JUDGMENT S. Talapatra, J. 1. Heard Mr. D. R. Choudhury, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-petitioner and Mr. A.K.Bhowmik, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. R. Datta, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1. 2. Since the appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 could not be filed by the appellant-petitioner in the prescribed period of limitation against the judgment and preliminary decree dated 26.07.2011, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Court No.2, West Tripura, Agartala in T.S.(P) No. 24 of 2010, this petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed by the appellant-petitioner seeking condonation of the delay of 67 days for preferring the said appeal. 3. For assigning cause for delay in preferring the appeal within the prescribed period, the appellant-petitioner averred in paragraph-16 of the petition that the judgment and preliminary decree was passed on 26.07.2011 and due date of presenting the appeal was on or before 25.10.2011. But the application for obtaining the certified copy of the judgment and preliminary decree was filed on 28.07.2011 and the certified copy was ready for delivery on 26.08.2011. Since the appellant-petitioner is entitled to get the discount for the period from 28.07.2011 to 26.08.2011, the appeal ought to have been filed on or before 25.11.2011, but the same was presented on 02.02.2012. As such, the appeal could be presented along with the petition for condonation of delay after 67 days. 4. It has been stated that by the said judgment and preliminary decree, the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Court No.2, West Tripura, Agartala urged the parties for amicable partition of the joint property suit land within six months, which expired on 26.01.2012. Though several proposals were made by the appellant-petitioner and his counsel for amicable partition of the joint property suit land as per the possession, but no fruitful result could be achieved. On 02.12.2011, the appellant-petitioner approached the plaintiff-respondent No.1 for the final decision after waiting a much long period. The plaintiff-respondent No.1 frustrated amicable settlement of the joint property suit land as per the proposal made on 12.09.2011 and persuaded subsequent thereto. On 02.12.2011, the appellant-petitioner approached the plaintiff-respondent No.1 for the final decision after waiting a much long period. The plaintiff-respondent No.1 frustrated amicable settlement of the joint property suit land as per the proposal made on 12.09.2011 and persuaded subsequent thereto. It is averred in the instant petition for condoning the delay that the appellant-petitioner having no other way met the counsel on 14.01.2012 for preferring appeal against the judgment and preliminary decree, who stated that it would take some time to prepare the memo of appeal and thereafter the appellant petitioner got the case file returned and approached Mr. D. R. Choudhury, Advocate on 24.01.2012 and instructed him to prepare the memo of appeal and other petitions, such as for condonation of delay etc. On 28.01.2012, the memo of appeal was drafted and it was finally typed on 29.01.2012. The appellant-petitioner affirmed the petition by swearing affidavit on 30.01.2012 and the same was filed on 01.02.2012 accompanied by the memo of appeal. It is further stated that the delay is not intentional and if the delay be not condoned, the appellant-petitioner would suffer irreparable loss and prejudice. 5. Mr. D. R. Choudhury, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-petitioner candidly submitted that the explanation of the delay ought to have been elaborate, but from the averments, made in the petition for condonation of delay, it would be apparent that for purpose of an amicable settlement there had been a series of parleys between the parties. Since the matter is confined between the full blooded brothers and sisters, there was some lax in pursuing the amicable settlement. As such, unless this Court adopts a liberal approach in condoning the delay, there would be denial of the substantive justice. 6. On the other hand, Mr. A. K. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel stoutly contended that the petition as filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be maintained, inasmuch as there is no explanation for the delay for the period from 09.09.2011 to 02.02.2012. Apart that, purported explanation again constitutes no sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 67 days. Mr. A. K. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel stoutly contended that the petition as filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be maintained, inasmuch as there is no explanation for the delay for the period from 09.09.2011 to 02.02.2012. Apart that, purported explanation again constitutes no sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 67 days. Mr. Bhowmik stoutly denied of any attempt of amicable settlement by the appellant-petitioner, rather he submitted that the plaintiff respondent issued a legal notice on 10.12.2011 asking the appellant-petitioner to strike out an amicable partition of the joint property suit land but the appellant-petitioner did not respond to that as his intention was to retain vast share of the joint property suit land under his possession for unlawful enjoyment. The endeavour for presenting the appeal is also for dragging the matter for unjust purpose. 7. Referring to the objection as filed by the plaintiff-respondent Mr. Bhowmik submitted that "the plaintiff-respondent No.1 individually and jointly with his sister in some occasions approached to the appellant-petitioner and requested him cordially to make the amicable partition of the joint property but he denied. The plaintiff-respondent also issued a legal notice on 10.12.2011 and the appellant-petitioner also duly received the same. But the petitioner denied to obeying the order of the learned court below as well as request of the respondents. There was no such occasion happened that the appellant-petitioner had made a proposal to the plaintiff-respondent or the proforma respondent to make the joint properly in equal partition within the said period of 6 months as prescribed by the learned Court below. Finding no other alternative/option the plaintiff-respondent thereafter filed a petition for preparation of final decree for the joint property. The learned Court below after hearing, appointed one Sri Mihir Dey, Survey Commissioner and the plaintiff petitioner also deposited Rs.2000/- for the purpose of fees of that Survey Commissioner on 22.02.2012. Thereafter, said Survey Commissioner issued notice to the party concerned of the suit to remain present in the suit land on 10.03.2012 just at 12 noon for demarcation and partition of suit land. Thereafter, said Survey Commissioner issued notice to the party concerned of the suit to remain present in the suit land on 10.03.2012 just at 12 noon for demarcation and partition of suit land. The cunning appellant petitioner on receiving the information to the effect that the plaintiff-respondent is taking preparation for obtaining final decree for partition of the joint property, then and there he filed the instant appeal along with the condonation petition to frustrate the decree as passed by the learned Trial Court and to drag the partition of the joint property among the legal heirs so that the appellant-petitioner is able to continue his illegal possession of four-fifth share of the joint property. Such intention of the appellant-petitioner cannot be allowed to succeed at all. If the delay is condoned and the appeal is admitted to be heard then the decree which was passed on consent would be frustrated. So, the petition for condoning the unexplained delay and the appeal which is devoid of merit may kindly be dismissed at this stage with cost for fair ends of justice other then the plaintiff respondent would be seriously prejudiced and caused irreparable loss and injuries." 8. The contention of Mr. A. K. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel is that the judgment and preliminary decree was passed on consent is belied as the operative portion of the judgment as quoted in the decree is as under : In view of the aforesaid findings, this suit is decreed on contest. The plaintiff Sri Kiriti Roy Barman and the defendant, namely Sri Utpal Roy Barman and Smti Prava Roy Barman(Singha Roy) are entitled to get 1/3rd share each over the suit land mentioned in the schedule of the plaint. However, the parties t this suit are at liberty to sell the movable properties of their deceased father and to receive 1/3rd share of the sale proceeds each, if they desires so. As it is partition suit, a preliminary decree is hereby passed declaring that the plaintiff is entitled to get 1/3rd share of the suit land including the dwelling building thereon. As it is partition suit, a preliminary decree is hereby passed declaring that the plaintiff is entitled to get 1/3rd share of the suit land including the dwelling building thereon. Both the parties are hereby directed to partition the suit property amicably amongst themselves as per order of this court within a period of 6(six) months from the date of decree, failing which parties to this suit are at liberty to approach this court for final decree to enforce the preliminary decree if the decretal suit property are not partition within six months. Both the parties are bear the own cost. Prepare preliminary decree accordingly. 9. To buttress the contention, Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel referred D. Gopinathan Pillai V. State of Kerala & anr. as reported in (2007) 2 SCC 322 . In paragraph 5 of that judgment the Apex Court held that "We are unable to countenance the finding rendered by the Sub Judge and also the view taken by the High Court. There is no dispute in regard to the delay of 3320 days in filing the petition for setting aside the award. When a mandatory provision is not complied with and when the delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the court cannot condone the delay, only on the sympathetic ground. The orders passed by the learned Sub Judge and also by the High Court are far from satisfactory. No reason whatsoever has been given to condone the inordinate delay of 3320 days. It is well-considered principle of law that the delay cannot be condoned without assigning any reasonable, satisfactory, sufficient and proper reason. Both the courts have miserably filed to comply and follow the principle laid down by this Court in catena of cases. We, therefore, have no other option except to set aside the order passed by the Sub-Judge and as affirmed by the High Court. We accordingly set aside both the orders and allow this appeal." 10. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel also referred to a decision of this Court in Union of India & ors. V. Wood Crafts Products Ltd. & anr. as reported in (2001) 1 GLR 327, where this Court refused to condone the delay of 118 days. We accordingly set aside both the orders and allow this appeal." 10. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel also referred to a decision of this Court in Union of India & ors. V. Wood Crafts Products Ltd. & anr. as reported in (2001) 1 GLR 327, where this Court refused to condone the delay of 118 days. Justice Jain while agreeing to Justice Saikia has given the reasons for such refusal to condone the delay, which is profitably excerpted herein below:- It is in the aforementioned factual position that the ratio of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and others, reported in, comes into play. It has been held in P.K. Ramachandran (supra) that the law of limitation has to be applied with all its rigours prescribed by the Statute and that Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The Apex Court in P.K. Ramachandran (supra) was dealing with a situation where the explanation was offered by the State that at the relevant time, the Advocate General's office was fed-up with many arbitration matters pending consideration. The delay was condoned by the High Court of Kerala. The Apex Court while reversing the judgment of the Kerala High Court, held that such an explanation would hardly be reasonable, satisfactory or even proper explanation. The aforesaid case, in my considered view, is squarely applicable to the fact of the instant case and, therefore, while agreeing with my brother, Mr. A.H. Saikia. J., I also order dismissal of the application for condonation of delay. 11. Mr. Bhowmik also referred to a decision of this Court in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & ors. V. Subrata Borah Chowlek, as reported in (2010) 3 GLR 312, where this Court held in paragraph-13 as under: - 13. Condonation of delay, it is no longer res integra, is not a matter of right, the essential pre-condition whereof is a sufficient cause satisfactorily explaining the same. There is no straitjacket formula to adjudge a sufficient cause, an appraisal whereof has to be logically individualistic contingent on the attendant facts and circumstances. By no means, if sufficient cause in wanting, delay can be condoned merely on equitable or sympathetic considerations. There is no straitjacket formula to adjudge a sufficient cause, an appraisal whereof has to be logically individualistic contingent on the attendant facts and circumstances. By no means, if sufficient cause in wanting, delay can be condoned merely on equitable or sympathetic considerations. Though, a liberal approach in analyzing the cause is generally adopted, it cannot displace the imperative essentiality of a convincing and rational explanation to avail the discretionary relief. 12. Mr. D. R. Choudhury, learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner while rebutting this legal position referred a decision of the Apex Court in State of Karnataka V. Y. Moideen Kunhi (dead) by LRs. & ors., as reported in AIR 2009 SC 2577 , where their Lordships have reiterated the law as to the condonation of delay in paragraph-15 of the judgment, which is extracted hereunder:- 15. It is submitted that even with the introduction of safeguards against delay in the process, in an occasional case delay occurs which is inexplicable in normal circumstances. The question is whether such delay, should result in the negation of the state's claim and at the cost of the interest of the members of the public whose cause has not been carefully espoused. It is submitted by the appellant-State that in such cases, delay must be visited with consequences but the interest of the inhabitants of the State must be protected. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan : 2008 (11) SCALE 455 it was held as follows: ...It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay - intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest......In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants Further at para 15 this Court held that: ...The above position was highlighted in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors. 2002 (143) ELT 249 (SC); Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala v. : K V.Ayisumma AIR 1996 SC 2750 and State of Nagaland v. : Lipok AO and Ors.: 2005 (183) ELT 337 (SC). It was noted that adoption of strict standard of proof sometimes fail to protract public justice, and, it would result in public mischief by skilful management of delay in the process of filing an appeal. 13. Another decision also relied on by the appellant-petitioner in Ram Nath Sao alias Ram Nath Sahu & ors. V. Gobardhan Sao & ors. as reported in (2002) 3 SCC 195 , where the law has been culled out succinctly in extracting para-12 and 13 from N. Balakrishnan V. M. Krishnamurthy as reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123 . Those paragraphs are extracted hereunder: 12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari [1969]1SCR1006 and State of W.B. v. Administrator Howrah Municipality [1972] 2 SCR 874a. 13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show at most consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. 14. It is further observed in the said law report that "it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute "sufficient cause" or not will be dependant upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal an exception more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bone fide can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the list terminates either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way. (Emphasis supplied). 15. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way. (Emphasis supplied). 15. From the decision as referred to by the learned counsel appearing for the rival parties, it is apparent that there should not be hyper technical approach while considering the condonation of delay, but while considering the inordinate delay the Court must find the sufficient explanation for condoning such delay. The basic principle is to adopt a liberal approach keeping an eye to the substantive justice and not to take a pedantic approach to reject the prayer for condonation of delay for some lapses. The Court should not run after finding fault rather it should balance between the gravity of the right that would be affected for rejection of the prayer for condonation and the approach that the Court thinks to be appropriate in the given circumstances of the fact. So far the explaining the delay sufficiently is concerned, the Court should not also rush for finding the mathematical precision in explaining the delay, it should be satisfied with the broader spectrum of the explanation that has been provided in the petition. 16. In the instant petition it is seen that though some lapses can be found in explaining the delay, but the fundamental reasons as provided constitute the sufficient cause and the same is apparent on the face of the record. The delay essentially occurred for the exercise taken by the parties in dispute on various levels. It is not denied by the plaintiff-respondent that there was no exercise for amicable partition of the joint property suit land. Apart that, for change of lawyer for preparing the memo of appeal has been assigned as a cause for the delay which cannot be brushed aside as flimsy explanation. Moreover, the delay is not inordinate. On the other hand, if the delay be not condoned, the right to appeal as is available with the appellant-petitioner would be scuttled for ever and he would be deprived of that right. Moreover, the delay is not inordinate. On the other hand, if the delay be not condoned, the right to appeal as is available with the appellant-petitioner would be scuttled for ever and he would be deprived of that right. The appellant-petitioner in the memo of appeal cited important debatable grounds in regard to the impugned judgment and preliminary decree, vis-a-vis, right to have that part of the joint property which has been developed on expending a huge amount from his own earning which the learned Civil Judge did not at all consider while passing the impugned judgment and preliminary decree. This ground also includes that whether the partition of the joint property in all circumstances means dividing the joint property in equal shares or not. However, submission of Mr. Bhowmik learned senior counsel for the plaintiff-respondent cannot be just discarded on the face. Slip shod explanation in a petition for condoning the delay may not be encouraged because that would frustrate the right that accrues in favour of the party adverse to the appeal or application by efflux of time. Since this Court finds satisfactory explanation of the delay of 67 days in presenting the appeal against the judgment and preliminary decree, this petition for condoning the said delay stands allowed, however, subject to payment of Rs.2,000/- (Rupees two thousand) to the plaintiff-respondent within a period of two weeks from this day. Petition allowed