintiff. The allegation of readiness and willingness made in the plaint was not denied in the written statement. Accordingly, plaintiff fully proved his readiness and willingness and also made necessary allegations in the plaint regarding that. 14. First substantial question of law is also therefore decided in favour of appellant. 15. Accordingly, judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court is erroneous in law. Second appeal is allowed. Judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court is set aside. Judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is restored. —————